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Preface
The field of Group Decision and Negotiation focuses on decision processes with at 
least two participants and a common goal but conflicting individual goals. Such pro-
cesses can be performed in an intra-organisational as well as an inter-organisational 
context. They consist of complex processes, including preference elicitation, prefer-
ence adjustment, proposals and counter-proposals, and choice. Communication and 
decision making are key to Group Decision and Negotiation processes; sophisticated 
support for these functions is thus a central objective of the field.
Research areas of Group Decision and Negotiation include electronic negotiations, the 
role of emotions in group decision and negotiations, preference elicitation and deci-
sion support for group decisions and negotiations, micro-processes of group decision 
making support, and conflict resolution principles.
The 17th International Conference on Group Decision and Negotiation (GDN 2017) 
continues the long history of GDN conferences as the primary forum for researchers 
and practitioners in the fields of group decision and negotiation. GDN 2017 is a truly 
international conference, with participants from Europe, the Americas, Asia, Africa, 
and Oceania. Especially in times of global conflict and uncertainty, the state-of-the-art 
research on dealing with conflicts in a cooperative and integrative way is more im-
portant than ever.
The proceedings are published in two volumes. The first volume contains the keynote 
papers and the full papers chosen in a blind review process [1]. The current second 
volume contains 55 short papers also chosen in a rigorous blind review process.  
These papers are organised in seven streams that demonstrate the variety of research 
successes presented at GDN 2017:
x The stream on General Topics in Group Decision and Negotiation includes 
papers covering a broad range of topics from across the GDN field, from 
formal foundations to practical applications.
x The Conflict Resolution stream analyses strategic conflicts between individu-
als and groups in diverse application areas. The role of information technol-
ogy in general, and dedicated systems in particular, are assessed.
x The Emotions in Group Decision and Negotiation stream examines the sub-
jective and inter-subjective role of emotions affecting group decisions and 
negotiations.
x The Negotiation Support Systems and Studies stream focuses on electronic 
negotiations using several systems and tools, and includes system designs 
and laboratory and field studies analysing e-negotiations, mediation, and fa-
cilitation.
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x The Preference Modelling for Group Decision and Negotiation stream fo-
cuses on approaches supporting groups of negotiators and decision makers in 
eliciting goals and preferences and on scoring systems for assessing offers. 
x The Micro-Processes of Group Decision Making Support stream is con-
cerned with an in-depth understanding of what occurs in the milieu of group 
decision-making processes, in particular in micro-processes, i.e. the relation-
ships between the social, behavioural, and the material entities.
x The Student stream is the first of its kind for GDN conferences. It addresses 
papers on all topics of Group Decision and Negotiation authored by Bachelor 
or Master students to encourage early research experiences for junior re-
searchers. 
Organising an international conference on Group Decision and Negotiation certainly 
requires many negotiations among many parties, and a great deal of cooperative group 
decision making. We are very pleased at how well the conference has come together
and would particularly like to thank:
x the three keynote speakers Wendi Adair, Matthias Jarke, and Dov Te’eni, for 
providing stimulating, innovative, and challenging research insights;
x the conference chairs, for regular interactions and advice;
x the organising chairs and the organising committee, for their work in putting to-
gether this splendid conference;
x the authors of the 94 papers submitted to the conference and the doctoral consorti-
um;
x the members of the programme committee and the reviewers, for providing careful
feedback and comments on all papers;
x Springer, for providing the funds for the Best Paper Awards;
x the University of Hohenheim and the Faculty of Business, Economics, and Social 
Sciences, and especially their research area on “Negotiation Research  - Transfor-
mation, Technology, Media, and Costs (NegoTrans)” for their support and for 
making it possible for the conference to take place in a beautiful venue - Hohen-
heim castle;
x Hohenheim Management Development e.V., and Unibund, for their generous 
financial support.
Stuttgart and Waterloo, August 2017
Mareike Schoop and D. Marc Kilgour
[1] M. Schoop and D.M. Kilgour (Eds.): Group Decision and Negotiation – A Socio-
Technical Perspective, Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing, LNBIP 
293, Springer, 2017.
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Abstract:
Despite the fact that quantity discounts have been broadly examined in de-
cisions on the sale or purchase of goods, the analysis of coordinating the dis-
count decisions for the retailer (buyer), the wholesaler (supplier), and the public
transportation service provider (LTL carrier) is still in its infancy. This research
presents a game theoretic approach to coordinate the three supply chain mem-
bers’ decisions on discount policies, when the demand is sensitive to the change
in price. The signiﬁcant improvements to each party and to the entire supply
chain resulting from the discount coordination are demonstrated under various
situations.
Keywords: Supply Chain Coordination; Game Theoretic Approach; Discount;
LTL carrier; Shipment Consolidation
1 Introduction
Coordinating the relationships among the SC members leads to achieve the ben-
eﬁts of overall goals with joint eﬀorts. Among various coordination mechanisms
that have been studied in the literature, the quantity discount is one of the most
powerful tools.
Transportation, though vital in connecting supply chain partners, has been
usually ignored or assumed ﬁxed when those ﬁrms make decisions on purchasing
and re-supply of stock. In the past few decades, many scholars have realized the
importance of transportation’s impact on inventory decisions. Those researchers
have been working on helping a buyer determine its replenishment policy, given
both the quantity and transportation discounts. Despite all the eﬀorts having
been put into those discounts, the existing research takes the buyer’s point of
view. Few studies integrate decisions by the carrier into their investigation.
Moreover, current literature in the pricing of transportation and logistics
services is extremely limited. Most existing papers analyzed the transportation
pricing based upon the market data, rather than assisting carriers in determining
their transportation prices or/and discounts. The relationships among the supply
chain members have been entirely ignored.
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To ﬁll this gap in literature, the main purpose of the present research is to
coordinate the discount decisions of all SC members, a retailer (buyer), a whole-
saler (supplier/vendor), and an outside transportation service provider (LTL
carrier), in the case of demand that is dependent on price. More speciﬁcally, the
coordination problem is formulated as a game-theory-based optimization model.
2 Model Development
This research considers a decentralized three-player supply chain, where a single
buyer purchases one product from a given supplier, and an LTL common carrier
is responsible for transporting those goods from supplier to buyer. The market
demand for this product is deterministic but sensitive to the price ﬂuctuations.
Both the buyer and supplier are assumed to employ the Economic Order
Quantity (EOQ) model, which computes the order quantity that minimizes the
total holding cost and ordering cost. Providing a good indication of replenish-
ment poicies for situations with relatively stable demand, this inventory model
has been extensively used in many relevant papers, such as [6–8, 10–12], to name
a few.
Furthermore, we assume that the carrier maintains a regular dispatching
schedule with a base-cycle length of T ; and the carrier’s dispatching schedule is
not impacted by the supplier’s shipments. The transportation (vehicle) capacity
of each dispatch cannot be exceeded after adding in those shipments.
All players are assumed able to estimate the relevant information from the
operation patterns of other parties, such as demand, particular cost parameters,
retail and wholesale prices, and freight rate. All parties also act wisely, i.e. they
would accept the chance to gain more proﬁt whenever and wherever possible.
Our analysis starts at the point that the market is in equilibrium, such that
both the supplier and carrier respectively charge standard prices for the prod-
uct and transportation. The buyer orders the product at the EOQ level, and
determines her retail price according to the cost structure.
Let AB and hB be the buyer’s order processing cost and inventory holding
cost, respectively. Before any discount, the buyer’s proﬁt is
πB0 = R0(d0)− p0d0 − 1
2
Q0hB − d0
Q0
AB . (1)
Particularly, R0(d0) = x0(d0)d0 is the annual proﬁt, p0d0 is the purchasing cost,
Q0hB/2 is the inventory holding cost, (d0/Q0)AB is the ordering cost, where
Q0 =
√
2ABd0/hB is the EOQ, and x(d) is the inverse demand function. Now
let us move to the stage that all discounts have been oﬀered and the SC has
achieved a new stable status. The buyer’s proﬁt is
πB = R(d)− pd− 1
2
QhB − d
Q
AB , (2)
where p is the discounted wholesale price and R(d) = x(d)d. To maximize this
proﬁt, the buyer’s order quantity can be calculated as qB =
√
2ABd/hB .
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For the supplier, AS and hS are respectively the order processing and inven-
tory holding costs. The proﬁt gained from this speciﬁc buyer before the discount
is
πS0 = (p0 − v)d0 − 1
2
Q0hS − d0
Q0
AS − wfNd0. (3)
With the discount, the supplier’s proﬁt is
πS = (p− v)d− 1
2
QhS − d
Q
AS − dwfV . (4)
Thus the supplier’s optimal order quantity that maximizes πS is
qS =
√
2ASd/hS . (5)
We assume AS/hS > AB/hB and hS < hB for the supplier and buyer [3, 4, 9,
13]. Therefore, we must have qB < qS . From the supplier’s point of view, the
reason to oﬀer the quantity discount is to encourage the buyer to increase the
order quantity to qS , so that the supplier’s proﬁt can be maximized.
Now consider the carrier. Before any discount, the proﬁt gained from this
pair, supplier and buyer, is
πC0 = wfNd0 − d0
Q0
F, (6)
where w is the product’s unit weight; fN is the carrier’s original freight rate;
and F is the ﬁxed cost to dispatch a vehicle. Note that, at this point, the carrier
directly sends out the supplier’s shipments whenever they have been received.
So no corresponding inventory cost is incurred. By oﬀering the transportation
discount, the carrier induces the supplier to send out shipments based on carrier’s
dispatch schedule, so that those shipments can be consolidated with the carrier’s
regular loads. Therefore, after discount, the carrier’s proﬁt from shipments made
by this supplier is
πC = dwfV − 1
2
nTdwrw − 1
nT
g, (7)
where rw is the holding cost per unit item per time period, which explicitly
refers to the expense associated with in-transit inventory [2]. Speciﬁcally, the
latter is a surrogate for the disutility experienced by a customer whose order
must wait a certain period of time (the time for consolidation) before that order
is dispatched [8].
Note also that the consolidation of shipments enables saving of the ﬁxed
transportation costs related to each dispatch. This is exactly the motivation
for the carrier to oﬀer a transportation discount. However, we introduce a new
parameter g, which refers to the costs regarding material handling or the making
of one more stop at the buyer. Given that g  F , the term g/nT is signiﬁcantly
smaller than the other two terms. Hence we can see that πC1 is a monotonically
decreasing function with respect to n, and thus, the carrier would like to induce
the supplier to slightly increase the time between shipments and choose the
smallest n value. Therefore, the best value of n can be found by solving
n− 1 < qS
Td
< n. (8)
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Start
q(i) = q(i-1)?
Initialization:
Market Equilibrium
Buyer: d0, q0, x0
Supplier: p0
Carrier: fN
Given d(i), calculate 
qS(i)
Determine n(i), such that 
n(i)í1< qS(i)/ d(i)T <n(i)
Then, the breakpoint 
ĳ(i) = ńn(i)Td(i)Ņ 
q(i) = ĳ(i)
i = 0
d(0) = d0
Given q(i), solve the tri-level 
model and obtain
Buyer: d(i+1), x(i+1)
Supplier: p(i+1)
Carrier: fV(i+1)
i = i + 1 End
Yes
No
Fig. 1. A heuristic solution procedure for determining the discount schedules
3 A heuristic solution procedure
Multi-level mathematical programming problems are extremely diﬃcult to solve.
In fact, even a two-level linear programming model has been proved to be NP-
hard [1, 5]. Therefore, solving a tri-level nonlinear model requires the develop-
ment of an eﬀective and eﬃcient approximate computational approach. Here we
propose a heuristic solution procedure to determine the discount schemes for the
supplier and carrier. The major idea of this procedure is to start from the initial
market equilibrium before any discount, then update each member’s decision
with the preferred transportation schedule (quantity) until convergence. To be
speciﬁc, our heuristic contains the steps in Figure 1.
4 Numerical Experiments
In this section, we conduct a series of numerical experiments based on the linear
demand function, which has been regularly used in the marketing and economics
literature. Table 1 lists the major results, which indicate the system proﬁt can
be improved by introducing proper discount schemes for the buyer, supplier,
and carrier. Each player’s individual proﬁt can also beneﬁt from the discounts,
especially the carrier (proﬁt increased by more than 80%).
In addition, sensitivity analyses are carried out to further illustrate the ro-
bustness of the proposed model and provide additional managerial insights.
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Table 1. Major results
Initial Equilibrium With Discount Percentage Change
Demand (units) 1,289 1,385 1.07%
Price Retail ($/unit) 68.56 68.07 -0.71%
Wholesale ($/unit) 60.80 60.09 -1.17%
Freight ($/cwt) 32.66 30.45 -6.77%
Proﬁt Buyer ($) 6,624 7,509 14.6%
Supplier ($) 14,606 17,864 22.3%
Carrier ($) 21,050 38,204 81.5%
System ($) 42,280 63,577 50.4%
Herein, we speciﬁcally discuss the system proﬁt gained from the discounts under
the various levels of (1) the slope of demand curve (b), (2) the buyer’s inventory
holding cost (hB), (3) the supplier’s inventory holding cost (hS), and (4) the
carrier’s holding cost (rw), with all other parameters remaining the same. Major
ﬁndings include:
– As the price elasticity of demand increases, there is enhanced improvement
in the system proﬁt due to discounts. Therefore, the price elasticity of de-
mand is a major motivation for all SC parties, especially the carrier, to oﬀer
discounts.
– The improvement in the system proﬁt gained by the discounts rises, as
• the buyer’s inventory holding cost increases;
• the supplier’s inventory holding cost increases; or
• the carrier’s holding cost decreases.
The sensitivity analyses demonstrate that our model and solution procedure
are robust with respect to various changes in demand and cost structure. The
beneﬁt of coordinating the retail, wholesale, and transportation discounts is
obvious.
5 Conclusions
Coordinating supply chains with quantity discounts has been widely investigated
in the literature. But the major attention was paid to the party who receives
the discount. The present research is the ﬁrst work to ﬁll this gap by presenting
a game theoretic approach to enable that coordination, and to assist all rele-
vant supply chain members in making their corresponding discount decisions.
We studied three discounts: 1) the retail discount that the buyer oﬀers to end
customers, 2) the wholesale discount oﬀered by the supplier to buyer, and 3) the
transportation discount oﬀered by the carrier to supplier. To solve the tri-level
model eﬀectively and eﬃciently, we developed a heuristic solution procedure,
which can be employed by each member of the supply chain, to establish his/her
discount scheme. A series of numerical experiments, based on a linear demand
curve, were conducted to illustrate the practicality of the proposed models and
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heuristic procedure. Our results reveal that the coordination of discounts yielded
signiﬁcant improvements to each party.
Our future research will focus on incorporating the demand uncertainty in the
coordination of discount schemes for multiple supply chain members. Starting
from a single-period model, the situation will be extended to consideration of
demand that is both price-dependent and stochastic.
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Abstract. Prediction Markets are a tool for group forecasting that is
recently gaining popularity in companies to support decision making. In
contrast to single expert judgements, group forecasts have the advan-
tage of being less biased than their solitary counterparts, which have
the disadvantage of being subject to singular opinions. However, some
cognitive biases, such as partition dependence, still occur systematically
also in Prediction Markets. In this research-in-progress we approach this
problem from a Dual-process Theory perspective and argue that the
market complexity is moderating information processing and therefore
the occurrence of the partition dependence bias. First evidence of a pre-
liminary experiment supports our hypothesis that increased complexity,
introduced by a LMSR market compared to a poll, reduces partition
dependence bias.
1 Introduction
Forecasting future events and their outcomes is essential in managerial and po-
litical decision-making. Forecasts can be made using either statistical models
or by using human forecasters; both methods, it has to be noted, coming with
certain biases. In recent years new methods, which forecast by relying on the
wisdom of the crowd, have emerged. Such are e.g. Prediction Markets, which are
suggested and used for corporate decision making [5,18]. They provide a simple
and convenient way of revealing and aggregating information accumulated by a
large set of people by adding gamiﬁcation elements to forecasting tasks. This is
one reason why they are used in large companies like Yahoo [22], Google [8], or
Microsoft [1]. Moreover, Prediction Markets are suitable for various contexts. In
contrast to single expert judgments, group forecasts have the advantage to be
less biased by individual diﬀerences [33]. However, some cognitive biases, such as
partition dependence, still occur systematically in Prediction Markets [27]. The
occurrence of cognitive biases in human estimations often has nothing to do with
the subject’s intellectual capacity, but arguably lies with the “slothful nature”
of systematic processing and the use of heuristics and mental shortcuts [12].
According to the Dual-process Theories (DPTs) which have their roots in psy-
chology and social sciences research, humans achieve better results if they were
to consider problems with more eﬀort and deductively [36].
In current work we want to address the occurrence of cognitive biases in
Prediction Markets from a Dual-process Theory perspective. The fundamental
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idea of the DPTs is that there are two diﬀerent kinds of thinking, of which one is
unconscious, fast, automated, and eﬀortless and the other is (at least partially)
conscious, slow, and strenuous (induces high cognitive load) [9]. Mental shortcuts
and cognitive biases are much more likely to happen in heuristic processing.
After a short introduction on Prediction Markets, partition dependence, and
the Dual-process Theory, an experiment design is presented that uses market
complexity as moderator between the two types of processing. The underlying
research question is: A more complex market mechanism encourages the use of
systematic processing and therefore reduces partition dependence bias.
2 Related Work
2.1 Prediction Markets, Biases, and Partition Dependence
Prediction Markets are deﬁned as markets where participants trade contracts
on the basis of probable outcomes of future events [15]. The prices in such mar-
kets can be interpreted as aggregate probability forecasts of the possible out-
comes [34]. Prediction Markets have shown impressive accuracy, for example in
forecasting elections [14], even if for the last two popular political events the
forecasts failed (Great Britain leaves the European Union and US Presidential
Elections 2016)1. Despite on accuracy, research on Prediction Markets was done
regarding motivation [20], manipulation [3], market mechanisms [6], interface
design [19] and combination with other methods [13].
Diverse authors discuss and explain some of the forecasting errors that ap-
pear systematically with the occurrence of (cognitive) biases in Prediction Mar-
kets [2, 7, 8, 21, 23, 27, 35]. Cognitive biases are basically the result of heuristics
in human information processing and decision making [30]. The simple aggrega-
tion of numerous individual opinions is, then, meant to reduce the inﬂuence of
cognitive biases, as many of them may average out [33]. However, there is still a
long list of biases that occur in Prediction Markets, such as the favorite-longshot
bias (tendency to overvalue longshots and undervalue favourites) [23,26], conﬁr-
mation bias (tendency to ignore conﬂicting information) [7, 24], or the overcon-
ﬁdence bias (overestimation of own’s skills or result) [2].
Partition dependence is also a cognitive bias that proved to be robust in
Prediction Markets [28]. Partition dependence is“[...] the tendency for the speciﬁc
partition of the state space to inﬂuence judged probabilities” [28, p. 11779]. This
usually leads to a distribution of probability estimations with a tendency towards
uniform distribution [11]. As events with multiple outcomes have to be presented
as a set of diﬀerent stocks in Prediction Markets, they are very prone to this
bias.
There are diﬀerent explanations why each bias occurs based on market mech-
anism, market liquidity, information spread, or motivation of participants. For
example the favourite-longshot bias can be explained by low liquidity that leads
to the situation, that in the border areas orders does not get matched, which
1 Predictions of of polls and betting markets did not much better.
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can again be explained with the prospect theory [26]. Other explanations argue
with the composition of the ﬁeld of participants [10], the motivation of the par-
ticipants, and subsequently incentives [25]. Yet, there is not a clear explanation
for all biases in Prediction Markets, but it is shown that warning messages re-
duces some biases signiﬁcantly. This already suggests that they happen during
the information processing and estimation formation of each individual [33].
2.2 Heuristic Systematic Model
Essentially, previous work that regarded the role of judgment in forecasting and
dealt with heuristics and biases focused on self-judgment [17]. Group decision
making or crowd-based forecasting is only rarely discussed. However, the initiator
of the Good Judgement Project states that in his view “[...] the heuristics- and
biases perspective still provides the best ﬁrst-order approximation of the errors
that real-world forecasters make and the most useful guidance on how to help
forecasters bring their error rates down.” [29, p. 204]
The occurrence of biases is usually explained with the use of heuristics and
mental shortcuts during reasoning. When discussing deductive reasoning the
idea of two fundamentally diﬀerent kinds of thinking in human information pro-
cessing and reasoning is considered since the 1970 [9] and is called Dual-process
Theory. The basic concept is that there are two diﬀerent kinds of thinking [9]
from which one is unconscious, fast, automated, and easy and the second is (at
least partly) conscious, slow, and eﬀort-full (induces high cognitive load). In In-
formation Systems mainly two DPTs are considered: The Elaboration Likelihood
Model (ELM) and the Heuristic Systematic Model (HSM) [32]. Both are variants
of the dual-process approach whereas the ELM already suggests its use in the
context of information ﬁltering and processing and the HSM is indicating the
diﬀerentiation between heuristic and systematic processing of information. The
HSM is a promising approach to explain the occurrence of biases. It is argued
that so-called “heuristic cues” trigger heuristic processing. An example of such
a heuristic cue is the partition of the state space.
There are several moderators that can initiate or reinforce systematic (de-
ductive) processing. One such moderator comes in the form of warnings [33].
In addition, expertise, personality, motivation, or external factors such as in-
centives, time pressure, or task complexity can be considered as moderators. In
eﬀect, anything that can inﬂuence cognitive capacity or eﬀort can be considered
as a possible candidate for the role of moderator [32]. Recently [6] considered the
market mechanism (and therefore market complexity) as a moderator of cogni-
tive load. The authors are arguing that the underlying market mechanism has
an huge inﬂuence on the cognitive load imposed on the participant. According
to their classiﬁcation, cognitive load/complexity is driven by the factors pricing,
timing, revisiting and beneﬁt.
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3 Method
To evaluate our research question, we developed an online experiment and ran a
preliminary test on a small sample. The experiments design is based on [28] and
contains three forecasting tasks2. In each task, all participants had to estimate
the probability of the outcome of an event (continuous variable) falling into cer-
tain, predeﬁned intervals. In the case of [28] the forecasting task was conducted
on a Prediction Market with a continuous double auction. Our participants faced
randomized either as a poll (hidden market design) or a posted-price Prediction
Market with a market maker, Logarithmic Market Scoring Rule, LMSR [16].
Participants were assigned randomized to either type. We chose the latter mar-
ket mechanisms for comparison, as the two interfaces can be designed similarly.
In addition to the setting where participants traded alone, a setting where all
participants traded in the same market was conducted3. According to the un-
derstanding of [31], we consider the LMSR market mechanism as more complex
compared to the poll, seeing as the estimation has to be mapped into prices
ﬁrst, and then, the trading mechanism has to be understood to calculate which
trades can be expected to have a positive outcome. In the classiﬁcation of [6]
this would mean to alter the pricing from “ﬁxed” or “no pricing” to “dynamic
pricing”, and, therefore, the LMSR market comes along with higher cognitive
load.
For each setting (poll or LMSR) and question, we had two distinct and ex-
haustive partitions of the state space that were shifted by one interval. This is
illustrated in Fig. 1, where X is the state space and i are the intervals. The outer
Fig. 1. Schematic partition of the state space and shift between the treatments
intervals (with subscript l or h) are open to the outer sides. In total, there were
six treatment groups in which the participants were given three forecasting tasks
in a randomized order (between-subject design). The measure of partition depen-
dence pdx can be calculated by comparing the mean of probabilities assigned to
each interval p(i) to the overlapping intervals, e.g. pdx = (p(i2l)+p(i2m))−p(i1l).
Similar to [28] we asked for an initial estimation and a ﬁnal estimation of
the absolute value before and after the forecasting task. After the tasks, the
participants performed a primary process test which is based on [4], to test
whether the dominant type of processing can be measured. Last, we asked about
demographics and the participant’s general knowledge of the predicted topics.
2 In our case three economic ﬁgures
3 We refer to the three settings later with “Poll”, “Lmsr1”, and “Lmsr2”
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Based on the considerations above, we formulate following hypotheses: H1:
The value for partition dependence is lower in the LMSR treatments compared
to the poll treatment. H2: The portion of systematic processing is higher in the
LMSR treatments compared to the poll treatment. H3: High experience and
knowledge leads to a lower value of partition dependence.
4 Implementation
The participants were asked to forecast the value of three economic ﬁgures. The
chosen forecasting tasks and partitions for each question can be seen in Table 2.
The “midpoint” of the intervals was chosen by the current value, approximately
one week before the experiment started. The width of the intervals was chosen
by an educated guess of a student in the ﬁeld of economics, regularly observing
this prices, with the instruction that the probability for the two inner intervals
should be approximately 50%. Therefore the width of the intervals should not be
ill-sized in a dimension, where results should be aﬀected signiﬁcantly. The task
for our preliminary experiment was opened at the 9th December 2016 and closed
at the 19th. Students from a university group4, whose primary purpose is to
talk and exchange about stock markets, were invited. Therefore we can assume
knowledge about the topics and trading in general. Roughly 300 students were
invited from which we received 50 valid answers (participation rate = 20%).
The students were incited by three amazon vouchers assigned according to the
forecast performance.
Before the participants started with the forecasting tasks, they had to read
the full instructions and answer two control questions to prove that they under-
stood the task and if applicable how to trade reasonably.
In the poll setting, the intervals were presented as rows in a table in the
ﬁrst column. The second column included input forms to insert the estimated
probability that the event outcome will fall in the interval. In the posted-price
market setting the intervals were also presented in the ﬁrst column, the second
presented the current price, and the third the current stocks in the participant’s
depot. In a fourth column the handles to buy and sell were provided. In addition
the trade of “bundles” was possible with two more buttons below the table.
A text below the table indicated the current money available. Besides this the
screens looked similar. Screens are appended in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 in the appendix.
After the forecasting tasks, the participants had to solve ﬁve “images” of the
primary process test by [4], which we displayed each after another. The length of
the online experiment depended on the setting. It took between roughly 4 min
(poll) and 7 min (market), also potentially depending on how quick participants
understood the market.
4 “Boersen Initiative Karlsruhe e.V.”
Group Decision and Negotiation – GDN 2017 
14-18 August 2017, Stuttgart-Hohenheim, Germany
13
5 Evaluation
As some participants did not ﬁnish the task, the distribution of participants over
treatments is not completely equally and reported in Table 3 in the appendix.
The results for the partition dependence are reported in Table 1.
First, we compared the partition dependence in the three settings. We used a
one-tailed Wilcoxon rank sum test to evaluate whether the partition dependence
eﬀect is signiﬁcant. However, yet our sample is missing statistical power due to
its small size. Here we observed that the partition dependence was less in Lmsr2
(around 0.01, no partition dependence) compared to the Poll treatment (around
0.15, weak partition dependence). This ﬁnding would, then, support our hypoth-
esis H1. Strong partition dependence also occurred in the Lmsr1 setting (around
0.23). This is opposed to our hypothesis H1 and is an unexpected outcome when
contrasted to Lmsr2. It indicates that there must have been yet another factor
inﬂuencing the results. We presume that this was the so-called anchoring and
adjustment bias. In the Lmsr1 treatment, the participants were shown an initial
pricing of 33ct for each stock. This priming may have been overloading the eﬀect
of the prior ignorance of partition dependence and, subsequently, have led to the
strong occurrence of the shift in the estimations. As in Lmsr2 the participants
faced the estimation of their predecessor, this eﬀect did not take place.
Table 1. Values for Partition Dependence split by Setting and Task. Signiﬁcance in
column “pd” is tested with a one-tailed Wilcoxon test. (p > 0.05 : ns; p ≤ 0.05 : ∗; p ≤
0.01 : ∗∗, p ≤ 0.005 : ∗ ∗ ∗)
Setting mean(pd) Task pd
Poll 0.153
Diesel 0.118
Deutsche Bank 0.175*
DAX-30 0.167
Lmsr1
0.127
0.227
Diesel 0.250**
Deutsche Bank 0.292***
DAX-30 0.139***
Lmsr2 0.012
Diesel 0.061
Deutsche Bank -0.050
DAX-30 0.024
Second, the results show that the partition dependence bias is distinctly less
visible (in all settings for the task) where participants reported most knowledge
and experience. This keeps in line with [11], who argues that participants that are
particularly knowledgeable in a certain ﬁeld will experience less or no partition
dependence in that area. Therefore we feel support for our hypothesis H3.
We also evaluated the number of times that the initial estimation diﬀered
from the estimation in the main task. This was the case when the highest prob-
ability was not assigned to the interval into which the initial estimation falls.
The high occurrence in our data is a clear sign of the presence of partition
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dependence, as in such instances “[...] markets are aﬀected by a pervasive bias
towards an ignorance prior probability distribution” [27]. In the Poll setting, this
occurred in 13 out of 22 cases (59%) far more often than in the Lmsr settings
(7 out of 28, 25%). The latter, then, excludes that the results were subject to a
sample bias.
As the N in our preliminary experiment is low, we should not yet over inter-
pret the trends, but still derive that the hypothesis H1 and H3 may hold in a
follow-up experiment, if we manage to prevent the priming by the initial prices
and anchoring eﬀects.
We were not able to evaluate H2 as the data of the primary process test
showed no signiﬁcant eﬀect into any direction. Most participants would have
been classiﬁed into the systematic processing category. However, participants
seemed to choose pictures consistently of either the heuristic or the systematic
category. The test of [4] should, actually, be regarded as a personality measure.
As heuristic and systematic “thinker” where more or less equally distributed
over the Poll and the Lmsr treatments, we conclude that our experiment could
not take enough inﬂuence to be registered by this personality measure directly
after the experiment.
6 Conclusion
The preliminary experiment gave several insights into the way in which partition
dependence and market complexity interact. We were able to demonstrate the
existence of the partition dependence bias in a posted-price market and a poll
as [28] did for a continuous double auction market. Also, the comparison of
Poll vs. Lmsr2 supports our underlying hypotheses that a more complex market
mechanism reduces partition dependence bias. We cannot, however, say for sure
if this eﬀect is moderated by the portion of systematic processing according to
the HSM yet. Our conclusion is nonetheless supported by trends found in our
preliminary data.
It is necessary to point out that we cannot exclude the occurrence of an
anchoring eﬀect from our intervals or initial prices, seeing as the data seems to
support its existence. The latter needs to be considered in a further experimental
design. It may be helpful to set an anchor intentionally to ensure that all par-
ticipants are at least biased with the same anchor. To reduce anchoring by the
partition, [27,28] is suggesting, and arguing, to brief the participants that other
participants may see other intervals. We may also forgo the Lmsr1 treatment or
hide initial prices.
A limitation is that we could not yet say for sure, which “type” of processing
our participants used during the experiment. To solve this problem, we may,
in the future, consider measuring pupil dilation. Another clear limitation is the
small N and the narrow demographic spectrum of the participants. Though with
this drawbacks, we were nonetheless able to draw meaningful conclusions and
insights from this preliminary experiment that we are now able to include in a
follow-up experimental design.
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Even if we cannot yet fully verify our hypotheses, we have arguably shown
ﬁrst supporting evidence. Also, we demonstrated a remarkably strong inﬂuence
of partition dependence in a forecasting task. This can, then, be regarded as a
recommendation to forecasters and decision makers: It is necessary to be aware
of partition dependence and to consider its inﬂuence when designing forecasting
tasks.
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Table 2. Three forecasting tasks with partitions.
Question Partition
What will the price of one litre
Diesel (Aral, Durlacher Allee 46)
be at 12:00 AM on Tuesday 20th
December 2016?
High <1.075 1.075 -
1.09
>1.09 e/l
Low <1.06 1.06 -
1.075
>1.075 e/l
What will the value of the
“Deutsche Bank” stock be at the
end of the trading day Tuesday
20th December 2016?
High 15.5 15.5 - 17 17 e
Low <14 14 - 15.5 15.5 e
What will the index of the DAX-30
be at the end of the trading day
Tuesday 20th December 2016?
High <10850 10850 -
11000
>11000 Points
Low <10700 10700 -
10850
>10850 Points
Table 3. Number of Participants per Treatment
Setting Partition N(=50)
Poll
High 9
Low 13
Lmsr1
High 5
Low 10
Lmsr2
High 4
Low 9
Fig. 2. Poll setting (DAX-30)
18 Group Decision and Negotiation – GDN 2017
14-18 August 2017, Stuttgart-Hohenheim, Germany
Fig. 3. Market setting (DAX-30)
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Abstract. In this study of 326 two-person negotiations involving the 
sale/purchase of a car advertised for sale at a specific asking price, sellers 
tended to outperform buyers and they did so largely because the specific pre-
negotiation asking price had exerted a series of constraints on their initial 
negotiation behavior. Sellers who repeated their advertised price as their first 
asking price during their negotiation tended to obtain a better outcome than 
sellers who did not. Sellers who further repeated their advertised/first 
announced asking price as their next asking price(s) tended to obtain the best 
outcomes of all. This price framed negotiation context, and the ‘initiator effect’
it generated, predominantly accounted for our findings that, contrary to much of 
the previous negotiation research literature (where buyers regularly outperform 
sellers), there also was no general outcome advantage for first asking/offer price 
announcers or for buyers who had opened with a strong/low first asking price.
Keywords: initiator effect, negotiation, uncertainty, framing, anchoring.
1 Introduction
One of the most common—if not the most common—of all forms of business 
negotiations are those which are instigated by a seller’s ‘invitation (or ‘offer’) to treat’ 
that includes a specific asking price. (By ‘specific’ we mean that a single 
asking/selling price, rather than a price range, is stated and that this price does not 
have a qualifying phrase—e.g., ‘or nearest offer’, ‘offers over’ or ‘offers in the region 
of’—attached to it.) Such prices are widespread in the advertisements employed to 
sell motor vehicles and real estate. In the building, construction and home 
improvement/repair trades, price-based tenders and quotes for the provision of work 
to be done or services to be rendered, once proffered, are then regularly negotiated.
Discounts off prices provided by prospective suppliers of requested goods or services 
are often asked for and, after some negotiation, may eventually be given to 
individuals, companies (e.g., supermarket chains), government agencies, health 
service providers, etc. In many countries and cultures bargaining over the stated or 
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‘ticket’ price of an item on offer is an accepted (if not expected) feature of almost 
every form of buying and selling, especially on street markets and in retail stores.
Each of these contexts and cases share one important, negotiation relevant quality: the 
written, advertised or oral pre-negotiation announcement of a specific asking price 
sends a clear and unequivocal signal about the seller’s aspiration price to a potential 
buyer that, with very few exceptions, places a socially obligating upper bound on the 
final outcome price the seller can hope for, can initially ask for and can thus 
subsequently obtain during any negotiation that may ensue.
Given that such pre-announced asking price framed negotiations are so prevalent in 
the ‘real world’, it is surprising that most researchers have concentrated on examining 
those situations where negotiations are conducted without a specific asking price 
having been pre-announced by the seller. Characteristically, in these studies the 
seller’s (and often the buyer’s) aspiration price is not made available to their 
‘opponent(s)’, or it is vague, or it is absent altogether, and both the seller and buyer 
are thereby placed in a situation of relatively heightened mutual uncertainty [e.g., 1-3].
A notable exception to this tendency can be found in the research conducted into 
the asking prices of real estate vendors. In these studies, though, the focus has firmly 
been on examining: i) the personal, environmental, social and economic factors that 
influence sellers’ choice of a particular listed/asking price; and/or: ii) the relative
impact of various types of ‘listed’ or advertised asking price strategies—e.g., whether 
the listed asking price ends in a rounded figure (e.g., £8,500) or is a more precise (and, 
occasionally, a relatively higher or lower) price than a rounded price (e.g., £8,501 or
£8,495) [e.g., 4-6]. We are not aware of any studies that have examined the general 
impact that specific asking prices per se have on negotiation behavior and outcomes. 
This paper attempts to rectify this lacuna by examining the influence of a very 
common form of specific, pre-negotiation asking price (i.e., a specific advertised
price) in a very common negotiation scenario—the sale/purchase of a used car. Our 
findings show that the pre-negotiation announcement of a specific asking price by 
sellers tended to: i) cast a huge and influential shadow over their initial negotiation 
behavior; ii) had a major impact on the outcomes participants tended to obtain (and, in 
particular, tended to generate a substantial outcome advantage for sellers); and: iii) 
reversed, negated or significantly compromised three of the most frequently replicated 
‘classic’ findings reported by those researchers who have examined other, far less 
common, negotiation contexts and scenarios.
1.1 Study Conducted
Our dataset comprises 652 participants who took part in a two-person negotiation 
exercise involving the sale/purchase of a used car. The bulk of this data was 
collected—at three British universities and on eight separate occasions—from: i) six 
groups of postgraduate (MBA and MSc) business students; ii) one group of 
postgraduate law students; and: iii) one group of undergraduate business students. On 
two other occasions we collected data from groups of professional sales/purchasing 
negotiators (some of whom were now managers of such negotiators) employed at: i) a
major European supplier of offshore oil and gas equipment; and: ii) a multi-national 
motor vehicle manufacturer and retailer. Collectively, these participants—though 
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predominantly British, Chinese, Indian or Nigerian—were from 60 different 
countries, aged between 19-62 years (M = 25.1 years) and had a stated level of 
“negotiation-involving employment experience” that ranged from zero (68.9%) to 29 
years (M = 0.94 years). 333 (51.1%) participants were male and 319 (48.9%) female.
Before each of these ten classroom-based negotiation sessions, a ‘General 
Information’ handout was sent to the participants describing the car on offer, details 
of the sale, and the exercise objective (i.e., “Your task is to negotiate with the other 
person in your group and reach the best possible mutually agreed deal for the 
sale/purchase of this car.”). Importantly, this handout also mentioned that the 
potential buyer of the car in question was responding to an advertisement the seller 
had placed in a motor trader magazine—an advertisement which included a specific
asking price for this car (i.e., “£8,500.”).
At the beginning of each negotiation session, participants were randomly allocated 
the role of the seller or buyer of the car in question, given a ‘Confidential 
Information’ handout to read (which included additional and private information 
pertinent to their particular buyer or seller role), and asked to make “final 
preparations” for their negotiation. Participants were then randomly placed into 
buyer-seller dyads and provided with a ‘Negotiation Prices’ form that was pre-
formatted so as to enable them to easily keep a record, during their negotiation, of: i) 
every asking/offer-related price that was mentioned; ii) the order in which these prices 
were mentioned; iii) whether it was the buyer or seller who had mentioned each price; 
and: iv) the final, agreed ‘outcome’ price at which the car had been sold/purchased.
To help standardize the conditions faced by all participants, the same instructor 
delivered (from a script) the same exercise instructions to each cohort of participants,
and the length of time participants were given to read their confidential information 
handout (40 minutes) and to negotiate with each other (50 minutes) was also the 
same. Seven dyads did not reach an agreement and had been excluded from our initial 
dataset, thus leaving the 326 dyad dataset we analysed.
Embedded within the handouts each participant received was a variety of 
information designed to encourage an outcome settlement within a £1,500 positive 
and fully overlapping ‘zone of probable agreement’ (ZOPA) that ranged, for buyers 
and sellers, from £8,500 to £7,000. That is, £8,500 was the seller’s optimum 
aspiration price and the buyer’s walk-away price, and £7,000 was the seller’s walk-
away price and the initial boundary point of the buyer’s optimum aspiration price.
However, aside from the fact that buyers could readily deduce the seller’s aspiration 
price/maximum possible £8,500 selling price (via the latter’s advertised asking price),
the information about the seller’s walk-away price as well as the buyer’s aspiration 
and walk-away prices was ‘confidential’ and was made explicit only to the 
negotiating party for whom it directly concerned.
Of course, this exercise-generated £1,500 ZOPA often differed from the actual
‘bargaining zone’ established by each dyad as a result of the discrepancy between the 
seller’s first orally announced asking price and the buyer’s (invariably lower) first 
announced offer price. Nevertheless, confirmation that the instruction materials for 
this negotiation exercise had successfully influenced participants to orient to this 
ZOPA came from the findings that: i) 562 (86.2%) of the 652 participants’ first 
asking/offer prices fell within or on the £8,500£7,000 boundary points of this zone; 
ii) the 90 (13.8%) exceptions to this tendency comprised buyers whose first offer 
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price was <£7,000; iii) only 9 (2.8%) of the 326 final outcomes were outside this 
ZOPA; and: iv) all 9 of these outcomes were <£7,000, the lowest being £6,500.
1.2 Non-Normality of the Dataset
A preliminary inspection of our dataset revealed that the frequency distributions of 
the first oral asking/offer prices of the sellers and buyers were severely non-normal
and significantly differed from one another in terms of their range, shape and location 
relative to the ZOPA. (As we will see, this was partly a result of the ‘initiator effect’.)
Consequently, we employed the following non-parametric statistical measures in our 
study: i) Mann-Whitney U tests when investigating sub-group based non-categorical 
differences in our dataset; ii) Spearman’s rho when conducting correlation tests; iii) 
Cliff’s delta/d (rather than Cohen’s d) when calculating the effect size estimates for 
our U test results [7]; iv) the non-parametric Levene’s test when evaluating the 
relative levels of variance in the variables compared in the U tests [8-11]; and: v) 
Mann-Whitney adjusted two one-sided tests (TOST) of equivalence to determine the 
level of similarity between compared samples that were p  in our U tests [12-14].
(Note: i) Į 0.05 for all tests reported as being ‘significant’; and: ii) whenever we 
report that two samples were ‘not significantly different from one another’, these 
samples were both p LQWKHinitial U test comparison and, in the follow-up TOST 
test, were deemed significantly equivalent to one another by virtue of being both p <
.05 and within a pre-specified ±10% ZOPA margin level.)
2 Initial Findings
The preliminary inspection of our dataset also revealed two findings that were in 
marked contrast to what has previously and regularly been reported by negotiation 
researchers: i) sellers tended to significantly outperform buyers; and: ii) those 
participants who announced the first oral asking/offer price during their negotiation 
did not tend to obtain significantly better outcomes.
2.1 Sellers Outperformed Buyers
Negotiation researchers have repeatedly shown that buyers tend to outperform sellers 
[e.g., 15-20]. In our dataset, however, sellers significantly outperformed buyers (Mdn
= 60.8% vs. 39.2%). (Note: all ‘outcome’ measures in this study—unless stated 
otherwise—refer to the median percentage of the ZOPA the tested participant groups 
tended to obtain as their final, agreed negotiation settlement price.) Sellers were also
significantly more likely than buyers to obtain an outcome better than the 50%/£7,750 
mid-point of the ZOPA for this negotiation exercise (nsellers >£7,750 = 211/64.7% vs.
nbuyers <£7,750 = 108/33.1%).
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2.2 First Asking/Offer Price Announcers Did Not Tend to Obtain Significantly 
Better Outcomes
Another common finding by researchers is that those persons who announce the first 
asking/offer price in their negotiation (‘FPAs’) are significantly more likely to obtain 
better outcomes than those persons who do not announce the first asking/offer price 
(‘non-FPAs’) [e.g., 1-3, 24-28]. In our dataset, however, the outcomes obtained by 
FPAs and non-FPAs (Mdn = 50.0% vs. 50.0%) were not significantly different from 
one another. A Spearman’s rho test also indicated that non-FPAs’ first asking/offer 
prices were not significantly associated with the first asking/offer prices of their FPA 
opponents and that the correlation between the first asking/offer prices of these two 
groups was only of a negligible strength (rs = -.077).
Much of the research cited above has also shown that the outcome enhancing 
‘anchoring effect’ of being the first asking/offer price announcer in a negotiation 
tends to occur irrespective of whether the FPAs were buyers or sellers [e.g., 3]. In our 
dataset, though, this was not the case. Although FPA sellers tended to obtain a
significantly better outcome than non-FPA buyers (Mdn = 61.2% vs. 38.8%), seller 
non-FPAs also tended to obtain a significantly better outcome than FPA buyers (Mdn
= 60.8% vs. 39.2%). Furthermore, tests comparing the outcomes obtained by: i) FPA 
and non-FPA sellers; and: ii) FPA and non-FPA buyers were, in both cases, not 
significantly different from one another. In short, in the pre-announced specific asking 
price framed negotiation context we examined the seller or buyer role the participants 
played typically had a greater impact on their outcome than whether they had been the 
FPA or the non-FPA in their negotiation.
Why were our findings so different from other studies that have consistently shown 
that FPAs typically obtain a better outcome than non-FPAs and that buyers typically 
outperform sellers? Put simply, none of the aforementioned studies examined 
negotiations that included a specific, pre-negotiation announcement of the seller’s
asking price. We now show that the specific pre-negotiation asking price information
(via which our negotiations had ostensibly been initiated and framed) generated a set 
of constraints on the sellers that, in turn, tended to provide them with a significant and
inherent outcome advantage over their buyer opponents, and did so regardless of 
whether the sellers had been the FPA or non-FPA in their negotiation.
3 ‘Initiator Effect’ Findings
In our dataset the specific, £8,500 pre-negotiation asking price tended to constrain
sellers, in a variety of ways, from announcing a first asking price during their 
negotiation that was both above and below this asking price.
First, specific pre-negotiation asking prices, like other types of expressed 
interactional ‘positions’ more generally, are typically imbued with a socially 
obligating ‘promissory’ expectation that the ‘position-taking’ interactant ordinarily 
should not and will not depart from their previously expressed interactional position 
[29]—e.g., that, in the negotiation context we examined, the sellers should not ask a 
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higher price than their advertised price for what they are attempting to sell. In our 
dataset no seller orally announced an asking price that was over £8,500.
Second, with regard to the specific pre-negotiation asking price also discouraging
sellers from announcing a lower first asking price during their negotiation, the sellers 
were significantly more likely than chance to have orally announced a first asking 
price of £8,500 (i.e., their advertised price) rather than a lower asking price.
208/63.8% sellers did so and 118/36.2% did not. (Only 163/50.0% sellers would have 
done so if they had announced this first asking price by chance alone.) This finding
suggests that most £8,500 opening sellers engaged in such repetition because they 
recognized that any lowering of the specific advertised asking price in their first orally
announced asking price would have the character of being a concessionary departure 
from their advertised asking price and would therefore be liable to be treated by their 
buyer opponent as a weakening of their initial/advertised negotiating position.
Moreover, because the specific asking price framed negotiations we studied tended to 
influence the majority of sellers to open at (and thus repeat) their pre-negotiation
asking price as their first oral asking price, most of the sellers ended up creating—by 
accident or design—an initial, orally expressed negotiation position that restated their 
advertised asking price and, by doing so, strengthened their optimum first negotiation 
position. Such £8,500 opening sellers not only tended to obtain a significantly better 
outcome than <£8,500 opening sellers (Mdn = 66.3% vs. 56.8%), they also tended to 
obtain the best negotiation outcomes of all the participant groups we have examined 
so far, and they did so regardless of whether they were the FPA or non-FPA during
their negotiation (Mdn = 64.0% vs. 66.7%).
However, both the level of significance and the effect size estimate for the
aforementioned test (comparing the outcomes obtained by £8,500 and <£8,500 
opening sellers) were unexpectedly small: p = .015; z = -2.43; Cliff’s d = .162. This 
lack of what we anticipated to be a much larger and stronger outcome difference was 
largely the result of another important way in which the specific pre-negotiation 
asking price discouraged sellers from announcing a lower first asking price during 
their negotiation. Not only was the range of first asking prices of the sub-optimum 
(<£8,500) opening sellers significantly narrower than the range for the first offer 
prices of those buyers who had opened at an equivalently sub-optimum price (i.e., 
>£7,000), sub-optimum opening sellers’ first asking prices were also significantly 
more likely to be located closer to their advertised/optimum opening asking price (i.e., 
£8,500) than the sub-optimum buyers’ opening first offer prices were to their own 
£7,000 optimum opening asking price borderline: <£8,500 sellers: range = 96.7%-
33.3% of the ZOPA (i.e., from í Mdn range = 16.7%; <£7,000 buyers: 
n = 172; range = 97.2%-6.7% of the ZOPA (i.e., from í Mdn range =
46.7%). This, we believe, was the main reason why even the relatively weaker sub-
optimum (<£8,500) opening sellers generally benefited from the initiator effect; they 
also tended to significantly outperform their buyer opponents (Mdn = 56.8% vs. 
39.2%) and, again, did so regardless of whether they were the FPA or non-FPA in 
their negotiation (Mdn = 55.0% vs. 60.0%).
We now report the results of two additional sets of tests that provide further
evidence of a general outcome enhancing initiator effect for the sellers we studied.
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3.1 First Asking Price Repetitions during a Negotiation
Because repetitions of the specific £8,500 pre-negotiation asking price predominantly 
accounted for the sellers’ ‘initiator effect’ outcome advantage, we hypothesized that: 
i) those participants (i.e., sellers and/or buyers) who repeated their first oral
asking/offer price as their next asking/offer price(s) (hereafter ‘repeaters’) would tend 
to obtain better outcomes than those participants who did not; and, more specifically:
ii) that £8,500 opening seller repeaters—by virtue of also having repeated their pre-
negotiation advertised asking price—would tend to obtain better outcomes than all the 
other seller and buyer repeater groups. Those participants who repeated their first oral
asking/offer price (n = 73/11.2%) tended to obtain a significantly better outcome than 
non-repeaters (Mdn = 64.7% vs. 46.7%). However, whilst seller repeaters (n = 45) 
tended to obtain a significantly better outcome than seller non-repeaters (Mdn =
70.0% vs. 60.0%), there was no significant difference between the outcomes that 
buyer repeaters (n = 28) and buyer non-repeaters tended to obtain (Mdn = 41.7% vs. 
37.5%). Furthermore, with regard to sellers: i) £8,500 opening repeaters (n = 30) 
tended to obtain a significantly better outcome than £8,500 opening non-repeaters
(Mdn = 71.7% vs. 63.3%); and: ii) <£8,500 repeaters (n = 15) tended to obtain a 
significantly better outcome than <£8,500 non-repeaters (Mdn = 66.7% vs. 56.7%).
Also, the outcomes that FPA and non-FPA seller repeaters, £8,500 FPA and £8,500 
non-FPA non-repeaters, and <£8,500 FPA and non-FPA non-repeaters tended to 
obtain were, in each test, not significantly different from one another. Thus, sellers in 
general, and £8,500 opening sellers in particular, tended to improve their negotiation 
outcome by repeating their first announced asking price; buyer repeaters did not and, 
because of the absence of anything akin to a specific, pre-negotiation offer price, 
buyers could not.
3.2 The Impact of First Asking/Offer Prices on Negotiation Outcomes
A third, commonly repeated research finding is that those negotiators who open with 
a strong (or extreme) first asking/offer price tend to obtain significantly better 
outcomes than those negotiators who do not [e.g., 25, 30-36]. The findings we have 
reported above raise the possibility that the significant difference between the 
outcomes that £8,500 and <£8,500 opening sellers tended to obtain may actually have 
been the result, in some important part, of the fact that £8,500 opening sellers had 
simply opened their side of their negotiation with a higher/stronger asking price. We 
hypothesized that, if this was the case, then: i) similarly strong opening buyers would 
also be likely to obtain the same (high) level of outcome as their £8,500 opening 
(strong) counterparts; and: ii) similarly weak opening buyers would also be likely to 
obtain the same (reduced) level of outcome as their <£8,500 opening (weak) seller 
counterparts. In our dataset the direct buyer equivalents of the two strong and weak 
opening seller groups were those buyer groups that had opened with a first offer price 
of £7,000 and >£7,000 respectively. This is because both of the strong seller and 
buyer groups had opened on their respective ZOPA borderline and both of the weak 
seller and buyer groups had opened within the ZOPA.
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To eliminate the outcome enhancing advantage sellers tended to obtain by 
repeating their first orally announced price, we examined only those participants (i.e., 
sellers and buyers) who had not engaged in such repetition. Strong (£8,500 opening)
sellers (n = 178) tended to obtain a significantly better outcome than their 
equivalently strong (£7,000 opening) buyer counterparts (n = 58) (Mdn = 63.3% vs. 
42.2%). In addition, the outcome that £8,500 opening FPA sellers tended to obtain 
was not significantly different from the outcome that £8,500 opening non-FPA sellers 
tended to obtain (Mdn = 60.0% vs. 60.0%), and the outcome that £7,000 opening FPA 
buyers tended to obtain was not significantly different from the outcome that £7,000 
opening non-FPA buyers tended to obtain (Mdn = 43.0% vs. 41.3%). Similarly, the 
relatively weaker (<£8,500 opening) sellers (n = 103) tended to obtain a significantly 
better outcome than their equivalently weaker (>£7,000) opening buyer counterparts
(n = 151) (Mdn = 56.7% vs. 30.0%) and, again, they did so regardless of whether they 
were the FPA or non-FPA in their negotiation.
Another test confirmed our finding that the strength of a participant’s first 
asking/offer price was not the principal basis for the sellers’ general outcome 
advantage. When we added the strongest group of <£7,000 opening buyers (n = 89,
Range = £6,950-£2,400, Mdn = £6,000) to our previous group of strong £7,000 
opening buyers—and thereby created a situation where 60.5% of these 147 buyers 
had opened with a (significantly) stronger first price than the £8,500 sellers—the 
RSHQLQJEX\HUVstill did not tend to obtain a significantly better outcome than 
the £8,500 opening sellers: (Mdnsellers = 63.3% vs. Mdnbuyers = 60.0%). In short, our 
findings suggest that the outcome enhancing ‘initiator effect’ was not simply, solely 
or primarily the result of the majority of the sellers having announced the strongest 
possible (£8,500) asking price as their first orally announced asking price.
4 Conclusion
In the specific, pre-negotiation asking price framed negotiations we examined the 
‘initiator effect’ generated a significant general outcome advantage for sellers,
particularly for those sellers who repeated their advertised asking price as their first
oral asking price. By making further repetitions of their specific, pre-negotiation 
asking price/first oral asking price, £8,500 opening sellers tended to obtain the best 
outcomes of all participants. On average, such seller repeaters obtained an outcome 
that was: i) 15% better than what sellers in general and non-repeating £8,500 opening 
sellers tended to obtain; ii) 25% better than what buyers in general tended to obtain; 
DQGLLLEHWWHUWKDQZKDW£7,000 opening buyers (n = 236) tended to obtain.
Our study also provides evidence which casts some doubt on the generalizability 
and practical efficacy of three of the most commonly repeated and, indeed, ‘classic’ 
negotiation findings to what is probably the most common general business 
negotiation scenario in the ‘real world’—specific asking price framed negotiations. At
the very least, we hope to have shown that such negotiations and, more specifically,
the wording of the information via which both real-life and research simulated 
negotiations are instigated and framed, merit further consideration from researchers.
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Abstract. Many studies have examined the roles of managers in organizations. 
However, very few have drawn explicitly on the concept of integration, which 
can be usefully deployed, to describe part of managers’ functional roles. The 
purpose of the article is to propose a way of characterising the integrative pos-
tures of managers through a mapping tool. This research is concerned with 
managers’ ability to make an entity cohesive while at the same time, accepting 
the need to differentiate the elements of which it is made up (for example, the 
various sub-components of an organisation or a team), an ability that is ad-
dressed in an heterogeneous literature through the concept of integration. We 
assume that this kind of ability and orientation has an impact on how managers 
solve problems and how they should intervene in the various problem-solving 
processes within the organization. The management team, composed of the or-
ganization main unit managers, may be in different configurations depending on 
each manager integrative skills. Mapping these skills could help recommending 
the assignment of roles to managers within working groups as well as in the 
management team. This is the main intention of the mapping tool we propose in 
this research. Before presenting the tool, we first introduce a literature overview 
that helps us to identify the dimensions that enable us to characterize a man-
agement integrative skill. Second, we present our mapping tool. Then, we pro-
pose an analysis of the mapping obtained with our tool, showing that it can 
highlight various configurations that lead to differentiated recommendations on 
the managers’ roles within an organization.
1 Integration as a key role in groups
Team members have roles. There is an abundant literature on group dynamics that 
has identified these roles within groups or teams. In this work, to our knowledge, the 
concept of integration has been little used. The traditional typology of the roles of the 
members of a group identifies categories of roles [1–3]. Some of them concern the 
construction of the team and the maintenance of its collective orientation. However, 
the notion of integration is not really mentioned. However, another literature has, as 
we shall see below, long ago identified integration as a fundamental part of the man-
ager's activity. We must therefore mobilize this work in order to develop a method for 
assessing and mapping the integration capacities of members of a team of managers.
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1.1 Integration as part of managers’ roles
Our research helps to define better what the role of integration within a team 
means. Integration is an old management theme and is present in most of the pioneer-
ing contributions of this field [4] (or in negotiation field [5]). According to the most 
traditional approach, integration is a mechanism consisting in satisfying the require-
ments linked to the mutual interdependence of the subcomponents of a group in an 
environment that on the contrary forces a certain level of differentiation between them 
[6]. Integration can be taken in the sense of the coherence of the organization in a 
context of perpetual transformation.
Integration is a dynamic that can be based on a cultural substrate, an integrating el-
ement, designed to develop an identity of sight and a common sense. In this perspec-
tive, the manager can be the guarantor of the transmission of organizational culture 
and value to the different subcomponents of the organization [7]. The manager thus 
seeks belongingness around shared values and, more broadly, a consensus on what is 
valued or, conversely, rejected within the group. Managers also play this facilitating 
or accompanying role in driving change and organizational transformation [8], a 
phase in which it is important to 're-freeze' cultural and organizational referents.
The concept of integration also reappears when one considers that one of the pre-
requisites for bringing coherence to the system is to know the organizational system 
and to be fully aware of its functioning, in particular the interdependencies between 
subcomponents of the organization. The manager, as an agent of performance im-
provement processes, must therefore be capable of a broad view of the organization, 
not reduced to the sub-component of which he/she is responsible [9, 10]. The manager 
develops a knowledge of the system (in the sense of interacting components forming a 
whole), its objectives, its stakes in terms of activity and social and political relations 
[11–13].
Integration can also be taken in the sense of the activity leading to the creation of 
links and facilitating and securing the processes of cooperation in the organization 
[14]. The manager is therefore a developer of an environment in which collaborations 
are facilitated. The manager develops the relationships he/she maintains with the 
members of the team, in order to develop the sharing of objectives [15]. He/she can 
also develop relationships with other managers to create linkages and facilitating so-
cial support [16]. In the case of cross organizational linkages, the manager plays the 
role of a boundary spanner [17].
Finally, we mention one philosophical approach to the concept of integration that 
seems to represent a synthesis of these different acceptations. It is advanced by M. P. 
Follett in a series of seminal contributions in management and group processes [18, 
19]. Integration is a two-dimensional process because it (1) recognizes differences in
each and each individual's contribution to overall goal levels and (2) builds on the 
necessary interdependence of each of the components of a whole. Integration refers to 
the social process of encountering, confronting and unifying the desires and interests 
of various parties; it is neither the making of a quantitative compromise nor the result 
of a distributive negotiation that one of the stakeholders would win. Integration is a 
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qualitative creative process [20]—the confrontation of differences (or, conflict) is 
sought in order to generate new ideas, and thus a collective mind, feeling and will.
1.2 Evaluating integrative postures
Our research also aims to answer the question of how the capacity of a manager to 
take the role of integrator in the sense defined above can be appreciated. This question 
is partially answered in the literature. In the following, we read these answers through 
the two perspectives that M.P. Follett summarized.
The first perspective (we call dimension D1) leads to see the integrative manager, 
as being aware of the interdependencies between problems and team members and 
being aware of how to fertilize the relationships between each of the components of 
the organization: thus, the different units in the organization are “decompartmental-
ized” and the reasoning of the manager mobilizes them all. When managers are able 
to do so, they show some ability for systemic reasoning as opposed to more analytic
way of thinking.
Research informs us how to evaluate the capacity of integration, according to this 
first perspective. [21] proposes a method based on cognitive mapping techniques to 
determine the nature of the potential contributions of a group member to a process of 
problem structuring. Essentially, one contribution to the structuring of a problem can 
come from an ability to introduce ideas diversity into the exploration of the problem 
or the ability to deepen the exploration of certain themes related to the problem.
According to a second dimension (we call dimension D2), the integrative manager 
is capable of repositioning the unit of which he/she is responsible in a more global 
context: the whole organization, the institution or society as a whole; thus the coordi-
nation in the organization is naturally guaranteed when the collective objective is 
fully shared. When a manager has this skill, he/she sees problem through a holistic
prism instead of a more individualistic perspective.
Research that has paid attention to the collective or individual orientation of group 
members helps to assess part of the D2 dimension of integration. The orientation to-
wards the team refers to the ”shared understanding of the extent to which a team em-
phasizes learning or performance goals, and, consequently, helps to facilitate group 
decision-making, collaborative problem solving, and intragroup coordination that 
maintain the group emphasis on learning or performance goals” [22]. Much research 
has focused on the relationship between this type of orientation and other variables, 
both organizational and collective, such as performance or outcomes [23–25], or crea-
tivity [26]. Some of these works use proxies that evaluate collective orientation by the 
level of familiarity of team members with the overall objectives and objectives of 
other team members or their perception of the level of competition or compatibility 
between these different levels of objectives.
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2 Presentation of a tool mapping managers’ integrative 
capabilities
The analysis tool that we propose aims at the characterization of the integrative 
postures of each member of a management team. These postures are represented ac-
cording to dimensions D1 and D2. This representation takes the form of a mapping 
constructed from the discourses that the managers make to talk about the organiza-
tion, its components and also how they analyze the problems the organization faces.
2.1 Building managers’ cognitive maps: a first preliminary step
The tool is fed by a preliminary work of building cognitive maps of the members 
of the management team. A cognitive map is a tool used to model and analyze an 
individual's discourse and consists in the reconstruction of discourse in the form of 
causal relations between concepts, variables or ideas [27]. Traditionally, the cognitive 
map takes the form of a graph representing a network made up of nodes (representing 
concepts, variables, ideas) and arcs joining these nodes (representing causal links 
between concepts, variables, ideas) [28, 29]. Since cognitive maps are a technique 
often used in analyzing the discourse of managers and managers [30–33], it seems to 
us that the technique is particularly adapted to the purpose of our tool.
Cognitive maps we use are based on interviews aimed at eliciting the mental repre-
sentations that a manager builds about a given problem. The choice of the problem to 
be explored depends on the level of agreement on the existence of the problem. Natu-
rally, the problem explored in the interviews must be the same for each manager we 
interview. The interviews are semi-directive and are conducted on the basis of an 
interview grid that allows us to discuss systematically the following topics: the inter-
viewee’s itinerary, the functions of the manager, the general situation of the organiza-
tion and the specific problem explored.
Conventionally, cognitive maps are obtained by encoding transcribed discourses.
The coding consists in transforming the transcriptions of the interviews in the form of 
ideas, called "concepts" in relation to each other. Thus, the causal relations are detect-
ed in the transcriptions and entered on a software (yed, software in open source). 
Several precautions are taken at this stage. Firstly, each map is constructed from a 
double coding of the transcriptions of interviews, carried out by two separate analysts 
in order to limit the occurrence of interpretation biases. Then, the maps take as much 
as possible the terminology and the words used by the interviewees. Finally, obvious 
causal links, given the knowledge of the context by the analysts, but which the inter-
view manager would not have evoked are not coded and inserted into the cognitive 
map.
2.2 Classifying managers’ representations: a second preliminary step
On each map, the same systematic analysis is conducted. It is based firstly on the 
calculation of indicators used conventionally in such a methodological framework 
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[28]: degree of centrality of variable concepts (number of incoming or outgoing links 
to or from a concept), internal degree (number of links incoming to a concept) and 
external degree (number of links out coming the concept). The complexity of the 
reasoning is thus studied and chains of reasoning are uncovered for each manager 
interviewed. The individual cognitive maps do not allow direct comparison of the 
positions of the managers on the two dimensions D1 and D2. There is a need to devel-
op a common scale for comparing managers and indicators.
One of the objectives of the tool concerns the position of the manager in relation to 
his/her professional environment, his/her ability to grasp more or less broadly prob-
lems, in short his/her degree of openness. This involves identifying the transversal 
links (between professional categories, services, units, departments, etc.) that the 
manager establishes. There is also a need to identify different levels of environment in 
the discourse of each manager. For this purpose, we refer to the environment accord-
ing to 6 levels (see Table 1), linked to each other and ranging from a micro level (the
individual level) to a macro level (the macro-environment). A thematic analysis of the 
type proposed by [49] makes it possible to classify the concepts of each manager (on 
each map) in these 6 classes. This thematic analysis is carried out by double coding, 
again, to limit the biases of interpretation of the analyst.
Table 1. 6 levels from individual to environment
Levels Meaning
External envi-
ronment
Level reflecting what is outside the organization's boundaries, the ex-
ternal environment: the societal environment (demographics, behav-
iors, technological evolutions, etc.), the environment of the sector and 
its actors, its regulatory mechanisms (standards, legislation, guardian-
ship, etc.).
Meta Organi-
zation
The level refers to institutions related to the organization: group-
venture relationships, a network of organizations (without any centrali-
zation) or relationships between entities belonging to one same group.
Organization Level reflecting the organization itself, considered as a homogeneous 
block
Extended silo Sub components of the organization with a consequent distance from 
the manager (units to which the manager does not belong, other profes-
sional categories, etc.)
Nearby silo Sub components of the organization to which the manager belongs 
(his/her own unit, his/her own professional category, etc.)
Individual Self-centered level representing personal interests (it includes intimate 
and private issues)
This classification is questionable because others could be used with more or less 
the same number of categories. To this criticism, we answer that the scale could be 
adapted to the context and here we present a kind of generic categorization. The clas-
sification makes it possible to assign the elements of discourse of the individuals (the 
concepts on the map) to the levels of references on which they are centered. The con-
cepts are thus sorted according to whether they refer to the environment, the meta-
organization, the organization, the extended silo, the nearby silo or the individual.
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2.3 Mapping managers on the two dimensions
The tool produces a mapping of managers positioning them on a two-axis plan. 
The axis I1 (corresponding to the dimension D1, the continuum systemic vs. analytic)
can be described as the intensity of the interdependencies that managers perceive in 
their discourse between the concepts they have stated. The method of calculating the 
position on axis I1 is as follows: let ݀௜ିand ݀௜ା be respectively the internal and external
degrees of the concept i. Let n be the number of concepts evoked by the manager. 
Then the position on axis I1 is simply one minus the average absolute difference be-
tween ݀௜ିand ݀௜ା. The higher is this indicator, the less simplistic are the reasoning 
chains on the managers’ cognitive map.
The axis I2 (corresponding to the dimension D2, the continuum holistic vs. individ-
ualistic) can be described as the positioning of the managers according to the levels of 
the classification described above. The calculation method for indicator correspond-
ing to axis I2 is as follows. The position of a manager on axis I2 is the average of the 
levels of the classification (a scale of 1 to 6) weighted by the maximum degrees of 
centrality of the concepts of each level of the classification.
Crossing the positioning on the two axis lead us to obtain a mapping of managers.
(cf. figures 1&2), the position informing us on the double dimension of integration.
It makes it possible to see, as it appears in the discourse, how well the manager 
connects ideas (axis I1 or dimension D1) and how a manager is able to relocate his/her
role and the problems of the organization in a wider context. The mapping does not 
produce a ranking of the best team members of the management team. Indeed, the 
positioning at the top right on the mapping could mean a positioning of great value 
but in reality if all the managers are located on this same quadrant, then the manageri-
al group is probably unbalanced. 
3 Analysis provided by the mapping tool
The mapping tool provides two levels of analysis. The first level concerns the 
analysis of each manager integrative posture and the detection of some possible inte-
grative relay. The second level of analysis concerns the overall configuration in which 
the management team is.
3.1 Managers level of analysis
Using our mapping technique, one manager is positioned on a two-dimensional 
plane (D1 and D2). There are several scenarios appearing (see figure 1).
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Fig. 1. 4 integrative postures
A manager could be located in the bottom right quadrant (manager M1) has a clear
systemic way of reasoning. Problem solving is approached regarding the situation in 
its complexity and trying not to reduce it by partitioning the problem into sub-
problems. However, the manager limits his/her analysis to a local scale, possibly cen-
tered on his/her very close environment. This differentiates him/her from the manager 
M2 located at the top right quadrant. M2 broadens his/her field of analysis by integrat-
ing, in a holistic approach, the environment possibly very far from him/her. The M3
manager located in the top left quadrant is an analytical strategist who has a broad 
scope of analysis but who simplifies problems by partitioning them. The M4 manager 
is no less good. He/she has a mode of reasoning which gives primacy to the ground,
the environment close (the team more than the external environment) and the simpli-
fication of problems.
The interest of this mapping is to show combinations of postures. Each position on 
the mapping has its limitations and advantages. It would be a bit simplistic to think 
that only the manager M2 is interesting. He/she is somewhat potentially disconnected 
from the local levels of analysis. On the other hand, it is useful to set up heterogene-
ous management teams on integrative postures. Some managers in intermediate posi-
tions, such as the manager M5, then play the role of integration relay between other 
managers (M2 and M4 for example) to enrich the process of problem solving.
3.2 Towards a typology of configurations
The second level of analysis consists in studying the configuration to which the 
management team belongs. We mainly identify 4 situations (cf. figure 2).
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Fig. 2. 4 types of management team configurations
Integrative team: managers deal with issues consistent with their level of responsi-
bility and function within the organization. Managers of group #1 (local managers) 
are task-oriented and self-centred. Managers of group #2 (middle managers) address 
coordination issues with respect to individual and local issues. Managers of group #3
(top managers) are open to their environment and make the connection with the inter-
nal issues with the relay of managers of group #2. The basic recommendation there is 
the mixing of managers in working groups. Managers working group work if and only 
if, the integration relays exist.
Enclave team: each manager addresses issues at a level consistent with his / her re-
sponsibilities. The ability of cooperation is totally atrophied; managers are very fo-
cused on their entity or business, unaware of the links between their own issues and 
those of other enclaves. Integration relays are therefore lacking. The different en-
claves operate in silos, unconnected with each other. If the top management for ex-
ample is able to understand global issues and adopt a real strategic vision of the or-
ganization, it is disconnected with local constraints and challenges. In this case, the 
intervention of external agent for problem structuring (vs. solving) could be a smart 
way to re-introduce complexity in analysis.
Satellite team: the managers of group #3 occupy an elevated position on the right-
hand side of the mapping and they are alone there. This corresponds to an awareness 
of the comprehensiveness of situations and a perfect ability to perceive the interde-
pendence between the different variables of its internal and external environment. 
Other managers have a narrow and confined vision of their own entity or business 
scope, without awareness of interdependencies. In this type of configuration, the 
transverse processes of cooperation are absent. The managers of group #3 are the 
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central core through which operates integration; they alone support the implementa-
tion of internal cooperation mechanisms, descending type of mechanisms. 
Strategists’ team: each manager has knowledge about global concerns; operational 
issues are not considered. The operationalization is anarchic since it has been aban-
doned by the different categories of managers. Local managers are away from their 
teams; operators must take ownership of the issues neglected by their context and 
assume some responsibilities (in a non official way). Mutual informal adjustment 
mechanisms emerge. Regarding global issues, tensions situations or situations of con-
flict can arise between different categories of manager, all occupying the same territo-
ry. The legitimacy of management in its function is tarnished, other managers inter-
fering with problem solving processes theoretically assigned to the top management.
4 Conclusion
Naturally several questions quickly emerge from such a mapping. This is a photo 
realized instantly. The position of managers on the mapping has no reason to remain 
stable over time. Learning phenomena lead managers to evolve, becoming aware of 
the complexity of situations or on the contrary becoming aware of the possibilities of 
segmenting different categories of problems.
This leads to the perspective of being able to simplify the procedure used to build 
the mapping, looking for a less time consuming procedure that enables to draw the 
mapping very fast and very frequently.
One last point concerns the uses that could be made of this tool. Other uses of the 
mapping may be found. We did not explore for example uses in human resources 
management: recruitment, training needs identification, etc. However we insist on the 
fact that the tool focuses on the integrative dimension of managerial work, which is 
part of the manager job. Moreover, the mapping tool does not take into account the 
various influence of the environment on the integrative skills. It only gives a photo of 
them without any possibility to highlight the various influences on them. 
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Abstract. The paper introduces and applies a hybrid procedure for group multi-
criteria decision analysis that consolidates a moderated Delphi process with an 
autonomous aggregation-disaggregation mechanism. It defines appropriate
metrics, operators and algorithms to operationalize all steps of the hybrid 
procedure. The research is based on the assumption that both consolidated 
approaches can lead to synergistic effects when properly combined. It justifies 
the hybrid procedure by assessing it with a preliminary qualitative study, which 
compares the three approaches with regard to a universal framework for the 
evaluation of group decision-making methods and systems.
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1 Introduction
A wide variety of approaches to individual and group decision-making exist. Two 
of them are the Delphi technique [15] and the aggregation-disaggregation analysis 
[14, 18], which are based on diverse core principles. Delphi is a technique of creative 
thinking, group problem solving and asynchronous communication. It aggregates the 
opinions of individual group members over several consecutive iterations based on 
the provided feedback. The disaggregation analysis is based on the presumption that 
the decision is already known, so it aims at constructing a preference model from 
global holistic judgements. It has been initially designed for multi-criteria decision 
analysis in non-group settings, however it was latter applied to many group decision-
making problems as well [16, 17]. Although the two approaches are substantially 
different in concepts, and consequently exhibit fairly unrelated properties, it is the key 
assumption of the presented research study that they can be, at least to some extent, 
efficiently combined to lead to synergistic effects. The research goal is hence to 
introduce and apply an iterative hybrid procedure for quantitative group multi-criteria 
decision analysis that consolidates an autonomous aggregation-disaggregation 
algorithm with a moderated Delphi process. Additional goals of the paper are:
1. to operationalize steps of the hybrid procedure by defining appropriate algorithms, 
operators and metrics, where the focus is on preference specification, preference 
aggregation, analysis of (dis)agreements, sensitivity/robustness analysis,
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communication, and adjustment of parameters and holistic decisions based on 
preference disaggregation and relaxation of constraints;
2. to compare the synergistic hybrid procedure with a generic autonomous and fully 
automated group aggregation-disaggregation procedure, and a generic moderated 
Delphi procedure that is adapted to multi-criteria decision analysis;
3. to justify the synergistic hybrid procedure by means of a preliminary qualitative 
efficiency evaluation with regard to a universal framework for the assessment of 
group decision-making methods and systems [4].
Some aspects of the study have already been presented in the past [3]. This paper,
however, (1.) defines the approach completely and thoroughly, (2.) fully 
operationalizes the hybrid procedure algorithmically and methodologically, and (3.)
provides an application of the procedure. Moreover, although research results have 
been partially presented at a previous conference, they are not available in any 
publication.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the generic Delphi 
and aggregation-disaggregation procedures, respectively. Because these procedures 
are existing approaches to group decision-making, Section 2 also includes a literature 
review. In Section 3, the hybrid procedure is defined and operationalized. It is applied 
in Section 4, while Section 5 makes a preliminary comparison of the three approaches 
and specifies a model to evaluate their efficiency. Finally, Section 6 concludes the 
paper with a brief summary, some remarks and directions for further work. It should 
be noted that several details on the hybrid procedure are omitted as a consequence of 
the length limit of a short paper.
2 Review of literature on consolidated existing approaches
2.1 Delphi method and Delphi processes
Delphi is a structured technique of creative thinking, group problem solving, and 
asynchronous communication [12, 15]. It is primarily designed to predict future 
events, but it can be adopted for different purposes, such as identification of 
alternative solutions, specification of common goals and values, information 
gathering, and multi-criteria decision-making. Its key characteristics are anonymity of 
the participants, structured information flow of contributions made by the individuals, 
regular feedback, moderation, facilitation, and asynchronous interaction [19]. In a 
Delphi organised process, judgements of individual group members are aggregated 
over several consecutive iterations, so that participants can modify and unify their 
opinions on the basis of the provided feedback. Delphi hence consists of a sequence 
of questionnaires, in which statistics are calculated based on the answers of the last
iteration. Compiled statistical information allows each group member to analyse, 
reconsider and improve personal judgements. In addition, a human facilitator is 
actively involved to aid group members in understanding their common objectives,
and to help identify and eliminate conflicts.
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The most common statistical and predictive metrics in Delphi are the measures of 
central tendency, such as the median, left quartile and right quartile. These metrics 
can present deviations of alternatives and preferential parameters with regard to the 
group of decision-makers in the case when Delphi is applied to multi-criteria decision 
analysis based on numerical preferences. In this way, statistical measures indicate the 
common opinion of the group and the direction in which the group is heading.
Collective learning is also enabled by giving the focus on judgements that are the 
primary source of disagreements. The perception of statistical measures of central 
tendency is a part of a broader analysis of judgements, which should be aided by a 
moderator and thoroughly supported in a computer based Delphi process with 
advanced techniques for interactive sensitivity analysis and visualization, such as 
presented in [7, 13].
2.2 Aggregation-disaggregation analysis
The disaggregation approach is confronted with problems from the opposite 
direction as the traditional multi-criteria decision-making paradigm [18]. It is based 
on the presumption that the decision is already known, so it tries to find a rational 
basis underlying this decision in the form of a preference model. By answering the 
question "How should the preferential model of the decision-maker be specified, so 
that it would result in the same decision as the one that is already made?", the 
disaggregation analysis aims at building a multi-criteria model from global 
preferential judgements regarding a limited subset of referential alternatives which the 
decision-maker is able to unambiguously evaluate. The reference set of alternatives
consists of real decisions providing necessary information on the problem-solving 
heuristics. It can be a set of available, fictitious or past alternatives.
However, the disaggregation analysis does not suffice to reach any decision, since 
it merely induces preferential information in the form of input parameters. For this 
reason, it has to be combined with the process of preference aggregation. The 
aggregation-disaggregation approach thus introduces two diametral and interchanging 
phases that (1.) construct a preference model from global holistic judgements
(preference structures) of decision-makers that pertain to a limited referential set of 
evaluated alternatives, and (2.) synthesize induced preferential information into the 
decision that is valid for an arbitrary set of non-referential alternatives. Iterativeness 
of aggregation and disaggregation phases has the effect of deepening the individual’s 
knowledge and improving his comprehension of preferences, so it allows for con-
structive learning [10, 11]. Although the aggregation-disaggregation analysis 
originates from the domain of individual multi-criteria decision analysis, it has also 
been applied to group decision-making [6, 8, 9, 16, 17].
In contrast to the Delphi procedure, the aggregation-disaggregation procedure for 
group decision-making exhibits a higher degree of autonomy. The decision-makers 
have to specify only initial values of preferential parameters and constraints on these 
parameters. Afterwards, the decision support system is able to autonomously identify, 
analyse and resolve discrepancies among group members. In most cases, it can 
achieve a full automatic convergence towards a consensual solution by iteratively 
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adjusting preferential parameters of contradictive group members within the defined 
constraints, and in accordance with the collective opinion of the decision-making 
group. Statistical experiments have shown a high ability of autonomous guidance, 
conflict resolution, and convergence of opinions [4, 5] for a consensus seeking
aggregation-disaggregation analysis based procedure, which has been introduced 
within the scope of our past research work [6]. It is essential for such a procedure to 
implement appropriate metrics to identify (dis)agreements in the decision-making 
group, and to assess the robustness of individual judgements [2].
3 Hybrid procedure
A major weakness of the Delphi procedure is that it requires considerable cognitive 
effort and intensive manual problem solving from the human moderator and decision-
makers. The main drawback of the autonomous aggregation-disaggregation 
procedure, on the other hand, is that in some cases it is not able to automatically
converge towards a consensual solution due to large discrepancies in the decision-
making group and too strict constraints on preferential parameters. For this reason, we 
propose the synergistic hybrid procedure which consolidates both approaches by,
presumably, removing their weaknesses and emphasizing their strengths. The hybrid 
procedure is outlined on Figure 1. Mathematical definitions of algorithms, operators 
and metrics are excluded as they would exceed the scope of a short paper.
The aggregation, disaggregation and Delphi phases/steps are complementary in the 
hybrid procedure. They interchange sequentially and iteratively in order to efficiently 
utilize the concepts of autonomous consensus seeking, constructive learning, problem 
and preference structuring, computer aided synchronous and asynchronous 
communication, and decision analysis. At first, the hybrid procedure tries to find the 
concensual solution automatically with regard to the constraints on preferential 
parameters, robustness of preferences and alternatives, uniformity and discrepancies 
among group members, and the direction into which the group is heading. If a 
complete consensus is not possible, it provides the decision-makers with metrical and 
statistical data, as well as analytical capabilities. The decision-makers are able to 
thoroughly analyse and communicate the parameters of the problem situation in a 
moderated session, and consequently improve their knowledge, comprehension and 
judgements. They can actively approve or reject adjustments that are autonomously 
proposed by the decision support system, and modify their individual values, either in 
the form of preferential parameters or reconsidered holistic decisions, in order to 
conform to the majority opinion, or to slightly force the collective opinion to move 
into a different, possibly more promissing direction.
If at least one group member is willing to conform to the majority opinion during 
the Delphi phase, the procedure continues with the disaggregation phase in which it 
attempts to infer new values of preferential parameters by obeying the constraints that 
were preliminary set by the decision-makers. In the case that the solution is not 
feasible, it is the decision-makers' turn to relax the constraints. When the constraints 
are successfully relaxed, the disaggregation analysis is performed again for the 
changed setting, otherwise the aggregation and Delphi phases are iteratively repeated.
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Fig. 1. Hybrid procedure
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If no group member is willing to conform during the Delphi phase, the hybrid
procedure autonomously determines the most discordant decision-maker with non-
robust preferences. The moderator is given the opportunity to approve the suitability 
of this individual to align with the group. According to the moderator's decision, the 
group member may be skipped, and the next most discordant one chosen for 
conformation.
The procedure eventually ends with a consensus, a satisfactory compromise, or 
without a commonly accepted solution. However, it can be argued that the possibility 
of the least desirable last outcome is substantially smaller as in the case of the generic 
Delphi procedure or the generic aggregation-disaggregation procedure. Moreover, the 
hybrid procedure applies several complementary mechanisms that enhance the quality 
of the problem solving process, even if an unanimous decision cannot be reached.
4 Practical example
This section provides a brief example on the application of the proposed procedure. 
Some of the key concepts are presented with regard to the first iteration of the group 
decision-making process. A broader and more thorough presentation would exceed 
the scope of a short paper. It can be obtained upon a request from the author.
The goal of the decision-making process is to collectively select a subcontractor for 
a software development project. The decision-making group consists of six decision-
makers, who represent middle management, domain analysts and technical experts. 
They are able to choose from the set of eight alternatives. For clarity, only five criteria 
are considered, which include costs, required time, number of successfully completed 
referential projects, experience with similar applications, and suitability of technology 
and architecture. All criteria are quantitative. If a non-boolean criterion is not directly 
measurable, as for example experience with similar applications, it is assessed on a 
numerical scale of [0, 100]. Preferences are elicited in the form of an outranking 
model, however the specified values and constraints of preferentail parameters are 
omitted in this section. After the aggregation of initial preferences, the decision 
support system calculates metrical and statistical data based on a number of metrics as 
the input to the Delphi and disaggregation phases.
The first subset of metrics deals with the unanimity of the decision-making group.
Two types of metrics are computed. The degree of consensus pertains to an 
alternative, so that it shows how much uniformity there is among all group members 
with regard to the evaluation of this single alternative. The agreement degree 
expresses to what extent an individual decision-maker is concordant with all other 
members of the group. The consensus and agreement degrees are summarized in 
Table 1 and Table 2.
Table 1. Consensus degrees.
Alternative a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8
Degree of consensus 0.333 0.000 0.333 0.667 0.333 1.000 0.667 0.333
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Table 2. Agreement degrees.
Decision-maker DM1 DM2 DM3 DM4 DM5 DM6
Degree of agreement 0.338 0.188 0.538 0.388 0.388 0.538
The robustness degrees in Table 3 indicate to what extent the values of preferential 
parameters must be modified for different decision-makers so that rankings or 
assignments of alternatives, respectively, are forced to change.
Table 3. Robustness degrees.
Alternative DM1 DM2 DM3 DM4 DM5 DM6
a1 1.000 0.263 0.434 0.145 1.000 0.608
a2 0.443 0.399 0.225 0.102 1.000 0.020
a3 1.000 0.053 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.742
a4 0.413 0.194 0.202 0.092 0.246 1.000
a5 0.357 0.345 0.044 0.115 0.321 0.436
a6 1.000 0.541 1.000 0.366 1.000 1.000
a7 1.000 0.288 0.422 0.172 1.000 0.231
a8 0.172 0.724 0.263 0.408 0.142 0.439
Based on the agreement and robustness degrees, the decision support system can 
autonomously determine which decision-makers should be asked to conform to the 
collective opinion of the group. As it is presented in Table 4, the decision-makers are 
ordered by the descending suitability for conformance, from the one whose 
judgements are the most contradictive, and are not based on sufficiently robust 
preferential information. The details for the most discordant decision-maker are 
shown in Table 5, where alternative a2 is considered as moderately robust, and hence 
not approprite for reevaluation.
Table 4. Conformations of decision-makers.
Rank order of DMs for conformation DM2 DM4 DM1 DM5 DM3 DM6
Reevaluation of alternatives feasible Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 5. Parameters of the disaggregation analysis for the most discordant decision-maker.
Alternative a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8
Value 0.688 0.725 0.600 0.750 0.700 0.267 0.588 0.900
Degree of robustness 0.263 0.399 0.053 0.194 0.345 0.541 0.288 0.724
Degree of agreement 0.200 0.400 0.200 0.000 0.600 1.000 0.000 0.600
Reevaluation required Yes No Yes Yes No No Yes No
It is possible that only a few, or even none, of the decision-makers are capable or 
willing to conform to the group, at least according to the results of autonomous 
calculation. In such cases it is crucial to additionally observe and analyse the 
statistical Delphi measures of central tendency, and to manually reconsider and 
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readjust personal preferences with the aid of moderated communication. Tables 6 to 8 
present the Delphi statistics for the first iteration of the decision-making process.
Table 6. Central tendency measures for criteria weights.
Criterion x1 x2 x3 x4 x5
Min 0.100 0.050 0.100 0.200 0.100
Max 0.400 0.300 0.250 0.300 0.300
Mean 0.242 0.183 0.167 0.217 0.192
SD 0.093 0.085 0.055 0.037 0.061
Table 7. Central tendency measures for cardinal assessments of alternatives.
Alternative a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8
Min 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.316
Max 0.688 0.725 0.600 0.750 0.886 0.267 0.588 0.900
Mean 0.286 0.342 0.212 0.364 0.467 0.089 0.260 0.644
SD 0.258 0.278 0.248 0.232 0.321 0.115 0.208 0.235
Table 8. Central tendency measures for rankings of alternatives.
Alternative a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8
Min 2 3 4 2 1 4 4 1
Max 5 6 8 7 4 8 7 2
Median 5 4 6 3 3 7 5 1
After the adjustments are confirmed by the moderator and decision-makers in the 
Delphi phase, the decision support system infers new values of preferential 
parameters in the disaggregation phase. If consensus is not reached in the current 
iteration, a new subsequent iteration is started. Table 9 shows that the decision-
making process converges towards a near consensual solution in seven iterations.
Table 9. Convergence of opinions towards the consensus.
Iteration 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Total consensus 0.458 0.625 0.750 0.792 0.833 0.875 0.917
5 Comparison and preliminary evaluation of approaches
Figure 2 presents a phase based comparison of procedures. It shows that the design 
of all three approaches utilizes almost the same key decison-making phases. In this 
regard, the procedures are directly comparable. Delphi lacks the disaggregation phase, 
while the aggregation-disaggregation analysis does not support any communication 
mechanisms and manual analytical capabilities. The hybrid procedure consolidates 
and unifies all phases, which could lead to synergistic effects.
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Fig. 2. Phase based comparison of procedures
In order to assess the efficiency of the proposed hybrid procedure and to justify its 
application, the general framework for the evaluation of group decision methods and 
systems [4] may be used. A preliminary descriptive comparison of the three 
approaches has already been made with regard to many criteria that deal with ability 
of autonomous guidance, conflict resolution, convergence of opinions, fairness,
communication efficiency, asynchronous interaction, complexity of analysis,
credibility and thoroughness of analysis, accuracy and validity of output data,
robustness, problem abstraction, focus on problem solving, and ability to learn.
6 Conclusion
Group multi-criteria decision-making processes may be supported either by the 
Delphi method or by the aggregation-disaggregation analysis. It was shown that both 
approaches can be combined. The proposed hybrid procedure is designed to result in 
the synergy of all key concepts of both "philosophies", in such a way that majority of
drawbacks are overcome, while benefits are emphasized. However, although a 
relevant set of assessment criteria was identified, the hybrid procedure was only 
assessed preliminary in a less formal descriptive manner. For this reason, its
efficiency will be more thoroughly evaluated with a simulation study and a case based 
study of real-life decision-making problems within the scope of further research work.
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Abstract: This paper reports on a global study investigating the assimilation 
and impacts of Collaborative Information Technologies (CITs).  We identify 
four states in the assimilation of CITs including: limited assimilation, lagging 
assimilation, focused assimilation, and pervasive assimilation. Our aggregate 
analysis of data collected from 607 organizations in Australia, Canada, Hong 
Kong, and the US provides the state of global CIT assimilation. Furthermore, 
we found significant differences in perceived organizational impacts of CITs 
between limited and pervasive assimilation states. Implications of our findings 
are discussed for research and practice. 
Keywords: collaboration information technologies, assimilation, impacts.
1   Introduction
Information Technology (IT) enabled collaboration continues to gain popularity in 
organizations around the globe. Commonly known as Collaborative Information 
Technologies (CITs), these applications can support teams (co-located or virtual) 
working together to accomplish common tasks irrespective of time, distance, and 
organizational barriers. The global market for CITs was estimated to reach almost 
$20 billion by 2015, resulting in a CAGR of 10.4% 
(http://www.marketsandmarkets.com/Market-Reports/web-conferencing-388.html).
Future forecasts for some regions (U.S., Germany, UK, Italy, Russia, China, India, 
Japan, South Korea, Brazil, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and South Africa) are 
equally promising as predictions suggest a 13% CAGR from 2016 to 2024, exceeding 
$8.5 billion by 2024 in these regions (https://www.gminsights.com/industry-
analysis/collaboration-software-market). Over the years, CITs have received a lot of 
attention from practitioners and academic researchers (for a review, see [3] and [4]). 
However, despite their widespread reach and growing popularity, exploring CIT 
assimilation and their organizational level impacts have not been globally researched. 
Our research attempts to fill this void. 
There are many CITs available on the marketplace. Our study focused on four 
clusters of CITs that include: 
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x Conferencing technologies (for example, GoToMeetings, WebEx, MS office Live 
Meeting, CU-SEEME, Evoke, Skype, Windows Live Messenger, AIM, etc.)
x Technologies supporting online communities (for example, Intranets, Listservers, 
Newsgroups, Blogs, eGroups, Open Topics, etc.)
x Proprietary groupware (for example, IBM Lotus Notes when used beyond email, 
Novell Groupwise, Oracle Collaboration Suite, MS SharePoint, etc.), and 
x Electronic meeting systems (GroupSystems, MeetingWorks, Facilitate.com, etc.).
2 Study Methodology
In the first phase, we undertook case studies to understand more about collaboration,
how CITs were used in organizational settings, and their potential impacts. Next, we 
deployed the approach suggested by Sethi and King [5] to develop a survey 
instrument. This included an extensive review of the literature to identify CIT impacts 
(case studies, practitioner reports, and empirical studies of CITs). The first phase
provided inputs to the second phase where we developed a survey instrument to 
assess CIT assimilation and their potential impacts on organizations. In the third 
phase, the survey instrument was pilot tested in three organizations. Feedback from 
the pilot test was used to slightly modify the survey instrument for clarity of the item 
measures. In the fourth phase, data was collected in four global regions including, 
Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, and the USA over a period of 4 years.
The survey instrument was mailed to the CIOs of the top 500 Australian 
organizations. In Hong Kong, it was mailed to the highest ranking MIS manager in 
the top 400 organizations. In Canada and the USA, an electronic mailing was sent to 
member organizations of Ziff Davis, Inc. A cover letter accompanying the survey 
identified the broad purpose of the study and requested the recipients to forward the 
survey to the person most knowledgeable about IT-supported collaboration in their 
respective organizations.  Clear instructions and definitions of terms and concepts 
were provided on the survey to assist and guide respondents. Multiple mailings and 
reminders were sent out to boost response rates in all the regions. We received 
responses from 73 organizations in Australia, 55 organizations in Canada, 94 
organizations in Hong Kong, and 385 organizations in the USA (see figure 1).
Fig. 1. Regional responses
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Four hundred and fifty three respondents identified their managerial position. 
These positions were categorized into three management levels. Top tier level 
included responses from Presidents, CIOs, CFOs, COOs, vice presidents, and 
directors. Middle tier included responses from general managers, administrators, and 
managers from functional areas. Lower tier included responses from senior analysts, 
engineers, consultants, and other supervisory positions. Figure 2 shows the 
management level of the respondents. Thirty three percent of our respondents 
belonged to the top tier and 41 percent to the middle tier. 
Fig. 2. Management levels of respondents
3 Organizational Assimilation of CITs
We collected data on the extent to which each of the four CIT clusters were 
accessible and used by end-users for collaboration in their respective organizations. 
We deployed a five point scale (1 = no one, 2, 3 = some people, 4, 5 = everyone) to 
measure access. Another 5-point scale (1= not used, 2, 3 = occasionally used, 4, 5 = 
always used) was deployed to measure the use of each of the four CIT clusters. The 
original 5-point scales were converted to 4-point scales to exclude those firms that 
provided no access and no use of any of the four CIT clusters. The means (ascending 
order) of responses from the global sample are shown in figure 3. The results indicate 
that conferencing technologies have the highest access and use while electronic 
meeting systems have the lowest access and use. 
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Fig. 3. Organizational access and use of CITs
Based on the level of access and use, an assimilation framework [1] was deployed 
to map the assimilation patterns of CITs. For simplicity, mid- points of the 
measurement scales were used as the cut-off points for low and high levels of access 
and use of CITs. Figure 4 shows the four assimilation states. According to innovation 
theory, once CITs are adopted, they can remain in the limited assimilation state or 
transition from limited to lagging (and finally) to pervasive states or they can 
transition from limited to focused (and finally) to pervasive states. Depending upon 
assimilation trends, it is plausible that each state may present itself as the end state in 
the assimilation of CITs. Therefore, transitioning from limited assimilation to other 
stages is not necessarily a natural phenomenon that is dictated by time. There can be 
several barriers to CIT assimilation. For example, cost, technical support, usefulness 
of CIT, negative impacts (increased information overload, increased fragmentation of 
work, decreased management control, decreased independence etc.) may impede
assimilation in organizations who may choose to retain limited assimilation status
rather than transition to other states.
Five hundred and forty-two firms in our sample were classified in the framework.
The remaining 65 firms did not provide information on both access and use of CITs.
Limited assimilation represents low CIT access and use. Two hundred and forty one 
(44.5%) of the firms were categorized in this state, indicating that the majority of the 
firms in our global sample provided access to only some end-users who used the CITs 
occasionally or less frequently to collaborate. 
1,0 2,0 3,0 4,0
Conferencing technologies
Technologies to support online
communities
Proprietary groupware
Electronic meeting systems
Use
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Fig. 4. CIT assimilation framework 
Lagging assimilation represents a state where CITs are made accessible to more 
than some end-users who use them occasionally or less frequently to collaborate.  One 
hundred of the firms (18.5%) in our sample were categorized in this state. Focused
assimilation represents a state where CITs are accessible to some end-users who use 
them more than occasionally to collaborate. Only 23 (4.4%) of the firms were 
categorized in this state. Pervasive assimilation represents a state where CITs are 
accessible to more than some end-users who use them more than occasionally to 
collaborate. One hundred and seventy seven firms (32.7%) were categorized in this 
state, indicating that many firms in our global sample have the highest (perhaps 
desired) assimilation level of CITs. 
4 Perceived Impacts of CITs
After reviewing the literature, we identified 14 potential impacts (internal and 
external) resulting from the use of CITs. These included: improvements in existing 
products/services, improved relationships with customers, suppliers, and business 
partners, improvements in existing business processes, structural changes, time 
savings, quick reaction to changes, increase peed of decision-making, increased 
productivity, appropriate responses to changes, facilitation of innovations, improved 
quality of decisions, and marketing the right products/services.  
We deployed a five point Likert-type scale (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 
= neutral, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree) to measure the level of agreement with each 
of the impacts resulting from the use of CITs. There was higher agreement with time 
saving to accomplish tasks, improvements in existing products/services, improved 
relationships with customers, and improved business processes than with any of the 
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other impacts. Figure 5 shows the impacts of CITs in limited and pervasive
assimilation states.
Fig. 5. Organization impacts of CITs in limited and pervasive assimilation
5 Discussion and Implications
From the standpoint of CIT assimilation, our findings provide a benchmark for the 
state of organization-level collaboration. Business and IT executives can benefit from 
assessing the current state of collaboration and the reach of CITs in their own 
organizations.  We have deployed the IT assimilation framework [1] to identify four 
CIT assimilation states. In our sample, the majority of the organizations were 
classified in the limited assimilation state. Even though collaboration could be driven 
by users, business partners, in-house IT professionals, or vendors/consultants, 
business executives may have to take a leading role in providing an impetus to resolve 
CIT assimilation issues in this state. They need to assess the desired level of 
collaboration to accomplish organizational goals and objectives in order to sustain 
their competitiveness and then create the context that promotes collaboration. 
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Although focused and lagging states are expected to be transitional in nature (only 
22.9% of the organizations were classified in these states), organizations may “freeze” 
in these states for an undesirably longer period of time. In the lagging state, 
organizations may be constrained by the inadequacy of cultivating a culture for CIT 
use. Simply providing access to CITs does not necessarily result in greater level of 
use. The role of business executives should be to nurture a collaborative culture while 
IT executives should promote greater awareness of CITs and end-user support for 
collaboration if these organizations desire to transition to the pervasive state. After all, 
the corporate culture is critical to either support or inhibit innovations in IT [6]. In the 
focused state, CITs are used more than occasionally but only by some employees. The 
CIT culture is prevalent in patches in these organizations. Organizations in the 
pervasive assimilation view collaboration as the key (a critical factor) to enhance 
organizational performance and improve competitive positioning. Collaboration is 
tightly inter-twined with their organization’s capabilities and strategy. Executives 
must address the growing popularity of conferencing technologies and technologies 
supporting online communities as the proliferation of intelligent handheld devices 
increases world-wide. Use of traditional CITs like electronic meeting systems and 
proprietary groupware is likely to be less extensive as they are expensive, propriety in
nature, hard to use, and therefore may not support a wide range of collaboration 
activities and expectations. 
From CIT impacts standpoint, all of them are significant as there is more 
agreement than disagreement in our responses. Our findings at the organization-level 
are consistent with research that suggests a positive impact of CITs on collaboration 
quality and performance, including reduced time, better decision quality, improved 
relationship, and decreased cost [2]. As for the implications, business executives 
must recognize the potential of CITs from a strategic standpoint. Our research has 
identified fourteen impacts of CIT use. These impacts can be viewed as internal and 
external. 
The internal impacts enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the organization.  
Some of these impacts (time savings to accomplish tasks, accomplishing more work,
increased speed of decision making etc.) can be realized in the short-term. Others 
(improvements in existing business processes and existing products/services, quality 
of decision-making, facilitating innovations, quick reaction to changes, and flatter 
organization structure etc.) are long-term impacts.
External impacts on the other hand, lead to better competitive positioning. For 
example, improvements in relations with suppliers, customers, and business partners
can increase the transparency in the value chain. As a result, organizations can better 
leverage the competitive forces to maximize wealth for all the entities in the value 
chain. It must be pointed out that these external impacts can also have significant 
influences on some internal impacts. For example, improving relationships with 
customers by collaborating with them could lead to improvements in existing 
products and services. IT executives, on the other hand, must understand that the 
potential scope of organizational collaboration extends across organizational 
boundaries. Accordingly, they must appropriately address the scalability of their 
organization’s IT infrastructure, security issues (as data and information is exchanged 
over the Internet), network management, end-user support, and vendor support for 
successful collaboration.
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5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have extended our previous reach by investigating CIT assimilation 
and their impacts as a global phenomenon. We have intentionally not tried to make 
any regional comparisons as that research has been presented elsewhere. Our 
objective here was to present aggregate results from data collected in four global 
regions. 
Collaboration is a complex phenomenon. However, CITs have the capabilities to 
support many collaboration activities and their use can have a wide range of impacts, 
both internally and externally. Our study provides evidence to support this notion. The 
CIT assimilation framework can be useful to understand diffusion patterns and to 
assess the current state of IT-enabled collaboration at the organizational level.
Business and IT executives should critically address the potential of CITs in their 
respective organization, as these technologies can enhance organizational 
performance and improve relationships with other entities in the value chain. Our 
findings provide valuable insights for executives as they embark upon CIT 
assimilation efforts.
Despite the contributions, our research has some limitations. First, our research is 
exploratory in nature and we have not proposed any hypothesis to confirm causal 
relationships. Second, the data was collected over a long period of time and there 
could be some lag effects of CIT assimilation in the study regions. Third, a single 
respondent was used to collect data in each organization. While we made every effort 
to reach the respondent most knowledgeable about CIT assimilation in each 
organization, our survey could have been misdirected. Finally, the majority (63%) of 
our respondents belonged to organizations in the USA. Given the global focus of our 
research, it is plausible that our results could be biased. Nevertheless, our study 
furthers research on global CIT assimilation and their organization level impacts. 
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Abstract. Configuration of a system for decision making problem which 
facilitates decision process and enables users to get higher quality advantages is 
a deal always in academic communities. This paper deals with proposing and 
constructing decision making system performing online software. The system 
implements the algorithm of MOORA and COPRAS techniques with an 
example of robot selection to test the applicability and validate multi criteria 
decision problem results. Results shows COPRAS and MOORA ranking of 
robots are very close to each other especially the 1st and second top 
alternatives. The software can be extended to the other decision making 
problems as well.
Keywords: decision support system (DSS), multiple criteria decision making 
(MCDM), complex proportional assessment (COPRAS), multi objective 
optimization based on ratio analysis (MOORA), STROMa (SysTem of 
RecOmmendation Multi-criteria)
1 Short Introduction
Operation research is a discipline with wide range of concepts and logics from 
mathematical modelling and programming to efficiency and productivity 
measurement in order to aid us in complex and parametric decision problems. 
Multiple criteria decision making (Thery and Zarate, 2009; Yazdani et al. 2017) 
family as a major category of operation research has been discussed in order to 
facilitate evaluation and selection problems. Adopted algorithms, integrated formulas 
along to mathematical and logical approaches lead to the development of decision 
making methods. Multiple criteria decision making (MCDM) forms a perspective in 
decision theory which facilitates business processes in practice (Ghorabaee et al. 
2017; Mardani et al. 2016) Zavadskas and Turskis (2011) believe developing 
economics, changing environment, sustainability of decisions are the reasons to 
develop new operation research techniques and specifically decision making 
approaches. A decision support system is defined a database, algorithm and user 
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interface within a computer or operating system which can handle the whole decision 
making process in a visualized form. It can enhance quality and reliability of decision 
system.  
In the real world issues, to overcome the complexity of the decision problem, we 
need to utilize the methods that are user-friendly and consider less computation to 
achieve the reliable solution. Mostly some decision support system comes up with 
simple methods like weighted product or simple additive tools. Rather than this the 
literature is saturated of using TOPSIS, VIKOR and other classical tools, so it is the 
moment to propose and validate to the more recent developed tools. This paper aims 
at finding solution for a typical decision making problem using two well-developed 
methods as complex proportional assessment (COPRAS) (Zavadskas et al. 1994) and 
multi objective optimization based on ratio analysis (MOORA) (Brauers and 
Zavadskas, 2006; Zavadskas et al. 2014). To get information and review of these 
methods, it is accessible (Brauers et al. 2008). The two methods have been employed 
in different decision making problems. Yazdani et al. (2017) studied on the affection 
of several normalization tools on COPRAS method.  Moreover, in a supply chain, 
COPRAS has been applied with other methods to compare and release the 
performance of suppliers (Tavana et al. 2017). The application of the both MOORA 
and COPARS has been demonstrated in the evaluation of suppliers in a dairy 
company (Yazdani et al. 2017). The COPRAS method is a tool which originates from 
ratio and partial proportion of ideal parameters, while MOORA comes from a multi 
objective assessment which is able to distinguish negative and positive impact of 
criteria. As these two methods have been developed by same research group and are 
almost well-designed by MCDM configuration, they are chosen to be compared in a 
decision support framework. In addition, the difference of both methods algorithm 
can be realized in a common platform. Therefore, it is shown that the selected 
methods are validated and approved in a higher quality research. The application of 
integrated MCDM tool in a decision support framework is observed in advanced 
studies (Fallahpour et al. 2017; Ignatius et al. 206). The contribution of this article is 
the implementation of aforementioned methods in a decision support system in order 
to build a dashboard for easier data gathering and effective outcomes. This system is 
interpreted in the implementation part. 
The paper is organized as this; section 2 presents main decision making tools as 
MOORA and COPRAS. Thereafter, implementation of DSS and a numerical example 
about robot selection problem is presented. Finally, a conclusion ends this paper and 
suggests short tips in section 4.
2 Methodologies
The paper intents to provide a group decision making system to show the performance 
of MCDM tools. The algorithms for two methods can be presented here;
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2.1   Multi-objective optimization based on ratio analysis (MOORA)
MOORA, developed by, is a MCDM method consisting of two phases, namely, the 
reference point approach and the ratio system approach, and allows measuring both 
beneficial and non-beneficial criteria in a process of selecting an alternative from a set 
of alternatives. 
An initial decision matrix whose kj-th element displays the performance rating of 
the k-th alternative ( tk ,,1 K ) upon the j-th decision criterion ( nj ,,1 K ) is 
formed. See the matrix of Eq. (3). Hence:
Step 1. Normalizing the decision matrix. To obtain dimensionless and comparable 
elements in the evaluation process, the kj-th element of the initial matrix are 
normalized using the following equations:
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Step 2. Determining the weighted normalized matrix. The kj-th element of the 
normalized matrix is replaced by the one calculated using the following:
jwkjrkjv                                                                                            (2)  
Step 3. Computing the overall rating of benefit and cost criteria for each 
alternative. The overall rating of the k-th alternative considering the beneficial and 
non-beneficial criteria are calculated implementing Eqs. (12) and (13), respectively:   
¦

 
MaxJj
kjvkS (3)
where MaxJ is the index set of the set of beneficial criteria for which higher values 
are desirable;
¦

  
MinJj
kjk vS (4)
where MinJ is the index set of the set of non-beneficial criteria for which lower 
values are preferable.
Step 4. Evaluating the overall performance of each alternative. The overall 
performance of the k -th alternative is calculated as the difference between the 
overall ratings for beneficial and cost criteria:
  kkk SSS (5)
Step 5. Ranking the alternatives. The kS values form a cardinal scale that can be 
used to compare and rank the alternatives: the higher the value of kS , the more 
preferred is the k-th alternative.
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2.2 COPRAS
COPRAS is another MCDM method which selects the best alternative among a lot of 
feasible alternatives by determining a solution with direct and proportional ratio to the 
best solution to the ratio with the ideal-worst solution (Zavadskas et al., 2007). 
To solve MCDM problem by COPRAS, after determining the alternatives and the 
related criteria, follow steps below;
Step 1 – Normalize the decision matrix: suppose ijx is the decision matrix of 
alternative j under the evaluation criterion i , and then normalized decision matrix is 
here;
¦
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Step 2 – Calculate the weighted normalized decision matrix where iw includes the 
weights of criteria and given by¦
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Step 3 - Identify the sums of weighted normalized criteria values )( jP for each 
alternative whose higher values are more preferable using the following equation; 
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Where k is the number of criteria value, which must to be maximized  
Step 4 - Obtain the sums of weighted normalized criteria values )( jR for each 
alternative whose smaller values are more preferable using the following equation; 
¦
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Where )( kn  is the number of criteria values, which should be minimized
Step 5 – Identify the relative weight of each alternative jQ
¦
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Step 7 – Determine the priority of the alternatives based on the values of jQ . The 
greater amount of jQ declares the higher preference (ranking) of each alternative.
3 Implementation and a DSS
3.1   Implementation
We developed software to implement a decision support system which efficiently 
illustrates decision making process and it has the ability to be extended. The software 
is designed to receive information about decision problem including performance 
rating of the alternatives, weights of each criteria and optimization direction of the 
proposed criteria. As Figure 1 declares, firstly a detail of the decision problem must 
be defined as in “Description” section. The user is asked to specify the type of 
problem choosing whether it is a quantitative or qualitative problem. It is easy to label 
decision problem, define number of decision factors etc. The next step is to compose 
decision matrix which is appeared in “Performance” headline. This task is done 
entering information of the alternatives with respect to each criterion. The whole 
information is thus stored in a database while the algorithm of the proposed MCDM 
method is written by Java computer language. Implementation of these methods is
carried out in the STROMa (SysTem Of RecOmmendation Multi-criteria) application 
(Fomba et al. 2017). STROMa is an integrated web application developed in JSF2 
(JavaServer Faces). The objective is to find the best multi-criteria aggregation 
operator for a given decision problem.
Fig. 1. A decision support dashboard for multi criteria decision problem
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3.2  A numerical example
The paper examines a case example which is related  to  the  selection  of  the  
most  appropriate  industrial  robot (For more information see Chakraborty and 
Zavadskas, 2014). The weights of decision criteria are based on 0.036, 0.192, 0.326, 
0.326 and 0.12, respectively for five criteria. Among five criteria, just C2 is a cost 
criteria and rest of four factors are as benefit indicators. Table 1 shows the data and 
details for a robot selection decision problem including alternative information. The 
weights of decision criteria are shown in Figure 1. We object to solve the decision 
problem using COPRAS and MOORA methods which have been explained in the 
previous section.
Table 1. Example of robot selection problem by Chakraborty and Zavadskas 
(2014)
Alternative robots C1 C2 C3 C4 C5
A1 60 0.4 2540 500 990
A2 6.35 0.15 1016 3000 1041
A3 6.8 0.1 1727.2 1500 1676
A4 10 0.2 1000 2000 965
A5 2.5 0.1 560 500 915
A6 4.5 0.08 1016 350 508
A7 3 0.1 1778 1000 920
As Figure 2 shows the detailed solution of COPRAS methodology is presented. 
The highlighted blue columns are weighted normalized matrix which is according 
formula 7. Then jP and jR values are measured using formulas 8 and 9, respectively. 
Finally jQ values must be produced to release the ranking of robots. The last column 
shows the ranking of the robots as well. Outcomes validate the results with the study 
already done by Chakraborty and Zavadskas, 2014. The same rules are tracked for 
MOORA method as well. It is observed the ranking of MOORA and COPRAS is very 
close while the Spearman correlation coefficient between them is achieved the 
agreement of 0.89. The range is completely acceptable. The software is able to 
present a bar chart to compare alternatives ranking score schematically. This leads 
effective understanding for engineers and experts who desire deeper analysis. 
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Fig. 2. Illustration of COPRAS method
Fig. 3. Illustration of MOORA method
74 Group Decision and Negotiation – GDN 2017
14-18 August 2017, Stuttgart-Hohenheim, Germany
4 Conclusion
Employing technologies and innovative systems aids development a body of 
knowledge. In area of decision making theories and applications, evolution of 
decision support system allows experts and decision makers to get the chance of 
interfacing to a database and facilitating decision process. This short communication 
tries to present application of MCDM methods and their implementation in a decision 
support system. For this, a decision making problem is composed and the solution 
then is validated and visualized by a system called STORMa. Decision problem is 
basically tends to assess robots for a specific usage with respect to some criteria. We 
have solved decision problem with utilization of MOORA and COPRAS techniques 
and tried to enhance the accuracy of the results with implementation of the problem 
by decision-making software. This study suggests the development of other MCDM 
tools like TOPSIS or WASPAS in order to get such improvement in MCDM class. 
In terms of group decision making approach, the decision making can be carried 
out by a team of decision makers to reflect different and integrated opinion of the 
participants. The proposed software and decision support system are enough flexible 
which enable a group of experts to decide efficiently. Therefore, it is possible to 
implement a group decision making structure in order to bring an optimized 
perspective for future research direction.
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Abstract. The Zeuthen-Hicks bargaining model suggests how two par-
ties may reach an agreement by making successive concessions. We an-
alyze under which conditions bargaining steps are actually concessions
(i.e., worsening the payoﬀ to the conceding party) that will eventually
lead to agreement on the Nash bargaining solution. We ﬁrst show that
if both parties have concave utility functions, then the process will con-
verge. Then we show that considering Prospect Theory-like utility func-
tions the Nash criterion can have multiple local optima. We present the
ﬁrst results of a simulation study to analyze the conditions under which
this phenomenon is more frequent.
Keywords: Bargaining, Nash solution, simulation
1 Introduction
Zeuthen-Hicks bargaining [Bishop, 1964] is a simple dynamic bargaining model
that explains how negotiating parties can reach the Nash bargaining solution
[Nash, 1950]. Although the model shows how the ultimate outcome of a bar-
gaining process can be equal to the Nash bargaining solution, it does not make
clear predictions about the bargaining steps that the two parties make. Although
these steps are referred to as “concessions”, it is not clear whether they are really
concessions in the usual sense so that the party making the concession reduces
its utility, and whether the entire process will eventually converge. In particular,
if the model would predict steps that actually take the two parties further apart,
negotiations might eventually end in disagreement
In this work, we analyze under which conditions bargaining steps in Zeuthen-
Hicks bargaining are actual concessions that will lead to agreement on the Nash
bargaining solution. After a brief introduction to the model, we ﬁrst analyze
the case of standard preferences (concave utility functions of both parties) and
show that in this setting the process will always converge. In the next section,
we consider alternative types of utility functions similar to those proposed in
Prospect Theory [Kahneman and Tversky, 1979] and analyze when such prefer-
ences might lead to disagreement.
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2 Zeuthen-Hicks bargaining
The Zeuthen-Hicks model is based on an analysis of individual bargaining steps.
We consider a negotiation between two parties, whom we denote as Buyer (B)
and Seller (S). Consider the problem from the Buyer’s perspective. Within each
bargaining step, the Buyer can decide whether to accept the Seller’s oﬀer xS
or make a counteroﬀer xB . If the opponent’s oﬀer is accepted, the bargaining
process ends with a compromise. If a counteroﬀer is made, there is the risk
that the opponent terminates the bargaining process, leading to a disagreement
outcome d. In Zeuthen-Hicks bargaining, this uncertainty about the opponent’s
reaction is expressed by a probability. Let pS(xB) denote the Buyer’s estimated
probability that the Seller will reject an oﬀer xB . The Buyer will make a counter
oﬀer if the expected utility of this gamble is greater than the utility of the Seller’s
oﬀer xS :
pS(xB)uB(d) + (1− pS(xB))uB(xB) > uB(xS) (1)
where uB denotes the Buyer’s utility function for outcomes. From (1), we can
compute a critical rejection probability for the Buyer as
p∗S =
uB(xB)− uB(xS)
uB(xB)− uB(d) (2)
Similarly, a critical probability p∗B can be computed from the Seller’s perspective.
The central assumption of Zeuthen-Hicks bargaining is that the party who has a
lower critical rejection probability (who can tolerate a lower probability of rejec-
tion from the opponent) will adjust its oﬀer so that its own critical probability
exceeds that of the opponent. In other words, the Buyer will try to establish
p∗S > p
∗
B (3)
which, after substituting (2) as well as the similar deﬁnition for the Seller’s
critical probability and some simpliﬁcations is equivalent to
(uB(xB)− uB(d))(uS(xB)− uS(d)) > (uB(xS)− uB(d))(uS(xS)− uS(d)) (4)
Once the Buyer has the higher critical probability, the Seller will adjust its oﬀer
to gain the lead again, so obviously the actions of both parties will lead to
maximization of
(uB(x)− uB(d))(uS(x)− uS(d)) (5)
which is the function that is also maximized in the Nash bargaining solution.
Our main question is now whether these adjustments of oﬀers always lead
to regular concessions, in which one party reduces its own utility in favor of
the other party’s utility. To simplify the analysis, we consider only a single
issue negotiation between a Buyer and a Seller over the price of an object. We
furthermore assume that a trade is beneﬁcial, i.e., the Buyer’s valuation of the
good being traded is higher than the Seller’s. Without loss of generality, we set
the Seller’s valuation to zero and the Buyer’s to one, so the two parties basically
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bargain about how to split the surplus of one that is created by the trade. We
denote the price by x. Obviously, the Seller prefers a higher price and the Buyer
a lower price, so
uS(x+ δ) ≥ uS(x) ∧ uB(x+ δ) ≤ uB(x), ∀δ > 0 (6)
If bargaining fails, no trade takes place and no value is created, so the dis-
agreement outcome for both parties is zero ( uB(d) = uS(d) = 0), which allows
us to omit the disagreement outcome.
The bargaining process will converge, and both parties will in their respective
steps make concessions if the function
n(x) = uS(x) · uB(x) (7)
has a unique maximum at some price xN , and is monotonically increasing for x <
xN and monotonically decreasing for x > xN , i.e., if this function is quasiconcave.
Under these conditions, when a party makes an oﬀer that increases the product
in (7), then this party is sure that it is moving in the direction of the global
maximum. Otherwise, if n(.) is not quasiconcave, situations like those depicted
in Figure 1 might arise. In such situations, even if a party had perfect information
about both utility functions in the neighborhood of its oﬀer, moving towards a
local maximum would not necessarily imply a concession.
3 Concave utilities
We ﬁrst analyze the case where both uB and uS are concave. This is the case
of well-known utility functions such as the logarithmic function or the negative
exponential function (e.g., uS(x) =
1−e−αx
1−e−α , α > 0).
It is easy to show that in these conditions the product of the utilities (7) is
a quasiconcave function. First, note that logn(x) = log uS(x) + log uB(x) is a
concave function in the domain where uS(x) > 0 and uB(x) > 0, since
a) both log uS(x) and log uB(x) are concave when uB and uS are concave (the
logarithm being a concave function as well);
b) the sum of two concave functions is a concave function.
To show that n(.) is quasiconcave amounts to demonstrate that:
n(x) > n(y) ⇒ n(λx+ (1− λ)y) ≥ n(y), ∀λ ∈ [0, 1] (8)
As we are working with non-negative utilities, if either uS(y) = 0 or uB(y) =
0 then n(y) = 0 and (8) trivially holds. In the domain where both utilities are
strictly positive, since the logarithm is a strictly increasing function, then having
n(λx + (1 − λ)y) < n(y) would mean that log n(λx + (1 − λ)y) < log n(y) <
log n(x). However this cannot be the case because log n(.) is concave. Thus, n(.)
is quasiconcave.
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Fig. 1. Reference point levels and occurrence of multiple optima
4 Non concave utilities
We now consider the case that utilities are not concave. In particular, we consider
a utility function that takes into account reference point eﬀects as discussed in
Prospect Theory [Kahneman and Tversky, 1979] and that is concave above some
reference point and convex below. Such functions reﬂect the idea that decision
makers consider outcomes above the reference point as gains, to which they react
risk averse, and outcomes below the reference point as “losses”, to which they
react risk seeking. It should be noted that according to our assumptions, neither
side will suﬀer an actual loss in case a trade is made. Still, parties might have
expectations about the price they will achieve, and consider any outcome that
is worse for them than this expectation as a “loss”.
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For the Seller, we therefore consider a utility function that is convex for
x < rS and concave for x > rS , where rS is the Seller’s reference level. Similarly,
the Buyer’s utility function is concave for x < rB and convex for x > rB .
To study under which conditions such preferences are more likely to lead
to multiple local maxima of uS(x)uB(x) and consequently the possibility of
negotiations ending in disagreement, we performed a simulation study. In the
simulation, we used a simple power function speciﬁcation for the utility function
[Schoemaker, 1990,Bleichrodt et al., 2007]. The Seller’s utility is speciﬁed as
uS(x) =
⎧⎨
⎩
xαS · vS/rαSS x < rS
vS x = rS
vS + (x− rs)βS · (1− vS)/(1− rS)βS x > rS
(9)
where αS > 1 and βS < 1 are two parameters determining the shape of the
convex and concave parts. The entire utility function is scaled between zero and
one, and obtains a value of vS at the reference point rS . The utility function for
the Buyer is speciﬁed similarly.
The function uS has four parameters: αS , βS , rS and vS , and the Buyer’s
utility function also has four parameters. For instance, Example 1 in Figure 1
corresponds to αS = 4, βS = 0.4, rS = 0.65 and vS = 0.35, together with αB = 4,
βB = 0.8, rB = 0.45 and vB = 0.15, whereas Example 2 corresponds to αS = 3,
βS = 0.7, rS = 0.12 and vS = 0.3, together with αB = 1.2, βB = 0.7, rB = 0.18
and vB = 0.3. Note that rS > rB in Example 1, whereas rS < rB in Example
2. These are just two arbitrary examples among many other ones, calling for a
simulation study aiming at ﬁnding out whether these or other properties of the
functions inﬂuence the probability of having multiple local maxima.
The simulation generated values of these four parameters for the two parties
from uniform distributions within reasonable ranges, and then calculated the
number of local maxima of the product of the two functions by considering
suitably spaced discrete points. For the simulation, one million parameter vectors
were generated and analyzed.
Note that the function (9) does not necessarily fulﬁll the usual assumption of
Prospect Theory that losses are more important than gains and thus the function
is steeper in the convex part. In fact, since the derivative of the concave part
is inﬁnite at the reference point, it is violated in some small neighborhood of
the reference point. In the simulations it was operationalized by comparing the
diﬀerences between the utility assigned to the reference point (v) and the utility
values of the next discrete points above and below the reference point that were
evaluated. We consider this fact a stylized property of the problem, which could
have an impact on the number of local maxima.
As Table 1 shows, this property has indeed a strong eﬀect on the occurrence
of multiple maxima. No multiple maxima occurred when both utility functions
fulﬁlled the assumptions of Prospect Theory and were steeper in the loss domain,
while multiple maxima occurred in more than half of the problems in which both
utility functions violated it.
A problem might be considered particularly diﬃcult if the aspirations of the
two parties are not compatible, i,.e., it the reference point for the seller is higher
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Table 1. Number of maxima for functions fulﬁlling and violating assumption of
Prospect Theory
Assumption fulﬁlled
Maxima none one both
1 44.62% 75.71% 100.00%
2 38.37% 24.29% 0.00%
3 17.01% 0.00% 0.00%
than the reference point for the buyer, as in Example 1 in Figure 1. Table 2
shows that this factor also has an impact on the occurrence of multiple maxima.
While multiple maxima still do exist, they are much less frequent in the case of
compatible aspirations than when they are incompatible.
Table 2. Number of maxima for functions with diﬀerent patterns of reference points
N. Maxima All rB < rS rB > rS
1 67.03% 38.28% 95.78%
2 26.34% 48.63% 4.05%
3 6.63% 13.09% 0.17%
Figure 2 extends this analysis by also considering the values of the reference
points. The two axes represent the locations of reference points for Buyer (y-axis)
and Seller (x-axis), and the color of the dots represents the number of maxima
in a situation with the corresponding reference point (rS , rB): green stands for
one maximum, yellow for two and red for three. Multiple maxima mostly occur
below the diagonal, where the buyer’s reference point is lower than the seller’s.
However, there is also a small strip of three maxima (red dots) just above the
diagonal.
For x ≤ min(rB , rS), the utility function of the Seller is always convex and
that of the Buyer is always concave, for x > max(rB , rS), they are the opposite.
In between the reference point, two diﬀerent situations might occur. If rB < rS ,
both functions are convex, and for rB > rS , both functions are concave. The
intersection between the two utilities is not necessarily in between the two ref-
erence points. We therefore also analyzed whether it makes a diﬀerence whether
the two utility functions intersect in the parts where the two utility functions
have diﬀerent curvature, or in the middle range where the curvature of both
functions is the same.
Problems in which the two utility functions intersect in the middle region,
where both functions have the same curvature, are signiﬁcantly more likely to
exhibit three maxima, and less likely to have just one maximum than problems
in which the two utility functions intersect outside that region.
Finally, we also consider where the local maxima are located. As Table 4
shows, a considerable fraction of all maxima is actually located exactly at one of
the reference points. In problems in which rB > rS and thus both functions are
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Fig. 2. Reference point levels and occurrence of multiple optima
concave in the middle part, it is also likely that a maximum exists in that part.
In contrast, if the reference points are arranged in the opposite way, maxima are
more likely to be located in the outer parts where one utility function is concave
and the other one convex.
5 Conclusions
The Zeuthen-Hicks bargaining model oﬀers a compelling rationale for two par-
ties to make successive concessions towards the Nash solution. For risk neutral
or risk averse parties, the concavity of their utility functions ensures that any
Table 3. Number of maxima and location of intersection between utility functions
Intersection at
N. Maxima left mid right
1 72.09% 65.02% 71.99%
2 25.78% 26.56% 25.78%
3 2.13% 8.41% 2.23%
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Table 4. Location of maxima
Middle part both
All concave convex
Outer 43.98% 8.01% 65.49%
At ref. 12.91% 17.26% 10.32%
Middle 43.10% 74.73% 24.20%
local maximum of the product of utilities n(.) will be the global maximum. A
concession aiming at increasing n(.) will surely lead the parties closer to the Nash
bargaining solution. However, if utilities are not concave, n(.) may no longer be
quasiconcave, meaning that a party might move farther away from the Nash
solution while increasing n(.).
If each party has accurate information about the entire utility function of the
other party, then they will be able to identify the global maximum of n(.) even
when n(.) is not quasiconcave. Subsequently, according to the Zeuthen-Hicks
model rationale they would converge to this agreement.
If each party has no information or has only local information (in the neigh-
borhood of the current oﬀers on the table) about the utility of the other party,
then the Nash bargaining solution might be missed in some cases where the util-
ities are not concave. For instance, in Example 2 (Figure 1), if the Buyer has
been overly generous oﬀering 0.24 and the Seller’s last oﬀer was 0.60, they might
take turns conceding utility to the other party reaching the local maximum at
x = 0.30 (missing the global maximum at x = 0.14). Even if the Buyer now sud-
denly realized that he/she would be in a better position oﬀering only 0.14, an
oﬀer that the Seller could not reject according to the Zeuthen-Hicks model, the
negotiations might still collapse because the Buyer would be reneging a previous
oﬀer.
We have shown that if both parties have concave utility functions, then the
process will converge to the global maximum. For the case of speciﬁc Prospect
Theory-like utility functions, we have presented results of a simulation study.
According to the simulations, multiple local maxima occur only if at least one
utility function violates the assumption of Prospect Theory and is not steeper
for losses than for gains. Another important characteristic of the problem is the
relative position of rS and rB . Although multiple maxima can occur in both
situations (Figure 1), they are more likely when the reference point for the seller
is higher than the reference point for the buyer. In the former case, maxima are
also more likely to occur in the region between the reference points, and thus
aspirations of both parties are fulﬁlled.
Of course, these results only hold for the speciﬁc type of utility functions
used in the simulation. We therefore intend to pursue this line of research by
running more simulations and studying other types of utility functions.
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Abstract. The negotiation location plays an important role in negotiations. The 
present study examined to what extent the negotiation process and outcomes are 
influenced by the formality of the location and negotiation type. It was 
hypothesized that negotiations in a beach setting would yield better integrative 
results than negotiations in an office setting, whereas an office setting would 
yield better distributive outcomes than a beach setting. To examine this, an 
experiment was conducted in a virtual reality laboratory in which dyads had to 
perform a job contract negotiation at the beach or in the office, that was either 
integrative or distributive. We found that the beach setting, as expected, created 
a more informal atmosphere, a more positive mood, and slightly less stress, but 
this difference did not depend on the negotiation type. Also, integrative 
negotiations yielded higher joint gains than distributive negotiations, but this 
was the same for both location settings.
Keywords: negotiation, location, formality, virtual reality, distributive 
negotiation, integrative negotiation.
1   Introduction
We all feel probably more comfortable at the beach then in an office space. The beach 
is a better place for amusement, relaxation, and relational matters than the office, but 
how about negotiating at the beach? Can you be a tough bargainer when you are 
sitting in a deckchair? Does the beach setting improve your creative skills? Does it 
matter if negotiations on a beach or at the office are centered around distributive or 
integrative issues? Remarkably, so far not much is known about the impact the direct 
place or location can have where the negotiation takes place.
Negotiations form a communicative activity for which many factors have been 
studies that could influence the process or outcome. The role of emotions, gender 
differences, cultural differences, and personality traits have received ample attention
[5]. However, the location where the negotiation takes place has yielded limited 
attention so far. Studies on this topic primarily focus on the strategical (dis)advantage 
of negotiating in a ‘home’ situation (e.g. own office, own country) versus traveling to 
the location the counterpart prefers [2] [4] [6]. The findings from these studies 
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suggest that negotiating at the premises of your own organization often leads to a 
home advantage. However, in these studies on the role of location, the negotiation 
takes place and focuses on the (home) business setting, or on a simulated (home) 
business setting. In our daily life, we learn from the news that it is not unusual that 
informal negotiations, mostly pre-negotiation talks or diplomatic negotiations, also 
take place in more informal and less professional settings, such as a restaurant, café or 
even at the beach. More formal and decisive negotiations however seem to take place 
in more formal and professional settings, for example at the headquarters of an 
organization. It seems safe to assume that a professional environment, compared to 
less professional settings, adds to the formal character of the interaction, and this may 
have an impact on the negotiation process and, ultimately, the outcome. Yet, little is 
known about the possible role the negotiation location itself plays in a negotiation.
Therefore, the main aim of the present study is to examine whether and how the 
formality of the negotiation location influences the negotiation strategies of the 
negotiators.
If a distinction is made between distributive (zero-sum) and integrative (win-win) 
negotiations, a higher formality of a location seems to be more appropriate for 
distributive bargaining strategies than for integrative strategies. The latter would 
benefit more from an informal location. On the one hand, a formal standpoint helps 
keeping a relational distance from the counterpart, which in turn makes it more easy 
to be competitive and to ‘claim value’. Good integrative bargaining, on the other 
hand, presupposes exchanging information, being open to the needs of the 
counterpart, searching for joint solutions, and taking a problem-solving approach in 
order to ‘create value’. Although the factor ‘formality’ as such has not been studied 
extensively in this context, we know that relational factors and the mood and 
emotions for instance impact the success of an integrative negotiation [1] [3].
Negotiators with more common ground share more information and are more willing 
to listen to their counterpart. Being in a good mood and experiencing positive 
emotions have shown to be beneficial for the integrative process [7].
The central question in this study is to what extent the characteristics of the 
location where the negotiation takes place influence the negotiation process and 
outcomes. We expect that an informal setting will be beneficial for integrative 
bargaining, whereas a formal setting facilitates distributive bargaining. More 
specifically, we expect that the higher formality of the office produces a greater 
‘fixed-pie’ bias in the distributive negotiation and leads to more competitive outcomes 
in the distributive case, and to lower joint outcomes in the integrative case. We 
therefore hypothesize a higher joint gain in integrative negotiations taking place in an 
informal location than in a formal location, and that differences in outcome between 
negotiators will be more pronounced in distributive negotiations taking place in a 
formal location compared to an informal location.
1.1   Present Study
To examine whether and how the negotiation process and outcomes are affected by 
the location formality and type of the negotiation, we set up an experiment in which 
participants negotiated the terms of a working contract during a job interview in an 
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office space or at the beach, in dyads, face-to-face. The location was manipulated in 
the DAF Technology Lab1 of Tilburg University, in order to increase the validity of 
the study. The lab enables the creation of very realistic Virtual Reality environments. 
For the purpose of this study a realistic office and beach setting was programmed. The 
addition of office furniture versus deckchairs increased the validity. We used a 2D 
application in which the setting (office or beach) was projected by eight beamers from 
the ceiling on all four walls of the room. The realism of the setting was enhanced by 
accompanying sound and motion of the setting. In the office location, participants 
heard a moving ventilator and office sounds in the background, whereas in the beach 
setting, they heard sounds of moving waves reaching the beach.
2 Method
2.1   Participants and Design
One hundred sixty two undergraduate students (81 dyads) from Tilburg University
participated in the experiment as part of a course requirement. Participants’ average 
age was 23.40 years (SD = 3.02), and they were randomly assigned to one condition 
in a 2 (location: office or beach) × 2 (negotiation type: distributive or integrative)
between-subjects design. The dependent variables consisted of the negotiation 
outcome (individual profit, joint profit), satisfaction about negotiation process and 
outcome, and relational variables (experienced formality, experienced trust, fairness, 
and mutual liking). Only experienced formality as a relational variable was used in 
this study.
2.2 Procedure
Upon arrival in the virtual reality beach or office, participants were introduced to each 
other and they were told that they would perform a negotiation with each other 
consisting of a job interview. The role of employer and employee was randomly 
assigned to the participants, and participants in the office setting were told that the 
negotiation took place at the office of the employer. After having been informed 
about the study, participants signed a consent form and completed a first 
questionnaire that contained demographic background variables, and items that 
assessed participants’ mood and stress level. After completing this questionnaire, the 
participants were given written information about the negotiation case. The 
negotiation case entailed a job interview between an employer and a future employee, 
who had to agree on three items: the salary, the length of the contract and the number 
of vacation days. A pay-off matrix was created in which for each option of the three 
items a different pay-off in gains was indicated. This allowed to create a distributive 
1 For more information about the DAF Technology Lab see:
https://www.tilburguniversity.edu/campus/experiencing-virtual-reality/.
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and an integrative negotiation case. In the distributive setting the pay-off matrix for 
both parties was completely mirrored with the most beneficial item and option for a 
negotiator being the opposite for the counterpart. In the integrative setting however, 
the importance of the items was not the same for both parties. In this case the 
employee had a relatively higher pay-off for the salary options whereas it was more 
important for the employer to limit the contract length. This difference created an 
integrative potential by logrolling. Participants were given a maximum of 10 minutes 
to prepare for the negotiation. Before entering the lab, they had to do an exercise of 
calculating the total pay-off of several offers in order to check whether they 
understood the matrix. Furthermore, they had to write down their planned first offer. 
Finally, they were entered into the lab and the negotiation started.
Participants negotiated about the offers of each item. During the negotiation they 
used the pay-off matrix to negotiate their (counter) offers. After approximately 15 
minutes participants had to decide if they came to an agreement, and if so, what the 
negotiated outcome was for each item. After the negotiation ended, they had to 
indicate on a special form whether or not they came to an agreement, and the final 
offer for each item. Then the participants were asked to fill out a questionnaire that 
assessed their stress level, mood, satisfaction about the process and outcome, and 
relational variables (experienced formality, trust, fairness, and mutual liking). Only 
experienced formality was used in the present study. After having completed this 
questionnaire, participants were thanked for their participation and were fully 
debriefed via email approximately two weeks after the end of the experiment.
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2.3   Measures
Mood. Participants mood was measured before and after the negotiation and 
consisted of 12 items on a 5-point scale (1 = very slightly or not at all, 5 = extremely)
that were adopted from the original Positive and Negative Affect Schedule PANAS
[8]. Six items measured positive affect (PA: interested, strong, determined, happy, 
excited, and proud) and 6 items measured negative affect (NA: afraid, nervous, 
scared, irritable, weak, and ashamed). Cronbach’s Alpha for the positive affect scale 
was .79 (M = 2.88, SD = 0.72) for the pre-measurement and .84 (M = 3.15, SD = 0.84) 
for the post-measurement. Cronbach’s Alpha for the negative affect scale was .70 (M
= 1.66, SD = 0.56) for the pre-measurement and .68 (M = 1.56, SD = 0.56) for the 
post-measurement.
Stress Level. Stress level was measured prior to and after the negotiation and 
consisted of one question on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = very relaxed, 7 = very tense). 
The mean score on this scale was 3.64 (SD = 1.52) for the pre-measurement and 4.65 
(SD = 1.86) for the post-measurement.
Satisfaction. Participants satisfaction was measured with two items: one item 
assessed their satisfaction about the process of the negotiation and one item assessed 
how satisfied they were with the result of the negotiation. Both items were measured 
on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = Completely disagree, 5 = Completely agree). The 
average score for process satisfaction was 4.13 (SD = 0.91) and for outcome 
satisfaction 4.11 (SD = 0.94).
Experienced Formality. Experienced formality was measured with a single item on a 
5-point Likert scale (1 = Completely disagree, 5 = Completely agree), and had a mean 
score of 3.83 (SD = 1.10).
3 Results
3.1   Joint Gain and Outcome Difference
In a first analysis, we tested whether an informal location (i.e. beach), compared to a 
formal location (i.e. office) would lead to a higher joint gain in integrative 
negotiations. To examine this, we performed a 2 (location: beach or office) × 2
(negotiation type: distributive or integrative) ANOVA, with joint gain as the 
dependent variable. The joint gain was computed by summing the pay-off gains for 
each party (i.e., employee and employer). The means can be found in Table 1.
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Table 1. Means and standard deviations (between brackets) for joint gain as a function of 
negotiation location and type.
Beach Office
Integrative negotiation 5,258.02 (125.95) 5,254.17 (94.97)
Distributive negotiation 5,108.33 (64.78) 5,137.78 (30.52)
The analysis revealed that the negotiations with integrative potential yielded higher 
joint gains (M = 15,769.77, SD = 342.63) than the distributive negotiations (M =
15,362.86, SD = 162.85), F(1, 74) = 37.84, p < .001, Șp2 = .34). No effect for 
negotiation space nor an interaction between negotiation type and space was found, 
Fs < 0.59, ps > .444. These findings do not support the hypothesis that an informal 
location would lead to a higher joint gain in integrative negotiations than a formal 
location.
In the second analysis, we examined whether differences in outcome between 
negotiators would be more pronounced in distributive negotiations taking place in a 
formal location than in an informal location. To examine this, we performed a 2 
(location: beach or office) × 2 (negotiation type: distributive or integrative) ANOVA, 
with outcome difference as the dependent variable. The outcome difference was 
computed by subtracting the pay-off gains for each party2. The means can be found in 
Table 2. 
Table 2. Means and standard deviations (between brackets) for outcome difference as a 
function of negotiation location and type.
Beach Office
Integrative negotiation 322.22 (290.45) 358.33 (405.79)
Distributive negotiation 505.00 (585.42) 408.89 (288.80)
The analysis shows that there were no main effects for office setting and 
negotiation type, nor was there an interaction between location and negotiation type, 
Fs < 1.51, ps > .223. Thus, contrary to our expectations, differences in outcome 
between negotiators were not more pronounced in distributive negotiations taking 
place in a formal location compared to an informal location.
3.1   Additional Analyses: Mood, Stress Level, Formality, and Satisfaction
Although not a prime focus of this study, we examined whether the beach or office 
setting would influence the negotiators mood, stress levels, formality, and 
satisfaction. To examine whether participants’ mood was influenced by the location 
and negotiation type, we conducted two mixed ANOVA’s on participants’ mood, one 
on participants’ positive affect (PA) and one on their negative affect (NA). In both 
analyses, location (beach or office) and negotiation type (distributive or integrative) 
were entered as the between-subjects variables, and timing of the measurement 
2 Since the outcome difference could be positive or negative, we first squared the differences 
and then square rooted the result to end up with an outcome difference that was positive.
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(pretest-posttest mood) was entered as the within-subjects variable. The first analysis 
showed that participants’ had a more positive mood after the negotiation (M = 3.15, 
SD = 0.84) than before it (M = 2.88, SD = 0.73), F(1, 154) = 29.51, p Șp2 =
.16. Furthermore, participants’ generally had a higher positive mood in the beach 
negotiations (M = 3.13, SD = 0.71) than in the office negotiations (M = 2.84, SD =
0.73), F(1, 154) = 6.03, p = 0.15, Șp2 = .04. Regarding participants’ negative affect, 
the analysis revealed that they had a less negative mood after the negotiation (M =
1.56, SD = 0.56) than before it (M = 1.66, SD = 0.56), F(1, 154) = 6.21, p = .014, Șp2
= .04. Thus, overall, the beach setting yielded a more positive mood than the office 
setting, and negotiations in general increased participants’ positive moods and 
decreased their negative moods. However, location did not influence participants’ 
positive and negative mood (i.e., increase or decrease), and this also did not depend 
on the type of negotiation.
The stress the negotiators experienced increased significantly after the negotiation,
F(1, 153) = 30.28, p < .001, Șp2 = .17. Furthermore, although not significant, the 
general stress experienced at the beach was slightly lower than in the office, F(1, 153) 
= 3.06, p = .082, Șp2 = .02. 
Moreover, with regard to the experienced formality, the negotiators found the 
beach setting more informal than the office setting, F(1, 153) = 5.66, p = .019, Șp2 =
.04.
With respect to satisfaction about the negotiation process and outcome, the 
negotiators in the integrative setting were more satisfied with the results than the ones 
in the distributive setting, F(1, 154) = 5.16, p = .025, Șp2 = .03. No main effect for 
location nor interaction between negotiation type and location was found, Fs < 0.53, 
ps > .468. Also, with regard to the negotiators’ satisfaction about the process, no main
effects for negotiation type and location nor an interaction was found, Fs < 1.84, ps >
.177.
4 Discussion
In the present study, we examined the possibility that the negotiation process and 
outcome are affected by the negotiation location and the type of negotiation. We 
hypothesized a higher joint gain in integrative negotiations taking place in an informal 
location than in a formal location, and that differences in outcome between 
negotiators would be more pronounced in distributive negotiations taking place in a 
formal location compared to an informal location. Our findings do not support our 
expectations. We found that the joint gain was higher in the integrative negotiation
than in the distributive negotiation, but the joint gain was not higher in the informal 
integrative negotiation than in the formal integrative negotiation. Also, the outcome 
difference was the same for distributive negotiations in the formal and informal 
location.
Our findings suggest that the negotiation process and outcomes may not depend on 
whether the negotiation location is more (in)formal, but they do indicate that the 
location formality influences negotiators’ perceptions and emotions. To our 
knowledge, this is the first study that has systematically examined how formality of
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the negotiation setting influences a negotiation. Its added value for the study of 
negotiations is primarily in the effect the location or surrounding can have on the 
atmosphere, stress, and on the mood of the negotiators. The use of the Virtual Reality
Lab makes it possible to create different negotiation environments that influence how 
participants perceive the setting as well as the negotiations. We created a beach and 
an office setting and found that both locations yielded different experiences. The 
increased informality of the beach setting resulted in slightly less stress compared to 
the office setting, and also the mood of the participants was generally more positive at 
the beach than in the office. These findings suggest that the manipulation of the
environment was quite successful. As this is a first step into building our 
understanding of the impact the formality of a location can have on negotiations, we 
encourage scholars to further explore this direction.
Our findings also suggest that negotiating at ‘home’, that is negotiating on the 
grounds of one of the negotiators, does not necessarily create an advantage for the 
home party in either a distributive or integrative negotiation. The negotiations that 
took place in the office had a home-advantage for the employee in the job contract 
negotiation whereas the negotiations in the beach environment were not at the 
premise of one of the parties. We found that negotiations with integrative potential 
yielded higher joint gains in general, but this effect was not stronger (or less strong) in 
in either location. Furthermore, the outcome differences in the distributive 
negotiations at the beach did not differ from the office negotiation outcomes. These 
findings nuance previous studies that indicate a strategical advantage of negotiating in 
a ‘home’ situation [2] [4] [6]. With regard to getting ‘better’ deals, it does not seem to 
matter whether parties negotiate in a neutral territory or in one of both parties’
location. However, since negotiations are often aimed at long-term relationships 
between parties, our findings do suggest that it could be beneficial to negotiate in 
neutral, ‘advantage-free’ locations. The negotiators generally had a more positive 
mood in the beach negotiations than in the office negotiations, and the former location 
was also slightly less stressful for the negotiators than the latter location. Thus, neutral 
settings seem to be better at fostering the negotiation process and relationship. 
However, examining the effect that these locations can have on relationship variables 
was out of the scope of this study. Therefore, future studies should more 
systematically examine whether formality of the location plays a role in negotiation 
relationships, and also whether this is different for home-advantage or advantage-free 
locations.
The finding that the location had no impact on the negotiation outcome variables 
(i.e. joint gains and outcome differences) could be an indication that the manipulation 
of the surrounding was not strong enough. Still, the effect that the location had on 
negotiators’ emotions (mood) and perceptions (stress) variables offers interesting new 
opportunities to further study the effects of mood on negotiations, and the fact that 
this is not induced by negotiation variables or by the interaction with the counterparts.
This makes a Virtual Reality Lab an interesting tool to continue that line of 
negotiation research.
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Abstract. Trust-free systems based on blockchain technology promise to revo-
lutionize interactions between peers that usually require a trusted third party. As 
a part of a global hype around the blockchain, the sharing economy is a promis-
ing field of application for such trust-free systems. However, trust plays a cru-
cial and complex role in sharing economy interactions and therefore may not be 
easily substituted by a new technology. In order to shed light on the questions, 
if and how blockchain technology can be leveraged to solve the central issue of 
trust in the sharing economy through trust-free systems, we conducted a dual 
literature review on trust in both the blockchain and sharing economy context.
Keywords: Blockchain; Sharing economy; Trust; Trust-free system; Literature 
review
1 Extended Abstract
“Together, we are entering the trust age.” [1, p. 31]
The rise of peer-to-peer (P2P) markets has paved the way for commercial interac-
tions among private individuals on large scales. In recent years, technology startups 
have leveraged the potential of higher resource utilization based on transactions be-
tween peers within the so-called ‘sharing economy’ [2]. The platforms therein enable 
short term peer-to-peer ‘sharing,’ renting of goods, and a variety of services [3]. A 
fundamental prerequisite for such interactions among private individuals is mutual 
trust [4]. According to Mazzella et al. [1, p.27], this “key building block of society”
takes an essential role for the formation of interaction relationships in the context of 
P2P marketplaces and P2P services.
While the sharing economy started out as a decentralized market system that prom-
ised to sustainably distribute welfare among participants, critics nowadays often see 
the idea of sharing underutilized assets for charitable reasons lost in a capitalistic 
platform economy [5]. On the one hand, the providers channel of benefits created by 
the community of peers. On the other hand, the central entity provides not only the 
technical infrastructure, user interfaces, and process regulations for transactions but 
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also takes a crucial role in establishing trust among users today by governing insur-
ance mechanisms, controlling executive measures such as the punishment or banning 
of users, and maintaining reputation systems [6–9].
In recent years, the blockchain as a decentralized consensus system – sometimes 
denoted as “trust-free technology” [10] – is discussed as the basis for an alternative 
scenario to the platform economy by enabling transparent recording and value ex-
change mechanisms [11] without the need for a central authority or institution [12].
While players such as Airbnb and Uber profited from the role as an intermediary be-
tween peers, performing transactions based on their private resources, the blockchain 
is assumed to provide an infrastructure [13] with the potential to organize truly decen-
tralized markets, defining the building blocks of the next generation of sharing econ-
omy business models [14]. Importantly, the blockchain technology is suggested to 
contribute to the resolution of one of the fundamental issues of P2P markets and shar-
ing economy activities: trust [15]. Rachel Botsman, one of the early pioneers in the 
context of collaborative consumption [16] suggested that the concept of distributed 
trust, accelerated by the blockchain technology will fundamentally transform the way 
trust is built [17]. Moreover, IBM stated in a recent discussion paper, that blockchain 
technologies have the potential to form a “sharing economy 2.0” by decentralizing 
trust [18].
In fact, several platform cooperatives such as Lazooz have set out to establish de-
centralized sharing economy platforms with remarkable success in initial crowd fund-
ing initiatives [19]. After traditional technology transformed the traditional markets to 
large scale P2P sharing markets, the question arises whether or not blockchain as a 
”trust machine” [20] will actually be able to disrupt the newly developed platform 
landscape by providing decentralized trust.
To shed light on the potential of the blockchain technology as a trust-free system in 
today's e-commerce landscape, an interdisciplinary approach is needed, integrating 
both the perspectives on blockchain technology as an IT-artifact as well as the corre-
sponding interactions with related tasks, existing structures, and the broader sharing 
economy context [21, 22].
In order to pave the way for future research within this complex environment, we 
conduct a dual literature review on the topics of trust in the context of the sharing 
economy and blockchain within the Information Systems (IS) literature. Following 
the idea of analyzing the past to prepare for the future [23], we uncover the intersec-
tion of two highly relevant and upcoming topics in IS research. Our contribution is 
twofold. First, we provide a comprehensive overview and conceptualization of exist-
ing IS literature on trust in the contexts of the sharing economy and blockchain tech-
nology. Second, we integrate the two perspectives to estimate the potential of block-
chain as a trust-free technology, to assess its disruptive impact on the formation of 
trust, and to suggest issues and paths for future research. Our findings suggest that the 
notion of trust-free systems is in fact only partly transferable to a sharing economy 
scenario thus far and requires further attention from IS researchers as well as practi-
tioners.
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Abstract. This study proposes a novel information fusion procedure to address 
the efficiency analysis of the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) with two non-
homogeneous decision making unit (DMU) groups, where each group contains 
DMUs with different input and output (IO) criteria. Firstly, a novel framework 
of DEA models with diversified IO structures is established under two non-
homogeneous groups, where each proposes distinct IO criteria. Next, a criteria 
fusion algorithm is designed to obtain different DEA modeling strategies. Then, 
a mixed value-weight optimization model is proposed to handle criteria with 
missing data, and an ordered weighted averaging (OWA) operator is applied to 
integrate different DEA analyses to reach final results. The new model relaxes 
the restriction of the classical DEA model, and provides more flexibility to 
address different decision analysis scenarios arising from practical applications.
Keywords: Data envelopment analysis; Inputs and outputs; Criteria fusion; 
Value estimation; OWA operator
1   Introduction
Owing to limited resources, efficiency evaluation is a common concern in human 
society, which can be observed in different kinds of organizations across various 
industries. The first DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis)model was proposed by 
Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes in 1978 [1], hereafter referred to as the CCR model, to
tackle the efficiency analysis among a set of decision making units (DMUs)with
multiple inputs and outputs. Subsequently, numerous research has been carried out to 
expand DEA from both theoretical development[2] and practical application
perspectives [3].
In traditional DEA models, all DMUs are assumed to be evaluated with the same 
set of criteria setting. However, in many real life applications, different DMUs may 
argue for distinct evaluation criteria to better reflect their specific concerns. For 
example, a news magazine, Maclean’s, ranks Canadian universities on an annual basis 
[4]. Given that programs offered in these institutions have a wild swing from 
primarily undergraduate to extensive graduate and medical, it is apparently unfair to 
compare these universities using the same set of criteria. As such, Maclean’s first 
classifies different universities in Canada into three relatively homogeneous groups, 1) 
universities that focus on undergraduate studies with few or no graduate programs, 2) 
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universities that have both extensive undergraduate studies and an extensive selection 
of graduate programs, and 3) universities that have a professional medical program 
and a selection of graduate programs, then evaluation ranking is carried out within 
each category where different criteria are applied to the three DMU groups.
Recently, research on the DEA with non-homogeneous DMUs catches many 
researchers’ attentions. Imanirad et al. [5] extended the traditional DEA methodology 
to assess technical efficiency in situations with partial input-to-output impacts. In a
recent article by Cook et al. [6], the efficiency analysis of non-homogeneous DMUs 
was formally conceptualized for the first time, where the overall efficiency of a DMU 
was determined as a weighted average of the efficiency scores for all subgroups that 
make up the DMU.
Inspired by this idea, this study proposes a novel DEA modeling framework to
address the efficiency analysis with two non-homogenous DMU groups, where each 
DMU group has its own criteria set for DEA modeling. The unique features of this 
study include: 1) Easy to understand criteria fusion procedure: four kinds of criteria 
fusion procedures are designed to incorporate the two criteria sets proposed by two 
DMU groups; 2) A new estimation method for missing data: a mixed value-weight 
optimization model is designed to estimate missing values by modifying the
conventional CCR model, which allows DMUs to assign the best value estimate to 
achieve the maximum efficiency; 3) Intuitive final result fusion procedure: an OWA 
(ordered weighted averaging) method is utilized to aggregate DMUs’ efficiency 
values generated by different criteria fusion strategies.
The overall structure of the study is listed as follows: Section 2 provides the
analysis framework under two non-homogenous DMU groups, and proposes four 
DEA model strategies based on different IO criteria fusion operations. Section 3 
devises a mixed value-weight optimization model to estimate missing criteria values
and applies an OWA operator to aggregate the derived different DEA results. 
2 ADEA Framework for Two Non-homogeneous DMUs
2.1 Basic Definitions of the Model
To clarify relevant concepts, the following notations are introduced:
(1) The definition of two non-homogenous DMU groups
Two non-homogeneous DMU groups are denoted byܩଵandܩଶ, respectively.ܩଵ =
{ܦܯ ଵܷ
ଵ, … ,ܦܯ ଵܷ
௝
, … ,ܦܯ ଵܷ
|ீభ|} , where ܦܯ ଵܷ
௝ stands for the ݆ th DMU 
in ܩଵ and |ܩଵ| represents the cardinality of ܩଵ . Similarly, ܩଶ =
{ܦܯ ଶܷ
ଵ, … ,ܦܯ ଶܷ
ௗ , … ,ܦܯ ଶܷ
|ீమ|} , and ܦܯ ଶܷௗ denotes the ݀ th DMU in ܩଶ .
Generally,| ή |gives the cardinality of a set in this study.
(2) Input criteria setting for two groups
It is assumed that each non-homogenous DMU group may propose a distinct input 
criteria set for DEA modeling. Let ܫଵ = {ܫଵଵ, … , ܫଵ௜ , … , ܫଵ
|ூభ|} and ܫଶ =
{ܫଶ
ଵ, … , ܫଶ
௜ , … , ܫଶ
|ூమ|} represent the input criteria set for ܩଵ and ܩଶ , respectively, 
whereܫଵ௜and ܫଶ௜ , correspondingly, depict the ݅th input criterion forܩଵand ܩଶ.
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(3) Output criteria setting for two groups
It is assumed that each non-homogenous DMU group may put forward a different 
output criteria set for DEA modeling. Let ଵܱ = { ଵܱଵ, … , ଵܱ௥ , … , ଵܱ
|ைభ|} and ܱଶ =
{ܱଶ
ଵ, … ,ܱଶ
௥ , … , ଶܱ
|ைమ|},respectively, represent the output criteria set forܩଵandܩଶ,where 
ଵܱ
௜and ܱଶ௜ represent the݅th output criterion forܩଵand ܩଶ, separately.
2.2 Criteria Fusion for Non-homogeneous DMUs
Both input and output criteria have to be aggregated, so that the traditional DEA 
model can be applied to evaluate DMUs across two groups. Based on the concept of 
“or” and “and” operations in the set theory, the following criteria fusion operations 
are proposed to generate a set of unified input and output criteria.
(1) “or” operation for input criteria
Let ܫ௢௥ = ܫଵ ׫ ܫଶ , be the “or”-based input criteria set. Naturally, ܫ௢௥ keeps both 
criteria sets proposed by the two groups and reserves different opinions from both 
perspectives.
(2) “and” operation for input criteria
Letܫ௔௡ௗ = ܫଵ ת ܫଶ, be the “and”-based input criteria set. ܫ௔௡ௗidentifies the common 
ground for both groups’ opinions.
In a similar fashion, ௢ܱ௥and ܱ௔௡ௗ can be defined as the “or” and “and”-based 
output criteria set, respectively.
2.3 DEA Modelling Strategies
Given the aforementioned two-input and two-output setting,ܫଵ, ܫଶ, ଵܱ, ܱଶ, and the 
four operations on the input and output criteria,ܫ௢௥ , ܫ௔௡ௗ , ௢ܱ௥andܱ௔௡ௗ, the following 
DEA modelling strategies can be constructed to evaluate DMUs across the two 
groups:
(1) ݁௔௡ௗ௢௥ -based DEA modeling: ܫ௔௡ௗand ௢ܱ௥ are designated as the input and output 
criteria set for both groups’ DEA modelling.
(2) ݁௢௥௔௡ௗ-based DEA modelling: ܫ௢௥and ܱ௔௡ௗare designated as the input and output 
criteria set for both groups’ DEA modelling.
(3) ݁௔௡ௗ௔௡ௗ-based DEA modelling: ܫ௔௡ௗ andܫ௔௡ௗ are designated as the input and output 
criteria set for both groups’ DEA modelling.
(4) ݁௢௥௢௥-based DEA modelling: ܫ௢௥ and ௢ܱ௥are designated as the input and output 
criteria set for both groups’ DEA modelling.
Without loss of generality, this study assumes that the results of all criterion fusion 
operations are nonempty. In this case, the four aforesaid DEA modeling strategies (1)-
(4) are referred to ask = 1,2,3,4, respectively.
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3 A Mixed Value-Weight Optimization DEA Model
3.1Value Estimation for Criteria with Missing Data
Upon establishing the four DEA modeling strategies, the next step is to assess the
DMUs according to different criteria settings. For any strategy, denote its input and 
output criteria sets by 1 | |{ ,..., ,..., }i II I I I and 1 | |{ ,..., ..., }r OO O O O ,
respectively. For convenience, the following notations are introduced:
 ׊ܦܯ ଵܷ௝ א ܩଵ, let ଵܺ௝ = ቀݔଵ௝ଵ, … , ݔଵ௝௜ , … , ݔଵ௝|ூ|ቁ denote DMU j’s input value vector,
where ݔଵ
௝௜
א Թା refers to DMU j’s value on input criterionܫ௜.
 Similarly, let ଵܻ௝ = ቀݕଵ௝ଵ, … ,ݕଵ௝௥ , … ,ݕଵ௝|ை|ቁdenote DMU j’s output value vector,
where ݕଵ
௝௥
א Թା refers to DMU j’s value on output criterionܱ௥forܦܯ ଵܷ
௝ .
 Similarly, for any ܦܯ ଶܷௗ א ܩଶ, ܺଶௗ and ଶܻௗcan bedefined accordingly asܺଶௗ =
൫ݔଶ
ௗଵ, … , ݔଶ
ௗ௜ , … , ݔଶ
ௗ|ூ|
൯ and ଶܻௗ = ൫ݕଶௗଵ, … ,ݕଶௗ௥ , … ,ݕଶ
ௗ|ை|
൯.
Based on this setting, the following four scenarios are discussed to address the 
issue of missing data in input and output criteria:
(1) Estimating missing data for input criteria in ࡳ૚
If ܫ௜௞ א ܫଵ, i.e. ܫ௜௞ is an original criterion proposed by ܩଵ, then it is assumed that 
the relevant criteria value, ݔଵ௜
௝ , is always available, since the criterion is supported 
by ܩଵ, and DMUs are ready to collect and apply the data for efficiency evaluation.
Definition 1: ׊ܫ௜௞ א ܫ௞, ܫ௜௞ is a data-missing input-criterion for ܩଵ, if ܫ௜௞ ב ܫଵ.
When ܫ௜௞ ב ܫଵ, consequentlyܫ௜௞is a criterion proposed by ܩଶ. Then DMUs in ܩଵ
may not have relevant value data available for ܫ௜௞, andܫ௜௞ can be assumed as a data-
missing criterion for ܩଵ . How to estimate the value of data-missing criterion 
becomes a priority issue when applying different DEA modeling strategies. 
To deal with such situation, the following methods can be employed to estimate 
the value of data-missing criteria:
It is assumed that with a data-missing input-criterion for ܩଵ,ܫ௜௞, all DMUs in ܩଶ
have the criterion values, i.e. ׊ܦܯ ଶܷௗ א ܩଶ,ݔଶ௜ௗ is available for ܦܯ ଶܷௗ . Then, all 
DMUs in ܩଵ can utilize the value information in ܩଶ as reference points to estimate 
their values for a data-missing criterion ܫ௜௞. Specifically, 
1) Maximum principle approach: choose the maximum value of ܫ௜௞ in ܩଶ to 
be the data estimation of ܫ௜௞ for all DMUs in ܩଵ, denoted as 
ݔଵ௜
௝
= maxௗୀଵ
|ீమ| (ݔଶ௜
ௗ )               (1)
Such assumption is an aggressive attitude to all DMUs in ܩଵ for efficiency 
analysis, since input value of ܫ௜௞ in ܩଵ may be overestimated.
2) Minimum principle approach: choose the maximum value of ܫ௜௞ in ܩଶ to be 
the data estimation of ܫ௜௞ for all DMUs in ܩଵ, denoted as 
ݔଵ௜
௝
= minௗୀଵ
|ீమ| (ݔଶ௜
ௗ )             (2)
Such assumption is a benevolent attitude to all DMUs in ܩଵ for efficiency analysis, 
since input value of ܫ௜௞ in ܩଵ may be underestimated.
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3) Average principle approach: calculate the average value with all DMUs’ data 
value of ܫ௜௞ in ܩଶ to be the data estimation of ܫ௜௞ for all DMUs in ܩଵ, denoted as 
ݔଵ௜
௝
= averageௗୀଵ
|ீమ| (ݔଶ௜
ௗ ) =
ଵ
|ீమ|
(σ ݔଶ௜
ௗ|ீమ|
ௗୀଵ )         (3)
(2) Value setting for Data-missing input-criteria inࡳ૛
Similarly, the following definition is given for a data-missing input criterion for ܩଶ.
Definition2: ׊ܫ௜௞ א ܫ, ܫ௜௞ is a data-missing input-criterion for ܩଶ, if ܫ௜௞ ב ܫଶ.
Maximum, minimum and average principle approaches can be applied to obtain 
value estimation of ݔଶ௜ௗ for all DMUs in ܩଶ.
(3) Value setting for Data-missing output-criteria in ࡳ૚
Correspondingly, the following definition is given for a data-missing output 
criterion for ܩଵ.
Definition3: ׊ ௜ܱ௞ א ܱ, ௜ܱ is a data-missing output-criterion for ܩଵ, if ௜ܱ௞ ב ଵܱ.
Then, maximum, minimum and average principle approaches can be applied to 
obtain value estimation of ݕଵ௥
௝ for all DMUs in ܩଵ.
(4) Value setting for Data-missing output-criteria in ࡳ૛
Likewise, the following definition is given for a data-missing output criterion for 
ܩଶ.
Definition4: ׊ ௜ܱ௞ א ܱ, ௜ܱ is a data-missing output-criterion for ܩଶ, if ௜ܱ௞ ב ܱଶ.
Again, maximum, minimum and average principle approaches can be applied to 
obtain value estimation of ݕଶ௥ௗ for all DMUs in ܩଶ.
3.2 Value Optimal Setting for DEA Model 
As mentioned in Section 1, one of the advantages of DEA model for efficiency 
analysis is that DMUs are allowed to freely set criteria weights for their overall 
efficiency maximization. Inspired by this idea, in this section, a value optimal setting 
procedure is proposed for the value estimation of data-missing criteria [7].
Following the assumption that all DMUs in one group can use the other group’s 
criterion value information as reference points to estimate their values of data-missing 
criterion, instead of the above mentioned maximum, minimum and average principle 
approaches, it is assumed that DMUs are allowed to freely set these values, as long as 
the following constraints are applied:
(1) The upper boundary of data estimation for a data-missing criterion 
׊ܦܯ ଵܷ
௝
א ܩଵ, let ݔଵ௜
௝ be the upper boundary of ܦܯ ଵܷ
௝’s data estimation for a data-
missing criterion, ܫ௜ . Setݔଵ௜
௝
= maxௗୀଵ
|ீమ|  (ݔଶ௜
ௗ ), i.e. the maximum value of available 
criterion data in ܩଶ is used as the upper boundary of data estimation for ܩଵ due to 
limited information available.
(2) The lower boundary of data estimation for a data-missing criterion 
׊ܦܯ ଵܷ
௝
א ܩଵ, let ݔଵ௜
௝ be the lower boundary of ܦܯ ଵܷ
௝’s data estimation for a data-
missing criterion, ܫ௜ . Similarly, setݔଵ௜
௝
= minௗୀଵ
|ீమ|  (ݔଶ௜
ௗ ), i.e. the minimum value of 
available criterion data in ܩଶ is used as the lower boundary of data estimation for ܩଵ.
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Hence, with a data-missing input-criterionܫ௜for ܩଵ, the value estimation of DMUs 
inܩଵ , ݔଵ௜
௝ , can be constrained byݔଵ௜
௝
൑ ݔଵ௜
௝
൑ ݔ
ଵ௜
௝ . Similarly, with a data-missing 
output-criterion ௜ܱ for ܩଵ , the value estimation of DMUs in ܩଵ , ݕଵ௥
௝ , is set as 
ݕଵ௥
௝
൑ ݕଵ௥
௝
൑ ݕଵ௥
௝ ; with a data-missing input-criterionܫ௜for ܩଶ, the value estimation of 
DMUs inܩଶ, ݔଶ௜ௗ , is set as ݔଶ௜ௗ ൑ ݔଶ௜ௗ ൑ ݔଶ௜
ௗ ; and with a data-missing output-criterion 
௜ܱfor ܩଶ, the value estimation of DMUs in ܩଶ, ݕଶ௥ௗ , is set as ݕଶ௥ௗ ൑ ݕଶ௥ௗ ൑ ݕଶ௥ௗ .The 
following Eqs. (4) is summarized as constraints for ܦܯ ଵܷ
௝ to estimate its values of 
data-missing input and output criteria:
ቐ
ݔଵ௜
௝
൑ ݔଵ௜
௝
൑ ݔ
ଵ௜
௝
;
ݕଵ௥
௝
൑ ݕଵ௥
௝
൑ ݕଵ௥
௝
;
                          (4)
Eqs. (5) is summarized as constraints for ܦܯ ଶܷ
௝ to estimate its values of data-
missing input and output criteria:
ቐ
ݔଶ௜
ௗ ൑ ݔଶ௜
ௗ ൑ ݔଶ௜
ௗ ;
ݕଶ௥
ௗ ൑ ݕଶ௥
ௗ ൑ ݕଶ௥
ௗ ;
                       (5)
3.3 Mixed Value-weight Optimization DEA Model
The following revised CCR model, P1, is constructed to identify the maximum 
efficiency value for ܦܯ ଵܷ
௝బ in ܩଵ under a specific strategy݇.
Kindly notice that in P1, the decision variables include all input and output 
criterion weights, ݒ௥ and ݑ௜(ݎ = 1,2, … , |ܱ|; ݅ = 1,2, … , |ܫ|); all value estimations 
for data-missing criteria for all DMUs, ݔଵ௜
௝ and ݕଵ௥
௝ ( ݆ = 1,2, … , |ܩଵ| ;  ݅ =
1,2, … , |ܫ|; ݎ = 1,2, … , |ܱ|), andݔଶ௜ௗ and ݕଶ௥ௗ (݀ = 1,2, … , |ܩଶ|;  ݅ = 1,2, … , |ܫ|;  ݎ =
1,2, … , |ܱ|). With P1, the optimal efficiency value can be obtained for ܦܯ ଵܷ
௝ in 
ܩଵas well as all criterion weights and value estimations for all data-missing criteria. In 
a similar procedure, the optimal efficiency value can be identified for ܦܯ ଶܷ
௝in ܩଶ.
The details are omitted here.
It can be verified that there existed at least one optimal solution to P1, since 
P1defines a closed and bounded set. The objective function is a continuous function 
on this set. The extreme value theorem of advanced calculus [8],therefore implies that 
P1 attains a maximum value at least once.
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3.4 OWA-based Result Aggregation
Upon the acquirements of efficiency values of DMUs under different DEA modeling 
strategies, a result aggregation procedure needs to be used to generate final results and 
facilitate decision analysis. Here, OWA (ordered weighted averaging) method is 
utilized to achieve such purpose. OWA provides a parameterized class of mean type 
aggregation operators. They were introduced by Ronald R. Yager [9]. Many notable 
mean operators such as the max, arithmetic average, median and min, are members of 
this class. 
Assumed that ׊݆ = 1, … , |ܩ|, the efficiency values of ܦܯ ௝ܷ under four strategies 
are available, then the following OWA aggregation procedure is designed:
(1) Efficiency value re-ordering: for each DMU, the order of its efficiency 
values is re-arranged discerningly. Let the descending order set of four DEA 
efficiency values for ܦܯ ௝ܷ is set asܧ(ܦܯ ௝ܷ), where ܧ(ܦܯ ௝ܷ) = ( ௝݁ଵ, ௝݁ଶ, ௝݁ଷ, ௝݁ସ),
and ׊݅ = 1, … , 3, it satisfies 0 ൑ ௝݁௜ାଵ ൑ ௝݁௜ ൑ 1. Then, a position related weight 
vector, ܳ (ܳ = (ݍଵ, ݍଶ, ݍଷ, ݍସ), needs to be attached toܧ(ܦܯ ௝ܷ), where σ ݍ௜ସ௜ୀଵ = 1,
and 0 ൑ ݍ௜ ൑ 1. Some weight vector settings for ܳ discussed in [19] can be used 
and reproduced as follows: 1) Benevolent attitude-based result aggregation: Let 
ܳ1 = (1,0,0,0), then ܱܹܣொଵ
௝
= max
௜ୀଵ,…,ସ
( ௝݁
௜), where the best DEA result is selected as 
ܱܹܣொଵ
௝ . 2) Conservative attitude-based result aggregation: Let ܳ2 = (0,0,0,1), then 
ܱܹܣொଶ
௝
= min
௜ୀଵ,…,ସ
( ௝݁
௜), where the worst DEA result is selected as ܱܹܣொଶ
௝ . 3) Neutral 
attitude-based result aggregation: Let ܳ3 = (ଵ
ସ
,
ଵ
ସ
,
ଵ
ସ
,
ଵ
ସ
), then ܱܹܣொଷ
௝
=
ଵ
ସ
σ ( ௝݁
௜)௜ୀଵ,…,ସ ,
where the arithmetic mean of all four DEA results is selected as ܱܹܣொଷ
௝ .
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(2) Final result aggregation: a final DEA results for ܦܯ ௝ܷ can be achieved by
through a selected aggregation from ܳ1 to ܳ3to aggregate different efficiency values, 
௝݁
ଵ- ௝݁ସ:
ܱܹܣொଵିଷ
௝
൫ ௝݁
ଵ, ௝݁
ଶ, ௝݁
ଷ, ௝݁
ସ൯ = σ ݍ௜
ସ
௜ୀଵ ௝݁
௜ (6)
Finally, Fig. 1 summarizes the overall DEA analysis procedure of two non-
homogeneous DMU groups.
The evaluation 
criteria set of
G1
Input criteria set
of G1
Output criteria
set of G1
Input criteria set
of G2
Output criteria
set of G2
“and” criteria infusion 
for input criteria
“or” criteria infusion 
for output criteria
“or” criteria infusion 
for input criteria
“and” criteria infusion 
for output criteria
The DEA modelling 
based on Ior and Oor
The DEA modelling 
based on Iand and Oor
The DEA modelling
based on  Iand and
Oand
The DEA modelling 
based on Ior and OandThe evaluation 
criteria set of
G2
OWA-
based result 
aggregation
Fig. 1.The overall analysis procedure of this study
4 Illustration example
4.1 Background information
It is assumed that there exist 28 departments in a university in China. Two academic 
divisions, G1 and G2, have been set for these 28 departments, as shown in Tab. 1. G1 stands for 
the group of Engineering-based departments containing 14 departments, as indicated by (A-N); 
G2 stands for the group of humanities and social science-based departments containing 14 
departments, as indicated by (a-n). 
The input criteria set, ܫଵ, proposed by G1 include NFP (number of full-time personnel), and
ESP (expense on scientific research project in RMB Yuan); the output criteria set, ܱଵ ,
proposed by G1 include JP (number of journal paper publication), AC (number of accreditation
certificate for research performance) and NAW (number of national awards).
The input criteria set, ܫଶ, proposed by G2 include NFP and EHP (expense on humanities
and social science research project in RMB Yuan); the output criteria set, ܱଶ, proposed by G2
include JP, NAW, and SCA (number of social community activities).
Next, based on the above criteria setting, the criteria value for each DMU is measured and 
listed in Tab. 1.
Tab. 1 The annual input and output data for 28 departments in a university
Department ESP NFP SHP JP AC NAW SCA
G1
A 54284 1934 359 1794 91 5 3
B 48879 454 1250 744 26 0 0
C 96830 1269 285 800 49 5 2
D 54595 790 765 470 22 2 2
E 85779 1391 562 1281 21 2 1
F 46512 1122 962 1481 39 0 5
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G 53834 1798 743 865 90 1 3
H 70780 536 378 774 25 3 2
I 72830 845 1252 1287 20 4 0
J 53207 1501 686 1624 91 1 1
K 90563 487 628 585 50 4 3
L 53271 641 366 1475 85 3 2
M 47361 1685 1287 1722 31 0 4
N 70816 861 1056 1201 77 2 4
G2
a 51629 872 4283 902 25 3 5
b 23814 240 3514 349 28 2 3
c 21179 609 2658 536 22 0 9
d 32474 732 5904 567 27 1 6
e 47789 974 5744 720 52 4 7
f 53584 263 2045 651 28 0 8
g 49254 223 5775 624 33 2 10
h 30295 682 2140 885 46 5 9
i 34424 259 2283 339 58 2 3
j 59245 251 3816 854 32 5 8
k 37524 463 3156 596 38 4 3
l 55776 904 2794 698 49 1 7
m 27032 282 4515 793 31 0 5
n 30359 981 5413 368 47 1 4
4.2 Different efficiency values’ calculation and results integration
According to Fig. 1, six kinds of DEA modelling results and three kinds of OWA 
aggregation final results are listed in Tab. 2.
Tab. 2 Calculated efficiency result for all DMUs
݁௢௥
௢௥ ݁௢௥
௔௡ௗ ݁௔௡ௗ
௢௥ ݁௔௡ௗ
௔௡ௗ ݁ଵ
ଵ ݁ଶ
ଶ
Integration of OWA
ܱܹܣொ
ଵ ܱܹܣொ
ଶ ܱܹܣொ
ଷ
A 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
B 0.665 0.665 0.573 0.573 0.573 0.665 0.665 0.573 0.619
C 1.000 1.000 0.439 0.418 0.439 1.000 1.000 0.418 0.716
D 0.538 0.520 0.342 0.342 0.342 0.538 0.538 0.342 0.437
E 0.540 0.540 0.498 0.498 0.498 0.540 0.540 0.498 0.519
F 1.000 0.989 0.960 0.960 0.960 1.000 1.000 0.960 0.978
G 0.995 0.477 0.986 0.463 0.978 0.677 0.995 0.463 0.763
H 1.000 0.995 0.556 0.556 0.556 1.000 1.000 0.556 0.777
I 0.796 0.796 0.712 0.712 0.712 0.796 0.796 0.712 0.754
J 1.000 0.943 1.000 0.901 1.000 0.943 1.000 0.901 0.965
K 1.000 1.000 0.588 0.494 0.588 1.000 1.000 0.494 0.778
L 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
M 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
N 0.811 0.609 0.689 0.601 0.673 0.805 0.811 0.601 0.698
a 0.605 0.605 0.605 0.605 0.605 0.605 0.605 0.605 0.605
b 0.915 0.764 0.915 0.764 0.915 0.764 0.915 0.764 0.840
c 1.000 0.735 1.000 0.735 0.775 1.000 1.000 0.735 0.874
d 0.606 0.554 0.606 0.554 0.567 0.606 0.606 0.554 0.582
e 0.687 0.544 0.687 0.544 0.683 0.544 0.687 0.544 0.615
f 1.000 0.871 0.833 0.758 0.796 1.000 1.000 0.758 0.876
g 1.000 0.838 1.000 0.838 0.974 1.000 1.000 0.838 0.942
h 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
i 1.000 0.587 1.000 0.587 1.000 0.587 1.000 0.587 0.794
j 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
k 0.926 0.887 0.926 0.887 0.926 0.887 0.926 0.887 0.907
l 0.633 0.423 0.576 0.417 0.529 0.595 0.633 0.417 0.529
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m 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
n 0.942 0.369 0.942 0.369 0.909 0.421 0.942 0.369 0.659
From the table 2, we can get the following results:
For ܱܹܣொଵ , a benevolent attitude-based aggregation, there has the most number of DMUs 
achieving relatively efficiency;
For ܱܹܣொଶ , a conservative attitude-based aggregation, there has the least DMUs achieving 
relatively efficiency;
For ܱܹܣொଷ , a neutral attitude-based aggregation, the number of relatively efficient DMUs is 
in the middle between ܱܹܣொଵ and ܱܹܣொଶ .
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Abstract. The preferences of emission enterprises in China over two carbon 
emission schemes, taxes and trade schemes, are investigated using Netlogo, a
multi-agent modelling approach. As the Chinese government needs to compare 
the two schemes from the perspective of the emission enterprises, the
circumstances under which each scheme is preferred by the enterprises are 
analyzed. In this short paper, the cost functions of emissions under the tax and 
trade schemes for each enterprise are defined. An enterprise would prefer the 
scheme with less emission costs. Meanwhile, the preference of one enterprise 
may be affected by others’. Steps for simulating the compliance of the carbon 
emission schemes for a number of enterprises using Netlogo language are 
provided. The simulation results indicate guidance of actions for the Chinese 
governments to design carbon emission policies more effectively by considering 
the interests of various emission enterprises.
Keywords: Multi-agent Modelling, Conflict analysis, Climate Change, Netlogo, 
Carbon Tax, Carbon Trade
1   Introduction
Global warming has posed a threat to the earth and wellbeing of mankind. In an 
effort to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions, multinational collaborations are carried out 
under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The 
governance over climate change is defined as the development of treaties, policies, and 
mechanisms towards reducing the risks and consequences of climate change (Jagers 
and Stripple, 2003). Within national borders, climate governance involves governments 
at multiple levels (Bulkeley and Newell, 2009). Traditionally, environmental laws and 
regulations are enforced by governments within the “top-down” framework. Besides,
non-state organizations are playing an increasingly important role, such as the 
participation of business sectors and the self-governance of local communities (Power 
et al., 2002).
Market-based mechanisms have been developed as the complement of governmental 
laws and regulations. In particular, carbon taxes and carbon trade are two powerful tools 
to control carbon emissions. Carbon trading, or called cap and trade, is a market based 
approach to encourage the reduction of emissions for enterprises (Starvins, 2001).
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Compared with carbon taxes, carbon trade scheme allows emitters to customize the 
amount of emissions and profit from unused quota. The European Union Emission 
Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is the largest multinational trading scheme in the world.
Major domestic trading markets can be found in Japan, the United States, and China. 
To ensure the effectiveness of trading policies, precise measurements are required to 
determine the inventories for trade (Tiwari et al., 2010). The implementation of carbon 
trading mechanism has many impacts apart from reducing carbon emissions, such as 
encouraging the development of clean technologies and an increase in low-carbon 
patents (Calel and Dechezlepretre, 2016). Several challenges and criticisms have been 
pointed out by researchers. The influence of carbon market on stock prices for 
enterprises cannot be ignored, although the environmental costs can be saved (Bushnell 
et al., 2013; Trotignon et al., 2015). Complexity of carbon trading markets will bring 
uncertainties to the implementation of trading policies (Lohmann, 2006). 
As one of the countries with significant emission, China has taken efforts in 
continuously mitigating carbon emissions. National carbon trading scheme in China 
were announced by the national government in 2008 to allow the transaction of unused 
quota among enterprises (Philip, 2014). Seven cities in China were selected as trading 
centers, including Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Guangzhou, Wuhan, Chongqing, and 
Tianjin (Swartz, 2016). However, enterprises are homogenous at some trading centers,
which means they may experience shortage or surplus at the same time. Thus, the 
fluctuating level of the quota for trade may result in low transaction rate (Tanpaifang, 
2016). A more unified market incorporating all existing trading centers will be in use
from 2017. Detailed policies at local levels need to be designed to support the running 
of the unified carbon market.
Carbon taxes have been adopted by a number of countries, such as European Union, 
Japan, Australia, and China. The amount of emission can be effectively controlled by 
determining the unit price of emission. The design of carbon tax policies has been 
thoroughly investigated from the perspective such as supply planning (Fahimnia et al., 
2015), social costs (Yohe, 2007), and the impact on national economy (Lu et al., 2010). 
Environmental laws have been initiated by governments including taxation on 
enterprises, especially on coal plants and cement factories. “Environmental Protection 
Tax” was passed nationwide in 2013, according to which CO2 emissions were charged 
for the first time. Although a unified carbon market will be in effect in 2017, carbon 
tax is still a useful scheme, as it can cover a wide range of emission industries and also 
affect the use of energy (Parry and Wingender, 2016). However, the implementation of 
the tax scheme may impact the export and economic growth.  
Whether to choose carbon tax or carbon trade by policymakers has been extensively 
discussed. When a tax scheme is applied, emission price has been determined to control
the emission, while the amount of emission can be limited by adopting to carbon trade
systems (David Suzuki Foundation, 2017). Under a tax scheme, the carbon prices are 
controlled by the governments. In comparison, the carbon prices are affected by many 
factors in carbon markets, such as economic growth (Pew Center on Climate Change, 
2009). The selection of the two schemes depends on factors such as the economic 
incentives to reduce emissions and which sectors of emitting enterprises are from. As a
unified carbon market in China will be established in 2017, policy makers need to 
investigate under what circumstances the respective schemes can work effectively. A
carbon scheme cannot be successfully accepted and complied by emission enterprises
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unless it is beneficial for them. In this paper, the selection of the two aforementioned 
schemes is analyzed from the perspective of these enterprises. In reality, these 
enterprises cannot determine the governmental policies. However, they can be 
modelled as stakeholders who can decide which scheme is more preferred.
In particular, the behaviors of stakeholders impacting the climate change have been 
simulated using multi-agent approaches (Baghoussi et al., 2016; Filatova and Bin, 
2014). Among them, Netlogo is a multi-agent programming language to model 
complex natural and societal systems. With its user-friendly platform, it can be applied 
to the complex interaction among large number of stakeholders when their patterns of 
behavior are hard to characterize, the dynamics of the interaction among the emitting 
enterprises in China need to be investigated to provide governments with guidance to
design climate change policies. In this paper, Netlogo methodology is used to analyze 
which one of the two carbon schemes would be preferred by enterprises in China and 
under what circumstances. Although an enterprise cannot decide the schemes to adopt 
by itself, the preferences for these enterprises would be important for governments in 
China to design the structure and the detail of carbon mitigation policies. Assuming a 
number of enterprises as the agents in the Netlogo model, the preferences of one scheme 
over the other for these enterprises are considered as interactions among the enterprises. 
The preference for one enterprise can be affected by the preferences for others. This 
paper only covers the modelling of the multi-agent interactions using Netlogo, while 
detailed simulation will be discussed in the future research. 
In the remainder of the paper, a brief introduction of Netlogo approach is given in 
Section 2. The cost functions for enterprises are defined in Section 3, followed by the 
selection of optimal emission costs for individual enterprises in Section 4. Generic steps 
for simulating the interaction among enterprises are introduced in Section 5. 
Conclusions and Further Study are provided in Section 6.
2 Netlogo Programming
NetLogo is designed to model complex systems using visual shapes and graphs.
Agents are expressed in the form of turtles, patches, links, and the observer 
(Kornhauser, 2007). It can model the evolution of complex system over time. By 
inputting instructions to independent agents, the interactions among these agents can 
be simulated. Practitioners are provided with a large number of sample documents and 
codes to facilitate the modelling process. 
Agents called “turtles” move over a grid of “patches,” which are small rectangles in 
two dimensions or blocks in three dimensions. A patch is identified by its coordinate, 
(x, y) or (x, y, z). Several variables can be used to describe a path, such as color and 
time of being visited. A turtle can go from one patch to another based on specified rules 
and definitions on its motion. The simulation starts with a particular state and evolve 
over time. The behaviors for the agents can be monitored. Note that agents can learn 
from others. For example, an agent can switch to an option that has been taken by 
others, if it could benefit from the switch of the option. 
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Netlogo programming has been applied to various research area, such as decision 
making (Sirer et al., 2016; Jiang et al., 2015), resource management (Cascalho and 
Mabunda, 2015), computer science (Feciciani and Nishinari, 2016).  
3 Modeling Carbon Emission Costs in China 
In this paper, the interaction between one government and a number of emitting 
enterprises in China is investigated to test the effectiveness of two different climate 
governance policies, i.e. taxes and trade. Although these enterprises are passive 
receivers of any instructions from the governments in China, the preferences over one 
scheme to the other would be indicative for the policy makers. Each enterprise is 
assumed to prefer one scheme to the other according to its emission costs. Under each 
scheme, an enterprise will reach an optimal emission amount so that the corresponding 
costs are the lowest. It will prefer the scheme with smaller optimal costs.
Suppose the set of enterprises in China is denoted as N, the amount of emission for 
enterprise ݅ א ܰ is represented by ݍ௜. As each enterprise can benefit from the emission, 
the reduction of the emission will result in some abatement costs (Fuentes-Albero and 
Rubio, 2010). As the cost of abatement can be denoted as a concave function indicating 
the decreasing returns of environment exploitation, the abatement cost function for i is 
written as (௖೔
ଶ
)(ߜ௜ െ ݍ௜)
ଶ, where ci is the parameter reflecting the abatement costs for i
and, ߜ௜ the emission for i under the condition of BAU (business as usual) (Botteon and 
Carraro, 2001; Fuentes-Albero and Rubio, 2010).
The overall emission for all enterprises is ܳ = σݍ௜. The carbon emissions will bring 
environmental damage and economic loss to the nation. For each enterprise, the loss is 
different. Hence, the loss caused by the overall emission for i is marked as ܦ௜(ܳ) =
݀௜ܳ, where parameter ݀௜ describes the loss per ton of CO2 for i.
Two climate change policies are considered, carbon trade and carbon tax. Under the 
scheme of carbon trade, the unit price of emission is marked as p; ݍො denotes the 
maximum emission allowed by the government for each enterprise. The cost function 
of emission for enterprise i is written as
                                 ܥ௜ଵ = (
௖೔
ଶ
)(ߜ௜ െ ݍ௜)
ଶ+݀௜ σ ݍ௜ െ ݌(ݍො  െ ݍ௜)                  (1)
The cost function for i under the scheme of carbon tax is denoted as 
                                                  ܥ௜ଶ = ቀ
௖೔
ଶ
ቁ (ߜ௜ െ ݍ௜)
ଶ+݀௜ σ ݍ௜ + ݁ݍ௜                            (2)
where e represents the parameter related to the tax. 
Under the two schemes, each enterprise wishes to minimize the emission cost. The 
optimal emission for i, ݍ௜כ , and its minimized emission costs can be obtained by 
calculating the derivatives of ܥ௜ shown as follows. 
Under trade scheme: ݍ௜כ = ߜ௜ െ
ௗ೔ା௣
௖೔
and
 ܥ௜ଵ
כ =
(ௗ೔ ା௣)
మ
ଶ௖೔
+ ݌(ߜ௜ െ ݍො) െ
(ௗ೔ ା௣)௣
௖೔
+ ݀௜ σ(ߜ௜ െ
ௗ೔ ା௣
௖೔
) (3)
when ௗ஼೔భ
ௗ௤೔
= 0.
Under tax scheme: ݍ௜כ = ߜ௜ െ
ௗ೔ା௘
௖೔
and
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ܥ௜ଶ
כ =
(ௗ೔ ା௘)
మ
ଶ௖೔
+ ݁ߜ௜ െ
(ௗ೔ ା௘)௘
௖೔
+ ݀௜ σ(ߜ௜ െ
ௗ೔ ା௘
௖೔
)             (4)
when ௗ஼೔మ
ௗ௤೔
= 0.
4 Selection of Carbon Emission Schemes
In this section, the emission costs under two schemes are compared. Suppose an
enterprise should decide whether to pay emission tax or trade in the regional market.
The cost advantage of one option over the other for an enterprise depends on the 
parameters in the two cost functions. The comparison of the emission costs is explained 
in detail as follows. 
By referring to Equations (3) and (4), the difference of ܥ௜ଵ and ܥ௜ଶ is expressed as 
οܥ௜
כ = ܥ௜ଵ
כ െ  ܥ௜ଶ
כ =  
௘మି௣మ
ଶ௖೔
+ (݌ െ ݁)ߜ௜ െ ݌ݍො +  ݀௜ σ
௘ି௣
௖೔
(5).
If οܥ௜כ > 0, enterprise i prefers to trade;
if οܥ௜כ < 0, enterprise i prefers to pay tax;
if οܥ௜כ = 0, no difference in cost between the two schemes. 
The abovementioned conditions indicate the when the selection of a given option is 
favorable for a focal enterprise. For example, if i pays the carbon tax, it will not change 
its option until οܥ௜כ > 0. 
In some carbon trading centers in China, the unit price of unused quota, p, fluctuates 
over time. Several conclusions are expected to be obtained by changing the values of 
the parameters in Equation (5). 
In Equation (5), the value of οܥ௜כ is determined by ݁ െ ݌, if the values for other 
parameters are unchanged. With the increase of e, the focal enterprise is more likely to 
switch to the trading scheme. As p fluctuates, the tax levied on each amount of 
emission, e, should be adjusted accordingly to cope with the change of p.
With the increase of ci, οܥ௜כ decreases correspondingly. The abatement costs 
increase under both carbon schemes. Given other parameters unchanged, the given 
enterprise is more likely to switch to carbon trade when ci decreases. It can be concluded 
that the trading scheme is more suitable when abatement costs decreases by various 
means, for example, by developing new technologies. 
It should be noted that the environmental loss to enterprise i, di, will affect the its 
preference over the two schemes. However, its relation with οܥ௜כ needs to be further 
analyzed during simulation. 
5 Steps for Simulation using Netlogo
The process of selecting the two carbon emission schemes for enterprises are 
simulated using Netlogo. The variables in Equation (5) include the cost parameter ci,
the loss parameter di, the reference displacement ߜ௜, the allowable carbon emission for 
each enterprise ݍො, the unit price of emission p, and the tax-related parameter e. The 
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dynamics of the actions of these enterprises are analyzed by changing one or more of 
these variables. The general steps for the simulation are provided.
Step 1: Model Initialization
A total of N emission enterprises are agents in the Netlogo model. To facilitate 
simulation, ߜ௜ and ݍො follow a normal distribution with a mean of 100 tons and the
variance of 10 tons. The parameters ci and di obey the uniform distribution as [l, 2]
(10 thousand Chinese Yuan per ton). In a certain period of time, the value of 
parameters p and e are certain and determined by the national policy.
At the initial status, enterprises that prefers the trading scheme are denoted by 
stars, while enterprises in favor of the tax scheme are represented by squares, shown 
in Fig. 1. The proportion of the two types of enterprises can be set at the start of the 
simulation.
Step 2: Run
As the program runs, each enterprise takes the option in which the optimal 
emission cost can be achieved. As the parameters change, the trend of the optimal 
emission cost and the actions for these enterprises can be observed. As the interaction 
among agents evolves with time, the dynamics of the selection of the schemes can be 
observed.
Step 3: Learning
Learning process can be simulated by setting the parameters for enterprises 
according to those for some others. The parameters for a number of enterprises, ܪ ؿ
ܰ, are determined at the start of the simulation. As the interaction evolves, the 
parameters, such as ݍ௝, for other enterprises ݆ א ܰ െ ܪ, are determined by ݍ௜ for ݅ א
ܪ. In the real world, as the parameters in the cost function may not be obtained, an 
enterprise could actually determine its emission amount according to how much other 
enterprises emit. 
Fig.1. Illustration of simulating carbon scheme selections using Netlogo
6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this short paper, the selection of carbon tax and trade schemes carbon emission 
for enterprises China is modelled on the Netlogo programming platform. Considering 
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the interaction of the enterprises as a conflict containing multiple decision makers, the
emission costs of selecting two carbon schemes are compared for each enterprise. As 
an enterprise will reach an optimal emission amount so that the costs are the lowest 
under each scheme, it will prefer the scheme with smaller optimal costs. Simulation 
will be carried out in the further study to analyze the dynamics of selecting carbon 
schemes for a group of enterprises. Moreover, each enterprise could learn the selection 
of the carbon schemes from others. The results of the selection, as well as the value of 
the parameters, can provide guidance of actions for governments in China to design 
carbon emission policies.
The detailed simulation results need to be obtained at the next step of this research. 
Moreover, graph model for conflict resolution (GMCR) methodology can be applied to 
the carbon scheme selection for a large number of decision makers. GMCR is a formal 
approach to analyze strategic conflicts. As the parameters in the cost function are often 
hard to determine, each enterprise chooses the carbon schemes according to the ordinal 
comparison of the corresponding emission costs. The selection process under GMCR 
paradigm can be simulated using Netlogo language. The combination of GMCR and 
Netlogo can provide a flexible and powerful tool for policy makers to analyze the 
dynamics of interactions among stakeholders regarding carbon emission mitigation.
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Abstract. We combine aspects of nuclear deterrence and nuclear ac-
cidents in one comprehensive game theoretic bargaining model. Based
on the game equilibria, we determine the conditions under which actors
prefer a conventional or a nuclear conﬂict environment. We ﬁnd that
aspects of nuclear deterrence and nuclear accidents are critical variables
with competing character. We discuss the impact of our ﬁndings in the
context of the Sagan-Waltz debate on the utility of nuclear weapons.
Keywords: nuclear weapons, game theory, bargaining model, interna-
tional conﬂicts
1 Introduction
The debate on the role and utility of nuclear weapons is as old as the realization
of the ﬁrst nuclear weapon itself. Some nuclear weapons scholars focus on the
causes and consequences of nuclear proliferation [1, 2], while others study the
closely related topic of the general role of nuclear weapons, which has been
discussed repeatedly over the last 70 years [3–9]. Although the studied topics
related to nuclear weapons are diverse, there is a largely common, ultimate urge
to understand certain, speciﬁc aspects of nuclear weapons in the hope to prevent
a destructive nuclear war.
While most scholars agree on the importance of preventing such a war, they
substantively disagree on how to ensure it. A prominent example, which we
focus on in this work, was the debate between nuclear pessimist Scott Sagan
and nuclear optimist Kenneth Waltz. In ”The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: an
Enduring Debate”, which is in its third edition, the two scholars disagree as to
whether the spread of nuclear weapons makes the world a more dangerous place,
or whether these weapons provide peace and stability.
By analyzing their debate, it becomes evident that the authors approach
the topic in two fundamentally diﬀerent ways. Sagan, on the one hand, looks
at it from an organizational theory standpoint. He assesses not only nuclear
accidents but also terrorist attacks and preventive war, and emphasizes that the
probability of a nuclear detonation is not negligibly low. Waltz on the other hand
underlines the anarchic system the states ﬁnd themselves in. He argues that the
prospect of the devastation resulting from a nuclear escalation makes the states
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cautious. Therefore, he concludes that nuclear deterrence is a key pillar of peace
and stability.
As we will point out later, Waltz’ way of looking at this question is implicitly
related to how many game theoretic studies approach the role of nuclear weapons.
We will show that this strategy-focused approach leads to a line of argument,
which is not a straightforward counterpart to Sagan’s organizational viewpoint.
In this work, we want to contribute to the understanding of the two theories’
diﬀerent levels, discuss their points of contact but also aspects where they are
at cross purposes. Hence, we develop a bargaining game which focuses on the
utility of nuclear weapons and incorporates two main aspects of Sagan’s and
Waltz’ arguments: nuclear accidents and deterrence. We ﬁnd that, if brought
on the same level as in our model, the two aspects are critical variables with
competing character, which determine the utility of nuclear weapons.
2 The Diﬀerent Levels of the Nuclear Debate
2.1 Waltz’ Reasoning and Game Theoretic Deterrence Theories
Based on two examples, we will point out parallels between Waltz’ way of looking
at the question of the utility of nuclear weapons and the approach game theoretic
studies take.
Anarchic Environment Waltz states early on in the book, that “[s]tates co-
exist in a condition of anarchy” and that states must provide for their own
security in the form of self-help [8]. This is an assumption that is also underly-
ing most game theoretic models in international relations (cf. [10–12]). Usually,
one goal of a game theoretic model is to understand which outcome(s) are most
likely. The assumption that states coexist in an anarchic world justiﬁes why the
equilibrium strategies of all actors are determined by maximizing the player’s
expected utility.
Likeliness of War and the Cost of War Waltz builds a substantial part of
his argument on the theory that “[w]ar becomes less likely as costs of war rise in
relation to possible gains” [8]. This draws on the modeling of the war outcome
in game theoretic models (cf. [12, 9]). The expected utility of going to war with
another player is commonly modeled as a costly lottery, i.e. the probability to
win the war times the concomitant beneﬁt minus the costs of war. Since usually
both players have to bear the cost of war, the payoﬀ of this outcome decreases
with increasing costs of war. Therefore, the likelihood that the game ends in this
outcome decreases.
2.2 Sagan’s Focus on Nuclear Accidents and Their Compatibility
with Game-Theoretic Conﬂict Models
Sagan’s argument about nuclear accidents, which is grounded in organizational
theory, is often only partly or not at all incorporated in game theoretic models.
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In the following, we will discuss how nuclear deterrence models usually only
account for accidents in the war-related expected nuclear escalation costs, but
not in a general way, i.e. in peace time (cf. [9, 13]).
Sagan’s argument that military organizations may inadvertently use nuclear
weapons “despite national interests to the contrary” [8], is incorporated in the
expected costs of a nuclear escalation. Nuclear deterrence models usually ac-
count for these types of accidents in the war outcome. However, Sagan also
discusses nuclear accidents based on Perrow’s normal accidents theory [14]: in
particular, he points out that “large-scale arsenals and command systems are
highly complex, [...] and are tightly-coupled [...]” [8]. According to Perrow, or-
ganizations, which exhibit the two mentioned characteristics and are assumed
to be boundedly rational, will not be able to eliminate the possibility of serious
system accidents. These kinds of accidents could happen regardless of whether
the states decide to go to war or not and they are not immediately compatible
with common game theoretic conﬂict models.
In the following chapter, we use these insights to show how the role of nuclear
weapons can be considered in a more comprehensive approach by proposing a
bargaining model of conﬂict, which overcomes this diﬃculty.
3 Model
When thinking of the nuclear security dilemma as a Prisoner’s Dilemma or
Chicken Game, the strategic interactions between nuclear armed states is at the
foreground. The possibility of accidents, which are independent of the players’
action sets, is not incorporated at that point because the focus lies on the strate-
gic interaction and the respective game equilibria. The question whether nuclear
weapons are beneﬁcial for the international community or a speciﬁc state is
thereby not answered on a comprehensive level. Therefore, the conclusion that
nuclear weapons provide peace and stability, which Waltz and others at least
partly draw from nuclear deterrence theory is a conclusion, which is – in game
theoretic terms – merely based on a subgame of a larger, and more comprehen-
sive game.
Based on a conventional two-player bargaining model of conﬂict [12], we
develop an extended model, which allows for the inclusion of the probability
of accidents after Perrow. Depending on one player’s choice, both players ﬁnd
themselves faced with a conﬂict either in a conventional or a nuclear scenario.
The conventional and the corresponding nuclear game constitute two subgames
of the overall model as shown in ﬁgure 1.
3.1 Subgame C: Conventional Single Round Bargaining
Subgame C is a common, conventional single round bargaining model based on
the Rubinstein model [12, 15]. Player 1 and player 2 bargain over a dividable
issue. First, player 1 oﬀers an issue resolution x ∈ X = [0, 1], where X denotes
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Fig. 1. Overall two-player model featuring two subgames: a conventional (SGC) and
a nuclear scenario (SGN). Here, x is player 1’s issue allocation oﬀer, s is the status
quo allocation, p the probability that player 1 wins the war, c1 and c2 the cost of
conventional war for each player, anG the general expected cost due to the existence
of nuclear weapons, bnE the expected cost of a nuclear escalation.
the normalized issue space. Second, player 2 decides whether to accept the oﬀer
(outcome 1), attack player 1 (outcome 2), or reject the oﬀer (outcome 3).
In case that player 2 accepts player 1’s oﬀer x, both players are allocated
a speciﬁc payoﬀ, which is mapped by a utility function ui(x), i ∈ {1, 2}. We
assume linear utilities, i.e. u1(x) = x and u2(x) = 1 − x. If player 2 rejects the
oﬀer, the status quo allocation (s, 1− s) of the issue remains in place. In case of
an attack, war is modeled as a costly lottery. Player 1 wins the war with a certain
probability p. Correspondingly, player 2 wins the war with probability 1−p. The
player who wins the war is allocated the entire issue, while the defeated party
gets nothing. Since war is costly, both players have to bear a cost of war ci,
i ∈ {1, 2} regardless whether they win or lose. Therefore, player 1 receives the
entire issue with probability p and nothing with probability 1− p and he has to
bear the cost of war c1. Player 2 receives the entire issue with probability 1− p
and nothing with probability p, and he has to bear the cost of war c2.
3.2 Subgame N: Bargaining in a Nuclear World
For the nuclear world scenario, each player’s action set as well as the game
structure remains the same. There are two diﬀerences, which are reﬂected in
the payoﬀ functions, and which are related to nuclear weapons possession. The
ﬁrst draws on nuclear deterrence theory in the sense that there exists a non-
zero probability b that both players suﬀer the cost of a nuclear escalation nE.
Therefore, if player 2 chooses to go to war, both players have to bear an additional
expected cost bnE. The cost of a nuclear escalation does not necessarily have to
be the same for both players, we will, however, in the following restrict our
analysis to this special case.
The second diﬀerence is a general expected cost term anG associated with
possible costs due to the very existence of nuclear weapons. These costs are
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related to the risks that nuclear weapons pose and they can range from the
costs from a full-scale nuclear war [16], a regional war [17], an attack involving
a limited number of nuclear weapons [18], and general acquisition, maintenance
and disposal costs [19].
In summary, both players bear an additional, general expected cost term
anG due to the existence of nuclear weapons in all three possible outcomes in
the nuclear scenario, subgame SGN. Furthermore, the possibility of a nuclear
escalation, once a conventional attack has been launched, is reﬂected in the
expected cost term bnE in the war outcome of SGN.
3.3 Introducing the Nuclear Option
In order to ﬁnd the criteria that determine whether the players prefer to face a
conﬂict in a conventional or in a nuclear scenario, we connected the two subgames
SGC and SGN by a preceding decision node. The extensive form of the overall
model is shown in ﬁgure 1. Player 1 ﬁrst decides whether to face this bargaining
conﬂict in a conventional world or in a world where both players are nuclear
weapon states. Second, player 1 decides on a issue resolution x ∈ X = [0, 1].
Third, player 2 decides whether to accept the oﬀer, attack player 1 or reject the
oﬀer. We analyzed this particular case here in greater detail, since we found that
if player 2 had the choice between a nuclear and a conventional world, he would
always choose the conventional world.
There are six possible outcomes oi, i ∈ {1, . . . , 6} to this overall model. The
ﬁrst three outcomes o1, o2, o3 are the outcomes of the conventional world, the
other three outcomes o4, o5, o6 are the outcomes in the nuclear world.
The payoﬀs for each player and outcome are formalized as follows:
u1(o1) = x
u2(o1) = 1− x
u1(o2) = p− c1
u2(o2) = 1− p− c2
u1(o3) = s
u2(o3) = 1− s
u1(o4) = x− anG
u2(o4) = 1− x− anG
u1(o5) = p− c1 − bnE − anG
u2(o5) = 1− p− c2 − bnE − anG
u1(o6) = s− anG
u2(o6) = 1− s− anG
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4 Results
We determine the equilibria of the game by backward induction. First, we ﬁnd
the subgame perfect Nash equilibria for each of the two subgames, SGC and
SGN. Then, we determine the equilibria of the overall game. We know that the
ordering of the reservation values is as follows:
r′1 < r1 < r2 < r
′
2 (1)
Depending on the relative value of the status quo allocation of player 1, s, and
each reservation values, we distinguish the following 3 cases:
Weak Starting Position If player 1 is in a weak starting position, i.e. if s < r2,
we know that s < r′2 because of the relation in 1. Therefore, he compares payoﬀs
u1(o1(x = s)) = s with u1(o4(x = s)) = s − anG. He always chooses the
conventional world ’C’ because anG is strictly positive.
Intermediate Starting Position If r2 < s < r
′
2 then player 2 compares the
payoﬀs u1(o1(x = r2)) = p + c2 with u1(o4(x = s)) = s − anG. We know that
p+ c2 = r2. Even though s is larger than r2 (by assumption), player 1’s decision
whether to choose ’C’ or ’N’ depends on the diﬀerence of s and r2. Player 1 will
choose ’C’ if s− r2 < anG.
Strong Starting Position If player 1 is in a strong starting position, i.e. if
s > r′2 then we know that s > r2 because of the relation in 1. Player 1 compares
the payoﬀs u1(o1(x = r2)) = p + c2 and u1(o4(x = r
′
2)) = p + c2 + bnE − anG.
Therefore, player 1 chooses ’C’ if anG > bnE.
We ﬁnd that player 1 prefers to face a conﬂict in the nuclear world under two
conditions, while player 2 never chooses to face a conﬂict in a nuclear world. One
condition for a preference towards the nuclear scenario is that the diﬀerence be-
tween player 1’s status quo s and player 2’s reservation value in the conventional
scenario r2 has to be smaller than the general expected cost due to the existence
of nuclear weapons anG. The second condition relates the general expected cost
due to the existence of nuclear weapons anG and the expected cost of nuclear
escalation bnE. Speciﬁcally, bnE has to be larger than anG.
5 Discussion
We found that the relevant variables for the choice between a nuclear and a
conventional scenario are the general expected cost due to the existence of nu-
clear weapons anG and the expected cost of a nuclear escalation in war time
bnE. Hence, we brought together the aspects of nuclear deterrence and nuclear
accidents in one comprehensive bargaining model in order to be able to discuss
their relationship on the same level. In this ongoing research project, this will
allow us to transfer our ﬁndings back into the debate on the utility of nuclear
weapons and discuss their signiﬁcance.
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Abstract. This paper, based on research conducted in the field of 
international relations, discusses the persistence of the Israeli decision not to 
decide regarding the area of the West Bank of the Jordan river. Unlike the most 
common security arguments for this policy, the author focuses on the Israeli
preference building process and its impact on the “decision not to decide” that 
is a major obstacle in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict resolution. This policy was 
the focus of interviews conducted with Israeli political elites that was 
supplemented by secondary sources, in order to give an inside view on the 
subjects at hand in future negotiations with the Palestinian people. With the 
help of George Tsebelis’ “Veto Player Theory”, the author addresses major 
obstacles rooted in the Israeli political system. The analysis of preference is a 
vital first step in a larger negotiation management process, as it sets the 
foundation to realizing each party’s true interests, thus allowing for an 
examination of those interests’ compatibility.
Keywords: negotiation management, preference building, veto players
1   Introduction
While a new generation of Palestinians rise up against the Israeli occupation of the 
West Bank, the Israeli military administration holds on to the territories west of the 
Jordan river. The uprising contains violent actions in East Jerusalem, in the West 
Bank and since the beginning of 2016 escalated to what is called “knife intifada” in 
major Israeli cities like Tel Aviv and Jerusalem [1][2]. The territories are under Israeli 
military law since the end of the Six Day War in 1967, and neither have they been 
fully annexed like it was done so in the Golan Heights in 1983, nor have the 
established Jewish settlements on Palestinian ground been evacuated like it was done 
so in the Gaza strip in 2005. “The [Israeli] government decided on 19 June [1967] that 
in return for peace Israel was ready to withdraw to the international borders with 
Egypt and Syria respectively, but the government could not reach such a conclusion 
on the Jordanian front” [3] [p.233]. The highly costly occupation of the West Bank and 
the deterioration of the situation on the ground, which are known as key elements in 
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the Middle East conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, show what kind of impact 
the 1967 established non-decision-policy has nowadays and questions the special 
status of the West Bank. Why did the Israeli government in 1967 purposely avoided 
making a decision on the future of the West Bank – and all the more striking – hold 
on to the non-decision-policy until today? A closer look at the inner Israeli preference 
building process with the American political scientist Andrew Moravcsik and his 
“New Liberalism” [4][5][6] is only one piece in the mosaic of a comprehensive
negotiation management process as used in other fields of research especially in 
business administration [7]. Nevertheless, as the very first step on the way to 
successful negotiations with the Palestinians in regard to the identification of 
integrative potential, it is worth to be in the focus of research on negotiations and 
group decisions.
2 Theoretical Frame
Findings from International Relations theory can help to identify preferences and 
their impact on decision making of political actors. Moravcsik underlines in his 
republican variant of “New Liberalism” that the state and its government functions as 
a transmission belt of domestic preferences into foreign policy [5]. Starting from this 
approach on foreign policy level, the operationalization of the inner Israeli domestic 
preference building process with George Tsebelis “Vetoplayer Theory”[8][9]
concretizes the phenomenon of the non-decision-policy in a deductive way. “In order 
to change policies – or, as we will say henceforth, to change the (legislative) status 
quo – a certain number of individual or collective actors have to agree to the proposed 
change. I call such veto players” [9] [p.2]. In regard to the Israeli non-decision-policy 
that means: If the political status quo of the military administration without annexing 
the West Bank should be changed, a certain number of individual or collective actors 
(the so called veto players) need to agree to this change of policy. 
Croissant gives a clear frame for analysis with Tsebelis’ theory by stating that 
“the chance to change to political status quo is the higher, (1) the smaller the number 
of players; (2) the bigger the congruence of the veto players and (3) the more cohesive 
or homogenous they are” [10] [p.133]. In the sequence it becomes clear that “generally, 
the more players it takes to change the status quo, the lesser the chance that something 
will be changed” [11] [p.180]. Consequently, the change of the political status quo in 
Israel becomes more likely, if only a few veto players can be identified within the 
political system of Israel, their programmatic distance is very small and their vision 
regarding the future of the West Bank is homogenous. 
Illustration 1: graph based on 
Ganghof/Schulze 2015[12].
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In a spatial model as designed in illustration 1, every actor (A-D) is able to define 
an ideal point (XA-D) of his policy preference in a certain issue. The actors will then 
try to influence the policy to change the actual status quo of policy (XSQ) in favor of 
their preference with knowledge of the preferences of the other players in the field.
Since all players are indifferent towards solutions, that have the exact same 
ideological distance from the own ideal point as the current status quo, an indifference 
circle can be drawn around them. Due to acceptance of the status quo, the indifference 
circle usually intersects XSQ in the spatial model. Policy stability – the retention of the 
status quo – is dependent on two variables: the size of the win set of the status quo 
WSQ represented in the shaded area and the size of the unanimity core represented in 
the dashed line. The unanimity core is the connection between the ideal points of all 
actors and its size is an indicator for policy stability: “Indeed, a bigger unanimity core 
produces a larger set of points that cannot be changed” [9] [p.21]. If an additional veto 
player whose ideal point lies within the unanimity core is added, it will automatically 
be absorbed, since its position is already covered by the position of other actors
(absorption rule). If an additional veto player whose ideal point lies outside the 
unanimity core is added, the unanimity core becomes bigger and policy stability 
increases.
In the synthesis of Moravcsik’s “New Liberalism”[4][5][6] and Tsebelis’ “Veto 
Player Theory”[8][9] the role of a preference building process is analyzed in a logical 
and comprehensive way. In the case of the West Bank it concludes, that each side of 
the future negotiations between Israel and Palestine needs to be clear about his own 
preferences regarding the contested core territory. In preparation to this larger 
negotiation process, the preference building process on both sides needs to be 
analyzed in detail in order to avoid negotiation failure. As a first step, this paper will 
give a detailed theoretical based insight on the Israeli side regarding the issue in the 
West Bank.
3   Methodology
Due to the expected negotiation expertise and their relevance as social actors, 
political parties are one of the subsequent objects of investigation when it comes to 
negotiation research. While the collection of data in negotiation research is highly 
problematic [13], the author choses a primary data frame by asking the political elite of 
the state of Israel themselves. Following the credo “Why not measure policy positions 
of politicians by asking the politicians themselves” [14] [p.213], the author collected 
data through guideline based interviews with representatives of Israeli parties. Even 
though gaining clear statements from Members of Knesset (MKs) or their direct 
representatives is challenging, the given statements in eight interviews with partners 
from six parties supplemented by party programs, public interview material and 
newspaper articles give an empirical based impression on the complexity of having a 
preference as an Israeli collective. Since party discipline in Israel plays a special role, 
the inherent reduction concerning the analysis of intern cohesion is less problematic 
than in comparable cases [16].
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4 Empirical Findings
The empirical analysis contains data from the ruling coalition in Israel from March 
2015 until May 2016 as well as the opposition parties in the Knesset. Even though it 
seems negligent to analyze the preference building process on the Israeli side by 
referring to parties only, this procedure can be justified by the central role that 
political parties in the Israeli society perceive [15][16]. Therefore, the focus of this paper 
will be on the partisan veto players as one specific group of veto players in contrast to 
institutional and other players in the field. 
4.1 Veto potential of the Israeli parties and the role of the referendum policy
The established Israeli multi-party system, which results from a strictly 
proportional election system in a nationwide single-district, forces coalition 
governments [17]. In the analyzed period, the coalition contained five parties: The 
center-right “Likud” (30 of the 120 seats in the parliament), the central party 
“Kulanu” (10 seats), the settlers party “HaBayit HaYehudi” (8 seats), the 
ultraorthodox parties “Shas” (7 seats) and United Torah Judaism (6 seats). The 
opposition contained the center-left “Zionist Union” (24 seats), the Arab “Joint List” 
(13 seats), the 2012 newly founded liberal party “Yesh Atid” (11 seats), the Russian 
immigrants party “Yisrael Beitenu” (6 seats) and the leftist party “Meretz” (5 seats). 
The highly volatile party system, that is characterized by multiple changes of 
governments, show that the role of the opposition should not be underestimated. In a 
minimum winning coalition (61 seats out of 120), every single member of the 
governing parties is a potential veto player. The basic law “Referendum” strengthens 
the role of the opposition: “The referendum law […] requires a referendum on any 
treaty that entails giving up land to which Israeli law applies, including the Golan
Heights and East Jerusalem but not the West Bank. However, if more than 80 MKs 
[Member of Knesset] support the treaty, it can be ratified without a referendum” [18].
Even if the West Bank de jure is not part of the referendum policy, de facto all the 
discussed scenarios for the future of the territory (two state solution, bi-nationalism, 
one state solution) contain either Jerusalem or the Israeli core territory (in the case of 
land swaps). Henceforth, every change of the current status quo in the West Bank de 
facto triggers the referendum policy. In order to reach the qualified majority of 80 
MKs to avoid the referendum, the votes of opposition parties are necessary. In 
pursuance of a change of the legal basis of the referendum law itself, only a majority 
of 61 MKs is necessary. Nevertheless, the referendum law contains symbolic 
character. It passed the Knesset with a 68 MK-majority and not only therefore, its 
reversion is highly unlikely [18]. Once in place, referendum laws as elements of a 
direct democracy are hard to change. The electorate will always feel placed under 
disability if politicians topple a referendum policy. The opposition as well as the 
government contains veto potential regarding the future of the West Bank.
4.2 The dimensions of preferences
In order to find out, which kind of preferences are leading and relevant for the non-
decision-policy, four key areas are in the focus of the interview guidelines: 
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coexistence between Israel and an independent Palestinian state, Jewish character of 
the Israeli state, settlements in the West Bank and Israeli annexation or occupation of 
the West Bank. Those key areas are part of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process since 
the Oslo Accords of 1993. 
During the interviews with Israeli party representatives two structuring 
dimensions become very clear and prevalent: The first dimension is the type of 
division of territory, namely if Israel should become a bi-national state, support a two 
state solution or become one Jewish state containing the West Bank as proper Israeli 
territory. The structuring element in this scale is designed from an Israeli perspective 
on the issue: The degree of Israeli sovereignty and its territorial expansion is 
increasing from left to right on a continuous scale that leaves room for options in 
between. 
The second dimension is the degree of autonomy for the Palestinian population,
namely the variation between a high degree of autonomy in a bi-national state to a 
low degree in a demilitarized variant of the two state solution. All statements of the 
politicians contain a clear position towards these two dimensions and help to structure 
the model usefully. 
4.3 Party positions and their relations to the current Status quo
Within these two dimensions all parties, with the exception of United Torah 
Judaism, who does not have a position on the status of the West Bank, could be 
positioned by their preferences expressed in the interviews. 
Key:
S(Q): Status quo
XH: ideal point HaBayit HaYehudi XS: ideal point Shas
XK: ideal point Kulanu XL: ideal point Likud party 
Illustration 2: Own graph based on Tsebelis 2002[9].
As presented in illustration 2, the parties do have varying ideal points keyed in the 
table below. In the “Likud” party as well as within “Kulanu” the intern cohesion is 
quite low. While Benyamin Netanyahu takes the middle position in the “Likud” that 
is congruent with the current status quo (S(Q)) of military occupation without 
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annexation, his fellow MK Tzachi Hanegbi is a strong supporter of a two state 
solution. Hanegbi’s counterpart within the “Likud” is Tzipi Hotovely. In an interview 
with Israel National News, she stated: “We expect as a model of principle that the 
international community recognizes Israel’s right to build homes for Jews in their 
homeland. Everywhere.” This statement gives a clear indication that settlements in the 
West Bank are included in an Israeli state and will be enlarged in the future. This 
means a clear violation of a possible sovereign Palestinian state in the West Bank.
Also within “Kulanu” a congruent position is absent. While Michael Oren underlines 
the Israeli interest not to rule over another population [20], Eli Cohen opposes the 
principals included in the so called “Arab Peace Initiative” [18]. Within these 
principles, he strongly opposes the establishment of a Palestinian state and tends to be 
closer to the “One Jewish State”-dimension. Despite these variances in internal 
cohesion, there is as win set between “Kulanu” and “Likud”. Their positions are 
overlapping. They open up a spot between their ideal points and give room for 
changing of the status quo – either in favor of Tzipi Hotovely, or in favor of Michael 
Oren. The next bigger member of the coalition in seats is the settlers’ party “Habayit 
HaYehudi”. “Habayit HaYehudi” is quite cohesive and openly opposes a two state 
solution: “On one hand we have the large vision of promised land to the Jewish 
people and at the end of the day that’s striking strong and behind the Habayit 
HaYehudis’ visions.  A second reason is security: We see every place that was given 
over to our neighbors has turned into… that’s the world that we’re in.” [21].
It shows, not only the cohesion of the first two players is low and policy stability 
therefore likely, but also that the congruence between the coalition parties is at a 
maximum level. The area of tension between “Kulanu” and “HaBayit HaYehudi” 
indicates policy stability as well. Both coalition partners accept the current status quo, 
their indifference circle intersects with S(Q). Besides the status quo, there is no win 
set between “Kulanu” and “Habayit HaYehudi”. Their ideal points (XK and XH) are at 
a maximum distance touching the status quo: While “Kulanu” (XK) is in favor of a 
two state solution, “HaBayit HaYehudi” (XH) fights for a one state solution of a 
Jewish democratic state from the sea to the river and thereby including the entire 
West Bank. “It should be one Jewish state that is a democracy. Jewish state means 
sovereignty all over the place”[21]. The second theoretical conclusion of veto players 
theory is realized: The bigger the programmatic or ideological distance between the 
veto players, the more likely policies will remain as they are. 
“Shas”, the fourth government coalition party was not ready to participate in the 
guide line based interview. However, secondary sources indicate, that “Shas” does not 
have an outstanding position on the four key areas discussed. Its position and 
indifference circle is mainly congruent with the “Likuds’” position (XL). Aryeh Deri, 
chair of the “Shas” party stated in public right before the elections in March 2015: “I 
do not agree to the partition of Jerusalem, and I do not agree to mass evacuations for 
no reason, but I do support the evacuation of isolated settlements, and I do support 
negotiations“ [22]. Due to the congruence with the “Likud”, “Shas’” position will be 
absorbed and will not be counted as another veto player following the absorption rule. 
“United Torah Judaism” (UTJ), the fifth government coalition party stated in an 
interview with the Jerusalem Post in 2015, that is does not have an official position on 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict including the West Bank issue [23]. Hence, the position of 
UTJ is not localized in the chosen dimensions.
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Key:
XB: ideal point Yisrael Beitenu XM: ideal point Meretz
XH: ideal point HaBayit HaYehudi XS: ideal point Shas
XJ: ideal point Joint List XY: ideal point Yesh Atid
XK: ideal point Kulanu XZ: ideal point Zionist Union
XL : ideal point Likud party S(Q): current status quo
Illustration 3: Own graph based on Tsebelis 2002[9].
When it comes to the opposition parties, policy stability becomes even more likely. 
As shown in illustration 3 the position of the “Zionist Union” and “Yesh Atid” are 
quiet homogenous which is proven by statements in favor of the two state solution 
with a low degree of Palestinian autonomy. In the interviews both stated: “I want to 
see a Palestinian State living side by side with the Israeli state” [25]. “We believe that 
we need to separate from the Palestinians, we believe in a two-state solution.[…] the 
security considerations have to be paramount. We believe that Israel has the right to 
act wherever there’s a threat to it, including in a future Palestinian state” [19]. They 
have the same ideal point (XY and XZ) and since they both tolerate the current status 
quo their indifference circle becomes equalized by intersecting S(Q). 
By adding those players, (following the absorption rule they are counted as one 
player) the size of the unanimity core becomes bigger. Following the third theoretical 
conclusion, the change of the current West Bank policy becomes even more unlikely
due to the bigger unanimity core [9].
“Meretz” and the “Joint List” would make the story even more complicated since 
their current position does not even touch the status quo. Both parties are strong 
supporters of either a two state solution with a high degree of Palestinian autonomy or 
of a binational-state with an Israeli and a Palestinian entity according to the Bosnian 
prelude [26][27].
4.4 Limitations
Clearly the presented empirical data base is only a starting point in the analysis of the 
inner Israeli preference building process. Since the focus of this paper is on partisan 
veto players, institutional players as well as the population itself also need to be taken 
into account in order to draw a complete picture. Nevertheless, the central role of 
parties in the Israeli political sphere can justify the priority of parties in this article. 
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Moreover, due to their refuse, not all political parties or representatives took part in 
the interviews the analysis is based upon. This first analysis could be further 
strengthened by a second interview attempt in the field. 
Usually it is difficult to look at parties as uniform players with coherent preferences. 
In the special case of the Israeli political system, they can be seen as uniform actors 
due to the special role of party discipline [16].
4 Conclusion
Within the analysis of the preference building process concerning the “decision not 
to decide” some logical, though underestimated findings have been revealed. The 
analysis of preferences within actors – and in this case within political actors – shows 
what in many negotiations is missing: A clear preference. Without having a clear 
preference in mind further negotiations with another entity not only seem negligent, 
but are sure to fail. Integrative subjects and compatible interests between actors can 
only be identified, if there is a preference in the first place. The exchange of 
negotiation subjects, the ability to make concessions and the final option to come to 
an agreement all depend on a clear preference as a starting point for negotiations. 
Therefore, not only a broad negotiation management process with all its elements is 
necessary, but also a vertical dimension that helps to identify key elements such as the 
preference building process before the leading part of negotiations start.
The Israeli decision not to decide demonstrates how a lack of preference for a certain 
issue can influence the situation on the ground in dramatic ways. However, through 
the analysis of the partisan veto players, their positions and their veto potential, some 
starting points for reforms could be uncovered. The political system as the context of 
the preference building process favors a lack of preference by making competition of 
interests more likely and more difficult. The Israeli multi-party system rooted in a 
strong proportional election system encourages the variety of preferences and their 
competing character. The necessity of coalition governments institutionalizes the 
partisan veto players’ constellation. The absence of a win set between coalition parties
is only one difficulty in the preference building process. The number of players in the 
field drive this difficulty on a further level and in this case leads to a nearly fifty years 
lasting non-decision policy on the Israeli side of the conflict resolution process.
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Abstract. The analysis of conflict requires an understanding of its dynamics and 
underlying structure. To study these underlying structures, we expand the 
existing theoretical work by introducing an agent-based model of a sanction 
conflict. This model describes rules on which the agents interact. Such rules are 
utility optimization, beliefs and expectations, subjective emotional actions, as 
well as learning and updating. In addition, the agents compare their actions to 
different negotiation solutions and agree on the negotiation solution if it is better 
for all involved agents. The simulation of this model allows studying conflict 
dynamics over many rounds as well as the emergence of negotiation solutions 
and helps for theory building in the area of conflict dynamics.
Keywords: Conflict, Agent-based model, Sanctions, Negotiation
1   Introduction
Conflicts are comprised of multiple interactions between diverse actors with a 
complex underlying structure. Studying such conflict structures and patterns is 
important for understanding the dynamics and development of a conflict. This is not
only important for conflict analysis but also for studying the emergence of possibilities 
for a negotiated solution. However, comprehending such an underlying structure in an 
existing conflict is often complex and not easy to achieve. While most conflict models
focus on a macro-level perspective, we introduce a generic model, which builds on the 
micro-level interaction of heterogeneous agents in a sanction conflict situation.
We expand the existing theoretical work on sanctions conflicts [e.g., 1–5] by 
introducing a sequential repeated agent-based model to study the interaction of a 
sanctioner and a sanctionee in a conflict situation. This allows us to study the dynamic 
of such a relation not only for one encounter but over many rounds. Instead of an 
analytical solution concept, which is not always suitable for repeated interacting models
[6], we follow a simulation method based on an agent-based modelling approach. 
Agent-based models are based on autonomous agents, which are capable to interact 
with each other and their environment.
In our model, we introduce simple rules according to which the two parties of a 
sanction conflict act. The agents assess the state of the current situation and decide on 
their action according to utility optimization rules, beliefs about future reactions of the 
opponent, as well as subjective emotional factors and learn as they update their beliefs 
about the other side’s behavior.
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2 Model
2.1   Conflict Structure
Our model builds on a sanction conflict structure [1], where one side can impose
sanctions as a reaction to unwanted actions of the other side. The two interacting agents
the sender ܵ (sanctioner) and the target ܶ (sanctionee) control one variable each. The 
sender controls the amount of sanctions ݏ and the target controls the amount of the 
sanction-triggering topic ݐ (this could be a nuclear program, pollution of the 
environment, human rights violation, or anything else that is unwanted by the sender).
The value of these two variables, that we assume to be between 0 and 1, affect the 
utility of the two players, which they want to maximize. An increase in ݏ affects both 
the sender ܵ and the target ܶ negatively, whereas an increase in ݐ affects ܵ negatively 
but ܶ positively. Sanctions are designed to harm the target but they are also negatively 
affecting the sender, whose economy can no longer freely interact with the target state. 
On the other hand, an increase in the disputed topic by definition negatively affects the 
sender and benefits the target. This can be explained through an increase in political 
power or the reduction of costs for the target, depending on the specific topic.
From a more formal consideration, the sender ܵ has a utility function of ݏ and ݐ
described as 
ݑௌ(ݏ, ݐ) with డ௨
ೄ
డ௦
< 0 and డ௨
ೄ
డ௧
< 0 .
The target ܶ on the other hand has a utility function of ݏ and ݐ described as 
ݑ்(ݏ, ݐ) with డ௨
೅
డ௦
< 0 and డ௨
೅
డ௧
> 0 .
The structure of interaction is sequential repeated, where sender ܵ and target ܶ
alternately determine their controlled variable ݏ א [0, 1] respectively ݐ א [0, 1] or 
decide on a mutually agreed negotiation solution for the two variables. Even though we 
focus on sanction conflicts, the model can easily be modified to different conflict 
structures by changing the utility functions of the two players. 
2.2 Agent-based Model
There is an ongoing transition from rational actor models to agent-based modelling, 
and from top-down macro decision-making to bottom-up microsimulation [7].
Different to an approach which wants to understand why specific rules are followed by 
the involved actors, the agent-based model defines micro-based rules of behavior and 
assesses whether they can explain macroscopic patterns. The main emphasis is on the 
explanation rather than on the prediction of behavior. In such a model, individual agents 
act according to rules, which can be simple or complex, fixed or adaptive, deterministic 
or stochastic and classical utility optimization is just one of many different [7]. We 
follow such an approach and present an agent-based model, which builds on five 
categories of rules: beliefs, emotions, optimization, learning, and negotiation.
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Model Structure
The model follows a sequential repeated structure. The first player (the sanctionee) 
starts by observing the starting conditions. Following his rules, he decides on the new 
value for his variable and tries to optimize his utility based on how he perceives his 
action to affect the future reaction of the second player. Thereafter, the second player 
(the sanctioner) observes the circumstances and the changes made by player 1. She
determines her new value for the controlled variable according to her rules (beliefs, 
optimizations, and emotions). In the subsequent rounds the players sequentially assess 
the new situation, update their beliefs, and decide on their actions. They always 
compare the current situation to a specific negotiation solution, which is only accepted, 
if its utility is higher than the current situation for both players. A schematic illustration 
of this procedure is shown in Figure 1.
 
Figure 1: Illustration of the sequential repeated agent-based model 
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Beliefs
A set of rules, which represents the beliefs and expectations of the agent about future 
actions and reactions of the other party in response to the circumstances and own 
actions. This anticipation is an important element for the repeated action over many 
rounds, as the own actions are expected to have an influence on the other side in the 
subsequent round. We model this disposition through a simplified comprehension of 
the sanctioning mechanism, where the agent anticipate that a certain level of topic ݐ /
sanction ݏ (above a threshold ߬) will trigger a change in sanction / topic. An illustration 
of these algorithms is presented in Table 1.
Table 1: Illustration of the beliefs algorithms
Emotions
A set of rules, which represents a subjective emotional reaction, leading to stronger 
opposition and less willingness for concession if the other side increases his pressure. 
This opposing function describes an external reward for resisting pressure. In the 
context of state actors, this can be understood as an effect similar to the rally around 
the flag syndrome [8], where external pressure increases support for the government. 
Reasons for this additional support can for example be ideological in nature. Figure 2
illustrates possible opposing functions for sender and target as they can be implemented 
in the model, where the opposing of the target could be modeled as a square root 
function and the opposing of the sender could be modeled as a quadratic function to 
represent their different opposing behavior.
Figure 2: Illustration of possible opposing functions for target and sender
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Optimization
A reaction function, which describes how the agent changes his controlled variable 
in response to the circumstances and the other party’s action, building on utility 
optimization. One important element for the optimization are the beliefs, how the other 
side will react. An illustration of the optimization algorithms is presented in Table 2.
Table 2: Illustration of the optimization algorithms
Learning
A set of rules, which updates beliefs and expectations of the agent. This happens if 
the beliefs and expectations are proven wrong in the course of the interaction. The 
adjustment of the beliefs happens in a targeted way such that they should become more 
accurate over time. A simplified illustration of this learning algorithms is presented in 
Table 3.
Table 3: Illustration of the learning algorithms
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Negotiation
A set of functions, representing different types of negotiation solutions. The utilities 
for a specific function are compared to the current situation and the negotiation solution 
is only accepted if it is perceived to be better than the current situation by both agents.
The types of negotiation solutions can be fixed (fixed value or fixed reduction), variable 
(continuing compromise over time or depending on the escalation), or stochastic as 
illustrated in Figure 3.
Fig 3: Illustration of possible negotiation solution
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3 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduce an agent-based model for the analysis of a sanction 
conflict, its underlying structure, and the possibility for a negotiated solution. The 
analysis of the simulations shows how the two parties interact and how this affects the 
conflict dynamic and a negotiation agreement. One example, which this analysis allows 
to describe, is the transition of a conflict into a cooperative solution process. In this 
case, the preceding dynamics of coercion and concession occupies a central place, with
escalation being one of the key concepts in the explanation of this transition.
As the use of models can be helpful for theory building [9], this study aims to 
develop a theoretical model to study conflict interactions, which can help to establish a 
set of testable hypothesis across different contexts. The model provides insights in 
underlying mechanisms and helps to assesses pathways under which conflict escalation 
can lead to one-sided concession as well as a cooperative negotiation.
The use of an agent-based model is particularly useful for this analysis for two 
reasons. First, agent-based models allow the analysis of complex systems. In our case,
complexity emerges due to multiple interactions and different underlying rules for these 
actions. Second, agent-based models enable to study the underlying casual mechanism 
of a conflict. Such a systematic process tracing goes beyond models who estimate 
relationships within an input-output framework and allow for a further study of 
underlying reasons for conflict dynamics. A more general discussion of the advantages 
and disadvantages of ABMs in conflict analysis can be found in [10–12].
Further research should focus on the extension of the model with more than two 
interacting agents and other conflict structures. This would allow to study a broader set 
of conflicts and its relation to cooperative solution concepts.
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Abstract: Several offshore oil drilling disputes have recently occurred, or will 
likely occur, in the South China Sea. They are analyzed using the Graph Model 
for Conflict Resolution methodology. The goal is to acquire insight into the 
mechanisms and possible solutions of these conflicts, and to understand similar 
scenarios that may occur in the future. The analysis demonstrates the important 
role of an outside participant, the US, in the evolution of these conflicts.
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1   Introduction
Territorial disputes over the control of the South China Sea (SCS) are becoming 
more intense. China claims 90% of the SCS, a maritime region believed to hold 
untapped oil and gas wealth, and through which roughly $5 trillion of ship-borne 
trade passes every year. Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei challenge China’s claims to 
islands and reef systems closer to their territories than Beijing’s (Guardian, 2016).
Offshore oil drilling in the SCS constitutes an important issue in recent disputes, 
and in the future. China’s growing reliance on oil imports thus makes oil security a 
preeminent policy issue, particularly because, despite the sharply rising demand, 
China’s domestic onshore production remains relatively flat, with decreases in recent 
years. Recognizing the economic and environmental costs of relying heavily on coal 
(about 2/3 of China’s energy consumption, and the main reason for China’s severe 
environmental pollution), and the limits of domestic oil resources, China’s leadership 
has been developing diversification strategies to enhance future oil security. Offshore 
oil production represents a great opportunity, especially in the SCS. At the same time, 
the SCS is an important sea lane for China: in fact, more than 80% of China’s 
imported oil is transported through the SCS (The Economist, 2016). Thus, there is a
serious risk of conflict if China starts to drill oil in disputed waters.
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Two classes of offshore oil exploration conflict are possible in the SCS: conflicts 
between two countries, such as the conflict between China and Vietnam in the Paracel 
Islands, and conflicts among three or more states, such as among China, Vietnam and 
the Philippines in the Spratly Islands. Below, a strategic analysis of the two types of 
conflict will be carried out.
Offshore oil drilling conflicts have been investigated and modeled elsewhere.
Oil and gas development in coastal areas from Delaware to central Florida was 
analyzed using the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) (Levy and 
Gopalakrishnan, 2010). Other modeling approaches employed for analyzing offshore 
oil field allocation include social choice theory, fallback bargaining and bankruptcy 
procedures (Sheikhmohammady et al., 2010).
Using GMCR theory, Xu (2013) interprets the oil exploration disputes between 
China and the Philippines, but does not consider the US as a Decision Maker (DM).
While the US is not a claimant country, it has a national interest in the peaceful 
settlement of disputes in the SCS and in freedom of navigation in waters that it sees as
critical for world trade. The need for allies may explain why several Southeast Asian 
countries have deepened their military ties with the US. Moreover, the situation is 
made more complex because the SCS is surrounded by a relatively large number of 
countries. For example, in sea surrounding the Spratly Islands, at least five countries 
are making claims.
The target of this research is to examine not only offshore oil drilling disputes 
that have already occurred in the SCS, but also those that will likely take place. The 
main tool is GMCR. In Section 2, offshore oil drilling disputes in the Paracel Islands 
are modeled and stability analyses are executed. Section 3 details the Graph Model 
analysis of the offshore oil drilling conflict in the Spratly Islands. Section 4 reviewed 
the strategic insights that result from the analysis, provides conclusions and suggests
potential avenues for future research.
2 Graph model of the Paracel Islands conflict
The offshore oil drilling conflict in the Paracel Islands is modelled below at a point 
in time just after China sent oil platform No. 981 to operate near the Paracel islands,
on May 2, 2014. To assess the impact of the US in the conflict resolution in the SCS,
this dispute will be analyzed without and with US involvement. Because the US can 
decide to intervene in the Paracel conflict, or not, it is considered as a third party. If 
the US is included, it is regarded as a real DM with its own options and preferences.
2.1 Conflict analysis without the US intervention
If the US does not intervene in the dispute, the DMs’ options and possible states 
are as shown in Tables 1 and 2. Notice that each DM has a single option. Each option 
combination is feasible, so it is labeled. In the states, a Y indicates that a DM has 
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chosen to take an option, and an N means that the DM has chosen not to execute the 
option. For instance, option 2, Challenge, is the choice of Vietnam to use diplomatic 
or military action to try to force China to withdraw its oil. Undertaking this option
means using force, while not selecting it means accepting the situation and allowing 
China to continue exploring for oil without disruption. 
Table 1. Oil exploration conflict in the Paracel Islands: DMs and their options
Table 2. DMs, options and states for the Paracel conflict (without the US)
DMs Options States
China 1. Withdraw N Y N Y
Vietnam 2. Challenge N N Y Y
Label 1 2 3 4
Table 3. Ranking of states for the DMs in the Paracel conflict (without the US)
The next step of the modeling process is to rank the states in Table 2 to show the 
preferences of each DM. A set of states ordered for a given DM contains a great deal 
of information about the DM’s viewpoint on the conflict. The preference rankings for 
China and Vietnam are shown in Table 3 where states are ordered, from most 
preferred on the left to the least preferred on the right, for each DM.
A key objective of the analysis is to identify the equilibrium states, from which 
no DM is motivated to move; therefore, the conflict will probably end at an 
equilibrium that is reached as the conflict evolves. To determine the equilibrium
states, one uses solution concepts, which describe human behavior patterns based on 
moves and counter-moves. As mentioned before, equilibria are states that are stable 
for all DMs. Using the decision support system GMCR II, the equilibrium results for 
both China and Vietnam were obtained. The left column gives the different solution 
concepts, while the remaining columns present the stability results for each solution 
concept corresponding to the state. Nash and Sequential Stability (SEQ) are 
considered to be stronger stability definitions. GMR and SMR stabilities are weaker 
since the process of sanctioning may include moves that are not in the interest of the 
mover. See (Fang et al., 1989) for a discussion of the relationships among solution 
concepts. It is clear that when the US does not intervene in the Paracel conflict, the 
unique equilibrium is state 1, which means that China does not withdraw its oil rig, 
and Vietnam does not challenge. No state other than state 1 shows any form of 
stability, so state 1 is a very strong equilibrium.
DMs Options Descriptions
China 1. Withdraw Withdraw the oil rig from the disputed territorial sea
Vietnam 2. Challenge Challenge China in order to restrain its oil exploration
DMs States
China 1 3 4 2
Vietnam 2 4 1 3
More Preferred  Less preferred
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2.2 Conflict analysis with US intervention
If the US decides to intervene, the DMs and options for the offshore oil 
exploration dispute in the Paracel Islands are as given in Table 4. Note that the US 
will not intervene in the Paracel conflict without Vietnamese support. 
Consequently, this leaves the feasible states shown in Table 5. Table 6 gives the 
preference rankings over the states for China, Vietnam and the US.
Table 4. Offshore oil exploration conflict in the Paracel: DMs and their options
Table 5. Options and states in the Paracel conflict
DMs Options States
China 1. Withdraw N Y N Y N Y
Vietnam 2. Challenge N N Y Y Y Y
US 3. Intervene N N N N Y Y
Label 1 2 3 4 5 6
Table 6. Preference ranking of states for the DMs in the Paracel conflict
After the DMs and their options and preferences are entered, GMCR II finds the 
equilibrium results shown in Table 7. It is clear that the strong equilibria are state 3 
(China does not withdraw, Vietnam challenges China and the US does not intervene)
and State 6 (China withdraws, Vietnam challenges and the US intervenes). State 4 
(China withdraws, Vietnam challenges and US does not intervene) and state 5 (China 
refuses to withdraw, Vietnam challenges and the US intervenes) are very weak 
equilibria. From the status quo, state 1, China will move to state 3, in which it will not 
withdraw its oil rig. So state 3 becomes a strong equilibrium if the US does not 
intervene. But China will withdraw its oil rig if the US intervenes, which is another 
equilibrium, State 6.
DMs Options Descriptions
China 1. Withdraw Withdraw the oil rig from the disputed territorial sea
Vietnam 2. Challenge Challenge China in order to restrain its oil exploration
US 3. Intervene Intervene on the side of Vietnam
DMs States
China 1 3 6 4 5 2
Vietnam 2 6 4 5 3 1
US 2 4 6 3 5 1
More Preferred  Less preferred
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Table 7. Equilibrium results for the Paracel Conflict
The analysis of a conflict describes how each DM’s preferences may have an 
impact on the overall conflict. Table 8 provides the actual evolution of the conflict, 
moving from the status quo on the left via several intermediate states to the final 
equilibrium on the right. At first, Vietnam alone challenged China, but China would 
not withdraw its oil rig. Then the US intervened, and China withdrew its oil rig from 
the disputed waters. This result is confirmed with actual events in the Paracel Islands
in 2014, as was mentioned in Section 2.
In summary, if the US promises definite involvement in the Paracel conflict, 
then Vietnam would challenge China’s oil rig in the Paracel waters. However, without 
US involvement, Vietnam would not challenge China, and China would not withdraw 
its oil rig.
Table 8. Offshore oil exploration dispute evolution in 2014
DMs Options Status quo  Intermediate states Equilibrium
China 1. Withdraw N N N Y
Vietnam 2. Challenge N Y Y Y
US 3. Intervene N N Y Y
Label 1 3 5 6
3 GMCR model for offshore oil exploration dispute in the Spratly Islands
If China explores for offshore oil in the Spratly Islands, more DMs will be 
involved than in the Paracel Islands. The DMs include China, Vietnam, the 
Philippines, Malaysia, and possibly others. In this paper, three countries are selected 
China, Vietnam, the Philippines  as the DMs in addition to the US. 
3.1 Offshore oil field conflict analysis in the Spratly Islands without US 
intervention
If the US promises not to intervene in the conflict in the Spratly Islands, then the 
DMs’ options and states are as shown in Table 9. Table 10 gives the preference 
rankings over the states for China, Vietnam and the Philippines.
Solaution Concepts States 3 4 5 6
Nash 
GMR    
SEQ  
SMR  
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Table 9. DMs’ Options and States for the Spratly Conflict (Without the US)
Table 10. Preference ranking of states for the DMs of the Spratly conflict
(Without the US)
The equilibrium results are given in Table 11. As can be seen, without US 
intervention, the unique equilibrium is state 1 (China does not withdraw its oil rig, 
and neither Vietnam nor the Philippines does not challenge China). There will be 
peace in the SCS if the US promises not to intervene. In particular, Vietnam and the
Philippines have no incentive to cooperate with each other without the US
intervention. 
Table 11. Equilibrium results for the Spratly Conflict (Without the US)
3.2 Conflict analysis in the Spratly Islands with US intervention
If the US decides to intervene in the Spratly Islands offshore drilling conflict 
among China, Vietnam and the Philippines, there exist four options in total. Because 
each option can be either selected or not, there are (i.e. 16) states in total. All 
mathematically possible combinations are feasible; the set of feasible states is given 
in Table 12.
DMs Options States
China 1. Withdraw Y N Y N Y N Y
Vietnam 2. Challenge N Y Y N N Y Y
Philippines 3. Challenge Y N N Y Y Y Y
Label 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
DMs States
China 1 5 3 7 8 4 6 2
Vietnam 2 6 8 4 1 5 7 3
Philippines 2 4 8 6 1 3 7 5
More Preferred        Less preferred
Solution Concepts State 1
Nash 
GMR 
SEQ 
SMR 
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Table 12. DM’s Options and States for the Spratly Conflict
In order to implement a stability analysis, GMCR II requires that feasible states 
be ordered from most to least preferred for each DM. Table 13 presents the rankings
of states for all DMs in the conflict. Table 14 displays the equilibria after the 
foregoing information is input into GMCR II.
Table 13. Preference ranking of States for the DMs in the Spratly conflict
Table 14. Equilibrium results for the Spratly Conflict
It is obvious from the GMCR analysis that the strongest equilibria are states 3
and 5, which means that Vietnam and the Philippines select to challenge China, but 
China continues exploring the offshore oil field regardless of the opposition of 
Vietnam and the Philippines, while the US does not intervene. States 10, 12, 14 and 
16 are SEQ equilibria, which suggest that when the US intervenes in the conflict with 
or without a challenge by Vietnam and/or the Philippines, a far-sighted China will 
withdraw its oil rig from the disputed waters, because of a credible sanction by the 
US.
4 Conclusions and future research
The US is clearly a key DM in offshore oil drilling conflicts in the SCS. If the 
US promises not to intervene in a conflict, there will be peace in the SCS: China does 
Solution 
Concepts
States 3 5 7 10 12 14 15 16
Nash  
GMR        
SEQ      
SMR       
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not withdraw its oil rig and none of the other countries around the SCS, Vietnam and 
the Philippines, challenges China’s operations. However, tensions between China and 
its neighbors will not disappear.
It is possible to recommend policies for the countries involved in the disputes in 
the SCS. It may be in China’s interest to develop a good relationship with the US, 
thereby discouraging the US from intervening in the conflict. The other countries 
surrounding the SCS could seek US help to restrain China’s offshore oil exploration 
in the disputed waters of the SCS. Recently, the Philippines moved closer to China 
(GMA News Online, 2016) and cancelled two joint military exercises with the US 
(Rappler, 2016). The consequences will be assessed using coalition analysis to be 
carried out in a subsequent paper.
Conflict may occur among more than three countries in the Spratly Islands, as
will also be considered in future research. For example, the offshore oil exploration 
conflict among China, Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia will be analyzed. 
Moreover, the preference rankings of national governments versus domestic groups
may be different. For example, in Subsection 2.1, the Vietnamese government prefers 
state 1 (China does not withdraw and Vietnam does not challenge) to state 2 (China 
does not withdraw and Vietnam challenges). But the domestic nationalist groups in 
Vietnam prefer state 2 to state 1. Further research will also consider domestic groups’ 
influence on government actions.
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Abstract. An optimization formulation is proposed to estimate how much water 
can be conserved from consumptive uses while maintaining at least the same 
level of economic output in a river basin. In this model, the productivity of var-
ious consumptive uses and the hydrological constraints are taken into consid-
eration. The results can be used to facilitate a better understanding of present 
water consumption and guide policy makers to make more informed decisions
for water demand management.
Keywords: demand management, conservation, consumptive uses, productivity
1   Introduction
Demand management receives particular attention when scarce resources, such as 
energy and water, are shared and utilized by various stakeholders to satisfy people’s 
needs for products and services. The concept of demand management involves influ-
encing demand by a series of socially beneficial measures such that a scarce resource
can be utilized efficiently and sustainably [1]. Water resource especially, as one of the 
most valuable and scarce resources on this planet, requires attention on the demand 
side [2]. Unlike conventional supply-oriented management, which seeks to expand 
water supply to satisfy future needs by constructing various forms of infrastructure,
demand management focuses on changing the water consumption levels of end uses 
such that future needs do not exceed the available water supply. The term “end uses” 
implies not only residential uses, but also industrial, commercial, agricultural, and 
other uses like water transfer to another basin. Improving the efficiency and produc-
tivity of these end uses and conserving water usage are the main objectives of water 
demand management (WDM).
Efficiency improvement and conservation normally imply two scenarios: either to 
provide more output with the current level of water usage or to consume less water to 
obtain at least the same level of economic output. However, conservation is common-
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ly not only a technical issue but also a perceptual problem, because how much water 
can be conserved is limited to not only technological factors but also the adoption 
level of existing water-saving technologies by people. The latter may even be more 
important since many advanced technologies already exist but have not been widely
adopted. The successful implementation of WDM requires initiatives and cooperation 
from both individuals and policy makers.
To investigate an achievable conservation target for WDM when the productivity 
of various consumptive uses is taken into consideration, an optimization problem for 
minimizing consumptive uses of water is formulated. Moreover, the characteristics of 
different uses, which are discussed in Section 2, have to be taken into account in
WDM.
2 Key Characteristics of Consumptive Uses
Consumptive uses, which typically refer to “water that is unavailable for reuse in the 
short term in the water sources from which it was extracted” [3], are the focus of 
WDM, and commonly consist of agricultural, industrial, and municipal uses. Munici-
pal use generally includes residential, commercial and public infrastructure uses. The
three types of consumptive uses possess distinguishable characteristics. 
In terms of total demand, municipal and industrial (MI) uses are projected to sig-
nificantly increase in the near future due to burgeoning urbanization and industrializa-
tion, while agricultural use will experience a slight decrease [4]. With respect to the 
consumption ratio, most water withdrawn by MI uses are returned to the water body, 
which means water consumed is much less than the water taken by them. In contrast,
agricultural use consumes a majority of the water it abstracts, thereby making it the 
biggest water consumer in a region. For instance, agriculture in Canada accounts for 
only five percent of total water withdrawal in 2013, but is still the largest water con-
sumer [5]. Moreover, water use efficiency in agriculture is generally lower than that 
in MI sectors.
As water is a scarce resource, a price is introduced for managing demand like an
economic good. Many studies have been conducted on estimating the price elasticity 
of water demand for both MI [6][7] and agricultural uses [8]. However, empirical 
studies suggest that elasticity in the municipal sector is relatively low, mostly falls
between -0.75 and 0, and normally varies from case to case [9]. Industrial use is gen-
erally inelastic as well and ranges from -0.79 to -0.1 [10]. Agricultural use is not nor-
mally very sensitive to price changes, either, with a mean value of price elasticity of -
0.48 [8]. Another important feature of agricultural use is its seasonality. Specifically, 
agriculture normally requires a sizable amount of water during the crop growing sea-
son, and much less water during the other months of the year; while the MI demand is
generally evenly distributed throughout the year.
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3 Minimizing Consumptive Water Uses
As aforementioned, achieving a high conservation target requires the joint efforts of 
several sectors, especially consumptive uses. When considering the characteristics of 
these consumptive uses, agricultural use may become the greatest contributor since it 
is the largest water consumer and has the most significant potential decreasing its 
demand. As indicated by a study in southern Alberta, a 4.6% improvement in irriga-
tion efficiency could conserve enough water to cover the annual usage of all munici-
palities in the basin [11]. To evaluate what type of effort, either conservation or con-
sumption by each of the uses, and how much is required, an optimization problem is 
formulated.
In this formulation, the objective is to minimize the total water usage of all con-
sumptive uses during all planning periods W, as shown in the optimization structure in 
Equation (1), subject to various physical and policy constraints. For the purpose of 
fairness, an initial allocation step is carried out prior to executing this optimization.
Qini(i,t) and NBini(i,t) in the formulation represent the initial water consumption of use 
i during period t and the corresponding initial net benefits produced from the water 
usage, respectively if the output of water is evaluated by economic returns. The sym-
bol C means consumptive uses. 
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where the inequality in Equation (1.2) implies that the economic output produced by 
consumptive uses of water would not become worse. Equation (1.3) represents the 
impact of conservation limit (U(i, t)(0,1)) in which water consumption Q(i, t) should 
be no less than its initial consumption minus the amount of water one is able to con-
serve. Equation (1.4) is used to guarantee that non-consumptive uses will not be ad-
versely affected by the changes of consumptive uses. Equation (1.5) shows a typical 
water balance constraint in which Qin and Qa refer to the inflow from upstream uses 
and adjustment flows from local tributaries, respectively; Qc and Ql indicate the 
amount of water consumed due to economic activities and the amount of water lost
during transportation, respectively; and Qout means the outflow to downstream uses.
In fact, more complicated and realistic physical constraints can be built into this for-
mulation as well. Equation (1.6) expresses the minimum and maximum demand for 
each consumptive use.
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4 Insights
Determining an achievable conservation target allows one to better understand the 
current status of water consumption and provide guidance to policy design for WDM.
Furthermore, if WDM is considered in a more comprehensive and long-term manner, 
it can also be an integrated part of a broader approach called “water soft path”
[12][13] in which its ultimate objective is to search for new ways to produce the 
products and services currently provided by water so as to achieve water sustainabil-
ity in the long-run. It should be mentioned that in addition to estimate the minimum 
water requirement to produce at least the same amount of benefits, another aspect for 
WDM is to evaluate the maximum benefits can be achieved given the current water 
availability in a river basin subject to a set of hydrological constraints, as examined by 
Xiao et al. [14].
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Abstract. A novel design is presented for incorporating hypergame theory 
within the paradigm of the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR). This 
new structure enables an analyst or expert to investigate real-life situations 
having misperceptions among the participating decision makers (DMs). Within 
this improved design, a DM can hold misperceptions about itself and/or its 
adversaries. In order to accomplish this, the sets of options, or courses of action 
available to the DMs, and the associated states within the standard GMCR are 
expanded to the universal set of options and states for a hypergame. Thereby, 
they include not only the real options and states for the dispute but also the 
misperceived ones. Also, to determine the equilibria for the hypergame, a range 
of GMCR solution concepts, depicting the way humans may interact in a real-
life conflict, are formally incorporated into the hypergame analysis within
graph form. With these developments, self-misperception can be modeled for 
the first time within the representation of hypergame in graph form and the 
reaction of DMs after they recognize the hypergame equilibria, which may not 
be what they expected, are investigated and highlighted.
Keywords: Hypergame, Conflict, Misperception, Graph Model for Conflict 
Resolution.
1   Introduction
Strategic decision making under conflict can be investigated using a flexible 
methodology called the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) [1], [2], [3].
GMCR is purposefully designed to model and analyze a broad range of real-life 
conflicts under the premise of complete knowledge and common perception among 
the players, also known as decision makers (DMs).  This methodology predicts the 
possible equilibria that are accessible to DMs in conflict circumstances. Solution 
concepts, imitating the way humans interact in a conflict setting, are used to calculate 
the equilibria of the conflict. 
Here, GMCR is extended to allow DMs to have incorrect perceptions about the 
conflict situation. It should be noted that many real-life disputes possess asymmetry 
of perception among the engaging DM, perhaps because of incomplete information or 
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misperception in recognizing the actual conflict parameters, such as the DMs' options 
and preferences [4], [5], [6], [7]. Hypergame is a technique that investigates conflict 
with misperception among the participating DMs. Hence, the objective of this paper is 
to improve the modeling and analysis of a hypergame by embedding it with the 
GMCR setting. That is, the applicability and efficacy of GMCR are extended to 
account for not only conflict with complete information but also with misperception.
2 Background
A hypergame is a technique used to formally study conflict circumstances in which
DMs have different perceptions about the dispute [4], [5], [6], [7]. Within this 
methodology, a DM may have misperception about the options and preferences 
available to its opponents or even may be unaware of all of DMs in the dispute. In 
some situation, a DM may assume the existence of one or more DMs when in fact 
they do not have any connection with the conflict situation. Within the classical 
hypergame theory [4], [5], [6], [7], a DM is assumed to correctly perceive its own 
parameters in the dispute. Also, a DM may have different levels of perception in a 
conflict setting [4], [5], [6], [7]. For example, if all DMs correctly capture the conflict 
situation and are cognizant of each other’s parameters, the dispute is a simple game or 
a zero-level hypergame. However, if each DM in the dispute perceives the conflict in 
a subjective fashion and no one is aware of the differences of understanding among 
the DMs, then the conflict is a first-level hypergame. Moreover, if at least one DM is 
aware of the other DMs' misperception, the conflict is a second-level hypergame. 
Keep in mind that the level of a hypergame can be extended up to any level of 
perceptions depending on the complexity of the conflict situation. 
There are a number of recent articles that incorporate hypergames theory into
GMCR. For example, Aljefri et. al. [8] model DMs' preference misperceptions within
GMCR. Also, misperception of unknown options and preferences was incorporated to 
GMCR [9].  In addition, the concepts of the universal set of options and states for a 
first-level hypergame are developed in graph form [10]. Within these concepts, self-
misperceptions are permitted. Lastly, the overall structure of a second-level 
hypergame in graph form is developed [11]. In this paper, a general structure of 
hypergame theory at any levels of perception is put forward within the paradigm of 
GMCR. 
3   Hypergame Model and Analysis in Graph Form
The suggested graph model for a hypergame with any level "h" of perception, where 
h t 0, contains two modules: the design of the universal set of states for the h-level 
hypergame and the construction of each DM's subjective hypergame.
For an h-level hypergame in graph form, states are defined by using DMs' 
universal sets of options for an h-level hypergame. A particular DM's universal set of 
options includes all the options that are correctly considered by the DM itself and 
those options that are misperceived by itself and its competitors. The collection of all 
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DMs’ universal sets of options constitutes the universal set of options for an h-level 
hypergame and creates the universal set of states. These states include all possible 
scenarios of the dispute, both real and misperceived. Because DMs may not be aware 
of each other’s misperceptions, the construction of the universal set of options and 
states for an h-level hypergame is accomplished by an outside analyst who is 
cognitive of the asymmetry of understanding among the competing DMs.
After defining the universal set of options for an h-level hypergame, one can define 
each DM's individual hypergame. Note that the level of each DM's subjective 
hypergame depends on the overall level of the hypergame. For example, if the overall 
level of hypergame is zero, then the game is a simple game, and thereby one graph 
model is used to model and analyze the dispute.  However, if the overall level of 
hypergame is one, then the conflict is a first-level hypergame, and each DM's 
subjective hypergame is of a zero-level. In this case, one can see that a first-level 
hypergame is a collection of individual zero-level hypergames, each of which depicts 
a particular DM perception of the dispute and no one is aware of any misperception 
happening. In summary, if the level of hypergame is h then the level of each DM's 
individual hypergame is (h-1). The universal set of states for an h-level hypergame is 
used to determine states in each DM's (h-l) subjective hypergame.
A hypergame analysis in graph form is accomplished in two steps: the analysis of 
(1) each DM's individual hypergame and (2) the overall hypergame analysis. In the
first step each DM's subjective hypergame in graph form is analyzed using a range of 
stability concepts defined within the hypergame in graph form. The objective is to 
predict the equilibria in each DM's subjective hypergame. In the second step, one 
combines the solutions obtained from each DM's subjective hypergame to predict the 
equilibria for the overall hypergame. These overall resolutions are expected to take 
place in reality. Of course, a DM may or may not perceive these overall resolutions in 
its subjective hypergame. If he or she perceive the equilibria, then one can conclude 
that the misperception could be preserved for that particular DM. If he is shocked by 
the overall resolutions, then the misperceptions is exposed to him and information 
about the true situation may be revealed to him to take appropriate action if he can.
4 Conclusions 
The overall layout of the h-level hypergame in graph form is introduced in this paper. 
This framework investigates any level of DMs' perceptions in a conflict situation and 
within the structure of GMCR. It also models self-misperception as well as a DM's 
misperceptions about its adversaries. Moreover, it can predict the equilibria of the 
overall hypergame and provides strategic insights.
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Abstract. An interactive values-focused software program, P2P-DSS, is 
designed and evaluated in relation to its impact on the collection and integration 
of public input for highly regulated environmental decision-making. The 
software program prompts the user to engage in values-focused thinking about 
the decision under deliberation while providing a platform for experts and 
citizens to interact with the decision model and to share their perspectives on 
proposed alternatives. The authors present the design of the software program 
and early results related to the impact of using this approach to join citizen and 
expert knowledge in a case study about a proposed amendment to an aggregate 
mining operation in Ontario, Canada. 
Keywords: Decision Support System, Values-focused Thinking, Public 
Participation, Environmental Management
1   Introduction
Resources management decision-making typically requires shared decision-making 
between multiple stakeholders with differing perspectives, knowledge domains, and 
objectives. Moreover, between these groups, and even within one group or individual, 
multiple competing objectives are generally of interest and debate [1]. These qualities, 
along with uncertainty over the impacts of decisions, create contexts that are prone to 
conflict. In order to mitigate conflict and facilitate the implementation of decisions 
and policies, integrating pubic participation is increasingly recognized as an important 
foundation to effective decision-making [2]. While many relevant stakeholder groups 
have developed sophisticated and formal mechanisms to engage in the decision-
making processes, enduring challenges remain when the goal is to involve public 
citizens who are impacted by complex decisions [3]. This is particularly true in highly 
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technical issues that are constrained by regulatory structures. Nonetheless, decision-
making in resources management increasingly demands the inclusion of citizen 
perspectives as part of integrating social and human dimensions that are relevant to 
planning and policy-making [4]. In response to these challenges, the development of 
systematic methods to structure and support the integration of public input in formal 
decision-making processes will provide valuable support in environmental 
governance and management. In this project, the authors examine the capacity for 
participatory modeling to advance values-focused approaches to decision-making. 
The objective of this approach is to assist local governments, regulators, and 
researchers to collect, integrate, and gain insights into public perspectives on complex 
environmental problems. Herein, the authors present the design and early results of an 
application of this program.
1.1   Foundations for Eliciting and Integrating Social Values in Decision-Making 
Contexts.
Methodologies to support multiple objective, multiple participant, decision making 
have been developed in the Decision Sciences [5], Operations Research [6], Conflict 
Analysis [7], and Participatory Modeling [8], [9]. Facilitating complex decision-
making specifically by integrating social values into decision-making has been 
operationalized through a variety of approaches including Values-focused Thinking 
[5], Discourse-based Valuation, the Pebble Distribution method, Contingent 
Valuation [10], [11], and Values Mapping [12], [13], [14]. In spite of this momentum,
values have not yet been operationalized in a software platform and examined as a 
public participation tool in the highly regulated sectors of resources management 
decision making and planning.
2 Development and Evaluation of a Participatory Modeling 
Software Program to Facilitate Values-focused Thinking
The authors develop and examine a novel participatory process for collecting and 
integrating citizen perspectives on management level decision-making. An interactive 
software platform is developed to assist local government decision-makers and 
regulators to collect, integrate, and gain insights into public perspectives on complex 
environmental problems. Specifically, the authors design and implement a software 
program that provides a shared interactive space for modelling decisions and ranking 
outcome proposals. This program is designed to both trigger and facilitate values-
focused evaluations of the proposals. Through examination of revealed behavior 
tracked by the software program, and responses to user surveys, the authors explore 
perceptions that formal decision-makers and public participants have of the impact 
this process has on the quality of public participation in decision-making, and the 
understanding that the collected data contributes to each user group. This work re-
examines the concept of ‘values’ as a research object in light of new modelling and 
communications technologies, examines public participants and formal decision-
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makers within one coherent research context, and applies values-focused decision-
making to challenges facing civic representatives as their citizens seek new methods 
to engage in environmental decision-making.
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Abstract. The crucial stage of the conflict among China, USA and Japan over 
the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is analyzed using the Graph 
Model for Conflict Resolution methodology. In October 2013, China proposed 
the establishment of the AIIB. Initially, USA and Japan opposed the idea, but 
eventually an agreement was reached. Several conclusions emerge from the 
analysis, including that the most likely outcome at the time of analysis was that 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a trade agreement involving 12 countries, would 
be rejected by the USA and Japan, and that China would proceed to establish the 
AIIB on terms acceptable to USA. 
Keywords: Conflict Resolution, Graph Model, GMCR, AIIB
1   Introduction
The ever-growing economic and military strength of China is a major concern for 
the United States of America (USA) and their allies especially Japan. Over the past few 
decades, China has shown that it is well on its way to becoming the next global 
superpower, one important event was the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB), which is considered to be a rival to the World Bank and the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB), which are led by the USA and Japan. The rising 
concerns of the USA and Japan over China’s international policies have led to many 
political and military disputes. The present study investigates the conflict over the AIIB
which among China, USA, and Japan. It develops a graph model of the conflict, which 
is analyzed utilizing the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) methodology, 
in order to obtain strategic insights regarding the possible outcomes of the conflict
[1][2][3]. This conflict interesting in itself, and also appears to be a good illustration of 
the effects of adding new options to a graph model.
The study is organized as follows. The background of the conflict is outlined in 
Section 2, while Section 3 describes the method used to construct and analyze the 
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model. Section 4 discusses the construction and the analysis of the GMCR model of the 
conflict. In Section 5, the study is summarized, and the insights into the outcome that 
it leads to are elaborated.
2 Conflict Background
In the past few decades, China has exhibited remarkable growth on many dimensions, 
including economic, military, and population. In 2008, China became the largest 
creditor to the USA [9]. In 2010, it became the world’s second largest economy, not far 
behind the USA [9]. It has been estimated that China will overtake the USA as the 
world’s largest economy by 2027 [10]. China is well along the path to superpower 
status. 
China proposed the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in 
October 2013 [11][12]. The concept of this institution was broadly accepted around the 
world, and in particular by the majority of nations in Asia. However, the idea was 
challenged by USA and Japan, who attempted to convince their allies not to join the 
AIIB. The opponents, USA and Japan, were clearly concerned that China would utilize 
the bank to carry out its own agenda [11][12][13]. Nevertheless, many USA’s allies,
including the United Kingdom, Germany, Australia, and South Korea, ended up joining 
this Chinese-led banking institution [11][13]. Moreover, China’s veto right in the AIIB 
could be revoked should the USA and Japan join the Chinese-led bank, which will
reduce the voting shares of China [14].
Surprisingly, however, USA and China reached a truce over the AIIB in 2015 [15].
In exchange for the USA and Japanese agreement, China increased its support for the 
World Bank and assured it that the AIIB will operate under the highest environmental 
and governance principles [15].
The USA and Japan proposed a trade agreement that would include 12 countries 
bordering on the Pacific Ocean. Named the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), it was led 
by the USA Obama Administration, and was perceived as a counterweight to the 
Chinese-led AIIB, aimed at reducing Chinese influence in the region [16]. However, 
some analysts had their doubts about the effectiveness of the TPP in reducing China’s
influence. According to these analysts, the TPP would encourage trade and economic 
growth in the region, which will ultimately be to the advantage of the whole region 
including China [17].
3 Methodology
Any graph model must represent the decision situation at a particular point of time.
The model must identify the decision makers (DMs) and the options they control at that 
time point.  Any combination of option is potentially a state, but care must be taken to 
remove infeasible combinations from the model to determine the feasible states. The 
next step is to identify which changes of a DM’s options are reversible or irreversible,
which determines each DM’s allowable transitions [18]. Finally, each DM’s preference 
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ranking of the feasible states must be entered into the model, which can be done 
efficiently using option prioritization.
This study included an exhaustive stability analysis using several solution concepts 
for every state and every DM. These solution concepts are: Nash stability (Nash) [4][5],
Sequential stability (SEQ) [6][7], General Metarational Stability (GMR) [8], and 
Symmetric Metarational Stability (SMR) [8]. If a state is stable for every DM under a 
specific solution concept, then it is an equilibrium under that solution concept too. 
4 The Graph Model and its Analysis
Based on the discussion in Section 2, the time point selected was February 2016. By 
this date, most of the information about the conflict was available, especially regarding 
the TPP. The key DMs considered in this conflict are China, and the USA and Japan. 
The objective of the USA and Japan is to reduce the ever-growing influence of China,
both globally and locally in the Asian-Pacific region. The USA and Japan have both 
shown their concerns over the AIIB and the increased influence it allowed China. They 
both have endeavored together to implement some strategic decisions like the TPP, 
opposing the AIIB, and joining the AIIB together to reduce the voting shares of China 
to revoke its veto in the organization. Because of the similarity of their options,
objectives, and vision, the USA and Japan are considered here as one DM
The options for the DMs are explained below.
China:
 Establish the AIIB: This option includes lobbying other countries to join 
the bank, and committing to environmental and governance standards
determined by China.
 Accept US terms: This option includes accepting the US proposal for an 
increased contribution by China to the World Bank.
USA and Japan: 
 Join the AIIB: This option precludes a Chinese veto over AIIB decisions.
 Insist on US terms: This option refers to China increasing its contribution 
to the World Bank and requiring the highest governance and 
environmental standards in the operations of the AIIB. 
 Oppose the AIIB: This option refers to lobbying other countries against 
joining the AIIB.
 Launch the TPP: This option sees the implementation of the TPP as a 
counterweight to the AIIB.
Table 1 summarizes the DMs and their options they control (on the left). States are 
defined on the right; an option exercised in the current state is denoted ‘Y’ and an option 
not exercised is denoted ‘N’. The DMs’ preference rankings are given at the bottom, 
from most to least preferred. In these rankings, states that are equally preferred are 
contained within brackets. Note that any option combination not included in the table 
was considered infeasible.
The preference ranking for each DM is constructed based on certain assumptions 
with respect to that DM. For China, the following statements are assumed: 
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 China’s highest priority is to establish the AIIB to increase its influence 
globally and regionally.
 China will agree to USA terms over the AIIB if the terms are offered.
 China prefers that the USA and Japan do not implement the TPP, as there 
is a risk that the Chinese influence will be reduced. 
 China prefers that the USA and Japan do not join the AIIB, which would
reduce its voting share and eliminate its the veto.
As for the USA and Japan assumptions were also drawn based on exhaustive 
research conducted to understand the conflict. The following is assumed for the USA 
and Japan for constructing the preference ranking:
 The USA and Japan prefer that China remains at State 1 (status quo).
 The USA and Japan prefer to launch the TPP as it will increase their 
influence and reduces China’s.
 The USA and Japan prefer that China agrees to the terms provided by the 
USA over the AIIB, since it will increase China’s contribution to the US 
and Japan led World Bank.
 The USA and Japan prefer to oppose the AIIB if China is not willing to 
agree their terms over the AIIB.
 The USA and Japan least prefer the scenarios where they end up joining 
the AIIB, which they consider their last resort.
Table 1. Graph Model of AIIB Conflict
DM States (Ordered) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
China
Establish 
the AIIB N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Accept 
USA terms N N N N Y N Y N N N N N N Y N Y N N
USA
and 
Japan
Join the 
AIIB N N Y N N Y Y N N N N Y N N Y Y N N
Request 
China 
accept USA 
terms
N N N Y Y Y Y N Y N N N Y Y Y Y N Y
Oppose the 
AIIB N N N N N N N Y Y N N N N N N N Y Y
Launch the 
TPP N N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
State 
Ranking
China ൣ2, 4൧ >  11 >  13 >  5 >  ൣ8, 9൧ >  ൣ17, 18൧ >  14 > 1 > ൣ3, 6൧ >  ൣ12, 15൧ >  7 >  16 >  10
USA and
Japan 10 >  1 >  14 >  5 >  16 >  ൣ17, 18൧ >  13 > ൣ12, 15൧ >  ൣ8, 9൧ > 7 >  6 >  11 >  3 >  [2, 4]
4 Equilibria of the Graph Model
The stability analysis of the conflict as presented in Table 2 showed that the following 
seven states are equilibria: 1, 5, 12, 14, 15, 17, and 18. However, state 14 is considered 
a weak equilibrium and the equilibria at states 1 and 5 cannot arise unless the DMs 
exhibit a minimal level of foresight. Thus, states 12, 15, 17, and 18 are considered
strong equilibria, any of which could be a resolution of the conflict. 
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The status quo of the model was considered to be state 1. A status quo analysis (see 
below) suggests that the most likely outcome of the conflict is state 5, which is SEQ,
GMR and SMR stable for all DMs. Once state 5 is attained, it would be difficult for a 
decision maker to reach a more preferred state, because each DM has the chance to 
sanction its opponent’s moves. 
Table 2. Stability analysis of the AIIB conflict
DM States (Ordered) 1 5 12 14 15 17 18
China
Establish the 
AIIB N Y Y Y Y Y Y
Accept USA 
terms over 
AIIB
N Y N Y N N N
USA and 
Japan
Join the AIIB N N Y N Y N N
Request 
China accept 
USA terms
N Y N Y Y N Y
Oppose the 
AIIB N N N N N Y Y
Launch the 
TPP N N Y Y Y Y Y
Equilibria
Nash - - 9 - 9 9 9
SEQ 9 9 9 - 9 9 9
GMR 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
SMR 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
5 Evolution of the conflict
The status quo analysis reported in Table 3 reveals that the model will probably end up 
at state 5, where China establishes the AIIB and agrees to USA terms, while the USA
withdraws its opposition and declare a truce over the AIIB.
In the real world, the resolution at state 5 was indeed reached, as predicted. Table 3
shows the evolution of the model over time. The model moved to state 2 from the status 
quo when China established the AIIB. Then it passed to state 8, where USA and 
Japanese opposition became clear. Subsequent insistence on the terms proposed by 
USA and Japan then took the model to state 9. Finally, the equilibrium at state 5 was 
reached when China agreed to the terms and the USA and Japan withdrew their 
opposition.
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Further research can be done in order to develop the model further by including more 
options such as the implementation of Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
(RCEP). RCEP is a trade agreement that involves 10 Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) member countries and 6 ASEAN free trade agreement partners, in 
which China and Japan are present while the USA was not [19][20].
Table 3. Evolution of the AIIB conflict
The conflict analyzed here can be categorized as a long-term conflict [21], as 
changes in the presidency of either China or the USA would change the preferences, 
which would ultimately lead to a shift in the equilibrium states of the conflict. The next 
stage of the project is to analyze the same conflict before the TPP, and after the USA
withdrawal from it, in order to study how the inclusion of new options, or the deletion 
of existing options, changes the equilibria of a graph model.
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Abstract. The historically reached equilibria of the Keystone XL pipeline
dispute is revisited using the characterization of long-term conﬂicts and
robustness of equilibrium analysis. A discussion shows that the Keystone
XL rounds can be treated as one conﬂict. As a result, a robustness of
equilibrium analysis is suggested to gain strategic insights into possible
future evolutions.
Keywords: Keystone XL, graph model, conﬂict resolution, long-term
conﬂicts, robustness of equilibria.
1 Introduction
In 2008, TransCanada Corporation proposed a new Keystone KL Pipeline to
carry Alberta’s oil sand from Canada to reﬁneries in the southern US states. The
project needed a presidential approval from the US to be allowed to cross six
state lines in the US, including Montana, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Okla-
homa, and Texas. Due to environmental concerns, especially around the Ogallala
Aquifer and the Athabasca River [4], the project faced some opposition. There
were many decision makers (DMs) involved in inﬂuencing the presidential deci-
sion, including, the US Congress, the State Department, Nebraska Department
of Environmental Quality (NDEQ) and some non-governmental organizations.
Using the Graph Model for Conﬂict Resolution, the Keystone XL dispute
has been analyzed by [4]. The initial analysis predicted three possible equilibria.
Over the course of the dispute, an equilibrium that was reached initially was not
sustainable. The objective of this paper characterizes the Keystone XL dispute as
a long-term using criteria appeared in [1]. Then, apply robustness of equilibrium
analysis [2] to understand the evolution of this protracted conﬂict.
2 Background
The Graph Model for Conﬂict Resolution (GMCR) is used to model strate-
gic decision-making situations between two or more interacting DMs. GMCR
uses graph theory to represents game-like dynamics in which nodes represents
states and arcs represent possible moves. Then, solution concepts of various sta-
bility conditions are applied to ﬁnd equilibria points. When a dispute restarts
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after reaching an equilibrium, traditionally GMCR is used again considering the
restart of an original conﬂict as a new one. However, characterization of a con-
ﬂict parameters [1] can be used to determine if separate rounds of a conﬂict
should be treated as one or not. Then, the robustness of equilibrium analysis [2]
is applied to understand conﬂict evolution.
The Keystone XL is mainly a local energy conﬂict caused by environmental
concerns over oil pipeline [4]. This dispute went through many stages and events
that reﬂected predicted equilibria as suggested by [4] model. The three equilibria
as analyzed by [4] are given in Table 1 below. State 12 represents a situation
where the US President requests to modify the proposal to address environmental
concerns, and the Canadian Coalition (consisting of TransCanada, the Canadian
Federal Government, and the Government of Alberta) accepts the modiﬁcations.
State 19 represents the situation where the US President disapprove the project,
and the project is canceled. On the other hand, state 21 is the situation where the
US President approves the project. Looking at historic events from 2008 to March
2017, two of the equilibria states have been reached. First, in November 2015
when President Obama rejected the proposed project citing that “ the Keystone
XL Pipeline would not serve the national interest of the United States” [3],
which is the outcome of state 19 of the model. Then, in March 2017, President
Trump approved the Keystone XL proposal saying that it was an overdue historic
moment for North American energy independence and a job creation opportunity
[5].
Table 1. Equilibria States in the Original Keystone XL Graph Model [4]
DMs Options States 
12 19 21 
US President 
Approve N N Y 
Modify Y N N 
Canadian
Coalition 
Build N N Y 
Modify Y N N 
US. Congress Pressure Y Y Y 
NDEQ Pressure N Y Y 
3 Methodology
How would a conﬂict reach two diﬀerent equilibria? Would this conﬂict be con-
sidered as one or two separate disputes? To answer these questions two steps are
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applied: characterization of a long-term conﬂict [1], then a robustness of equi-
librium analysis [2]. Considering two rounds of the dispute, the ﬁrst took place
between 2008-2015, and the second 2015-2017, it is noteworthy to mention that
options remained the same, DMs positions that represent the public interests
remained the same (a change in representation is allowed according to condi-
tions given in [1]). Also, the status quo of the second dispute is the same as the
equilibrium of the ﬁrst dispute. Therefore, according to criteria given in [1], the
two rounds are part of the same conﬂict and should be treated as one.
Because the two rounds are treated as one, it is now important to under-
stand the evolution of equilibria and understand whether it could be possible to
identify the ﬁrst one as temporary. It is now observed after the fact that the ﬁrst
equilibrium was not sustainable. The change in equilibrium came as a result of
changing in US President preferences, which is one of the causes of equilibrium
changes. Using robustness of equilibrium analysis, it is possible to investigate
the level of freedom for each DM at all equilibrium states to rank the robustness
of stable states.
4 Conclusion
The Keystone XL pipeline dispute is a real world example that can be used to
show how strategic insights can be gained when long-term conﬂicts are treated
as one. Conditions for connecting rounds must be examined, then a robustness
of equilibrium can be applied. Future work to include a detailed analysis of
equilibrium robustness and insights into the possibility of further evolutions.
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Abstract. The role of two interaction modes, inquiry and advocacy, have been 
of interest in group decision and negotiation. Inquiry refers to an interested and 
explorative interaction mode, and advocacy to an assertive and narrow mode. 
However the intrapersonal emotional responses to the inquiry and advocacy 
modes remain yet unexplored. We studied the intrapersonal emotional 
responses to inquiry and advocacy by facial electromyography and skin 
conductance response. Subjects were prompted to adopt the different modes in 
hypothetical encounters with other persons. We found that Duchenne smiles 
were specific to the inquiry mode and furrowed brows were specific to the 
advocacy mode. The results emphasize the importance of interaction modes and 
the related possibilities of influencing one’s internal emotional state by 
communicating with the inquiry or advocacy mode.
1 Introduction
This paper reports the results of an experimental study of intrapersonal emotional 
responses to two interaction modes, inquiry and advocacy. In group decision and 
negotiation the person’s own emotional states and facial expressions triggered by the 
two interaction modes will have an impact on one’s own and the other’s negotiation 
behavior and subsequently on the success of the negotiation. Language and emotions 
have also been shown to play a role in on-line negotiations and negotiation support 
systems in which there is no direct facial contact (see e.g. Brett et al. 2007; Hine et al. 
2009; Broekens et al. 2010). So it is also important to understand how the negotiator’s 
communication mode affects her emotional state.
A person with an inquiry mode shows interest in the other’s points of views and 
asks questions and explores different possibilities. A person with an advocacy mode 
approaches others with a narrow and assertive way and emphasizes her own points of 
view. Inquiry and advocacy have earlier received interest in the organizational 
learning literature (Argyris & Schön, 1978; Senge, 1990, Schein, 2013). This 
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literature emphasizes the systems perspective in understanding and improving 
organizational behavior. More recently the concept of systems intelligence was 
introduced by Hämäläinen and Saarinen (2004). It reflects the way we interact with 
people in systemic settings such as in groups. The construct was shown to have eight 
factors some of which relate directly to how people are encountered and are thus 
directly related to group interaction (Törmänen et al., 2016).
2 Literature
Inquiry and advocacy have also received interest as ways to introduce cognitive 
conflict into an organizational decision making process (Schweiger, Sandberg, & 
Ragan, 1986). Evidence from laboratory experiments show that introducing and 
balancing inquiry and advocacy in the decision making process improves decisions 
over a simple process where only expert recommendations are followed and no 
conflict between the decision makers is present (Schwenk, 1990). 
Emotions are particularly important in studying face-to-face interactions because 
factors such as nonverbal signs and speech intonation are so often used to express 
emotion (Martinovski, 2015a). Positive emotion expressions are known to increase 
cooperativeness and reduce conflict and lead to better outcomes than negative 
emotions (Barsade 2002; Kopelman et al. 2006; Hine et al., 2009) and carry 
informational value in decisions despite being seemingly irrelevant (Steffen et al.
2008). Negative emotion expressions such as anger cause more concessions (Sinaceur 
& Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef et al. 2004) as well as an anger response in the opponent 
(Friedman et al., 2004), but experienced anger may be counterproductive (Allred et 
al., 1997). Positive and negative emotions affect differently on cognition: Whereas 
negative emotions narrow attention and bias it against threats (Frijda, 1994), positive 
emotions broaden attention and increase cognitive flexibility (Fredrickson, 2001),
promote in-group identity (Johnson & Fredrickson, 2005), and may lead to different 
information processing strategies than negative emotions (Forgas & George, 2001).
Despite of the extensive interest in emotions in human interactions and in group 
decisions, previous research has not studied the intrapersonal emotional effects of 
language and communication modes such as inquiry and advocacy. At first thought 
one might assume that the advocacy mode only incorporates negative emotions and 
the inquiry mode positive emotions. However, this is a too simplistic view. For 
example, it is possible that a fraudulent person expresses non-genuine positive 
emotions in advocacy, or that a person in an inquiry mode gets frustrated at the 
interaction process and experiences negative emotions. It may also be that neither of 
the modes generates changes in the internal emotional state of the person.
3 Methods
To explore the emotional responses to inquiry and advocacy we carried out 
experiments where the subjects were facing an on-line type setting where they were 
not in direct face to face communication but they were shown a picture and a textual
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statement from another person. The subject was then instructed to take either an 
enquiry or an advocacy mode reaction towards this virtual counterpart. We then
measured how the facial expressions of emotions and the activation of the autonomic 
nervous system (ANS) of the person related to the two modes. Subjects (N = 33) were 
prompted to adopt an inquiry mode, an advocacy mode, and a passive (neutral) 
viewing mode in simulated encounters with other persons who were represented by 
facial pictures accompanied by statements. We then measured emotions in the 
alternative modes in a within-subject design. To distinguish genuine positive 
emotional expressions from non-genuine ones, we measured both the Duchenne and 
the non-Duchenne smiles. These facial expressions were measured by facial 
electromyography (EMG). The 2048-Hz EMG data was band pass filtered between 90 
Hz and 200 Hz, smoothed, rectified and logarithmized. The EMG scores were 
obtained with a similar procedure as used by Johnson et al. (2010). The signal during 
the 18-s stimuli was averaged into 3-s bins, the mean from the 60-s baseline signal 
was subtracted from each bin, and each bin was coded active for a positive remainder. 
A Duchenne smile was registered if both the zygomaticus major and the orbicularis 
oculi were active but the corrugator supercilii inactive. A non-Duchenne smile was 
registered if only the zygomaticus major was active. A furrowed brow was registered 
if only the corrugator supercilii was active. Each EMG score therefore has a count 
value 0 to 6. Activation of the sympathetic part of the ANS, emotional arousal, was 
measured by the skin conductance response (SCR). The 128-Hz SCR data was 
deconvoluted into an integrated SCR (ISCR) score (Benedek & Kaernbach, 2010) and 
ORJDULWKPL]HG 7KH ,6&5 VFRUH KDV XQLW ȝ6VTo include somatic responsivity as a 
control variable in the analysis we formed an empathy score for each subject with a 
33-item self-report questionnaire.
4 Results
The results were analyzed using linear mixed models (LMMs) where the subjects 
were treated as random effects. This takes the between-subject heterogeneity in the 
psychophysiological measurements into account. The degrees of freedom were 
FDOFXODWHGE\6DWWHUWKZDLWHDSSUR[LPDWLRQV:HUHSRUWWKH6'RIUDQGRPHIIHFWVDVı
UHVLGXDODQGıVORSH
Figure 1 shows the main results. There were more both Duchenne and non-
Duchenne smiles in the inquiry treatment than in the passive treatment. Thus, the 
inquiry treatment generated both genuine and non-genuine positive emotional 
expressions. The number of Duchenne smiles was not different between the advocacy 
and passive treatments. However, the number of non-Duchenne smiles was higher in 
the advocacy treatment than in the passive treatment. Thus, the genuine positive 
emotional expressions were above the passive treatment numbers only in the inquiry 
treatment, whereas the non-genuine positive emotional expressions were above the 
passive treatment numbers in both the inquiry and the advocacy treatments. 
Furthermore, the mean bin count of the Duchenne smiles was significantly greater 
than the mean bin count of the non-Duchenne smiles in the inquiry treatment (one-
sided paired t-test, t = 8.79, 831 df, p < .001).
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The comparison of the mean numbers of non-Duchenne smile bin counts between 
treatments in Figure 1 raises an additional question: Did the advocacy treatment have 
a higher number of non-Duchenne smiles than the inquiry treatment? An LMM with a 
focused contrast between the advocacy and inquiry treatments indicated that this 
GLIIHUHQFHZDVQRWVLJQLILFDQW/00VORSHFRHIILFLHQWí6(0 W í
GIS ı DQGı 
Figure 1. LMM estimates of mean bin counts of EMG for the three facial 
expressions and ISCR for arousal. Note: The reference treatment, passive, is moved to 
zero, i.e. the bar heights represent deviations from the passive treatment level. The 
error bars represent standard errors of the means. The random effect standard 
GHYLDWLRQV DUH ı    ı    'XFKHQQH ı    ı    QRQ-
'XFKHQQHı ı )XUURZHGEURZVı ı $URXVDO
Asterisks represent significance levels: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
There were a higher number of furrowed brows in the advocacy treatment than in 
the passive treatment and a lower number of furrowed brows in the inquiry treatment 
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than in the passive treatment (Figure 1). In other words, the furrowed brows 
expression was activated in the advocacy treatment and inhibited in the inquiry 
treatment. This suggests that there was a treatment-specific inverse relationship 
between furrowed brows and the Duchenne smiles. We also studied the relationship 
between the bin counts of the furrowed brows expressions and the Duchenne and non-
Duchenne smiles. This revealed that the furrowed brows bin count at each stimuli was 
indeed inversely related to the bin counts of the two smiles (LMM, Duchenne 
coefILFLHQWíW íGISQRQ-'XFKHQQHFRHIILFLHQWíW 
íGISı DQGı 
Figure 1 shows that there was more emotional arousal in both the inquiry and 
advocacy treatments than in the passive trHDWPHQW 0HDQ ,6&5 ZDV  ORJ ȝ6V
(SEM = 0.04) higher in the inquiry treatment than in the advocacy treatment (LMM 
with a focused contrast between the advocacy and inquiry treatments, t = 6.9, 1377 df, 
Sı DQGı 
How did the different emotional expressions moderate the treatment effect of 
emotional arousal? Table 1 shows results from an LMM where emotional arousal is 
the dependent variable and the emotional expressions are the independent variables 
and the treatments are included as interaction effects. Only the non-Duchenne smiles 
were differently related to emotional arousal in the inquiry and advocacy treatments. 
This treatment interaction effect was positive in the inquiry treatment and negative in 
the advocacy treatment. In other words, arousal increased in the bin count of non-
Duchenne smiles in the inquiry treatment, but in the advocacy treatment arousal 
decreased in the bin count of non-Duchenne smiles. The relationship between 
emotional arousal and the Duchenne smile was constant and increasing across all the 
treatments. The relationship between emotional arousal and furrowed brows was 
constant and decreasing across all the treatments, albeit only at a marginal 
significance level (p = .07).
Table 1. How the Emotional Expressions Are Related to Emotional Arousal, LMM 
Estimates
Independent variable Estimate (SEM) × 1000
(Intercept) 638.8 (102.1) ***
Duchenne 0.75 (0.3) *
Non-Duchenne 5.11 (0.37) ***
Furrowed brows í0.26 (0.14)
Duchenne × Advocacy 0.00 (0.41)
Duchenne × Inquiry í0.5 (0.38)
Non-Duchenne × Advocacy í10.36 (0.62) ***
Non-Duchenne × Inquiry í1.97 (0.54) ***
Furrowed brows × Advocacy 0.31 (0.21)
Furrowed brows × Inquiry 0.13 (0.22)
Note. The dependent variable is the ISCR score. The EMG bin counts are centered 
on subject means. The main treatment effects are omitted from the regression. The 
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significance levels: * p < .05, *** p < .001. 
The mean empathy score was 43.4 (SD = 23.7). Table 2 shows results from LMMs 
where each emotional expression and emotional arousal were in turn the dependent 
variables and the empathy score was the independent variable and the treatments were 
included as interaction effects. Empathy correlated with all the EMG bin counts as 
well as with the arousal score in the inquiry treatment, but in the advocacy treatment 
empathy correlated only with the non-Duchenne smile. With the Duchenne and non-
Duchenne smiles this treatment effect was increasing, i.e. in the inquiry treatment 
subjects with a higher empathy score expressed a higher number of positive emotional 
expressions than subjects with a lower empathy score. With the furrowed brows 
expression this treatment effect was decreasing, i.e. in the inquiry treatment subjects 
with a higher empathy score expressed a smaller number of negative emotional 
expressions than subjects with a lower empathy score. With arousal the treatment 
effect was increasing but again only in the inquiry treatment.
Table 2. How Empathy Moderates the Treatment Effects of Each Emotional Measure, 
LMM Estimates
Independent 
variable Duchenne Non-Duchenne Furrowed brows Arousal
Intercept 26.15 (10.56) * 13.9 (10.78) 215.9 (28.48) *** 46.0 (7.8) ***
Empathy 0.49 (0.44) 0.12 (0.45) í0.86 (1.2) 0.14 (0.33)
Advocacy í4.61 (4.88) 8.4 (3.14) ** 16.82 (8.08) * 10.77 (3.48) **
Inquiry 53.18 (4.88) *** 7.5 (3.14) * í83.39 (8.08) *** 38.03 (3.48) ***
Empathy × 
Advocacy í0.26 (0.21) 0.92 (0.13) *** í0.02 (0.34) 0.00 (0.15)
Empathy ×
Inquiry 2.14 (0.21) *** 0.64 (0.13) *** í2.2 (0.34) *** 1.0 (0.15) ***
ı0 1.0 0.64 1.65 0.65
ı1 0.56 0.6 1.58 0.39
Note. Each psychophysiological score is in turn the dependent variable. Each cell 
shows the estimate (SEM) × 100. The empathy score is centered on its mean. 
Asterisks represent significance levels: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
5 Discussion
We found that Duchenne smiles were specific to the inquiry mode and furrowed 
brows were specific to the advocacy mode. Subjects with a high empathy score 
expressed more Duchenne smiles than those with a low empathy score. The results 
highlight that genuine positive emotional expressions are related to the inquiry mode 
and negative emotional expressions to the advocacy mode. We provide experimental 
evidence on genuine positive emotional responses to the inquiry mode and negative 
emotional responses to the advocacy mode.
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We were also interested to know how well the different emotional expressions in 
different treatments correlated with internal emotional states. Our hypothesis was that 
emotional arousal would activate alongside the emotional expressions such that it 
shows specificity to either positive or negative emotional expressions. This 
hypothesis is supported, as the Duchenne smile increased in arousal and the furrowed 
brows expression decreased in arousal across treatments. ANS activity as measured 
by SCR, or emotional arousal, is known to increase in facial expressivity (Adelmann 
& Zajonc, 1989) and be specific to many discrete emotions (Kreibig, 2010). Thus, 
one possible way to interpret our findings would be as follows. The furrowed brows 
and the Duchenne smiles corresponded to internal emotional states to which 
emotional arousal showed specificity across the treatments. In contrast, the non-
Duchenne smile did not correspond to an internal emotional state as its linear 
relationship to emotional arousal was different between the different treatments. This 
interpretation is in line with the monotonicity hypothesis (McIntosh, 1996; 
Soussignan, 2002) that argues that autonomic arousal increases monotonously with 
the intensity of the facial expression. The monotonicity hypothesis would thus 
indicate that that the non-Duchenne smile did not correlate with an internal emotional 
state
Our results thus provide evidence that the communication mode also has an impact 
on the person herself. Thus one should not only consider the language of 
communication but also the intrinsically triggered emotions as factors that will  
influence group decisions both in face-to-face and on-line settings. This emphasizes 
the importance of interaction modes and the related possibilities of influencing one’s 
internal emotional state by communicating with the inquiry or advocacy mode. When 
the person is aware of the resulting emotional responses in herself and the related 
facial expressions she can use the modes more effectively in group interactions and 
negotiations.
Research on group decisions making is increasingly interested in emotions 
(Martinovski, 2015b). These developments are reflected in our second 
methodological conclusion which is that because emotions do play a key role in 
negotiations the use of psychophysiological measurements as well as brain imaging 
methods is likely to increase in group research. For the first time we can also 
measure, neural correlates of two-person social interactions (see e.g. Hari & Kujala, 
2009). We suggest that group decision researchers should increasingly use these new 
tools to help understand how people’s emotional responses are related to group 
decisions. The resulting insights can then be used to find improved ways of 
supporting group decision processes.
References
Adelmann, P.K., & Zajonc, R.B. (1989). Facial efference and the experience of 
emotion. Annual Review of Psychology, 40, 249–280. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev.ps.40.020189.001341
Allred, K.G., Mallozzi, J.S., Matsui, F., & Raia, C.P. (1997). The influence of anger 
and compassion on negotiation performance. Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes, 70, 175–187.
188 Group Decision and Negotiation – GDN 2017
14-18 August 2017, Stuttgart-Hohenheim, Germany
Argyris, C., & Schön, D. (1978) Organizational learning: A theory of action 
perspective. Reading, MA: Addison Wesley.
Barsade, S. (2002). The ripple effect: Emotional contagion and its influence on group 
behavior. Administrative Science Quarterly, 47, 644–675. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3094912
Benedek, M., & Kaernbach, C. (2010). A continuous measure of phasic electrodermal 
activity. Journal of Neuroscience Methods, 190, 80–91. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jneumeth.2010.04.028
Brett, J.M., Olekalns, M., Friedman, R., Goates, N., Anderson, C. & Lisco, C.C. 
(2007). Sticks and stones: Language, face, and online dispute resolution. 
Academy of Management Journal, 50(1), 85–99. 
Forgas, J.P., & George, J.M. (2001). Affective influences on judgments and behavior 
in organizations: An information processing perspective. Organizational 
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 86, 3–34.
Fredrickson, B.L. (2001). The role of positive emotions in positive psychology: The 
broaden-and-build theory of positive emotions. American Psychologist, 56, 
218–226.
Frijda, N.H. (1994). Emotions are functional, most of the time. In P. Ekman & R. 
Davidson (Eds.), The nature of emotion: Fundamental questions (112–122). 
New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Hari, R. & Kijala, M.V. (2009). Brain basis of human social interaction: from 
concepts to brain imaging. Physiological Reviews Published, 2:89, 453–479.
Hine, M.J., Murphy, S.A., Weber, M., & Kersten, G. (2009). The role of emotion and 
language in dyadic e-negotiations. Group Decision and Negotiation, 18, 
193–211.
Johnson, K.J., & Fredrickson, B.L. (2005). “We all look the same to me”: Positive 
emotions eliminate the own-race bias in face recognition. Psychological 
Science, 16, 875–881.
Johnson, K.J, Waugh, C.E., & Fredrickson, B.L. (2010). Smile to see the forest: 
Facially expressed positive emotions broaden cognition. Cognition and 
Emotion, 24, 299–321. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02699930903384667
Kopelman, S., Rosette, A.S., & Thompson, L. (2006). The three faces of Eve: 
Strategic displays of positive, negative, and neutral emotions in negotiations.
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 99, 81–101. doi: 
10.1016/j.obhdp.2005.08.003
Kreibig, S.D. (2010). Autonomic nervous system activity in emotion: A review. 
Biological Psychology, 84, 394–421. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsycho.2010.03.010
Martinovski, B. (2015a). Discourse analysis of emotion in face-to-face group decision 
and negotiation. In B. Martinovsky (Ed.), Emotion in group decision and 
negotiation (137–188). The Netherlands: Springer.
Martinovski, B. (2015b). Emotion in group decision and negotiation. The 
Netherlands: Springer.
McIntosh, D.N. (1996). Facial feedback hypotheses: Evidence, implications, and 
directions. Motivation and Emotion, 20, 121–147. doi: 10.1007/BF02253868
Schweiger, D.M., Sandberg, W.R., & Ragan, J.W. (1986). Group approaches for 
improving strategic decision making: A comparative analysis of dialectical 
Group Decision and Negotiation – GDN 2017 189
14-18 August 2017, Stuttgart-Hohenheim, Germany
inquiry, devil’s advocacy, and consensus. Academy of Management Journal, 
29, 51–71. 
Schwenk, C.R. (1990). Effects of devil’s advocacy and dialectical inquiry on decision 
making: A meta-analysis. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes, 47, 161–176. 
Schein, E.H. (2013). Humble Inquiry: The Gentle Art of Asking Instead of Telling.
Berrett-Koehler Publishers.
Senge, P.M. (1990). The fifth discipline: The art & practice of the learning 
organization. New York, NY: Doubleday/Currency.
Sinaceur, M., & Tiedens, L.Z. (2006). Get mad and get more than even: When and 
why anger expression is effective in negotiations. Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology, 42, 314–322. 
Soussignan, R. (2002). Duchenne smile, emotional experience, and autonomic 
reactivity: A test of the facial feedback hypothesis. Emotion, 2, 52–74. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/1528-3542.2.1.52
Steffen, A.C., Rockstroh, B., & Jansma, B. (2009). Brain evoked potentials reflect 
how emotional faces influence our decision making. Journal of 
Neuroscience, Psychology, and Economics, 2, 32–40. 
Törmänen, J., Hämäläinen, R.P., & Saarinen, E. (2016). Systems intelligence 
inventory. The Learning Organization, 23, 218–231.
Van Kleef, G.A., De Dreu, C.K.W., & Manstead, A.S.R. (2004). The interpersonal 
effects of anger and happiness in negotiations. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 86, 57–76

Group Decision and Negotiation – GDN 2017 191
14-18 August 2017, Stuttgart-Hohenheim, Germany
M. Schoop and D. M. Kilgour (eds.), Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on 
Group Decision and Negotiation, Hohenheim Discussion Papers in Business, Economics and 
Social Sciences, Research Area NegoTrans, 16-2017, University of Hohenheim, Stuttgart, 
2017.
Emotion Feedback in Small Group Collaboration: A
Research Agenda for Group Emotion Management 
Support Systems
Michael T. Knierim1, Anuja Hariharan1, Verena Dorner1, Christof Weinhardt1
1 Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT),
Institute for Information Systems and Marketing (IISM),
Fritz-Erler-Str. 23, 76133 Karlsruhe, Germany
{michael.knierim, anuja.hariharan, verena.dorner, christof.weinhardt}@kit.edu
Abstract. With emotion management continuously emerging as a central factor 
for positive cognitive and affective small group collaboration outcomes, more
investigations are appearing that utilize digital emotion information in group
tasks like decision-making, idea generation and structured problem solving.
However, no coherent and structured approach has been developed to address 
the variety of critical aspects of emotion management support. In this article,
we outline central research gaps aligned with an established data quality 
framework. We argue that group emotion management support systems 
(GEMSS) research should be driven to investigate matters of how digital 
emotion information is measured, how information should be designed and 
transmitted, how emotion management can be supported in the context of 
collaboration scenarios, and how privacy and personal requirement concerns 
need to be integrated.
Keywords: Emotion Management, Emotional Intelligence, Group Support 
Systems, Small Group Collaboration, Emotion Data Quality
1   Introduction
Adequate processing of emotion is one of the hallmarks of positive social interactions 
and a crucial factor for the integrity and viability of social units [1]. Unsurprisingly, 
emotions have been found to play an important role in small group collaboration in 
general [2, 3] and group decision and negotiation in particular [4]. Emotions guide 
thought and influence intrapersonal dimensions such as feelings, attitudes, and 
motivation, as well as interpersonal dimensions such as conflict and cooperation [2–
4]. Also, emergent group level phenomena such as group emotion, stress or flow
experiences have been reported to influence collaboration outcomes [2, 5]. In the 
context of group decision-making and creativity especially, emotion has been found 
to influence elaboration on shared information, to influence exploration behavior, and 
to determine aggressiveness and success in negotiation [2, 6, 7]. Consequentially,
abilities to manage emotion are increasingly found as important factors in cognitive 
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(e.g. performance) and affective (e.g. satisfaction) collaboration outcomes [3, 7–9].
Perhaps most exemplary are the recent findings on the so called collective intelligence 
factor (the group equivalent to individual IQ) [8], that show abilities related to 
emotion recognition to be more strongly related to group performance than individual 
cognitive abilities or team quality aspects like team cohesion, motivation, and 
communication behavior [8, 10].
As individuals differ in their emotion management abilities [11], supporting 
technologies could strongly improve collaboration outcomes [12]. One promising 
approach is the amplification of cues on emotion phenomena (i.e. states and 
processes) to increase the emotion information base for individuals to act upon [12, 
13]. These require detection and presentation of phenomena through suitable methods
and formats. Diverse emotion measurement approaches are available and allow the 
detection of a variety of emotion experiences based on facial, vocal, or postural 
expressions, and from physiological changes [14, 15]. Emotion information has been 
used by previous investigators to for example reduce experiences of stress in 
instructor-worker scenarios [16], increase engagement in team task processing [17],
or improve communication and cognitive performance in negotiation tasks [18, 19].
Clearly, the plethora of usable emotion information creates numerous possible 
designs for group emotion management support systems (GEMSS). The importance 
of appropriate system design as effectiveness determinant has demonstrably been 
outlined by DeSanctis and Gallupe’s [20] theoretical work on group decision support 
systems. Nevertheless, research on GEMSS has not received the same amount of
investigation, as for example research on supporting communication behavior in 
groups (e.g. [21, 22]), information-sharing behavior and preference aggregation in 
group decision or negotiation (e.g. [23, 24]), or other task-specific outcome support 
systems. Central questions that remain to be answered are (i) how emotion 
information can be derived adequately, (ii) how presentation and transmission formats 
need be designed, (iii) what type of emotion information is useful for emotion 
management in different small group scenarios, and (iv) how aspects of privacy and 
individual preferences are taken into account to support the viability of GEMSS.
Given these challenges, we turn our attention to the development of a research agenda 
for the integration of emotion management in group support systems.
2 A Research Agenda for Emotion Management Support Systems
2.1 Emotion Phenomena & Emotion Management Abilities
In order to understand the complexity of emotion phenomena, a few central concepts 
need to be outlined. Emotional experience has been described with a variety of facets 
that are captured predominantly by dimensional and discrete emotion models [25, 26].
Emotion takes on different forms in time, for example by the distinction of emotion
(short-lived) from mood (longer experience) and forms part of preferences and 
attitudes [25, 26]. While an emotional experience is in essence perceived by an 
individual, other levels of analysis like the experience of vicarious affect (i.e. feeling 
something for someone else) have been described on the dyadic level. Also, group
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level emotion and emotion experienced on behalf of a group are additional facets of 
interpersonal emotion phenomena [1, 2]. Furthermore, emotion phenomena are being 
described in dynamic terms. On the individual level dynamics relate to links between 
different emotion experiences (e.g. relations of two emotions like anger or fear), or 
emotion facets (e.g. mood influencing the experience of emotion) [25, 26]. On the 
interpersonal level, the experience of empathy or the process of emotional contagion 
in group settings represent main dynamics [1, 2]. Knowledge of this variety is critical 
in the development of systems that are to support emotion management.
Two aspects of emotion management need to be distinguished that are (i) general 
emotion management abilities and (ii) their use in social interaction. General emotion 
abilities are described in ability models of emotional intelligence that classify such 
skills as recognition, understanding, utilization and regulation of emotions [11, 13].
Facets of these abilities have been found to strongly explain cognitive and affective 
collaboration outcomes [3, 7–9]. The potential to support emotion management 
abilities comes from findings on intra-personal emotion management support that 
show emotion feedback can improve self-recognition and self-regulation of emotional 
reactions [27, 28]. Additionally, explorative studies on digital emotion information in 
social interaction indicate a facilitation of emotion reflection and regulation in dyads
[28, 29]. Aside from general ability levels, it has furthermore been found that the 
utilization of emotional abilities is prone to situational limitations such as induction of 
bias from own emotional states [30], or simply that in interaction, especially task 
collaboration, attentional resources are divided between task and emotion processing
[31, 32]. Therefore, GEMSS and the amplification of emotion cues might not only be 
beneficial, but potentially even necessary to ensure good and stable use of emotion 
management abilities in collaborative interactions.
2.2 A Data Quality Perspective for Emotion Information Systems
The approach of amplification of emotion cues is in essence built on data collected 
from each group member to be processed and fed back. This relates GEMSS in a 
central manner to digital data processing, which is why the data quality framework 
(DQF) by Wang & Strong [33] is adopted to structure this research agenda. Main 
benefit of the DQF is its generic description of data quality requirements. Previous 
research has for example capitalized on this property for the case of recommendation 
systems [34]. Main argument in the DQF is, that high quality data is represented by
the degree of fit for data consumption [33]. Furthermore, four central dimensions of 
data quality are outlined that are intrinsic, contextual, representational and 
accessibility data quality. We adopt these dimensions for GEMSS and order them in 
descending manner, along the criterion of how critical they are for the feasibility and 
effectiveness of GEMSS.
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2.2.1 Intrinsic Quality – Emotion Data Sourcing
Intrinsic quality describes the “extent to which data values are in conformance with 
the actual or true values” [33 p. 18]. Included dimensions are believability, accuracy, 
objectivity and reputation of data [33]. In the case of GEMSS, this dimension 
represents the critical foundation of every system, a necessity condition to be fulfilled 
in order to derive value from it. Consider for example a system that reports 
ungrounded information on emotional arousal (e.g. heart rate changes without 
baseline comparison or normalization to account for inter-individual dynamic 
differences). This unprecise data will inhibit accurate interpretation and will probably 
cause confusion or dismissal of data as alternative, more accurate sources will be 
taken to infer emotional states (e.g. one’s own perception of other’s faces).
Objectivity is critical to provide a ground truth that can be acted upon, which is
especially important when data is shared between individuals. Accuracy is important 
to further facilitate data interpretation. Believability represents an interesting aspect to 
emotion data, in that it has previously been found to influence perceptions of 
objectivity and accuracy [35]. This observation is representative for the present 
difficulty to capture this personal experience validly and reliably [25, 26].
Furthermore, this relation shows that regardless of theoretical accuracy, individual 
understanding and perception of emotion information have to be taken into account to 
ensure high intrinsic emotion data quality. Reputation of emotion data factors into 
GEMSS usability in a similar manner, but the novelty of this type of date makes it 
difficult to draw conclusions yet. Different emotion data sources might come with 
their own reputation, to how accurate, objective and believable they are. For example, 
with physiological data it has often been proposed, that this data is objective and more 
difficult to manipulate voluntarily as for example self-reports [14, 15], which might 
represent a distinct reputational characteristic.
We propose GEMSS researchers put emphasis on comparison of how different 
measurement modalities perform in terms of the four sub-dimension. This relates to 
three granularity levels: Comparison of approaches that use (i) different source classes 
like bodily expressions (e.g. face, posture, gestures), verbal expressions (i.e. speech or 
text), or psychophysiological signals (e.g. heart rate, electrodermal activity, skin 
temperature) on a macro level, (ii) different features within such a class (e.g. 
comparing how heart rate (ECG) or sweating (EDA) perform as arousal indicators) on 
a meso level, or (iii) different algorithms within a feature (e.g. comparing how HR-
arousal algorithms perform) on a micro level. The latter is of special importance as 
research in this direction often relies on manual calibration (e.g. [16, 28]) and that 
comparison knowledge is missing.
2.2.2 Representational Quality – Emotion Data Feedback
Representational data emphasizes format and meaning of data and refers to the 
“extent to which data are presented in an intelligible and clear manner” [33 p. 18].
This dimension includes the sub-dimensions of interpretability, ease of understanding, 
representational consistency, and concision of representation [33]. In the case of 
GEMSS this dimension represents the second critical step towards usability of 
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systems. No data, no matter how valuable can be utilized if it cannot be processed 
well by group members. Consider the case of a visual dashboard, integrating a small,
symbolic display of arousal levels (e.g. a trend plot for multiple people alongside a 
mouse cursor) superimposed on complex and dynamic stock market data. Such a 
representation of data might run the risk of going unnoticed or mistaken by the system 
user. This pertains not only to the visual representation itself, but also to the question 
whether visual information allows adequate information transmission itself.
Therefore, two research avenues are proposed that touch on all the sub-dimensions 
of representational data quality: Comparison of (i) emotion data transmission channel,
and (ii) emotion data design. Whereas a larger amount of research on GEMSS has 
focused on visual data representation as an intuitive way to transmit data (e.g. [16, 28, 
36]), this modality is simultaneously limited in transmission effectiveness when the 
same sensory channel is occupied by reception of other task-relevant data. Therefore, 
other modalities like audible or tactile feedback have been proposed as alternatives
[37, 38]. Especially the use of tactile feedback seems to be a promising avenue for 
GEMSS, as the haptic channel is not as occupied and more wearable devices with 
usable actuators are now available (e.g. smartwatches). However, as this modality is 
relatively novel to GEMSS, design of haptic emotion data representations still poses a 
research challenge. Similarly, while there have been several reports on how visual 
data ought to be designed to support collaborative interaction (e.g. [39]), there have 
not been comparisons as to how representations (e.g. symbols, values, placements) 
influence conscious and subconscious emotion data reception and how they differ in 
terms of interpretability, ease of understanding, representational consistency, and 
concision of representation. Whilst knowledge on general requirements to emotion 
data representation are a main concern in its own right, representation is closely tied 
to contextual variables, that are discussed next.
2.2.3 Contextual Quality – Emotion Data in Collaboration Scenarios
Contextual data quality describes the “extent to which data are applicable 
(pertinent) to the task of the data user” [33 p. 18]. This includes the sub-dimensions of 
added value, relevance, timeliness, completeness and appropriate amounts of data 
[33]. The main argument in this category is, that information needs differ across 
situations. Therefore, effective GEMSS should take these influences into account in 
order to enable and improve system utility. Relevance and added-value of emotion 
data play an important role in GEMSS as perception thereof is another necessity 
condition that determines system use. With contextual data quality, it needs to be 
pointed out that a major point of concern is to delineate which emotion phenomena 
(for an overview see [1, 2]) add value and are relevant in collaborative scenarios. 
Consider for example crisis management teams that are more strongly required to 
receive information on emotional arousal to reduce bad decisions in critical situations 
(as has been investigated for groups of stock traders [36]), e-sport teams or product 
innovation teams requiring the elicitation and maintenance of positive emotion tones 
to be more creative or achieve group flow states [5, 40]. In each instance, different 
types of emotion management systems could have different requirements to ensure 
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relevance and added value of emotion data. Specification of required emotion 
phenomena included in GEMSS should be a major concern in future research.
Furthermore, we propose to structurally compare how different emotion data
influences perceptions of the aforementioned five sub-dimensions across different 
types of (i) teams and (ii) tasks. Structural team conditions (life span, physical 
distribution, communication, leadership and role structure, as well as task 
interdependence) [41], and member compositions (distributions of abilities, functional 
and cognitive diversity) [42, 43], impose different requirements on GEMSS. 
Considering for example the difference in physical distribution (i.e. co-located or
distributed collaboration), requirements for digital collaboration might differ as 
contextual emotion information is comparatively scarce to face-to-face interaction 
[12] and relevance of emotion data might intuitively be perceived as higher. Team 
compositions refer to the aspects of what individual members bring to the group in 
terms of emotional, cognitive and functional abilities, modes of thinking and 
personality [42, 43]. Consider for example that groups with people bringing lower 
levels of emotional abilities might require more frequent emotion data to support their 
interaction. Also, teams with increased diversity (e.g. cognitive, personality or 
organizational function), could require more timely emotion management support due 
to higher conflict potentials [43]. Different task types (managing or advising others, 
human service, negotiation, problem-solving, psychomotor action) have been the 
center of attention in a lot of team research [8, 41], demonstrating that different tasks 
types require different GEMSS. However, abstracting slightly from the cognitive 
processes involved in different task types, properties that span across task types and 
moderate any type of emotion information feedback should more strongly be taken 
into focus. These conditions refer to aspects like task complexity or time pressure that 
invoke more general complications like competition for attentional resources [32, 31].
Consider for example, that a task requires constant attention to minute detail in 
comparison to a task with a more open setting, supplying time for reflection, where 
the former intuitively evokes more complications when highly frequent emotion 
information is supposed to be processed.
2.2.4 Accessibility Quality – Emotion Data Protection and Personalization
Accessibility data quality emphasizes the role of data access as an important 
component to data quality and refers to the “extent to which data are available or 
obtainable” [33 p. 18]. This includes the sub-dimensions of accessibility and access 
security [33]. Accessibility data quality posits a final optimization challenge to 
effective GEMSS. Consider for example a system that collects emotion information 
through video cameras [44]. Such a system might provoke reservation by users that 
feel out of control on which data is collected on them, as well as uncertainty about 
who else might be able to access it. Therefore, the provision of emotion data through 
GEMSS needs to include research on how highly personal emotion data access can be 
managed well. The guiding question here is, how access to emotion information for 
the individual, group and external actors can be supported. This pertains the aspects of
(i) how emotion data is collected, (ii) distributed, and (iii) stored. This is especially 
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important as explorative studies have highlighted, that user preferences and 
acceptance of digital emotion support technologies vary strongly [28, 29].
Data collection and the obtrusiveness of measurement, pertains emotion data 
access with a trade-off in awareness and user control. On the one hand, the 
application of sensors on subjects represents an obvious way of keeping the user in 
control of what data is collected from himself, whilst potentially making him overly 
aware and distracting him from other relevant tasks. On the other hand, non-contact 
measurement presents unobtrusive collection, but alleviates the user from controlling 
data access. Investigations need to take into account how different approaches 
influence user perceptions of data access for different parties in GEMSS. Also, 
distribution of emotion data in and beyond the group represents a major area of 
concern. Naturally, not everyone might want to expose one’s own emotional state, as 
to avoid malicious manipulation, embarrassment, or simply because it might cause 
others to experience unwanted emotions [45, 46]. Questions such as how these 
experiences relate to control and access to distributed data within the group form 
additional research avenues for GEMSS. Furthermore, the question how acceptable 
access to different emotion data is for external actors (e.g. managers or institutions)
will need to be taken into consideration. A final concern is how emotion information 
is stored, and how access is provided for retrospective utilization (e.g. for individual 
or team analysis purposes). While it has for example been found beneficial for 
intrapersonal emotion management, to log and review records of emotion experiences 
[47], the storage and treatment of historical data on emotion in the interpersonal and 
group context represents a considerably more tenuous question. Even though the 
promise of higher quality emotion management for cognitive and affective interaction 
outcomes is tempting and justifies this avenue of research, it needs to be ensured, that 
advances do not come at the cost of individual rights, values, and preferences.
3 Concluding Remarks
As the quality of management of emotion in small group interaction is a central 
factor in cognitive (e.g. performance) and affective (e.g. satisfaction) collaboration 
outcomes [3, 7–9], the advancement of GEMSS promises to be a highly valuable 
contribution. Building on Wang & Strong’s DQF [33], we outlined propositions for 
salient aspects to be taken under more scrutiny in group emotion management support 
research. These comprise (i) how emotion information can be derived adequately, (ii) 
how presentation and transmission formats need be designed, (iii) what type of 
emotion information is useful for emotion management in different small group 
scenarios, and (iv) how aspects of privacy and individual preferences are taken into 
account to support the viability of these systems. Each dimension represents a central 
limiting factor to the effectiveness of GEMSS, yet we discussed them in the order of 
our perceived criticality to outline research priorities.
As all GEMSS build essentially on the quality of data that is collected, we 
conceive intrinsic data quality as the first dimension that needs to be addressed by 
future research. Within the intrinsic data quality dimension a major concern is the 
lack of comparison of how data on emotion phenomena are measured and how 
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different approaches perform in terms of objective criteria (objectivity and accuracy), 
but also subjective criteria (believability and reputation of data). Therefore,
comparison research should be advanced across data sources (e.g. behavioral vs. 
physiological) and within data sources (e.g. comparing different algorithms). Given 
sufficient intrinsic data quality, representational data quality was discussed as the next 
step in limitations to GEMSS effectiveness, with the argument that no data, no matter 
how valuable can be utilized if it cannot be processed well. Therefore, we outline two 
main areas for investigations that compare how different transmission channels (e.g. 
visual vs. haptic) and different information designs (e.g. visualization complexity)
fulfill sub-dimension requirements like ease of understanding and interpretability.
Given adequate emotion data representation, contextual data quality was discussed as 
a step to enable and optimize GEMSS for specific usage scenarios. The main 
argument is, that emotion data needs differ across team types and task requirements. 
Therefore, comparison of the adequacy of considered emotion phenomena (e.g. 
individual vs. group emotion metrics) in specific team structures (e.g. distributed vs. 
co-located) and specific tasks (e.g. high vs. low attentional requirements) should be 
put forward to improve on data quality sub-dimensions like added value and 
relevance of represented data. Lastly, given sufficient data quality from all the 
previous dimension, in a last step of optimization, accessibility data quality posits a 
challenge to effective GEMSS. This refers to the problem that individual user 
acceptance and control of such systems needs to be integrated. Therefore, we outline 
that comparison of designs that integrate user preferences and control would further 
be beneficial to increase the feasibility of GEMSS.
In summary, while in this discussion we mainly argue for comparison of how 
systems differ across situations, we want to outline that findings from comparisons 
might also highlight, which factors are stable across situations and therefore would 
allow to support collaborative action in a more generalizable manner. This links back 
to the observation of the collective intelligence factor and its relationship to emotion 
recognition abilities [8, 10]. A final limitation to be outlined at this point, is that even 
though we argue for the central importance of emotion management in small group 
interaction, an extension to a more general level of mental state management is 
conceivable. This conception is similarly derived from collective intelligence findings 
[8, 10]. Even though these authors find the relationship between a test that is argued 
to primarily address abilities of emotion recognition [48], the test extends to the 
concept of mentalizing, i.e. to more general abilities of processing interpersonal 
mental state information [49]. Future extension to encompass more holistic mental 
state management, would thus provide an even more valuable point of orientation for 
research endeavors in small group collaboration support.
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Abstract. Anger plays an important role in negotiation. In this paper, we study 
how anger intensity is perceived in an electronic negotiation. Participants are 
asked to judge the emotion and emotion intensity of a series of statements that 
were shown to elicit anger in previous experiments. We test whether there is 
significant difference in overall anger intensity perception among the 
statements that were perceived as angry. Statements that evoked the most and 
least anger intensity are reported.
Keywords: perceived anger intensity, electronic negotiation, emotion.
1   Introduction
Large number of studies have documented the impact of emotion on negotiation. 
Effectiveness of sadness expression in negotiation [1], impact of power and emotion 
in negotiation [2], negotiation outcome when interacting with a worried, guilty or 
regretful counterpart [3], concession behavior under angry and happy counterparts 
[4], positive and negative effect of anger expression on dispute resolution [5], 
interpersonal effect of emotion [6] attest to the growing importance of emotion 
research in negotiation. Among all the emotions, anger is the most studied.  In 
addition to studying the raw effect of anger on negotiation outcomes, researches have 
gone deeper and investigated the role of power [7], effect of person-directed vs 
behavior-directed anger displays [8] and impact of culture [9], thereby deepening our 
understanding of negotiation under the influence of anger.
Although the study of emotions in negotiation is relatively new, they have been the 
focus of study for a long time in social sciences. Theoretical models in psychology 
[10], economics [11] and philosophy [12] routinely have emotional constructs at its 
core. Effect of anger on health [13], workplace [14], sports [15] and conflict [16] have 
been explored in depth.
One of the dimensions of anger studied in the psychology literature is anger 
intensity. Anger intensity has proven to be a useful measure in studying the impact of 
anger on pain [17] [18], in examining the relationship between cognition and anger 
[19] and in other behavioral contexts. However, in early ‘90s, Sonnemans et. al. 
remarked that, in the psychology field, “…this aspect of emotion has been almost 
completely ignored as a specific object of research.” [20]. Electronic negotiation 
literature has dealt with anger at an emotional level and anger scores were mainly 
used to judge whether participants were more or less angry compared to other 
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emotions and in manipulation checks in assessing the overall participants perception 
of the opponent’s emotion [21][4][8]. Opponent’s anger intensity perception at the 
participant’s level is not explored further. Hence this paper addresses the gap by first 
asking the question, given a set of angry statements, how is an opponent’s anger 
intensity perceived by the participants? In [4], a set of angry and happy statements 
were analyzed and those statements that were perceived to be most angry and most 
happy were reported. We use a similar approach but report statements that were most 
angry and least angry. We also differ by asking the participants to choose only one 
emotion and rate it instead of asking to rate how each statement reflected anger and 
happiness. The pilot study in [4] was done on 28 participants while we significantly
expand our sample size to 88. Finally, in addition to including the top angry 
statements reported in [4], statements from a more recent study [26] were taken up 
and the dynamics of anger intensity perception is studied. Our study contributes by 
presenting two sets of statements that differ significantly in anger perception, which 
can be further used in future experiments to explore the effect of anger intensity on 
demand and concessions. This study is part of a broader research of anger intensity 
perception in electronic negotiation that is in progress. The rest of the paper is 
organized as follows: Section 2 has definition of anger intensity and hypothesis, 
section 3 has a survey of existing literature, section 4 describes the methodology, 
section 5 has the discussion of the results, section 6 concludes the paper and section 7 
highlights the limitations.
2 Definition and hypothesis
2.1   Definition
We define perceived anger intensity in the context of an electronic negotiation as 
follows. “Perceived anger intensity is the degree of anger that a negotiator thinks his 
or her counterpart is feeling, judged only by text message(s) exchanged by the 
counterpart during the course of electronic negotiation. The text message(s) are 
devoid of special characters, emoticons and other cues and written in plain English 
language.” Thus perceived anger intensity is viewed as an abstract construct that is
configured or assessed only by viewing the counterpart’s messages. Emoticons and
other paralinguistic cues are known to affect the meaning of the messages in 
electronic negotiations [38]. Since this is a first attempt to look at perceived anger 
intensity, we wanted to study the effect of only the text messages without the 
confounding effect of the cues.
2.2 Hypothesis
Intensity perception is subjective. A subject may easily answer the question ‘How 
intense was your emotion?’ but the underlying motivations for their answer may vary 
widely. In this respect, five dimensions of intensity were identified, comprising of 
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recollection and re-experience of emotion, duration of the emotion and delay, action 
tendency, belief changes and long term behavior and perceived bodily changes and 
strength passivity[22]. The overall felt intensity is thought of as a function of these 
five factors and the joint function appeared to vary with emotions or occasions. A 
similar view that an emotional component is composed of multiple cognitive 
components is shared by [23], where these components were identified as behavioral, 
experiential and psychological. In addition, cultural norms and appropriateness of 
anger expression also impact behavior. Expressing anger induced larger concessions 
from European American negotiators but smaller concession from Asian and Asian 
American negotiators but Asian American negotiators made large concessions when 
the anger expression is adjusted for cultural appropriateness [24]. Appropriateness of 
anger expression, along with power, was also found to influence the counterpart’s 
intention to compete or cooperate [25]. Interplay of several such complex and 
subjective factors in anger expression and intensity perception leads us to the 
hypothesis:
H: Given a set of angry statements, some of them will be perceived as 
significantly more angry than the other.
3 Literature survey
The main motivation of this paper is to understand how anger intensity is perceived 
by one’s partner in a negotiation setting. Perception of anger and its impact on 
negotiation was studied by Van Kleef as early as 2004 [4]. A comparison of demand 
levels of participants who were paired with an angry opponent placed lower demands 
and gave larger concessions as compared to participants who were paired with happy 
opponent. Subsequent studies have established the role of anger in negotiation 
[26][27][28]. In [4], participants were shown statements representing anger and 
happiness and asked to score how well each statement represented anger and 
happiness on a 7-point scale. The statements that had the highest score on the emotion 
they were supposed to reflect and the lowest score on the emotion they were not 
supposed to reflect were selected and used in negotiation experiments. The intensity 
of emotion is compared on a scale and the intensity values were used for statement 
selection. Further the adequacy of anger manipulations were tested with a post-
experiment questionnaire by asking how angry, irritated, happy and satisfied they 
thought their opponent had been on a 7-point scale. In addition, the participants own 
emotion were tested by asking to what extent they felt they experience anger (or 
happiness) during their negotiation on a 5-point scale. In [26] questions such as to 
what extent the confederate display anger was measured in a 7-point Likert scale. 
Similar scale based measurements were used in [28] where the participants were 
asked to rate to what extent they thought their counterpart expressed anger on a 6-
point scale. Multiple item questionnaire could be used to record perceived anger 
expressions as in [29] where a three item questionnaire with 9-point scale was used. 
Electronic negotiation literature mainly employs self-report measures, items and 
scale to measure anger, but there are other alternatives. Psychological studies measure 
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anger states and intensities at various periods of time using scales such as State Trait 
Anger Expression Inventory (STAXI-2) [32]. STAXI-2 assess the momentary 
experience of anger that occurs in response to some event or person (State-Anger), 
how frequently, easily and intensely the person feels angry (Trait-Anger) and what the 
person does when feeling angry (Anger Expression-In, Anger Expression-out, Anger-
Control). Other scales such as Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) [33]
is used to measure mood or emotion comprises of a scale of 20 items, 10 measuring 
positive effect and 10 measuring negative effect. Each item is rated on a 5 point 
Likert Scale with 1 being “Very Slightly” and 5 being “Extremely”. Item composition 
of the PANAS-X [39] scale, an extended form of the PANAS scale, lists additional 
three scales, Basic Negative Emotion Scales, Basic Positive Emotion Scales and 
Other Affective States. Among these scales, there are subscales for different 
emotions. And among the subscales, hostile, disgusted, irritable, loathing and scornful
emotions are all treated the same as anger. Due to its simplicity and ease of use, we
considered an adapted form of PANAS-X scale for our study.
4 Methodology
4.1 Survey
A survey was conducted to collect data on anger intensity perception of a group of 
statements. The survey details out a negotiation setting, similar to the one used by 
Van Kleef [4]. Participants were told that they are negotiating for buying a used cell 
phone. Past research has found that negotiation behavior changes while negotiating
with a stranger as opposed to a known person [34]. Hence it was mentioned in the 
scenario that the negotiation is happening with a stranger. It is a multi-round
negotiation with exchange of offer and counter offers. Participants were told that in 
each round of the negotiation, they get a counter offer from the seller along with a 
message. They were asked to judge how well they understood the message and the 
emotion and emotion intensity of the counterpart from the message. The message that 
were selected were shown by prior research to elicit anger [4][26]. A more recent 
study by Chesin [26] categorized statements as angry resolute, angry flexible, happy 
flexible and happy resolute. They also found that verbal and text-based 
communication of emotion played a significant part in the attribution of anger. Hence 
we included the statements used in his study. In all, a total of 25 statements were 
presented to the participant out of which 15 statements were angry as per literature.
The statements were randomized for each participant. A 5-point scale was used to 
measure comprehension and emotion intensity. List of emotions were selected from 
PANAS-X scale [39]. It lists 11 different emotional states under Basic Negative 
Emotion Scales, Basic Positive Emotion Scales and Other Affective States along with 
their corresponding sub-scales. During pilot runs, we found that listing all of them 
results in confusing the participant and made it harder to complete the survey. Hence 
to decrease the cognitive load, the user was asked to select only a subset of three 
emotions, Happy, Sad and Angry. An additional ‘Other’ option was used to capture 
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any other emotion. Since our focus is only on understanding how text messages are 
interpreted, any emoticon and other special characters such as capital letters, 
exclamation marks and other paralinguistic cues were removed. Details such as
gender, age-group, country of birth, country of residence and job level were also 
collected.
4.2 Results
A total of 88 participants responded to the survey. There were 63 male respondents 
and 25 female respondents. We started our analysis by analyzing the 15 statements 
that were listed as angry from literature. Participant’s perception of the opponent’s 
emotion for each statement was arrived at by calculating the percentage agreement 
among the participants for each of the emotion. For instance, emotion for a statement 
was tagged as angry if more participants rated them as angry compared to sad, happy
and other. Considered this way, 12 out of the 15 statements were found to reflect 
opponent’s anger and were carried over for further analysis. An single factor ANOVA 
test for anger intensity with the statements as the factor found significant difference in 
intensity ratings between the statements at p<0.05 level F(11,1032)=11.3185, p=0.
The statements were sorted based on anger intensity and the average anger intensity 
of the top three statements were compared with the bottom three using a paired-t test. 
For the paired t-test and ANOVA, the intensities of those statements for which the 
participants responded with ‘not comprehensible’ were coded as 0. Intensities of non-
angry statements were similarly coded as 0. The test found a significant difference 
between the top 3 (M=2.9693, SD=1.2755) and bottom 3 statements (M=1.8582, 
SD=1.1743); t(86)=8.9869, p=0. Thus Hypothesis 1 was supported. The top three and 
bottom three statements with the most and least anger intensity are given in Table 1
and Table 2 respectively.
Table 1. Top three statements with the most anger intensity
Sl.No. Statement
1 This negotiation pisses me off.
2 This offer really makes me mad. There is no way I am selling for this price.
3 How long does it take you to respond. I agreed to your awful request.
Table 2. Bottom three statements with the least anger intensity.
Sl.No. Statement
1 Well, ok. I will give in this time. But this is really making me mad.
2 Whatever. But send your offer fast. I am tired of waiting.
3 Ok. But you are starting to get on my nerves.
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5 Discussion
Anger is a negative emotion that may occur due to interruptions in planned 
activities, loss of pride or self-esteem and the violation of personal wishes and social 
norm [35]. Previous studies investigated anger and focused on comparing negotiation 
behavior with other emotions. Our study looked deeper into anger intensity perception 
from a participant’s point of view. The results highlight that that even though 
participants predominantly agree that a group of statements signify angry emotion,
there are significant differences in the anger intensity perception of those statements.
Another contribution of the study is the identification of high intensity and low 
intensity angry statements that may be used to study concession behavior under 
varying intensities.
The fact that anger intensity perception differs among the participants may have
implications in electronic negotiations. For instance, Flaming is an antinormative 
hostile behavior characterized by the use of profanity and insults [27][30]. It can, by 
definition, be considered as a more intense form of anger and has been documented to 
occur more in electronic communications compared to face to face communication. 
Such intense form of anger expression has an impact on negotiation outcome and
concession behavior. Flames directed at the negotiation opponent slightly decrease the 
likelihood of reaching an agreement, while, flames directed at the negotiation context 
significantly increase the likelihood of agreement. It also produces unexpected 
outcomes such as the negotiation result favoring the flame recipient when an
agreement is reached [31]. Van Kleef proposed Emotion as Social Information model 
(EASI) to explain the effect of emotion on the communication process [36][37].
According to the EASI model observers draw inferences from others’ emotional 
expressions, which in turn guide their own behavior and/or response. Hence, correctly 
interpreting a counter-part’s emotion intensity and having the ability to convey 
statements with the right intended anger intensity may add strategic depth to a 
negotiation and can be helpful in fostering better negotiation outcomes and improved 
inter-negotiator relationship. Wrongly concluding that a negotiator is very angry 
might result in giving too much concession while under estimating the anger intensity 
may result in impasse or failed negotiation. The top three and bottom three 
statements of varying intensities, reported in this paper, may help in the conduct of 
future experiments to test this behavior.
6 Conclusion
Impact of emotion on electronic negotiation is an active field of study. The paper 
discusses anger intensity and its perception during an electronic negotiation. This 
study is part of a larger study on the impact of anger intensity in electronic negotiation 
and it presents two findings. One, even though participants rate a group of statements 
as angry there are variations in the anger intensity perception of those statements.
Second, a set of statements having high perceived anger intensity and another having 
low perceived anger intensity is presented, which has the potential to be used in future 
negotiation experiments to further validate anger perception hypothesis.
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7 Limitation
The result of the study was based on a survey. Survey lack experimental realism 
compared to experiments. Thus, the results of the study need to be interpreted 
accordingly. A sample size of 88 respondents may not be enough to come to a valid 
conclusion. Of all the respondents, 71.6% were male, skewing the study towards a 
predominantly male response. The study asks the respondents to choose only one 
emotion along with the intensity of emotion, thereby subscribing to Discrete Emotion 
Theory [40][41]. However, it is possible that participants may be experiencing a range 
of emotions, as proposed by the Dimensional model of emotion [42][43][44]. The 
survey did not control for the personality profiles of the participants, which could 
have a critical role to play in anger intensity perception. Culture could also have an
impact in emotion intensity perceptions. The present study does not study its effect.
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Abstract. This paper proposes a dynamic modular model of emotion- and 
culture-based communication in decision taking and negotiation, which reflects 
intercultural communication processes and can be used in the design of life-like 
negotiation-training scenarios. Communication is defined as an opportunity for 
meeting of Otherness. Culture is defined as a semiotic process and a system, 
which builds upon Self and Other identities and which is sustained and modified 
through communication and cognitive-emotive mechanisms, such as reciprocal 
adaptation, interactive alignment and appraisal. Since culture covers many 
different aspects of social life i.e. people practice intercultural-communication on 
daily basis, Human-Virtual Agent interaction is modeled as a form of 
intercultural communication.
Keywords: emotion, culture, communication, simulation, decision, negotiation
1 Introduction
Emotion and culture influence how we communicate, how we take decisions and how 
we negotiate. The opposite is also valid yet less obvious, namely, that communication 
influences culture, emotion, and decision taking processes. In effect, simulation of 
emotion and culture-based communication is a challenge in design of intelligent 
systems such as Virtual Agents. There is diversity of behaviors and cognitive 
frameworks in different cultural environments. Yet, the relation between emotion states 
and culture-based communication is unclear. Both humans and Virtual Agents need to 
behave appropriately according to environment, for instance, when involved in life-like 
training scenarios. This explains why there has been increasing interest in emotionally 
and culturally adaptive agents. The agents are built to relate to particular cultures by 
exchanges of modules related to behaviors and functions. In most cases, the agent's 
designer decides what set of culture-based features are to be used in order to generate 
culturally appropriate behavior [1].
This paper proposes and motivates a model of emotion and culture-based 
communication for humans and Virtual Agents, which aim is to to capture the dynamic 
relation between emotion, communication and culture in decision taking and 
negotiation. It starts with theoretical foundations and definition of the modeling 
concepts. Section 2 defines culture. Section 3 defines communication in culture 
relevant terms. Section 4 offers a description of culture-as-a-process mechanisms such 
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as reciprocal adaptation and interactive alignment. Section 5 defines emotion as used 
in the model of culture-based communication presented in Section 6.
2 Culture as a process and a system of interpretation
There are various definitions of culture some emphasizing competence, others –
performance, cognitive aspects vs. communicative and activity aspects. Its history of 
conceptualization is long, starting with cultivation of crops, moving through a dilemma 
- ‘culture vs nature’, followed by a view of culture as high and low expressions of 
human talent and insight, and later as ‘a historically transmitted pattern of meaning 
embodied in symbols’ [2]. The currently dominant conceptualization of the term 
defines culture as ‘programming of the mind…interactive aggregate of common 
characteristics that influence a human group’s response to environment’ [3]. Although 
the dominant usage of culture concept is based on nationality, cultures vary also with 
respect to ethnicity, age, gender, profession, activity, language, and even species. For 
instance, Shuter’s [4] study of proxemics behavior among Latin American pairs in 
conversation shows regulations not only according to national culture but in 
dependence of gender, where women stand closer to each other than to men 
independent of nationality and Costa Ricans stand closer to each other than Columbians 
independent of gender. In other words, we participate in different forms of intercultural 
communication on daily basis and there are measurable behavioral changes depending 
on cultural context. Therefore, a model of cultural awareness is better grounded on the 
fundamental relation between Self and Other informed by modular variation of cultural 
and communicative features.
As cultural values, perception, judgment, emotions and communication are acquired 
at very early age, cultural awareness becomes a process, which develops from low to 
high awareness. A child acquires cultural values and habits actively and non-critically, 
which define his/her sense of Self. Realization of Self is thus contingent on realization 
of Otherness: if one has no understanding of Self as different from the Other, one has 
no realization of Self [5, 6]. Without the neural ability to distinguish Self and Other [7] 
culture-awareness would not be formed. From a neurocognitive point of view, the brain 
and the body assemble inner and outer information depending on the capacities of the 
specific species [8]. Except for the sense of smell, which initially does not go through 
interpretative circuits, the human brain interprets information coming through the outer 
senses. For instance, when a sound wave reaches the ear receptors there is no 
interpretation of what that sound is but we cognize that we perceived a sound of a train 
because we immediately created an interpretation, based on possible already 
experienced or learned sounds. Thus, what we ordinarily regard as perception is rather 
the act of interpreting sensory data [8, 9].
This applies also to culture-sensitive phenomena such as proxemics. Through the 
process of upbringing we learn to ‘perceive’ certain distance between speakers as right 
and wrong, comfortable and uncomfortable. During this rather unconscious process, we 
built our culture-specific model or system of proxemics. From the moment of birth, our 
environment supplies us with a range of possible interpretations. With time, the 
possibilities turn into a full system by means of which we conduct all our perceptual 
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transactions. In that sense, culture is not only a full system of preferred interpretations 
of sensory data but also the very process of acquiring and building that system. It is the 
process aspect of culture that expresses its dynamics, its ability to change. Both as a 
system and as a process, Pierce’s three basic semiotic signs - icon, index and symbol -
are realized in human culture and communication as various modalities [10]. Therefore, 
the definition of culture adopted in the proposed model is formulated as follows: 
Definition 1. Culture is a dynamic semiotic process and a semiotic system of 
interpretation of Self and Otherness by means of which we conduct our perceptual 
transactions in interaction with environment.
Contemporary research on the functions of mirror-neurons [11] examines the neural 
mechanisms, which support our understanding of others’ and own intentions and states, 
which, in turn, are used for development of cultural and social cognition [12, 7]. Beliefs 
about age, gender, language, environment, and so on contribute to cognitive ‘models’ 
that individuals form and keep of each other's characteristics and intentions. Baron-
Cohen [13] went as far as to claim that the human brain has a particular “mindreading” 
mechanism, specialized module dedicated to prediction and interpretation of others’ 
intentions. He characterized this as a natural and innate capability, which enables socio-
cultural contact to take place.
3 Culture-relevant definition of communication
Culture is tightly related to the concepts of language and communication. This section 
provides an overview of conceptualization of communication in order to reach a 
culture-relevant definition operative in the proposed model (see Section 6 below).
There are two major views on the relation between language and communication. 
The more dominant view concludes that language originated as a tool for 
communication and that communication is exchange of information. Within this view, 
miscommunication is treated as a problem, which can be solved by more 
communication. Culture-specific concepts are explained with differences in objective 
reality. However, there are languages that lack specific words for e.g. color, but does 
that mean that there are no colors in their regions or that the speakers don’t perceive 
color? Universalist studies [14] on perception of color show that the speakers perceive 
colors although they don’t have specific words for color and that their concepts have 
different semantic fields i.e. they use the word ‘blood’ to denote even the color of red. 
These findings suggest another view on the relation between language and 
communication, namely, that language originated as an inborn tool for thinking and 
that communication is not the primary function of language. The cognitivist view [15] 
underlines universal linguistic structures and concepts. Surface lexicalizations and 
expressions could be culture-specific but not the underlying inborn syntactic and 
conceptual structures, which define us as species. Miscommunication is not necessarily 
resolved by more communication because language is not a tool for communication but 
rather a tool supporting thought processes. 
These two views are competitive with respect to origin and function of language but 
they also express a dichotomy in the modern concept of communication, which Peters 
[16] sees as a product of 'a dream for instantaneous connection or a nightmare of being 
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locked in a labyrinth of solitude'. In other words, we prefer to define communication 
and language as means for immediate connection between Self and Other because we 
are terrified by the idea of being locked in a solitary world of solipsistic thought. In this 
context, we need to examine the history of the dominant definition of communication 
as exchange of information.
For the past 60 years the humanities have been dominated by a metaphor of 
communication borrowed from telephony (ibid.). In his view, this definition locks us 
in a dichotomy - instantaneous connection vs. nightmare of solitude – and dislocates 
our attention from the cultural and ethical nature of communication. Communication 
becomes either destructive or therapeutic, its main function is to eliminate differences 
or cure us from our differences. This tendency towards sameness, caused by and 
resulting in irrational fear of otherness builds on the temptation to reduplicate the Self, 
to mirror signal/meaning/ideas. Therefore, Peters (ibid.) revises the definition of inter-
human communication as a transmission of information and develops the idea of 
communication as a manifestation of the ethical. Ethics emerges through and in 
language: beyond the contents delivered and the linguistic structure it enforces, 
language inspires the fundamental response-ability between Self and Other. 
Responsibility implies both being response-able to the Other’s call and being 
responsible for the Other, reaching out to Alterity, beyond the Self.  Communication 
transpiring between Self and Other is not only exchange of information, or participation 
in a discursive sphere; it is also a manifestation of the fundamental responsibility to and 
for the Other.  This, according to Martin Buber [5, 6] and Emmanuel Levinas [17] is 
the origin of language and communication: openness, exposure, proximity, and 
responsibility. Response-ability as a priori agreement is not always representable 
linguistically, it is the fundamental relation and the condition for any understanding and 
representation. Locked within a dichotomy in conceptualization of communication “at 
once a bridge and a chasm” [16: 5], telepathy and solipsism, telephony and poesis, 
missiles and swan lakes, we miss the opportunity to meet the Other and the Self. Instead 
of viewing human communication as a battle against noise for a clear message or as a 
therapeutic technique, we can view communication as an ethical process, as an 
opportunity to meet otherness, outside or inside the Self. As Peters’ [16: 21] puts it: 
“Communication as reduplication of the self or its thoughts in the Other needs to crash 
for the resulting discovery of the Other (besides knowing and the check on the hubris 
of the ego) is in essence the way to the distinctness of human beings. “ Inspired by 
Ralph Waldo Emerson, William James, Adorno, and Buber, Peters [16: 31] offers a 
new idea of communication as reconciliation with Alterity: “The most wonderful thing 
about our contact with each other is its free dissemination, not its anguished 
communion….acknowledging the splendid otherness of all creatures that share our 
world without bemoaning our impotence to tap their interiority.’ Based on this analysis 
of communication, the definition adopted in the proposed model is as follows:
Definition 2: Communication is an opportunity for a meeting between Self and Other.
This calls for re-evaluation of “miscommunication”. It is precisely the failure in 
communication that opens up the very possibility for ethics to manifest. It is in the 
unsettling moment of incomprehensibility that one is exposed to the Other’s otherness 
with no guidance as to how to respond. Intercultural communication confronts with 
otherness on daily basis, which is often seen as a challenge therefore the next section 
explores the definition of intercultural communication.
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The dominant view on language and communication as sender’s signal to a receiver 
dominates the field of intercultural communication yet there is diversity in the 
evaluation of the effect of intercultural communication. Iles [18] finds that it aggravates 
relational conflict. “Culture is more often a source of conflict than of synergy. Cultural 
differences are a nuisance at best and often a disaster." (Hofstede http://www.geert-
hofstede.com/). Few emphasize its potential for enhanced  performance and creativity 
[19].
There are not so many studies of intercultural communication. Cross-cultural studies 
predominate the field. The cross-cultural perspective studies behaviors, values, norms, 
and perceptions of one culture in mono-cultural conditions and in comparison to those 
in another culture [20]. Intercultural studies examine behaviors, values, norms, and 
perceptions of participants representing different cultures in intercultural settings. 
However, most ‘findings’ in this field are based on cross-cultural studies and oriented 
towards description of similarities and differences [21], e.g., collective cultures prefer 
charismatic leaders, Individual cultures prefer task-oriented leaders, High Power 
Distance prefer directive leadership; In Japan turn-taking is characterized by pauses, in 
USA by latching and in Brazil – by overlap, etc.
There are only a few pure intercultural negotiation behavior studies. Reeh et al. [22] 
finds nonverbal reciprocal adaptation [23] in intercultural conditions, which is not 
observed in mono-cultural conditions. Qui & Wang [24] find verbal reciprocal 
adaptation in negotiation role-play between Chinese and Swedish women manifested 
by bargaining - gravitating towards each others’ value, mirroring, and drop of learned 
own cultural behaviors.
Whereas cross-cultural studies compare cultures in their intra-cultural functionality 
and find or predict an established system of similarities and differences, in intercultural 
conditions we observe a process of mutual adaptation, of reciprocal reaching towards 
each other, which along with exposure to otherness produces hybrid cultures. 
Intercultural communication brings adaptation as a reaction to the exposure to 
Otherness, which manifests the tension between a desire for fusion, for reduplication 
of Self and a possibility for reconciliation with Otherness, for openness to the unknown. 
Exposure to Otherness opens a possibility for communication as manifestation of the 
ethical. It is therefore important to understand how this adaptation occurs and how it 
relates to culture-based behavior.
4 Reciprocal adaption and alignment
There are interactive mechanisms, which build culture-based frames of reference. Two, 
relevant for our inquiry, concepts have been introduced, namely reciprocal adaptation 
and interactive alignment. Gumperz [23: 13] definition of reciprocal adaptation is in 
short the following: “the procedure...where each participant gradually learns to adapt 
and to enter into the other's frame of reference." In his view, reciprocal adaptation is 
involved in interactive reframing of situations, knowledge and arguments and it does 
not presuppose conscious or less conscious processing of information. This 
communicative, cultural and learning mechanism is not only cognitive but also 
linguistic, emotive and behavioral i.e. speakers adapt to each other on different levels: 
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lexical and semantic choice, syntax, posture, gaze, proxemics, orientation, tone of 
voice, etc. It is a mechanism behind linguistic phenomena such as creole-like varieties 
of languages and interactive emotions such as empathy and rapport [25]. Similarly, 
human users adapt to the speech and behavior of the Virtual Agent [26, 27].
According to Pickering and Garrod [28] communication in discourse is 
accomplished through an interactive process they call alignment and successful 
communication is accomplished through good alignment: 'the development of similar 
representations in the interlocutors … interlocutors align situation models during 
dialogue.' [ibid.: 1]. The main claim of their theory is that 'automatic processes play a 
central role and explicit modeling of one’s interlocutor is secondary' in communication 
[ibid.].  The alignment involves situation models and non-situational knowledge such 
as language knowledge. Interlocutors align their situational knowledge but they also 
align knowledge of situation and language (for instance, what they think 'right' means 
with the word 'right'). The situation models include notions such as 'space, time, 
causality, intentionality, and reference to main individuals under discussion' [ibid.: 2]. 
Alignment is based on willingness for cooperation and on mechanistic automatic 
imitation (of lexical choices, syntax, tone of voice, etc.): 'Our underlying 
conceptualization of conversation is collaborative, in that we treat it as a “game of pure 
cooperation” … in which it is in both interlocutors’ interest for it to succeed for both 
interlocutors' [ibid.: 22] and 'the interactive-alignment account proposes that alignment 
is primitive. It is a form of imitation and drops out of the functional architecture of the 
system… In these accounts, imitation is an automatic, non-inferential process and is in 
some sense the default response. Generally, imitation does not appear to require any 
decision to act' [ibid.: 18]. 
Thus, alignment does not involve building of entire theory of the other as in Theory 
of Theory of Mind but a primitive turn-to-turn alignment on different linguistic levels 
of the message: phonetic, syntactic, semantic, etc. Each level is processed and aligned 
for itself and misalignment on one level enhances alignment on another level. Pickering 
and Garrod point out that children can't inhibit alignment, which speaks for the 
forcefulness of this interactive mechanism. They base their view on situated interaction 
where participants have to find interactively each other's position in a maze without 
being able to see it and assume that the same mechanism works on everyday 
conversation: 'Such models are assumed to capture what people are “thinking about” 
while they understand a text, and therefore are in some sense within working memory 
(they can be contrasted with linguistic representations on the one hand and general 
knowledge on the other). Successful dialogue occurs when interlocutors construct 
similar situation models to each other.' [ibid.: 1-2].
They point out 'that this account differs from Clark [29] who assumes that speakers 
carefully track their addressees’ mental states throughout conversations' [ibid.: 10] and 
that 'the important point is that effects of partner specificity do not imply that 
interlocutors need employ complex reasoning whenever they produce an expression. 
Instead, they have a strong tendency to employ the form that they have just encountered' 
[ibid.: 20].
Interactive alignment is similar to the concept of reciprocal adaptation in that they 
refer to framing in terms of similar discourse processes and do not demand conscious 
processing during interaction, although the connection has not been made nor explored 
yet:
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Reciprocal adaptation: “the procedure...where each participant gradually learns to 
adapt and to enter into the other's frame of reference".
Interactive alignment: "the development of similar representations in the interlocutors 
… interlocutors align situation models during dialogue”. 
However, since alignment is by definition a primitive process, i.e. it does not involve 
complex reasoning or active long-term memory based monitoring, it is hardly the case 
that interactants rely only on this process in order make sense of a situation. Rather, it 
is more likely to see it as a way of preliminary or first layer framing. In Gumperz' terms, 
interactants gradually learn to frame their activities through reciprocal adaptation in 
order to make sense of a situation. It is a more general term than alignment because it 
does not pose a condition of automaticity and short-term memory basis, but does not 
exclude it either.
Even more complex cognitive-emotive processes such as some forms of Theory-of-
Mind-building produce culture-based behaviors. Martinovski, Traum and Marsella’s 
[30] analysis indicates that complex emotions such as empathy involve Theory-of-
Mind models. Martinovski [31] found that emotions function as engines in conflict 
management and involve opposite reciprocal adaptation and that they realize in 
different manner depending on culture-specific settings. Thus a model on culture-based 
behavior and awareness needs to involve emotions.
5 Emotion and Culture
According to the social and anthropological constructivist theory [32] socio-cultural
interpretations determine emotions and body behaviors. Cornelius [33] gives as an 
example of emotion attitudes to language variations such a dialects. However, although 
attitudes may trigger regularly the same emotions as a result of culture-specific 
appraisals this does not mean that attitudes are the same as emotions. Test on capacity 
for interpreting body language, the so called, PONS-tests, Profile of Non-Verbal 
Sensitivity [34] show that women are generally better then men at recognizing 
expressions of emotions but worse in interpreting anger. The socio-cultural perspective 
explains these results by pointing out that in patriarchal, i.e. in most, societies women 
are prohibited in various ways to express anger, which is part of the subjugation of 
women [35]. Yet, prosodic comparisons of intended and recognized emotions and 
attitudes in different unrelated languages found “remarkable similarities” [35: 2], which 
indicates that the relation between content and expression of emotion is not arbitrary 
i.e. the results supported that universalist perspective on emotion.
In the framework of Darwinism, emotion has a role in adaptation in the course of 
evolution and therefore universal because expression of emotion is found in other 
species [33]. In Descartes’ era, emotions intertwined with cognition of stimuli. William 
James [36] introduced the role of the body in the cause and effect chain: the mind 
perceives the reaction of the body to stimuli, e.g. increased heartbeat; the sensation of 
the physiological response is a feeling which mental representation is an emotion, e.g. 
fear. 
Contemporary neuroscientists report evidence for the involvement of emotion in so 
called rational cognitive processing. Neuroscientists such as Von Uexkull [37] Fuster 
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[38] and Arnold Scheibel (personal communication) observe that evolution gave 
privilege to the limbic system: emotional feedback is present in lower species, but other 
cortical cognitive feedback is present only in higher species. In that sense, emotion 
functions in evolution as a coordinator of other cognitive and non-cognitive functions. 
Damasio [39] suggests that the state of the mind is identical to the state of feeling, which 
is a reflection of the state of the body. He explores the unusual case of Phineas Gage, a 
man whose ability to feel emotion was impaired after an accident in which part of his 
brain was damaged. Damasio finds that, while Gage's intelligence remained intact after 
the accident, his ability to take rational decisions became severely handicapped because
his emotions could no longer be engaged in the process. Based on this case, the 
neurologist comes to the conclusions that rationality stems from our emotions and that 
our emotions stem from our bodily senses. Certain body states and postures, e.g. 
locking of the jaw, would bring about certain feelings, e.g. anger, which in turn will 
trigger certain thought and interpretations of reality, a thought traced back to William 
James. Appraisal theory sees emotion as something automatic, non-reflective and 
immediate and at the same time, cognition leads emotion, i.e. the way we cognize 
events influences our emotions related to them, not the opposite. In that sense, emotions 
become and involve coping strategies [40]. 
Three mutually exclusive theories have been suggested to explain how we 
understand others i.e. what are the cognitive-emotive mechanisms that facilitate 
communication and learning: by imitation [7] - ex. we understand what it means to have 
stomach ache by imitating that state; by simulation [41, 42] - ex. we understand what it 
means to have stomach pain by associating it with our state when we ourselves have 
stomach ache; by symbolic representation which does not rely on neither imitation nor 
simulation [43] – we understand when it means to have stomach ache by having a fixed 
set of features describing how one feels when one has stomach ache and a fixed set of 
features on how one should react to that state in different contexts. Given the short 
overview above, the definition adopted here for emotion is as follows:
Definition 3: Emotion is sensory feedback recognition and a coping strategy, which 
coordinate decision-making on individual level and in interaction.
Martinovski [44] finds indications that all three cognitive-emotive processes are 
employed in human interaction. Reciprocal adaptation and interactive alignment are 
directly supported by imitation and simulation. Yet, symbolic representations of states 
are dependent on simulation. There is correspondence between these cognitive 
processes and Pierce’s semiotic signs: icon (similarity-based relation between signifier 
and signified), index (indexical associative relation between signifier and signified) and 
symbol (convention/representation-based relation between signifier and signified). 
Design of Virtual Agent systems is based on representation-based and simulation-based 
cognitive-communicative processing which is similar to appraisal theory’s view on 
emotion but even imitation, which is productive in human learning, has proven possible 
and productive method, especially in culture-based communication training systems 
[45].
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6 Model of culture-based communication
The model of culture-based communication proposed here relies on definitions 
motivated by the theoretical overview in the previous sections, namely:
x Culture is a dynamic semiotic process and system of interpretation of Self and 
Otherness by means of which we conduct our perceptual transactions in 
interaction with environment.
x Communication is an opportunity for a meeting between Self and Other.
x Emotion is a sensory-feedback recognition and a coping strategy.
x Interactive alignment is a primitive cognitive-emotive process based on 
imitation during which interlocutors develop and align similar representations 
in dialogue.
x Reciprocal adaptation includes interactive alignment and complex long-term 
memory cognition where each participant gradually learns to adapt and to 
enter into the other's frame of reference.
It suggests a process-like representation of culture-based communication, which builds 
on connection between different modules, such as modules of culture awareness, 
culture behavior, communication processing, alignment, appraisal, and revision. Each 
module has a separate set of features and under modules. For instance, the module of 
culture behaviors includes modules on turn-taking, gaze, proxemics, gestures, semantic 
fields, etc. Culture awareness consists of values related to awareness to each of the 
behavioral modules as well as other culture related features such as values, beliefs, and 
goals. For the purpose of Virtual Agent simulation, they can be represented as in XML 
format as in Jan et al. [1].
Culture and emotion form and are formed by communication assisted by both 
primitive and complex cognitive interactive procedures, such as interactive alignment 
and reciprocal adaptation, as illustrated by Fig.1 below.
Fig. 1. Model of Culture-based Communication
Studies suggest [46, 47] that awareness of and reference to co-existence in a larger 
context facilitate communication and decision-making. Therefore, in this model, each 
interaction is embedded in a larger existential context, which wraps in all human and 
other activity. Each interactive situation starts with a basic level of awareness of Self 
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and Other, which is imbedded in a general sense of existence, of being and which can 
vary from person to person. This existential sense of Self and Other is then processed 
by degrees of awareness of own and Other culture and expressed in situated behavior 
in different modalities. Communication is the process through which both non-culture-
based and culture-based awareness are realized and have a chance to change. 
Communication may include activities, such as talking between interlocutors, silent co-
presence, reading, singing together, teaching, training, etc.
During communication, beliefs and emotions related to Self and Other are aligned 
and appraised which brings about coping strategies. These trigger re-evaluation of 
initial conscious or unconscious models of Self and Other, including goals and beliefs, 
which may result in need to change cultural models, awareness and behavior. 
Alignment and appraisal based states may change without changing culture-based 
awareness and behavior. Emotions are not static. They are processes on a neurological, 
biological and expressive level. One and same stimuli can cause a chain of different 
physiological reactions, emotional sensations and cognitive appraisals, each of which 
can influence the other in time. That is, a physiological reaction may bring about an 
emotion, which can influence cognitive appraisal but this appraisal can in turn bring 
about coping strategies, which generate other emotions. 
Reasoning in intercultural situations is based on abduction rather than deduction of 
induction because the premises of beliefs and goals in the 'awareness' and 'behavior' 
modules may be incomplete or incorrect. In order to illustrate how the model works we 
can observe the following scenario: a woman from a culture in which women stand 
physically far from male acquaintances, especially in public, meets physically and 
converses on a public street with a male acquaintance who comes from a culture with 
similar proxemics between women and men. Proxemics is usually a low consciousness 
feature in non-verbal communication, therefore we can define the initial culture-based 
awareness of Self and Other on both parties i.e. awareness of the exact comfort distance 
between women and men in own and Other culture to be low. The behavior is defined 
as expected according to respective proxemics culture. Given their cultural settings of 
proxemics, the woman may move slightly away from the man as he tries to shorten that 
distance to fit his cultural habits. Both may experience initial cooperative alignment but 
may appraise the changes in proxemics as uncomfortable. For example, the woman may 
feel invaded or in danger and the man may feel unappreciated or avoided. These 
dynamics will occur in the small loop between appraisal and the module of changes. 
The reciprocal adaptation mechanism may push both parties towards final acceptance 
of a distance which is least uncomfortable for both parties but in short term, it may not 
result in changes of culture-based awareness of own and Other proxemics, nor in 
changes of culture-based behavior. Only after repeated exposure may culture-based 
awareness and behavior change and thus yield less emotionally and cognitively loaded 
interactions. If however, both parties start with high level of culture-awareness 
regarding the Other but not Self, the process may get stuck in the smaller loop until 
there is one-sided adaptation or until there is increase in Self culture–awareness. If both 
parties are highly aware of cultural regulations of proxemics in own and Other culture, 
the cognitive-emotive load for conscious processing of reciprocal adaptation may be 
higher i.e. the smaller loop will be shorter, given that there is no special agenda which 
blocks their will to reciprocal adaptation, but may take more conscious cognitive effort.
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7 Summary
Based on concept analysis and empirical findings within the research fields of emotion, 
culture and communication, this study concludes that cultural awareness is acquired 
through communication and filtered through emotion. The proposed dynamic modular 
model of emotion- and culture-based communication reflects this process-oriented 
view of culture and includes emotion as an engine for cultural learning and expression. 
Culture is defined as a semiotic process and a system, which builds upon Self and Other 
identities and which is sustained and modified through communication and cognitive-
emotive mechanisms, such as reciprocal adaptation, interactive alignment and 
appraisal. Communication is defined as an opportunity for meeting of Otherness. In 
that sense, Human-Virtual Agent interaction can be seen as a meeting with otherness. 
Since intercultural communication involves interactive alignment and reciprocal 
adaptation, these mechanisms can be applied also to simulation of culture-based 
communication where the adaptation occurs with respect to culturally varied and 
measurable features and behaviors i.e. the model can be utilized and operationalized in 
the design of life-like training scenarios.
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A Multi-Agent Negotiation Support System for Supply 
Chain Formation
Florina Livia Covaci
Business Informations Systems Department
%DEH܈-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania 
Abstract. During the supply chain formation process, agents must agree on 
different combinations of values for shared issues that are part of the contracts 
between involved parties and each of them is trying to maximize their utility. 
This paper focuses on contract negotiation during the decentralized supply chain 
formation process by mapping the problem in terms of a directed acyclic graph 
where the nodes are represented by the suppliers/consumers acted by agents. 
Communication between agents along the supply chain is done by message 
exchange and provides support for negotiation of contract constraints along the 
network. By encoding the values of negotiated issues in messages that are sent 
between each pair of agents in the supply chain the overall system stability will 
be achieved and the specific contract requirements will be propagated 
autonomously across all participants within the supply chain.
Keywords: Agent-based negotiation, Contract Negotiation, Supply Chain 
Formation, Decision Support
1   Introduction
Negotiating contracts between providers and consumers is the core of supply chain 
formation (SCF) because a consumer and its provider can balance their interest 
FRQÀLFWV7KH6XSSO\&KDLQ)RUPDWLRQ6&)SUREOHPKDVEHHQZLGHO\VWXGLHGE\WKH
multi-agent systems community. Numerous contributions can be found in the literature 
where participants are represented by computational agents [2],[6],[3],[7]. These 
computational agents act in behalf of the participants during the SCF process. By 
employing computational agents it is possible to form SCs in a fraction of the time 
required by the manual approach [8]. 
The existing literature on SCF uses two DSSURDFKHVWKH¿UVWRQHLVPRGeling the supply 
FKDLQDVDQHWZRUNRIDXFWLRQVZLWK¿UVWDQGVHFRQG-price sealed bid auctions, double 
auctions and combinatorial auctions among the most frequently-used methods [1],[2]. 
In the past years another type of approaches were proposed. These approaches make 
use of graphical models and inference algorithms to tackle SCF and related problems 
[4],[6],[7],[8]. 
Although the second types of approaches have a lot of advantages over previous 
approaches, they have the limitation of using only cost for pairwise agents. Also the 
optimization problem is treated only as a profit maximization function and it doesn't 
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consider the propagation of constraints from the underlying suppliers. In real world 
scenarios the SCF problem is more complex because:
1. The contracts between partners in the supply chain involve multiple issues 
(cost, time of delivery, quality constraints, penalties etc. ), that the involved entities are 
negotiating on. These give raise to different utility values for a contract of the 
participating agents, according to their preferences.
2. In a SCF process, an entity can be both a supplier and a consumer in 
different negotiation contexts at the same time (Figure. 1). The dual role of a participant 
in the SCF complicates the negotiation scenarios. In particular, a participant has to 
confirm that its own suppliers can support the issues it negotiates with its consumer, 
before it commits to his own contract as a supplier. 
Having the above stated problems for real world scenarios, the present paper 
explores the following research challenge: providing support for negotiation and for 
linking end-consumer requirements to underlying suppliers to conjointly guarantee 
end-to-end agreed contract parameters.
The participants in the supply chain are modeled by self-interested agents that own 
utility functions and communicate directly with the other participant agents 
representing their potential buyer or seller and take actions in order to maximize their 
utility functions.  
Our results indicate that the proposed formalism provides means to perform 
decentralized supply chain formation that optimize participants’ utility and propagate
negotiated constraints from the underling to the upper level participants. The present 
paper is structured as follows: section 2 describes the proposed SCF formalization and 
encoding for agent messages for the shared negotiated issues, section 3 provides
background and related work for SCF, section 4 provides an experimental evaluation 
of the proposed approach and finally section 5 provides conclusions and future work. 
2 Negotiation in Supply Chain Formation by Message Passing
Multi-agent systems enable the modelling of supply chain formation (SCF) using self-
interested agents for decentralized decision making and the process of information 
propagation across the whole network.
The current paper uses the max-sum algorithm mechanism of passing messages for 
the values of the issues that the agents are negotiating on, the agents having an exact 
way to estimate the utility they get, by making use of utility functions. The agreed 
values of the negotiated issues are reflected in a contract which has a certain utility 
value for every agent. By using utility functions, they can assess the benefits they would 
gain from a given contract, and compare them with their own expectations in order to 
make decisions.
During the SCF process the messages are passed between a consumer and its 
suppliers. Agents send messages regarding multiple contract issues: cost, time of 
delivery, quality indicators, delay penalties etc.
The following paragraph provides a formal description of the supply chain formation 
problem in terms of a directed, acyclic graph (X, E) where X = {X1,X2, ..., Xn} denote 
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set of participants in the supply chain represented by agents and a set of edges E
connecting agents that might buy or sell from another.
7KHDJHQWVQHJRWLDWHRQPXOWLSOHFRQWUDFWSDUDPHWHUVDQGQHJRWLDWLRQ¿QLVKHVZLWKD
contract that is composed of the actual values of the issues that they have agreed on. 
Notation vi represents the expectation of a participant in the supply chain on issue i of 
the contract and U(v) the utility that a participant obtains by receiving the actual value 
v =(vi1 ,vi2 , ..., vik ). When a supplier (seller) negotiates with a consumer (buyer), both
parties are interested in obtaining those contract values v =(vi1 ,vi2 , ..., vik ) that 
maximize their utility functions U(v) . This means that during the negotiation, the agent 
sends a messages to its neighbors regarding the states of his variables that is maximizing 
its utility function. 
The utility functions U(v) will be calculated by means of weighted sum as follows: 
ܷ(ݒ) = σ ݓ௜ כ ݒ௜  , ݓ݅ݐ݄ σ ݓ௜
௞
௜ୀଵ
௞
௜ୀଵ = 1 (1)
where 0 <= wi<= 1 represent the weights measuring the importance of a given issue i
for a certain agent in the chain. 
The agents don’t know each other utility functions, they are aware only of the values 
of the discrete states variables they share. Each agent interacts with its neighbors agents 
such that the utility of an individual agent U(v), is dependent on its own state and the 
states of these other agents. 
6ROYLQJ WKH SUREOHP VWDWHG DERYH SURYLGHVPHDQV IRU ¿QGLQJ DQ DOORFDWLRQ WKDW
Fig. 1 Example of supply chain with agents sharing state variables
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maximize each agent utility in the supply chain within the underlying partners’
constraints. 
An allocation is a sub-graph (X',E') ك (X, E). For Xi, Xj א V ', an edge between Xi,
Xj means that agent Xj provides goods to agent Xi. An agent is in an allocation graph if 
it acquires or provides goods. 
In the graph in Figure 1 each node represents a participant in the supply chain. Each 
two nodes share at least one issue that they must agree on, and the value that they have 
agreed on, must be propagated from the underlying suppliers to the upper level of the 
supply chain. Figure 2 shows how the message is send between node X1 and X2 and 
back, when the agents have to agree on the issue B of a potential contract.
Fig. 2 Messages sent from X1 to X2 and back when they negotiate on issue B
By sending the message in equation (2), X1 says to X2 which is his preferred value 
from the set of values for issue B. Table 3 shows an example of computed values for 
PHVVDJHȜí!(B). 
ɉଵ՜ଶ(ܤ) = ݉ܽݔ஻(ܷ൫ ௝ܾ , ܿ௞൯ +݉ܽݔ஺ ቀܷ൫ܽ௜ , ௝ܾ൯ቁ) (2)
X1 sends the max-marginalization of B over A ( maxA(U(ai,bj ) ) and then adds the 
computed utility of agent X2 and then computes the max marginalization of B over the 
above terms. Table 3 VKRZVDQH[DPSOHRIFRPSXWHGYDOXHVIRUPHVVDJHȜ1í>2(B).
Table 1 Utility 
obtained by agent X1
A B U(ai,bj)
a1 b1 4
a1 b2 1
a2 b1 0
a2 b2 2
maxA(U(ai,bj))
b1 4
b2 2
maxC(U(bj,ck))
b1 5
b2 3
Table 2 Utility 
obtained by agent X2
B C U(bj,ck)
b1 c1 5
b1 c2 2.5
b2 c1 1.2
b2 c2 3
Agent at node X2 evaluates using his utility function, the utility that he gets for each 
combination of values from the set of values for issues B and C. X2 send to X1 the 
message in equation (3), which is his preferred value from the set of values for issue B. 
7DEOHVKRZVDQH[DPSOHRIFRPSXWHGYDOXHVIRUPHVVDJHȜí!(B). 
Group Decision and Negotiation – GDN 2017 233
14-18 August 2017, Stuttgart-Hohenheim, Germany
Table 3 Computing values for Ȝ1->2(B)
A B U(bj,ck)+maxA(U(ai,bj))
a1 b1 5+4=9
a1 b2 2.5+2=4.5
a2 b1 1.2+4=5.2
a2 b2 3+2=5
Table 4 Computing values for Ȝ2->1(B)
A B U(ai,bj)+maxC(U(bj,ck))
a1 b1 4+5=9
a1 b2 1+3=4
a2 b1 0+5=5
a2 b2 2+3=5
ɉଶ՜ଵ(ܤ) = ݉ܽݔ஻(ܷ൫ܽ௜ , ௝ܾ൯ +݉ܽݔ஼ ቀܷ൫ ௝ܾ , ܿ௞൯ቁ) (3)
X2 sends the max-marginalization of B over C (maxC (U(bj ,ck) ) and then adds the 
computed value for utility of agent X1 and then computes the max marginalization of 
B over the above terms. 
The messages are scheduled starting from leaves and then are propagated upward 
towards the root. 
3 Background and related work for SCF 
3.1 Max-sum 
Max-sum [9] is a message passing algorithm that provides approximate solutions 
for the problem of maximizing a function that decomposes additively in three steps. 
First, it maps the problem into a structure called local term graph. Then it iteratively 
changes messages between vertexes of that graph. Each vertex of the local term graph 
is in charge of receiving messages from its neighbors, composing new messages and 
sending them to its neighbors. Finally, it determines the states of the variables. 
3.2 Loopy Belief Propagation (LBP) 
/%3LVWKH¿UVWSHHUWRSHHUDSSURDFKWKDWKDVEHHQXVHGWRVROYHWKH6&)SUREOem 
in a decentralized manner [4],[5],[7],[10]. In [5], an LBP-based approach was applied 
to the SCF problem, noting that the passing of messages in LBP is comparable to the 
placing of bids in standard auction-based approaches. 
The work in [4] shows that the SCF problem can be cast as an optimization problem 
that can be eᚑFLHQWO\ DSSUR[LPDWHGusing max-sum algorithm [9] presented in the 
section above. Thus, the authors oᚎHUWKHPHDQVRIFRQYHUWLQJD6&)SUREOHPLQWRD
local term graph, on which max-sum can operate. 
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3.3 Reduced Binarized Loopy Belief Propagation (RB-LBP)
As LBP suffers from scalability issues in [6] the authors introduce the Reduced 
Binarized Loopy Belief Propagation algorithm (RB-LBP). RB-LBP is based on the 
max-sum algorithm and simplifies the calculation of max-sum messages through 
careful analysis of its local terms. The variables are binary which simplifies the supply 
chain formation process and each buy and sell decision is decoupled, encoded in a
different variable, from the rest of buy and sell decisions. By decoupling these decisions 
the algorithm is able to reduce the number of combinations to take into account.
4 Experimental Evaluation 
In order to validate the proposed model in section 2, PeerSim simulator was 
selected. The reasons for making this choice are the PeerSim performance regarding 
scalability and because it is based on components that allows prototyping a new 
protocol, combining diᚎHUHQWSOXJJDEOHEXLOGLQJEORFNV>@
Fig. 3 Solution 1 -possible allocation sub-graph
The network used for the current simulation has 18 nodes and each node has three 
possible partners that he can trade with. Each node v has a vector of numeric values that 
are the preferred states of the negotiated issues. The considered issues for negotiation 
over the supply chain are: delivery time and cost. The delivery time is measured in 
months and the cost is measured in the amount of money spent and it has been divided 
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by 100 for the simplicity of the illustration of the values obtained. Also each node owns 
a utility function which is computed as a weighted sum from each of the issues that the 
agents in the supply chain are discussing on. At the beginning of the simulation all the 
agents in the network are being initialized with random preferred values for the states 
variables and also for the weights used at computing every agent utility. 
Each node that is not a leaf is receiving messages from its neighbors, composing 
new messages and sending them upward to its neighbors. Each node will assess 
messages received from the corresponding neighbor according to his own utility 
function and will chose among all the possible partners the one that maximizes his 
utility function. 
7KH¿UVWVROXWLRQWKDW WKHLPSOHPHQWHGSURWRFRO¿QGVLV WKHDOORFDWLRQVXE-graph 
presented in Figure 3 being formed of the following nodes {X11,X3,X0}and the utility 
that the end-consumer gets is 16.64 with the states of the variables being propagated to 
the root (t=2;c=48) 
Fig. 4 Solution 2 -possible allocation sub-graph
7KHVHFRQGVROXWLRQWKDWWKHLPSOHPHQWHGSURWRFRO¿QGVLVWKHDOORFDWLRQVXE-graph 
presented in Figure 4 being formed of the following nodes {X6,X1,X0}and the utility 
that the end-consumer gets is 19.14 with the states of the variables being propagated to 
the root (t=1;c=58).
The propagation of the states of the variables for agent X2 has two phases: in phase 
1 the agent X2 chooses X9 DVDSDUWQHUDVLW¿QGVWKDWWKHXWLOLW\WKDWKHJHWVLVKLJKHU
than the previous one but in phase 2 the agent chooses agent X8 as he gets an even 
higher utility that the one provided be agent X9. The delivery time is shorter and the 
cost is higher than the ones at the allocation in solution 1 and according to the utility 
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function of the agent at node X0 it provides a higher utility. The agent gets a higher 
utility if the required component is provided in shorter time event it costs more. 
Fig. 5 Solution 3 -possible allocation sub-graph
7KHWKLUGVROXWLRQWKDWWKHLPSOHPHQWHGSURWRFRO¿QGVLVWKHDOORFDWLRQVXE-graph
presented in Figure 5 being formed of the following nodes {X8, X2, X0} using the 
propagation at the previous solution it propagates further the states of agent X2 to the 
root and the utility that the end-consumer gets is 20.15 with the values states of the 
variables (t=3; c=14). The delivery time is longer but the cost is much lower that the 
allocation at solution 2 and according to the utility function of the agent at node X0 it 
provides the maximum utility. 
5 Conclusions and future work 
In this paper we have proposed a negotiation support system for SCF. As opposed 
to the previous decentralized approaches, the current approach translates the SCF 
RSWLPL]DWLRQ SUREOHP QRW DV D SUR¿W PD[LPL]DWLRQ SUREOHP EXW DV D PHDQV IRU
maximizing a utility function. Hence, it incorporates multiple negotiated issues and 
enforces the propagation of the negotiated values from the underlying suppliers to the 
upper levels in the supply chain. As a future work we consider investigating the impact 
on the SCF process when agents make decisions under risk situation. 
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Abstract. The results of experiments involving software agents negotiating with 
humans are discussed. The purpose of the experiments was to study humans’ be-
havioral differences caused by the agents’ different concession-making tactics. 
In the experiments, human subjects acted as buyers of a mobile phone service. 
Software agents represented a telecom company. The negotiation task complex-
ity was manipulated to determine the effects of interaction between tactics and 
complexity level. Results show that interaction between negotiation task com-
plexity and negotiation tactic has significant impact on negotiation outcomes and 
on subjective assessments by the human participants.
Keywords: Electronic negotiations, software agents, multi-issue negotiations, 
concession-making, experimental studies.
1   Introduction
Software agents have been proliferating in various aspects of e-commerce (Yu et al., 
2015) as they can enable automating active offer-exchange processes in negotiations.
An automated negotiating agents competition (ANAC) held recently (Baarslag et al., 
2012) attests their growing popularity. Nonetheless, because of the inherent uncertainty 
in agent-managed negotiations, especially when negotiating with human counterparts, 
it is important to be able to assess their performance while utilizing various negotiation 
tactics.
Effective and efficient use of agents in negotiations can be influenced by a number 
of factors, including the economic outcomes achieved by the agents, and the subjective 
assessments by human counterparts of the outcome and of the process of negotiation. 
In this work, we evaluate the performance of negotiating agents paired with human 
counterparts in experimental settings. The effects of agent negotiation style and nego-
tiation task complexity as manipulated by introducing a different number of negotiation 
issues were studied in experimental treatments. In addition to measuring objective out-
comes, including agreement rate and agreement utility we also measured the effects on 
subjective variables, e.g. satisfaction with the outcome and perceived ease of use.
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2 Background
Faratin et al. (1998) proposed three categories of tactics: behavior-dependent, resource-
dependent and time-dependent. Tit-for-tat is an example of behavior-based tactics. In 
resource-dependent tactics concession levels are adjusted depending on the scarcity of 
the resources. If concession-making is a function of time elapsed between the beginning 
and the end of negotiation period, then such tactic is time-dependent. Curves showing 
small concessions in the beginning correspond to tougher competitive behavior, while 
those making large concessions relate to conceding behavior.
An early experimental study matching humans with agent counterparts was reported 
in (Byde et al., 2003). A salesperson agent that employed persuasion and other negoti-
ation techniques while negotiating product price with a customer is described in (Huang 
and Lin, 2007). Persuasion took place through customer – agent dialogue with the use 
of pre-defined arguments organized into a tree. Price was the single negotiated issue. 
The findings suggested that persuasion increased buyers’ product valuation and will-
ingness to pay, increasing the seller’s surplus. 
Using various agent negotiation tactics in experiments with human subjects has been 
reported in (Vahidov et al., 2014). The experiments involved purchasing a computer. 
The participants used five different concession-making styles, including: competitive, 
linear, conceding, competitive-then-conceding, and tit-for-tat. The agents played the 
role of a seller. A control group on the seller side included human subjects. The results 
showed that most agent types outperformed humans in terms of utility of the achieved 
agreement, and the agreement rate. 
The current study looks at the evaluation of the impact of agent negotiation tactics, 
and of task complexity on the negotiation outcomes and assessments. On one hand, 
increasing the number of issues leads to more room for maneuver, and, potentially to
higher propensity towards agreement. On the other hand, higher task complexity im-
plies higher cognitive effort, and, thus lower agreement rate.
3 Experiments
The case featured a sale of a mobile phone plan. Two versions of the case were in-
cluded: a simple and a complex one. The simple case involved the following issues: 
price, regular air time, extra air time, text messaging, and data. The buyers and sellers 
were given different weights for these issues according to their importance levels. The 
complex case, additionally, included call display, voicemail, call waiting, conference 
call, and call forwarding as extra issues (Figure 1).
Tradeoffs were considered to be one of the key integrative negotiation characteris-
tics. Therefore to facilitate tradeoffs, weights were set differently for the sellers and for 
the buyers. Although the system allows users to specify their own preference structures, 
these were fixed to be the same for all human users so that variation in the experiments
could be controlled. Four time-dependent tactics were used: competitive, conceding, 
competitive-then-conceding, and conceding-then-competitive. The concession sched-
ule for the competitive tactic is shown in Figure 2. The conceding agent has a convex 
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profile, while in the other two types these profiles are switched over midway through 
the time scale.
Fig. 1. Setup of the simple case
Fig. 2. Competitive agent
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The subjects were recruited among university students. We randomly paired the sub-
jects with different types of agents in a simple or complex case. The experiment was 
conducted on the web, whereby subjects could perform their tasks from any location in 
an asynchronous mode during a two-day period. The subjects were invited to join the 
negotiations via email containing the link to the system.
4 Results
A total of 754 subjects were registered for the experiment and completed the experi-
mental task. We only used data where subjects made more than one offer, which re-
duced the number to 368. From these 262 negotiations (71%) ended with an agreement, 
and 106 (29%) without. 
The agreement rate for the simple case setting was 75.5%, while for the complex 
case it was 65.4%. On the one hand, a larger number of issues should have given nego-
tiators more space for “maneuvering” in negotiations, thus facilitating higher likelihood 
of making an agreement. On the other hand, the complexity of the case demanded 
higher cognitive effort. The chi-square test conducted for the agreement rates was sig-
nificant at a o.o5 level (p-value = 0.021). The agreement rates are shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Agreement rates for different tactics of the agents.
Case Simple Complex
Agreement No Yes Rate No Yes Rate
Tactic Competitive 27 36 57.1% 24 23 48.9%
Competitive-Conceding 9 22 71.0% 10 15 60.0%
Conceding-Competitive 6 31 83.8% 15 35 70.0%
Conceding 10 71 87.7% 5 29 85.3%
Total 52 160 75.5% 54 102 65.4%
As expected, the highest agreement rates were achieved by the conceding agents; the 
lowest rates were achieved by the competitive agents. Conceding-competitive agents 
made more agreements than the competitive-conceding ones. The case’s complexity 
did not seem to have a large effect on the agreement rate for the conceding agents. This 
is because the agents conceded irrespectively of their human counterparts’ concessions. 
In effect, the agents using this tactic reached agreements early regardless of the com-
plexity of the case. However, for competitive agents the situation is different. Compet-
itive agents made more deals in the simple case. 
Table 2 shows the average utilities achieved by sellers. In the simple case, the aver-
age utility per one seller is the highest for the competitive tactic followed by conceding-
competitive tactic. Interestingly, in the complex case conceding and conceding-com-
petitive agents achieved highest utility values. Overall, these three strategies yielded 
much higher utility, compared to the competitive-conceding tactic.
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Table 2. Average seller’s utilities.
Average Utility Seller
Case Simple Complex Total
Tactic Competitive 27 36 57.1%
Competitive-Conceding 9 22 71.0%
Conceding-Competitive 6 31 83.8%
Conceding 10 71 87.7%
Total 52 160 75.5%
We further analyzed only the instances where the agreement was achieved (Table 
3). As one can see, agents achieved higher utility (58.93) in simple case settings than 
in complex settings (50.93). Further, competitive agents achieved highest utility agree-
ments, followed by the conceding-competitive, competitive-conceding, and lastly, con-
ceding agents. The complexity of the case has the largest impact for competitive agents. 
We developed a general linear model incorporating agent types and the complexity 
level for predicting the obtained utilities of seller agents and human buyers. The number 
of offers was included as a co-variate as it represented human buyers’ effort in the ne-
gotiation instances. The test results show that the case complexity, agent type, and the 
number of offers, were all significant. Furthermore, the interaction between the case 
complexity and agent tactic, as expected, was also significant. 
Table 3. Average utilities for sellers who achieved agreements.
Average Utility Seller
Case Simple Com-
plex
Total
Tactic Competitive 81.42 61.55 71.49
Competitive-Conceding 53.26 46.33 49.80
Conceding-Competitive 54.16 49.86 52.01
Conceding 47.05 45.96 46.51
Total 52 58.97 50.93
We have also conducted a survey among the participants to obtain insights into the 
user assessments that could serve as a basis for future research. A survey questions 
asked about five aspects of user experiences, including perceived ease of use (PEU), 
perceived usefulness (PU), satisfaction with outcome (SO), perceived procedural fair-
ness (PPF), and overall experience (OE). 
Three tests using general linear model were conducted. The first test was conducted 
on the dataset including all instances. Test 2 was conducted using only the instances 
that featured an agreement. Test 3 was conducted using the instances that had an agree-
ment, however, it used achieved utility as a covariate to replace the number of offers. 
The decomposed effects of the independent variables on each of the subjective as-
sessment variables are reported in Table 4. The results show that case complexity has 
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a significant direct effect on PPF in all of the three tests (p = 0.037, 0.021, and 0.012).
Case complexity and agent tactics have a significant interaction effect on PEU in the 
three tests (p = 0.003, 0.001, 0.002). They have a significant interactive effect on SO 
only in Test 1. The number of offers has significant direct effect on PU (p=0.002 and 
0.027) and SO (p =0.011 and 0.042) in its relevant tests (Test 1 and 2). Agent tactic has 
a significant direct effect on PPF only in Test 1. Achieved utility has a significant direct 
effect on PEU in Test 3.
Table 4. Average utilities for sellers who achieved agreements.
Decomposed effect Agent 
tactic
Case com-
plexity
Number 
of offers
Achieved 
utility
Case complexity * 
Agent tactic
PEU Test 1 0.840 0.182 0.918 0.003
Test 2 0.775 0.484 0.525 0.001
Test 3 0.315 0.552 0.019 0.002
PU Test 1 0.188 0.441 0.002 0.453
Test 2 0.298 0.186 0.027 0.415
Test 3 0.609 0.097 0.220 0.412
SO Test 1 0.538 0.371 0.011 0.040
Test 2 0.748 0.918 0.042 0.145
Test 3 0.807 0.672 0.325 0.262
PPF Test 1 0.098 0.037 0.348 0.775
Test 2 0.309 0.021 0.271 0.747
Test 3 0.335 0.012 0.629 0.675
OE Test 1 0.601 0.653 0.223 0.148
Test 2 0.436 0.739 0.164 0.129
Test 3 0.540 0.577 0.510 0.150
The above results suggest that agent tactic by itself does not have a significant effect 
on any of the dependent variables. Case complexity had a significant effect only on the 
perceived procedural fairness. Here, when faced with a high number of issues subjects 
reported lower perceived fairness. The interaction effect on PEU is significant in all 
three tests. The means of the score of PEU (sum of the item scores) are reported in 
Table 5. These results look surprising at first glance. When negotiating with a conced-
ing agent, users perceived the system to be easier to use in the simple case as compared 
with the complex one. However, paired with competitive agents, subjects felt the sys-
tem was easier to use in the complex negotiation setting. We believe, that this is due to 
the fact that concessions made by competitive agents on ten issues are less visible than 
those made by the same type of agents in the simpler case. Therefore, subjects may be 
perceiving competitive/complex setting more as a fixed-offer (take it or leave it) mech-
anism, rather than negotiation. The former is perceived as easier to use than the latter, 
since negotiations involve more effort.
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Table 5. Effects on perceived ease of use
Agent tactic Test1 Test2 Test 3
Simple Complex Simple Complex Simple Complex
Competitive 9.57 10.87 9.07 11.85 8.92 11.36
Competitive-Conceding 10.22 10.36 10.06 11.80 9.65 11.06
Conceding-Competitive 11.42 9.88 11.41 10.36 10.69 9.93
Conceding 11.22 9.15 11.16 9.42 10.18 8.27
5 Conclusions
The experiments revealed that the interaction between the agent negotiation tactic and 
the negotiation task complexity has significant impact on objective, and some subjec-
tive variables. The results show that competitive agents made fewer agreements and 
had considerably lower agreement utilities in complex cases compared to their perfor-
mance in simple cases. For the conceding agents, there was not much difference be-
tween the complex and simple cases. Agent tactic by itself did not have much impact 
on the subjective variables. However, its interaction with the case complexity did prove 
to be significant for perceived ease of use, and, partially for satisfaction with the out-
come. Future research could focus on the study effects of on varying levels of complex-
ity.
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Abstract. In this paper, we describe an approach to build an automatic 
classification model that analyzes the communicational content of electronic 
negotiations and determines whether negotiations ended in impasse or success. 
In order to do so, we constructed a category scheme that simplifies the exchanged 
messages based on word lists. Based on semantic lexica, a machine learning 
model was trained that achieves comparable classification performances 
compared to recent research on this topic. These models could now be employed 
in order to proactively evaluate communication in ongoing electronic 
negotiations and lay a foundation for advisor technologies for e-negotiators.
Keywords: electronic negotiations, machine learning, sentiment analysis,
negotiation support systems
1 Motivation
Communication has always been a crucial factor for negotiation success, especially in 
electronically mediated scenarios, for example when state-of-the-art Negotiation 
Support Systems are used. Most of these systems offer different approaches to structure 
the communication task such as regulating the communication protocol or explicating 
communicational actions via message types [1]. Whilst this form of support mainly 
structures the communication flow between the negotiators, there is still further 
potential for supporting the communicated content itself. Advances in Sentiment 
Analysis and Text Classification provide us with apt toolkits that are able to 
automatically analyse negotiation transcripts during negotiations and provide advice 
for the negotiators.
The notion of automatic conversation analysis and support has also recently spread 
into practice, with important examples being the IBM Watson™ Tone Analyzer that 
analyses emotional tone expressed in emails and is accessible programmatically [2], the 
personality analysis service based on communication style offered by Crystal [3], or 
the “emotion spellchecking” services by ToneCheck [4].
Systems that analyse communication behaviour at runtime of the negotiation can 
improve negotiation results and agreement rate in that they may provide early detection 
of potential negotiation failures such as negotiation partners expressing their wishes to 
end the negotiation. Further analysis of the communication may even provide 
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diagnostic means to investigate what went wrong in a negotiation. These systems may 
then enter into dialogue with the negotiators and provide advice to steer the negotiation 
back onto the path towards agreement. However, in order to achieve this, important 
foundations have to be provided.
First of all, we need to identify critical communication behaviour in negotiation that 
are indicative of failure or success. We specifically focus on an explicit distinction 
between agreement, where a final contract was accepted by both parties and impasse, 
where at some point a party actively ended the negotiation. Whilst there exists a lot of 
variety between these extremes, treating the distinction as binomial is a necessary 
reduction in order to simplify the classification problem in further steps (see [5] and [6] 
for similar simplifications)
Secondly, this knowledge has to be employed in the form of a machine learning 
classifier that automatically analyses negotiation transcripts and provides judgement 
about the outcome of the negotiation. This does not mean to improve on human 
judgement of negotiation outcomes based on transcripts – which is naturally far more 
accurate in such a complex classification task – but rather to enable Negotiation Support 
Systems to detect critical “entry points” at which means of support can be offered.
Lastly, advice for the negotiators has to be extracted from this classifier judgement,
either in the form of general communication advice or in a more concrete fashion 
relating to the communication problem detected by the classifier. 
The present paper presents a multi-step approach to take on the first two challenges 
described above. We derived semantic lexica from a large corpus of negotiation data 
that was coded into meaningful linguistic and semantic categories available for 
automatic analysis. This was partially done by incorporation of ideas from Sentiment 
Analysis. Afterwards, several machine learning models were trained on the 
preprocessed data that seek to classify negotiations into the categories “successful” and 
“failing”. This will be presented before discussing inferences that can be made for 
giving advice to negotiators based on the classification data.
2 Theoretical Background
Whilst the importance of communication in negotiations is undisputed, there exists a 
plethora of theorisation on its exact role and contribution to electronic negotiation 
success. 
Different influential factors that are manifest in communication have been 
established both in negotiation and communication theories. In general, communication 
is seen as playing an essential role to structure the interaction flow between the 
negotiators, to convey information and achieve mutual understanding, and to form an 
impression of the counterpart, contributing to relationship-building and the generation 
of mutual trust [7], [8], [9]. If these functions of communication are fulfilled adequately 
by the negotiating parties, the likelihood of reaching an agreement increases.
Classical cues-filtered-out approaches from the theoretical realm of interpersonal 
computer-mediated communication such as Media Richness Theory [10] or the Social 
Identity Model of Deindividuation Effects (SIDE, [11]) suggest that the usage of an 
electronic medium should have detrimental effects on relationship-oriented 
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communication because of the narrowed possibilities to exchange social cues. 
Furthermore, the usage of electronic media may facilitate misunderstandings and result 
in overly aversive behaviour of negotiators, because they feel less accountable for their 
utterances, lacking visual or aural access to their negotiation partner.
Social Information Processing Theory (SIP, [12]) employs a different viewpoint on 
this matter. It argues that whilst there are fewer channels available to convey social 
context cues, this does not impede impression formation or relationship-building since 
the remaining cues will attain greater importance and compensate for the lacking 
channels. Furthermore, new forms of cues are encoded into the language content, either 
explicitly via lexical choice or implicitly via stylistic elements of the message [13].
Following this line of thought, we argue that indicators of successful relationship-
building and, furthermore, of negotiation success are externalised in the content of the 
messages exchanged between the negotiators and can be used to detect negotiation 
failure or success. Hence, when we assess the communicational content of the 
negotiation, we are specifically interested in linguistic indicators that provide 
information about the final result of the negotiation.
Seminal research on this topic shows that the language actually does differ between 
negotiations ending in impasse or agreement. Early work by Simons [14] already 
indicated that linguistic patterns are capable predictors of negotiator agreement. Hine 
et al. [15] analysed communication of INSPIRE [16] data and found that words of 
positive emotion and expressions of assent are common in successful negotiations, 
whilst negation expressions and negative emotions displayed in the last half of the 
negotiation indicate that the negotiation fails. Sokolova and colleagues used different 
approaches to classify negotiation data and showed that degrees, scalars, and 
comparative words yield a high classification accuracy [17] They also discussed 
possible category representations of negotiation data [18]. Lastly, Twitchell et al. [5]
employed a speech-act based coding scheme on divorce negotiations and found that 
scoring models of integrativeness of these speech acts can serve as predictors for 
negotiation outcome.
A commonality in all of these findings is the important role that emotions play for 
deciding the result of the outcome. This is consistent with the notion that 
communication serves as the main vehicle to express emotional state, whether 
unwillingly (or unknowingly) or not, which has been addressed in seminal research on 
the influence of emotions on negotiation outcome ([19], [20], [21]).
Sentiment Analysis is a research stream that specifically analyzes the role of 
emotional expressions in written texts. It gained interest with the increased amount of 
user-generated content during what was called Web 2.0. The original aim of sentiment 
analysis was to provide a means to distinguish positive evaluations (of products, 
politicians, brands, etc. etc.) from negative ones in an automated fashion. Since then, 
the notion of Sentiment Analysis has spread into a multitude of other fields, where these 
techniques have been applied, as for example medical texts [22] or online discussions 
[24]. Usually, singular expressions in texts would be tested for their valence (“positive” 
or “negative”), either by using sentiment dictionaries that provide a mapping of words 
to valence or by using a machine learning classifier [23]. These evaluations are 
subsequently aggregated to an overall evaluation of the valence of the document. 
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We argue that a classification approach that draws on these ideas can – in 
combination with feature categorization schemes as in [17] or [18] can increase 
classification accuracy for automatic evaluation of negotiation texts.
3   Classifying Electronic Negotiations
Channeling previous research as well as communication-theoretic influences, we 
used a multi-step process to train a machine learning classifier on a corpus of 
negotiation data. The initial corpus consisted of 173 negotiations in the B2B-domain 
conducted by trained students in various experiments at the University of Hohenheim. 
Different experimental cases were used over those experiments, all of which consisted 
of a multi-attribute negotiation scenario containing both integrative and distributive 
issues. Using existing sentiment lexica ([25] and [26]), we created a domain-specific 
sentiment dictionary in the context of negotiations. Therefore, we extracted adjectives 
and verbs that occurred in the context of common nouns (and nouns paired with 
possessive pronouns, such as “your offer”) in our corpus and assessed their valence via 
the existing sentiment lexica. Overall, we extracted 762 sentiment expressions which 
we split into adjectives and verbs of positive or negative valence respectively (see [27]
for the exact steps which were undergone to create the sentiment dictionary). 
Since context is often an important aspect for the occurrence of these polar adjectives 
and verbs (which is suggested by the findings of Hine et al. [15]), we used our existing 
list of top nouns occurring in the corpus and tried to separate them into a set of domain-
specific categories, similar to open-coding processes in Grounded Theory and also 
similar to the approach used in [18]. This approach is also similar to what is usually 
done when performing content analysis on negotiation data. However, existing 
category schemes for negotiations seem to be too complex to be used as input for 
machine learning processes [28], hence we decided to develop a rather simple scheme, 
which can be obtained from table 1.
Table 1 Semantic categories for nouns in negotiations.
Semantic category Content
Discussion Nouns related to the offer exchange and 
argumentation / persuasion
Issues Nouns related to the negotiation agenda and 
its issues
Demands Nouns related to individual goals and 
demands
Integrative Nouns related to joint goals and compromises
Problems Nouns related to potential problems and 
errors during the negotiation process
Internal Nouns related to expressions of internal 
feelings of the negotiators
Relationship Nouns related to the relationship and 
partnership between the negotiators
The category sets we extracted this way make up our group of semantic level 
categories. Additionally, we introduced context through rather syntactically defined 
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categories which are not dependent on content-specific knowledge but can be obtained 
via the application of linguistic rules. We included categories for different personal 
pronouns, negation expressions, and intensification expressions.
In the end, we used these semantic categories to create coded representations of
electronic negotiation texts, i.e. we performed automatic, dictionary-based coding for 
each expression belonging to one of our categories, resulting in a Term-Document-
Matrix that can be used as an input for Text Classification. These recoded messages 
were then used to train machine learning classifiers to separate failing from successful 
negotiations. The preliminary classification results of the different classifiers can be 
obtained from table 2. The data set used here consisted of a balanced set of 234 
complete student negotiation transcripts, half of which ended in explicit agreement and 
the other half resulting in explicitly stated impasse i.e. an “accept” or “reject” message 
was sent at the end of the interaction. Category sequences were treated as bigrams in 
the term-document-matrix, with term frequency scores being used as cell values.
Table 2. Classification quality for electronic negotiations (10-folded CV, baseline 50%. ȕ=1 for F-Score) .
Naïve 
Bayes
kNN Logistic 
Regression
Neural 
Network
SVM Decision 
Tree
Accuracy 68.62 64.04 69.08 65.29 69.91 63.93
Precision 69.03 64.85 70.39 65.35 71.79 64.47
Recall 68.68 64.20 69.25 65.24 70.05 63.92
F-Score 68.85 64.39 69.81 65.29 70.91 64.19
Kappa 0.373 0.283 0.384 0.305 0.400 0.279
All in all, a significant improvement in classification quality compared to the 
baseline has been achieved, which shows that the representation of negotiations in 
semantic categories retains important information about the result of the negotiation 
process. The overall classification performance seems to be on a similar level to the 
levels reached by previous research, although no exact comparison is possible due to 
differing baselines.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we outlined steps towards using automated negotiation classification in 
order to detect success or failure of negotiations. The research presented builds up on 
the work of Sokolova and colleagues and offers a differentiated category scheme in
order to provide further diagnostic information of potential sources of negotiation 
failure. Furthermore, approaches of sentiment analysis are employed in order to obtain 
enriched information about the negotiators’ communication that can be used as an input 
for classifying negotiations according to their outcome.
The information obtained this way could be used by a negotiation support system in 
order to evaluate the negotiators’ communication during the ongoing negotiation 
process. It would thus be possible to give concrete communication advice either on an 
individual or a joint level – and, furthermore, the system could detect potential 
negotiation breakdowns and use further user interaction to investigate the exact nature 
of the problem during the negotiation and then inform the negotiators about potential 
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paths of resolution. In order to do so, the classification models have to be enabled to 
classify partial negotiation transcripts, to allow for a detection of potential failure as 
early in the process as possible. This step is subject to our current research, training 
using similar classification methods on half and three quarters of negotiation 
transcripts.
Automatic classification of negotiations opens up a multitude of future research tasks 
and possible variations on the topic. First of all, the classifier itself could be refined in 
different ways; for example in that it considers both negotiators separately in order to 
include information about the actual interaction between them and to detect 
asynchronous conflicts (i.e. where only one party perceives conflict or frustration).
Secondly, micro-level classification could be refined – either by providing a more 
differentiated category scheme or by replacing dictionary-based methods with machine 
learning classification models, that account for differences between factual and 
evaluative statements, a task known to sentiment analysis as subjectivity detection [23].
The next step that was also introduced as part of the motivation for this research is 
deducing options of advice that a system can give based on the information obtained 
by the classifier. Technically, it would be possible to determine which kind of 
utterances occur in an ongoing negotiation and subsequently identify whether they are 
indicative of success or failure according to the classification models established over 
the course of our research. Based on this information, general communication advice 
such as that given in [9] could be adapted to the specific situation, e.g. avoidance of 
unnecessary aggression, explication of emotions to avoid misunderstandings, asking 
questions to check the assumptions made about the partner etc.
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Abstract. As negotiations become increasingly embedded in electronic systems, 
the role of written language has assumed a greater relevance than ever before.
However, insights into the importance of language dynamics are scarce. We eval-
uate the role of language tone (also known as sentiment) on the outcomes of bi-
lateral e-negotiations. Our study draws from 1,304 bilateral e-negotiations with 
10,929 negotiation messages from the Inspire e-negotiation database. Our results 
suggest that a more positive language tone increases the chances of reaching an 
agreement. At the same time, the avoidance of negative words is a stronger driver 
of higher payoffs than increased levels of positive words. Intriguingly, successful 
e-negotiations exhibit a more positive sentiment during the opening stage, and a 
reduced utilization of both positive and negative words during the core negotia-
tion phase. Our findings suggest that careful language choice remains crucial in 
e-negotiations.
Keywords: negotiations; e-negotiation; negotiator language; negotiation pro-
cess; sentiment analysis.
1   Introduction
Negotiations are a critical process in economic systems: they serve the purpose of fa-
cilitating a market agreement among two or more parties seeking to exchange goods 
and services. The negotiators aim to secure a better deal through a potentially oppor-
tunistic interaction than they would without negotiating (Lax, Sebenius 1986).
The use of the Internet and other digital services in economic transactions leads to 
negotiations being conducted online. Exchanges, often impersonal, rely on electroni-
cally submitted textual content. Negotiators may purposefully choose the language with 
which they encode such qualitative information. They select the words that they feel
will best express their opinions and emotions. The assessment of the positivity and neg-
ativity embedded in such communication is the concern of sentiment analysis (Tetlock 
et al. 2008; Loughran, McDonald 2016). 
Emotions in negotiations have been studied in the context of face-to-face interactions
and, more recently, in e-negotiations (e.g., Griessmair, Koeszegi 2009, Griessmair et 
al. 2015; Hine et al. 2009; Kurtzberg et al. 2005; Parlamis, Geiger 2015; Sheehy, Pala-
novics 2006). Hine et al. (2009) find that more positive emotions and less negative 
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language have a favorable effect on the success rate of e-negotiations.
Earlier language-focused negotiation research relied on machine learning to predict 
negotiation outcomes on the basis of certain linguistic elements. Sokolova et al. (2008)
and Sokolova, Szpakowicz (2007) used machine learning approaches to show that in e-
negotiations, the later part of the communication is a better predictor of the negotiation 
outcome than the opening part in a negotiation conversation.
Sentiment analysis is a dictionary-based approach, in which dictionaries are used to 
classify words as either positive or negative. Positive and negative words are counted 
and a formula is used to obtain a sentiment score. Dictionary-based approaches are used 
in various fields of business; for example, Tetlock (2007b) shows that sentiment in 
financial media is positively related to stock returns and Antweiler et al. (2004) find 
that stock price volatility can be more accurately predicted when accounting for online 
stock message boards. 
This paper employs sentiment analysis to assess the effect of language sentiment on 
e-negotiation outcomes. Messages exchanged by participants of the Inspire negotia-
tions (Kersten, Noronha, 1999) are analyzed using the psychological Harvard-IV dic-
tionary (Stone 2002). The results show that negotiators who employ less negative lan-
guage sentiment are more likely to achieve an agreement with a higher payoff. The 
negative language sentiment component exerts a stronger effect on negotiation out-
comes than positive language. Using less negatively connoted words increases the prob-
ability of achieving an agreement and a better outcome, while using more positively 
connoted words has no statistically significant effect on outcomes.
Following this introduction, Section 2 introduces related work on the role of senti-
ment in negotiations and the methodological approach to sentiment analysis. We set
forth our research hypotheses in Section 3. Section 4 presents the experiment design 
and data. Section 5 reviews our results as well as the implications for our hypotheses.
Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Language sentiment analysis
Information Systems (IS) research is well-equipped to study how agents process infor-
mation conveyed by the language used in textual messages (Chen et al. 2012). Textual 
content provides relevant insights into the position of the message originator through 
the tone of the language. The subjective tone of documents can be assessed using sen-
timent analysis, which includes methods used to measure the positive or negative lan-
guage that comprises textual information (Loughran, McDonald 2016).
Sentiment measures enable the evaluation of the role of language in the context in 
which it is used. Among other applications, sentiment analysis has been used to study 
the function of language in financial markets (e.g. Antweiler et al. 2004, Tetlock et al. 
2008, Karapandza 2016, Loughran, McDonald 2016). Thereby, sentiment analysis can 
be deployed for datasets of varying sizes. For instance, while Tetlock (2007a) studies 
the role of sentiment in a newspaper column on financial markets with a few thousand 
observations, other papers analyze several hundred thousand media articles (e.g. Ahern, 
Sosyura 2014).
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IS research has developed various approaches to measuring sentiment, since senti-
ment analysis is deployed across various domains and applied to a range of different 
textual sources (Pang, Lee 2008). Overall, sentiment analysis approaches fall into two 
categories: dictionary-based approaches and machine learning methods. Dictionary-
based approaches produce reliable results by counting the frequency of words pre-de-
fined as either negative or positive by a given dictionary (Loughran, McDonald 2016).
Domain-independent dictionaries that perform this function, Harvard-IV being one 
of them, are developed by psychologists. Their aim is to gauge and then to reflect the 
likely cognitive reaction to a specific word. The Harvard-IV dictionary contains differ-
ent categories, which reflect the polarity (a binary classification as either positive or 
negative), emotions, or arousal, to name just a few. We rely on the polarity of words. 
Many dictionaries are domain-specific and classify words differently for different do-
mains. For example, words such as ‘tax’ or ‘cost’ are assigned a negative sentiment in
the Harvard-IV dictionary but may convey a positive meaning in a financial context
(Loughran, McDonald 2011; Stone 2002).
Language sentiment analysis requires a pre-processing stage during which the text 
messages corpus is prepared. In this stage tokenization splits a running text into single 
words, called tokens. Negations are then adjusted using a rule-based approach to detect 
negation scopes and invert the meaning accordingly (Dadvar et al. 2011). In a next step, 
the so-called ‘stop words’ are removed; these are words without relevance, such as
articles (e.g. the, a, an) and pronouns (Lewis et al. 2004). Finally, stemming is per-
formed via the Porter stemming algorithm in order to truncate all inflected words to 
their stem (e.g. stemming truncates ‘announces’ and ‘announced’ to ‘announc’).
The results of the pre-processed corpus allow for the computation of the sentiment 
variable. We select the psychological Harvard-IV dictionary to label the stemmed word 
tokens as either positive or negative (Stone 2002). Different from dictionaries utilized 
in financial market research, the Harvard-IV dictionary is not specifically tailored to 
textual content in financial markets. In contrast, this dictionary reflects to most common 
perception of a given word on the basis of psychological experiments. The Harvard-IV 
dictionary has been deployed in business research (e.g. Tetlock 2007a) and non-busi-
ness research (e.g. Sureja, Sherasiya 2017).  Therefore, we deem this dictionary most 
suitable for our case study, which reflects a business negotiation setting, however, 
among students and thus non-professionals. 
The Net-Optimism metric of Demers and Vega (2010), combined with the Harvard-
IV dictionary, is one such variable that yields a robust relationship. The Net-Optimism 
metric S(m) of message m processes all words contained in message m, where S(m) is
the difference between the count of positive Wpos and negative Wneg words divided by 
the total count of words Wtot in message m; that is:
ܵ(݉) =
ௐ೛೚ೞି ௐ೙೐೒
ௐ೟೚೟
 א [െ1, +1]. (1)
Note that the sentiment variable is standardized to mean 0 and standard deviation 1.
Below, S(m) is referred to as sentiment.
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3 Hypotheses
Van Kleef, Gerben A et al. (2004) and Kopelman et al. (2006) find negotiators to be 
more cooperative and willing to make concessions when they show positive affect. 
Griessmair, Koeszegi (2009) also show that friendlier language leads to a higher like-
lihood of reaching an agreement. Therefore, we hypothesize that positive sentiment has 
a favorable effect on the process of seeking a mutually agreeable resolution.
Hypothesis 1a (H1a): Language sentiment has a positive effect on the likelihood of 
achieving an agreement.
Hypothesis 1b (H1b): Language sentiment has a positive effect on the payoff 
achieved in a negotiation.
The influence of negative information was found to outweigh that of positive infor-
mation in human decision-making (Kanouse 1984). The affective negativity effect as-
sumes a stronger impact of negative versus positive affect, e.g. emotions or feelings, in 
human decision-making. The informational negativity effect suggests a higher cogni-
tive relevance of negative than positive information, e.g. a more pronounced response 
to negative than for positive information (Fiske 1980).
We pursue two alternative approaches in order to study whether negotiators treat 
language sentiment asymmetrically. First, we decompose language sentiment into its 
negative and positive components, respectively, by only considering negatively or pos-
itively connoted words within a given text. Consequently, we expect negative sentiment 
(as measured by negative language only) to play a more important role than positive 
sentiment (as measured by positive language only). Second, we perform quantile re-
gressions on different payoff quantiles to understand whether the language reception 
intensity differs depending on whether the outcomes are poor or favorable.
Hypothesis 2a (H2a): Negative sentiment is a stronger driver of negotiation out-
comes than positive sentiment.
Hypothesis 2b (H2b): Sentiment is a stronger driver of poor negotiation outcomes 
than of favorable negotiation outcomes.
The negotiation process is sequential and has several phases.  Holmes (1992) for-
malizes such negotiation stage models according to three phases: (1) the initiation 
phase, in which the negotiators introduce themselves, establish a relationship, and clar-
ify any preliminary questions; (2) the problem-solving phase, in which the negotiators 
lay out their positions, explore mutual opportunities, and make concessions; and (3) the 
resolution phase, in which the settlement is finalized and the negotiations are con-
cluded. Prior research also suggests that the importance of sentiment varies across the 
different phases in a negotiation. Twitchell et al. (2013) and Sokolova et al. (2008)
report an increase in the importance of language towards the end of negotiations. On 
the other hand, Simons (1993) emphasizes that negotiators focus on relationship-build-
ing at the beginning of a negotiation as trust must be established at this early stage
(Elkins, Derrick 2013).
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Language sentiment is more positive during the initiation phase 
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and the resolution phase and more negative in the problem-solving phase.
4 Negotiation Experiment
The data used here is the corpus of textual messages obtained from bi-lateral, multi-
issue negotiations conducted via the Inspire system (Kersten, Noronha, 1999). The par-
ticipants in the Inspire negotiations are students tasked with negotiating a contract be-
tween a music artist and an entertainment company.
The data was collected between 2009 and 2016. During this time 10 experiments
were conducted in which 2,608 students participated, i.e. there were 1,304 bilateral ne-
gotiations, from which we obtained a total of 10,929 messages. The reported ages of 
the majority sample of participants (i.e. 93%) is between 20 and 30 years. We collected 
the data from eleven online experiments conducted between 2009 and 2016.
We test our hypotheses against two outcome measures. The first outcome measure 
is whether an agreement was made. This measure is binary. The second outcome meas-
ure then takes into consideration the payoff of each negotiator, which is 0 in the case of 
not achieving an agreement, and a full-integer value with a median of 75 and a maxi-
mum of 236 on a negotiator level otherwise.
5 Results
5.1 Language sentiment and negotiation outcomes
We assess the impact of language sentiment in terms of the probability of achieving an 
agreement and taking into account the negotiation’s eventual payoff. The results sug-
gest that the aggregated language sentiment is not a significant driver with respect to
achieving an agreement, but that only negative language sentiment is. Thus, Hypothesis 
H1a only holds true for negative language, but cannot be generalized to aggregated 
language sentiment. In support of Hypothesis H1b, a one-standard deviation increase 
in language sentiment is linked to a 2.248 units (P-value smaller than 0.05) higher pay-
off for a negotiator, which is a 3.64 percent payoff increase over the mean payoff. We 
do not find a significant effect in support of H1b on the dyad-level. 
5.2 The dominating role of negative tone
We also split up our sentiment variable into its positive and negative language compo-
nents. As suggested by Hypothesis H2a, the negative language sentiment component 
exerts a stronger effect on negotiation outcomes than positive language. Using fewer
negatively connoted words increases the probability of achieving an agreement. In fact, 
a one-standard deviation reduction in the use of negatively connoted words increases 
the likelihood of achieving an agreement at a statistically significant level (coefficient 
of 0.303; z-statistic of 3.220; P-value smaller than 0.01).
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The negative language sentiment component also exerts a stronger influence on ne-
gotiation payoffs than positive language; both on a negotiator- and a dyad-level. Using 
fewer negatively connoted words increases the probability of achieving an agreement 
and a higher payoff, while using more positively connoted words has no statistically 
significant effect on the payoff. For instance, a one-standard deviation reduction in neg-
ative sentiment in a negotiation leads to a 7.677 units higher payoff. This is about 12.44 
percent of the mean payoff per player across all negotiations and thus of high economic 
relevance.
In addition, we run quantile regressions on the 25th, 50th and 75th quantiles of the 
dyadic payoffs. In confirmation of Hypothesis H2b, language sentiment is a stronger 
driver of poor negotiation outcomes than of favorable negotiation outcomes. Again, this 
relationship is only statistically significant for negative language sentiment, but not for 
aggregated language sentiment or positive sentiment. In fact, the coefficient of negative 
language sentiment in a quantile regression is 20.798 (t-statistic of 2.365; P-value 
smaller than 0.05) at a quantile regression on the 25 percent payoff quantile. The coef-
ficient decreases thereafter to 2.314 at the median payoff (50 percent quantile; t-statistic 
of 2.340; P-value smaller than 0.05) and to 1.297 at the 75 percent payoff quantile, 
which is statistically not significant.
5.3 Sentiment evolution
Next, we want to understand whether the message sentiment differs across successful 
and failed negotiations. We thus evaluate how our sentiment measure develops through-
out the negotiation process. In order to examine this sentiment evolution throughout the 
communication process, we decompose our negotiations into three phases following
Holmes (1992): an initiation (relationship building) phase, a problem-solving (negoti-
ation) phase, and a resolution phase. 
We assign the first two and last two messages, respectively, to the first and third 
phases. We assume that in a standard negotiation protocol, one of the two parties initi-
ates the negotiation with a first (welcoming or introductory) message, while the other 
negotiator replies in kind with a similar (welcoming or introductory) message. Then the 
negotiation takes place. Finally, the last two messages serve to close the negotiation,
whereby one party summarizes the (possibly) settled terms of the agreement and the 
negotiating party confirms the mutual understanding of the resolution.
As our results reveal, sentiment is more positive at the beginning (coefficient of
0.187; t-statistic of 6.817; P-value smaller than 0.001) and end of the negotiation (co-
efficient of 0.095; t-statistic of 4.707; P-value smaller than 0.001) than during the ne-
gotiation period (coefficient of -0.276; t-statistic of -11.486; P-value smaller than 
0.001). Thus, we cannot reject Hypothesis H3. Whereas the initiation phase serves to 
establish a relationship based on positive sentiment, the sentiment in the middle, prob-
lem-solving stage is more negative, driven by a decreased use of positively connoted 
words and an increased use of negatively connoted words. Towards the end, once an 
agreement has been reached (or abandoned), the outcome becomes clear and the tone 
of messages rebounds and becomes more positive again.
A closer look at the comparative sentiment dynamics, subject to whether an agree-
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ment is made or not, reveals intriguing insights into how successful and abortive nego-
tiations differ. While the differences in sentiment across the phases are all significant, 
the sentiment in negotiations leading to an agreement is more positive in both the rela-
tionship-building and closing phases, and lower during the core stage, as compared to 
futile negotiations. While this interaction effect is only statistically significant for the 
building phase, the directional effect size reveals that successful negotiations are char-
acterized by a more diligent (social) opening and closing phase, but also a more intense 
negotiation period. 
Interestingly, successful negotiations differ from abortive negotiations in the way 
negotiators manage their use of both positive and negative language. In negotiations
that conclude with an agreement, negotiators’ language is more positive in the opening 
phase (t-statistic is 2.053; P-value smaller than 0.05), but less positive in the central 
negotiation period (t-statistic is -2.424; P-value smaller than 0.05), as compared to 
abortive negotiations. Meanwhile, the degree of positivity in the final period of negoti-
ation does not matter at statistically relevant levels. At the same time, successful nego-
tiators (in terms of coming to an agreement) also reduce their amount of negatively 
connoted words during the negotiation phase as compared to abortive negotiators (t-
statistic is 2.674; P-value smaller than 0.01).
6 Conclusion
The results show that the negotiators are more likely to succeed if they use more posi-
tive language during the opening phase and reduce the overall amount of positively or 
negatively charged words during the middle phase, when the actual negotiation occurs.
This suggests that investing in initial trust- and relationship-building pays off and at the 
same time allows the negotiators to focus during the core negotiation phase on the ne-
gotiation itself in a matter-of-fact communication style.
The language of negotiations matters in electronic exchanges just as it matters in 
face-to-face exchanges. It is advantageous if negotiators avoid a high level of nega-
tively connoted words in their language, since a reduced usage of negative language 
tend to increase the likelihood of an agreement and lead to better payoffs. We need to 
point out, however, that the language of negotiations that ultimately result in an agree-
ment is more positive in the opening phase but it is more negative in the second, nego-
tiation phase as compared to failed negotiations.
Finally, future research might apply dictionary generation approaches from machine 
learning to the textual content of negotiations. Such approaches allow to identify words, 
which have a positive of negative effect on negotiation outcomes. The resulting word 
lists may then also benchmarked against static dictionaries, such as the Harvard-IV dic-
tionary used in our research, to validate their reliability. 
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Abstract. Sharing economy platforms aim at an increased utilization of un- or 
underutilized assets and posit enormous potential as a growing domain for 
online mediation and electronic negotiation. Within this paper we present the 
context, design, implementation and evaluation of a sharing economy platform 
for peer-to-peer sharing of wild camping sites in Germany – www.sharewood-
forest.de. The platform is used productively by Sharewood-Forest e.V. – a
German association for community-based wild and nature friendly camping – to 
facilitate the grant of permission for camping on private forest plots in accord-
ance with the German forest laws.
Keywords: sharing economy, trust, wild camping
1   Introduction
Spending a night in a tent – out in the wilderness – is an untamed desire of many 
modern “urban” adventurers. The longing for experiences with the lonely beauty of 
nature fanned by popular writers such as Jack London or Thomas Hiram Holding has 
led to the pilgrimage of many German adventurers to European countries with the 
right of freedom to roam. This desire may be best expressed within the renowned 
verbalization by Hetfield and Ulrich [1]: “Anywhere I roam, where I lay my head is 
home / And the earth becomes my throne”. 
The main reason for many German adventurers to make the effort of a long jour-
ney, to countries such as Norway, Scotland, or Sweden is grounded in the German 
forest legislation, which prohibits the act of “wild camping” in public forests. The 
only option for German adventurers to camp “wild” is to elaborately identify private 
land owners of desired wild camping spots and ask for a special permission. Since the 
process of identifying the corresponding land owner and negotiating the terms for a 
special permission requires an unreasonable high amount of effort and time, the less 
(environmentally) sustainable and more expensive journey to foreign countries is 
frequently preferred. 
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This inefficiency in both the search and negotiation process may be well addressed 
by Information Systems (IS). The implementation of an IS artifact such as an online 
platform for sharing privately owned forests in terms of wild camping permits, could 
help to address this problem. In today’s internet based society, IS – and peer-to-peer 
(P2P) platforms in particular – leverage transactions among peers in large scales. 
The so called ‘Sharing Economy’ as an umbrella term subsumes a variety of P2P 
transactions with both online and offline components [2]. Within a broad platform 
landscape (e.g., gartenpaten.org for garden sharing, hipcamp.com or youcamp.com
for renting wild camping sites in the US and Australia), a variety of goods and ser-
vices is provided and consumed by private individuals. While renowned platforms 
such as Couchsurfing stress the communal aspects of a transaction, others such as 
Airbnb increasingly focus on the provision of professional quality standards within a 
professionalized interaction, blurring the lines between true and pseudo-sharing [3].
For both providers and consumers trust – among other potential drivers and imped-
iments [4] – is a crucial factor within the decision process for partaking in sharing 
economy activities [5, 6]. It is thus a major issue among sharing economy platform 
providers to design a platform that serves the need of a specialized community in 
guiding transactions and supporting the formation of trust [6].
Within the scope of this work we will present a design science approach for im-
plementing a P2P sharing economy platform for wild camping sites in Germany.
The novelty of our platform design is grounded in the special domain it is address-
ing. Compared to other established sharing economy platforms, www.sharewood-
forest.de possesses a set of unique and exciting characteristics. These inter alia in-
clude: 
i) The character of the shared resources (wild camping sites) requires specialized 
means of communication and negotiation support (e.g., for determining where to 
build camp, where to find water or a toilet, how to arrange with animals, trees, dan-
gers or other environmental factors). 
ii) The platform exclusively enables nonmonetary exchange, i.e., the permission 
for a guest-night is granted on a voluntary and altruistic basis, which may require non-
monetary means of reciprocity (e.g., through permanent communication channels). 
Furthermore, in contrast to platforms like Couchsurfing the shared resources is typi-
cally not within a directly controllable range for the land owner.
iii) The platform addresses a small, nature enthusiastic, altruistic and responsible 
user community – which needs to be especially protected from improper or abusive 
platform usage. 
In order to develop a basic and prototypical design for an adequate mediating plat-
form, we follow the design science research approach as suggested by Peffers et al. 
[7], covering the phases of problem identification and motivation (Section 1), defini-
tion of the objectives for a solution, design and development (Section 2), as well as 
demonstration and evaluation (Section 3). The design artifact is the German platform 
www.sharewood-forest.de that facilitates sharing of privately owned camping sites in 
the forest by supporting and guiding the trust- and reciprocity-based request and per-
mission process.
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2 Basic Platform Design of Sharewood-Forest
The central problems to be addressed by a platform for P2P sharing of tangible re-
sources (i.e., wild camping sites) inter alia comprise i) the provision of a trustworthy 
platform environment that encourages the registration of resource providers (i.e., land 
owners with their property) – particularly, if no prospect of monetary compensation is 
provided – ii) an online matching process with registered consumers (i.e., adventur-
ers), and iii) the facilitation of offline interaction and subsequent evaluation of inter-
action. Since Sharewood-Forest is a true sharing platform in the sense of Belk [3],
transactions are mainly based on social and altruistic motives (c.f. [4]), as no means of 
(monetary) compensation is provided. A key issue to be solved is therefore the for-
mation of trust between adventurers and land owners (with higher stakes on the altru-
istically motivated land owner side).
Building on the work of Hawlitschek et al. [2], we break these problems down to 
six basic requirements: R1) Providers shall be able to list resources. R2) Consumers 
shall be able to search and request resources. R3) Providers shall be able to respond
to (confirm/reject) requests. R4) Consumers shall be able to book a resource. R5), R6)
Providers (consumers) shall be able to perform trusting (reciprocating) behavior.
The Sharewood-Forest booking process follows a unique and context-specific 
communication and cancellation policy in order to appropriately support and guide 
communication, negotiation and interaction between users (see Fig. 1.). 
Fig. 1. Flow Chart of the Sharewood-Forest Booking Process
The design and implementation of the Sharewood-Forest platform that fulfills R1)-
R6) will be described in the following: 
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Subject to a prior registration, land owners can offer a well-defined spot on their 
ground to adventures (R1). While presenting their land to all registered adventures on 
the platform (R2), they remain in full control of their right to permit or prohibit ad-
ventures to spend a guest-night (R3). Adventurers are given the possibility to browse 
all land owners’ adverts, inspect their details and eventually bindingly book a spot for 
a guest-night (R2, R4). 
Offering and booking are facilitated by the unique booking process of Sharewood-
Forest, which is depicted in Fig. 1. By requesting a spot on a specified day for a 
guest-night, an email is sent to the respective land owner informing about that particu-
lar request (R2). The request contains profile information, a profile photo and a repu-
tation score to increase perceived social presence and trust [5, 8, 9]]. Synchronously, a 
bilateral chat is provided on the platform for the participants in a transaction to ex-
change further details of the stay and provide a socially rich means of communication 
[10].
This open request can either change its state into a confirmed request through the 
land owner by granting the adventurer a guest-night permission, or into a cancelled 
request by one of the following actions: i) the adventurer cancels his former request, 
ii) the land owner declines the request, or iii) by the platform itself, if the requested 
date of the guest-night is expired (R3). 
By trustfully granting the guest-night permission, an email containing an auto-
generated legally binding permission is sent to the requesting adventurer (R5). This 
allows him to substantiate his right towards any person or authority he might get into 
contact with on the land owner’s spot. But even in case of a confirmed request, both 
adventurer and land owner can cancel it at any time, leading to one of the respective 
revoked states. In case of the occurrence of a guest-night, it is the adventurer’s re-
sponsibility to behave in a nature-friendly and trustworthy manner following outdoor 
ethics such as the leave-no-trace principle (R6). 
In order to strengthen mutual trust amongst platform participants, access to a bilat-
eral reputation and rating system [11] is granted to both parties on the day after the 
guest-night was “booked”. Here, the adventurer may rate the visited spot, whereas the 
land owner may rate the adventurer’s behavior; both using a wide-spread five-star 
rating. By publishing the results no earlier than after both parties cast their votes, or 
30 days after the guest-night took place – whichever comes latest – the otherwise 
obvious conflict of interest is averted and reciprocity in ratings is mitigated [12]. In 
case none party casts a vote, the rating is closed 30 days after the guest-night took 
place.
3   Evaluation and Contribution
Our platform www.sharewood-forest.de (i) brings together nature enthusiasts; on 
the one hand land owners willing to share their land, on the other hand adventurers 
loving to explore wilderness, (ii) empowers nature enthusiast with the freedom to 
roam, (iii) provides legal certainty, hence supporting risk-averse land owners to se-
curely act as land benefactors, and (iv) unites demand and supply in a non-profit shar-
ing economy way (true sharing). 
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The platform is evaluated in live operation since September 2016 and used produc-
tively by the Sharewood-Forest e.V. – a German association for community-based 
wild and nature friendly camping (see Fig. 2 in the Appendix). A community of ~200 
nature enthusiasts has created user profiles (see Fig. 3) on the platform and first regis-
tered camping sites (see Fig. 4) speak in favor of the long term success of the concept.
The platform is accessed about 10 times per day, which provides the potential for 
future survey- and interview-based evaluation of the platform. 
Following the call of Matzner et al. [13], this prototype paper provides a case for 
the design of a P2P sharing economy platform that may serve as a basis for cross-case 
replications. We therefore contribute to a growing body of literature that investigates 
the design of use-case specific P2P sharing economy platforms (e.g. [13, 14]). Specif-
ically, we describe a use-case for the evaluation of designing trust building mecha-
nisms between altruistically motivated peers. Our work is of particular practical rele-
vance for platform providers who aim at designing P2P sharing economy platforms, 
but most importantly for nature enthusiasts and adventurers in Germany. We set the 
stage for a growing community of both altruistic land owners and wild campers who 
may now – facilitated through our platform – share their passion for outdoor experi-
ences on private forest property in Germany. 
4   Conclusion and Outlook
Within this paper we present the context, design, implementation and evaluation of 
a sharing economy platform for P2P sharing of wild camping sites in Germany, which 
addresses an existing demand. The platform is used to facilitate the communication 
and negotiation between users, in order to grant permission to camp on private forest 
plots in accordance with the German forest laws. The unique characteristics of the 
described platform design make our work particularly interesting for charitable non-
profit organizations, especially with a certain closeness to nature. The concept is 
based on a user community, which is characterized by two main drivers: closeness to 
nature and individualization. In other words: By user self-commitment, forests are 
handled responsibly, enabling renaturation. Zeitgeists idealism enables highly diverse 
individual experiences (joyriding adventures) – commonly known as utilitarian striv-
ing. We contribute to existing work by describing a unique and novel use-case for the 
design of a P2P sharing economy platform for true sharing. 
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Appendix
Fig. 2. Sharewood-Forest Homepage (www.sharewood-forest.de)
Fig. 3. User Profile on Sharewood-Forest
Fig. 4. Registered Camping Site on Sharewood-Forest
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Abstract. Trust is a crucial factor in a variety of computer-facilitated
interactions, for example in the context of electronic commerce or negotiation. 
Since most transactions on the Internet are carried out by interacting with a 
User Interface (UI), a variety of UI artifacts were developed particularly for the 
purpose of building trust between users. In order to investigate the effects of UI 
artifacts on trusting behavior, numerous researchers conducted trust game 
experiments focusing on the manipulation of the UI. Within the scope of this 
extended abstract, we introduce a structured literature review approach that 
aims at gathering the findings of these studies in order to streamline research 
and provide insights as well as future research directions for trust-related UI 
design.
Keywords: experiments; literature review; trust game; user interface
1   Introduction
Over the past decade, a wide range of activities in everyday life have become 
facilitated by a broad range of Internet-enabled services. Within this modern platform 
landscape, users engage in peer-to-peer interactions to, for instance, book 
accommodation and mobility services (sharing economy), outsource (micro) tasks to 
strangers (crowdsourcing), or communicate and socialize with people around the 
globe (social networks). In such peer-to-peer interactions, users often need to interact 
with persons they only get to know via the UI of the mediating platform, which may 
lead to a perception of risk or uncertainty [1]. Such burdens of uncertainty may, 
however, impede the usage of e-Services [2], as decisions become increasingly 
complex when considering all potentially occurring incidents originating from other 
actors [3]. According to Gefen [3], interactions will not take place in the long run 
without applying some kind of complexity reduction methods—trust is a highly 
effective means for enhancing interactions under uncertainty [3]. In general, trust is 
defined as “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party 
based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to 
the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party” [4, p.712].    
The trust game, also known as investment game or shipping game, is the most 
274 Group Decision and Negotiation – GDN 2017
14-18 August 2017, Stuttgart-Hohenheim, Germany
common experimental method to investigate economic trust scenarios and trust-
related behavior [5]. It was first introduced by Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe [6] and 
has since then been widely adopted to investigate trusting relationships in a variety of 
settings. The rules proposed by [6] are as follows: Two anonymous players interact 
with each other in a two-stage sequential transaction. Before the game starts, both 
players receive an initial endowment of 10 monetary units (MU) and are assigned to 
play either the role of the trustor or the trustee. In the first stage, the trustor, acting in 
the role of an investor, decides how much (xt = (0,1, … ,10)) of the initial MU 10 he 
or she wants to transfer to the other player (trustee). The amount sent is multiplied by 
a factor į . In the second stage, the trustee in turn decides how much, if anything, 
of the received tripled amount he or she wants to return to the trustor (yr = (0, «į
xt)). Applying backward induction, the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium turns out to
be a zero-investment by the trustor and a zero-return by the trustee, although both 
players would be—due to the multiplication factor’s effect—better off if the trustor 
placed trust in the trustee and the trustee reciprocated [6]. As seen, the decision is 
characterized by a problem of trust in the first stage followed by a subsequent 
problem of reciprocity. However, it has been shown that people commonly deviate
from the above described theoretical equilibrium.1
2 Literature Review
Numerous researchers have conducted trust game experiments addressing a wide 
range of questions in the domain of Cultural Studies, Economics, Psychology, and 
Sociology, to name just a few (for a meta-analysis of trust game experiments see [7]). 
However, the trust game has also been used in a variety of studies to investigate the 
role and impact of UI artifacts on the formation of trust (e.g., profile photos [8–11],
avatars [10, 12], communication elements [12, 13], reputation systems [8], virtual 
world environments [12, 14], or design elements [15]. A large body of IS literature 
has acknowledged the important role of trust on IT-mediated interactions [16–18].
However, to the best of our knowledge, no prior study has set out to provide a 
systematic literature review (1) of the results of existing studies employing the trust 
game to investigate the role of UI artifacts in building trusting relationships online 
and (2) of how the trust game can be used to investigate these relationships from a 
methodological perspective. Common approaches to investigate trust in IS are, for 
instance, (experiential) surveys [19], field interviews, case studies, and experiments 
[1, 16] that are increasingly supplemented by neuro-physiological measures [10]. The 
trust game has the particular characteristic that the actual behavior within the game is 
used to capture trust [20]. Thereby, the major advantage lies in the fact that trust is 
observable in a real transaction environment.
In order to establish the current state of research on the usage of UI elements in 
trust games, we conducted a structured literature review of experimental studies. To 
identify UI artifacts which could potentially influence trusting behavior, we followed 
the structured literature review approach of Webster and Watson [21]. The review 
1 In the trust game experiment by [6], 30 out of 32 participants have sent on average $ 5.16 of 
their initial endowment to their counterpart.
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covers full-paper studies that have conducted a computerized trust game experiment 
focusing on the manipulation of UI artifacts. We scanned the top ranked IS literature 
covering the “Basket of 8,” all A* and A ranked IS journals, as well as the seven 
recommended generic IS conferences as recognized by ACPHIS [22]. Furthermore, 
we included relevant outlets from the field of Economics such as “Experimental 
Economics” or the “Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.” A full-text 
search was applied based on the following key words: either “trust game,” or 
“investment game,” or “shipping game,” in combination with “experiment.” Only 
trust games following the rules of Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe [6] or Bolton, Katok 
and Ockenfels [23] were included in order to ensure the comparability of the studies. 
As the focus especially lies on UI elements, experiments which solely use reputation 
information but do not consider the role of the actual UI artifact were also excluded 
from our search.
3 Summary
Overall, 44 studies were considered relevant for this review after conducting a 
backward search as well as a forward search using the “Web of Science2” as proposed 
by [21]. These 44 studies were published in journals originating from subject areas—
besides IS—such as Economics, Neurosciences, Political Science, Psychiatry, or 
Psychology. Remarkably, 29 out of the 44 studies were published in the last six years, 
demonstrating the increasing relevance of experimental studies employing the trust 
game for understanding the formation of trust in online interactions. The majority of 
studies focus on UI artifacts aiming at an adequate user representation (35), whereof 
30 apply a photo and 7 use an avatar for that purpose (2 studies implemented both). 
Another set of studies allows direct communication between participants (6), whereas 
4 studies conduct experiments under virtual world conditions or manipulate other 
design elements. In addition, 5 studies provide their subjects with reputation 
information besides other UI artifact manipulations.
Overall, the influence of respective UI artifacts on trust varies widely between the 
artifacts, whereby the specific design of the UI artifact, also for UI artifacts 
originating from the same category, strongly influences behavior. In addition to the 
insights concerning trusting behavior, we give a comprehensive overview on the 
applied experiment design. This includes information on design parameters such as 
the multiplication factor, the initial endowment, the number of played rounds, the 
matching of players, whether or not roles are changed, the sample size, as well as the 
general framing of the study. Taken as a whole, we contribute to existing literature by 
aggregating and analyzing the most relevant articles on the influences of UI artifacts 
on trust related behavior in the trust game. Our findings may support practitioners in 
developing effective UI artifacts for applications that are based on trust between 
users, such as negotiation support and group decision support systems. For 
experimenters, this review may provide a comprehensive overview of established 
2 http://www.webofscience.com/
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experimental guidelines for future trust game experiments and, hence, support their 
experimental design.
References
1. Hawlitschek, F., Teubner, T., Gimpel, H.: Understanding the Sharing 
Economy - Drivers and Impediments for Participation in Peer-to-Peer Rental. 
In: Proceedings of the 49th Hawaii International Conference on System 
Sciences. pp. 4782–4791 (2016).
2. Pavlou, P.A., Fygenson, M.: Understanding and Predicting Electronic 
Commerce Adoption: An Extension of the Theory of Planned Behavior. MIS 
Q. 30, 115–143 (2006).
3. Gefen, D.: E-commerce: The Role of Familiarity and Trust. Omega. 28, 725–
737 (2000).
4. Mayer, R.C., Davis, J.H., Schoorman, F.D.: An Integrative Model of 
Organizational Trust. Acad. Manag. Rev. 20, 709–734 (1995).
5. Mcknight, D.H., Chervany, N.L.: What Trust Means in E-Commerce 
Customer Relationships: An Interdisciplinary Conceptual Typology. Int. J. 
Electron. Commer. 6, 35–59 (2001).
6. Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., McCabe, K.: Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History. 
Games Econ. Behav. 10, 122–142 (1995).
7. Johnson, N.D., Mislin, A.A.: Trust Games: A Meta-Analysis. J. Econ. 
Psychol. 32, 865–889 (2011).
8. Bente, G., Baptist, O., Leuschner, H.: To Buy or Not to Buy: Influence of 
Seller Photos and Reputation on Buyer Trust and Purchase Behavior. Int. J. 
Hum. Comput. Stud. 70, 1–13 (2012).
9. Eckel, C.C., Petrie, R.: Face Value. Am. Econ. Rev. 101, 1497–1513 (2011).
10. Riedl, R., Mohr, P.N.C., Kenning, P.H., Davis, F.D., Heekeren, H.R.: 
Trusting Humans and Avatars: A Brain Imaging Study Based on Evolution 
Theory. J. Manag. Inf. Syst. 30, 83–114 (2014).
11. Wilson, R.K., Eckel, C.C.: Judging a Book by its Cover: Beauty and 
Expectations in the Trust Game. Polit. Res. Q. 59, 189–202 (2006).
12. Fiedler, M., Haruvy, E.: The Lab Versus the Virtual Lab and Virtual Field-An 
Experimental Investigation of Trust Games with Communication. J. Econ. 
Behav. Organ. 72, 716–724 (2009).
13. Ben-Ner, A., Putterman, L.: Trust, Communication and Contracts: An 
Experiment. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 70, 106–121 (2009).
14. Fiedler, M., Haruvy, E., Li, S.X.: Social Distance in a Virtual World 
Experiment. Games Econ. Behav. 72, 400–426 (2011).
15. Hawlitschek, F., Jansen, L.E., Lux, E., Teubner, T., Weinhardt, C.: Colors and 
Trust: The Influence of User Interface Design on Trust and Reciprocity. Proc. 
49th Hawaii Int. Conf. Syst. Sci. 2016–March, 590–599 (2016).
16. Gefen, D., Benbasat, I., Pavlou, P.: A Research Agenda for Trust in Online 
Environments. J. Manag. Inf. Syst. 24, 275–286 (2008).
17. Gefen, D., Karahanna, E., Straub, D.W.: Trust and TAM in Online Shopping: 
Group Decision and Negotiation – GDN 2017 277
14-18 August 2017, Stuttgart-Hohenheim, Germany
An Integrated Model. MIS Q. 27, 51–90 (2003).
18. McKnight, D.H., Choudhury, V., Kacmar, C.: Developing and Validating 
Trust Measures for e-Commerce: An Intergrative Typology. Inf. Syst. Res. 3, 
334–359 (2002).
19. Grabner-Kräuter, S., Kaluscha, E.A.: Empirical Research in On-line Trust: A 
Review and Critical Assessment. Int. J. Hum. Comput. Stud. 58, 783–812 
(2003).
20. Fehr, E.: On the Economics and Biology of Trust. J. Eur. Econ. Assoc. 7, 
235–266 (2009).
21. Webster, J., Watson, R.T.: Analyszing the Past to Prepare for the Future: 
Writing a Literature Review. MIS Q. 26, 2206–2217 (2002).
22. ACPHIS: Recommended IS Conferences. Australian Council of Professors 
and Heads of Information Systems. Available at: http://www.acphis.org.au/ 
(visited on 03/30/2017) (2013).
23. Bolton, G.E., Katok, E., Ockenfels, A.: How Effective Are Electronic 
Reputation Mechanisms? An Experimental Investigation. Manage. Sci. 50, 
1587–1602 (2004).

Group Decision and Negotiation – GDN 2017 279
14-18 August 2017, Stuttgart-Hohenheim, Germany
M. Schoop and D. M. Kilgour (eds.), Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Group 
Decision and Negotiation, Hohenheim Discussion Papers in Business, Economics and Social 
Sciences, Research Area NegoTrans, 16-2017, University of Hohenheim, Stuttgart, 
2017.
On Experts' Intuition as a Supportive Mechanism
in Negotiations
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Abstract. The problem of negotiations with players grouped accordingly to their 
specific approach to negotiation process is considered. Then the concept of a 
profile of a player introduced by Mastenbroek [1] becomes a part of toolbox for 
strategy construction. Mastenbroek styles’ classification is expanded with 
intuition-based attitude of player. The relevant literature shows that intuition 
occurs in ill structured problems with gaps in information on the problem. We 
introduce a framework embedding in classical negotiation style a description 
which treats intuition as insight-oriented process.
Keywords: negotiation style, experts, intuition, leap of faith, insight
1. The problem and discussion
Negotiation is seen here as a strategic dialogue between two or more parties intended 
to reach a possibly beneficial outcome over one or more conflicting at least one or more 
issues. Negotiation1 depends on information assets. Parties do not possess complete 
information on themselves, therefore they are forced to make immense efforts to learn 
on circumstances important for other parties. There exists information gathered during 
negotiation process.
Parties frequently use consciously a pattern in their actions influencing both an outcome 
and context, called here a strategy. However rising body of research confirms also 
acting in accordance to unconscious patterns – developed due to implicit learning2.
Intuition that is perceived to be mainly developed through implicit learning [2] is found 
to be a source of providing implicit strategy into decision-making [3].
In business or politics negotiation involves mutual discussion and arrangement of the 
terms of a transaction or agreement. These discussions aim at reaching an agreement, 
usually a formal one in this context. Thus negotiations can be considered as formal
debate between people with different aims or intentions. Parties in negotiations remain 
1 For illustration in legal sphere who considers pretrial negotiation case with a plaintiff with 
private information see [4].
2 Implicit learning is considered here as the process by which people acquire knowledge about 
rule-governed complexities of a stimulus environment independently of conscious attempts to do 
so [5].
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in conflicts but they may also internally disagree. Consequently, negotiations can be 
spilt in external and internal negotiations among own side of negotiations.
Research on negotiation tackles important issues related to teamwork, information 
assets, complexity, role of intuition and negotiation styles. Negotiating styles model of 
Mastenbroek is based on the space of negotiation and the set of influence controls
concepts. The space of negotiation consists of mixtures of cooperation and competing
behaviors called a coopetition level and interpreted as willingness to cooperate. The 
level of proactivity consists of avoidance and exploring proportions revealed in 
negotiation behavior.  The set of instrument controls has five dimensions which will be 
labelled persuasion, power, climate, constituency and procedures. Each dimension -
accordingly to the dimension level - collects players’ actions which aim at control of 
negotiation dynamics. Each dimension describes thus sources of control of dynamics 
of negotiating. Hence negotiation problem can be located in space of negotiation with 
coordinates defined – competition and proactiveness levels. Different levels of these 
coordinates correspond to four negotiating styles: ethical, analytical-aggressive, jovial,
flexible-aggressive. The control set can be constructed based on specificity of current 
negotiation problem and negotiation toolbox (assets and skills at disposition) [1].
Intuition in negotiation raised interest in various fields and was investigated from 
different perspectives from psychology and decision science to management. The 
research on role of negotiation shows importance of intuition and encourages to 
consider some findings in proposing negotiation supporting procedures. The research 
proves intuition to affect progress in understanding organizations and propose relevant 
research program [6]. Dane and Pratt [7] explain influence of domain knowledge and 
learning effectiveness of intuition rooted perceptions. Again, they emphasize on 
including intuition and its applications to managerial decision making.
Druckman [8] review of seminal negotiation research focuses on methodological
approaches to conceptualization and studies of negotiation as a vehicle to discover 
appropriate research direction. Consideration of results achieved “at the negotiating 
table, around the table, and away from the table” leads to question for further research 
accordingly to this distinction. Intuition clearly fits this program.
Tsay and Bazerman [9] taking general methodological perspective advocate on 
importance of improvement the “dialog between the descriptive and the prescriptive”
and participation both of academics and practitioners in this interaction. Achievements
in behavioral decision theory merged with conclusions from practical experience can 
explain deviations from rationality in negotiation.
Intuition occurs in ill structured problems and lack of measurable information related 
to the problem. Above mentioned surveys show that intuition is promising direction of 
expansion of classical models. In the framework given below we provide a description 
treating intuition as insight oriented process. This insightful process can be attributed 
not only to personality of player, but also to professional role (culture).
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On a theoretical level, intuition is typically perceived as one of two processing modes 
in a variety of dual-process theories i.e. [10], [11]. The models assume a deliberate 
mode of thinking as a counterpart to the intuitive mode. 
The definition of intuition as „affectively charged judgments that arise through rapid 
non-conscious and holistic associations" [7] encompasses conscious result of 
unconscious processes that occurs in a form of affectively charged judgments (positive 
or negative feeling). The input data of intuition consists of implicit and explicit 
knowledge stored in long-term memory which was acquired through experience. 
Contrary to deliberate thinking, the input data of intuition are processed without 
conscious attention. That makes intuitive judgment to be a fast process [12] which 
allows holistic associations to occur [11]. Finally let us note that it is not gifted -
intuition is a result of - explicit and implicit – learning, e.g. [10], [13].
An issue of identification of experts who equipped with intuition raises. Contrary to 
novices, experts direct a problem-solving process following their intuition. Even 
unsupported intuition leads to insight which becomes explicit support. The Figure 1
below represents how experts use unsupported intuition to gain explicitly supported 
insight they can implement to solve a problem. The moment experts approach a 
problem they have intuition which manifests in a form of a feeling about recognizing a 
familiar pattern experienced before. As intuition is highly based on implicit knowledge, 
it is hard to define why the piece of information recognized by intuition is important. 
That is why, there appear a next unconscious process, called leap of faith3, which 
interprets intuition in terms of explicit knowledge. 
Figure 1 A mix of conscious and unconscious processes in situations of missing data employs
expert intuition to find an anchoring point and a leap of faith to direct the search for solution to 
a problem [14].
Leap of faith [14] doesn’t provide solution but rather indicate where to search for 
solution. The simultaneous conscious and unconscious processes allow to collect 
information towards and beyond leap of faith and to merge them with one’s experience. 
3 Leap of faith is perceived as an interpretation of intuitive judgments that arise from experience 
consistent with perceptions of a current situation [14].
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That results in insight which provides solution to a problem that could be supported 
with collected evidence. Insight allows to find solution when there is not enough data 
to do this by conscious analysis. Experts also are able verify when intuitive path is 
misleading using available information. The necessary condition to be an expert is 
experience and learning ability (needed to study the role of unconscious processes in 
decision-making). Each solved problem enriches collective artificial intuition which 
supports decision-making process not only by experts but also novices.
2. Intuition and negotiation styles
We modify the concept of the space of negotiation [1] by enriching the set of influence 
controls. We supply the coopetition and proactivity axes with intuition. Then we
consider analyses mixtures of intuitive and analytically organized behaviors. More 
precisely we consider as equivalent direction of analyses mixtures of intuitive and 
analytically organized behaviors. It will be convenient to call intuitive fathom level
such a mixture of behaviors and interpret this as measure of intuition driven component 
of negotiation strategy.
This expansion leads to possibility of enriching the set of influence controls. It doesn’t 
raise resistance to note, that actions aimed at influence dimensions - persuasion, power, 
constituency and procedures - can be intuitively supported. The question is related with 
the problem of control of intuitive fathom level. Let us recall here that intuition is 
inseparably linked with unconscious thinking process, see e.g. [7]. The problem raises
how to use assets that we are unaware if it exists and how it determines result. We 
address this issue in the next Section. 
At conceptual level expansion adds to two coordinates – coopetition and proactiveness 
levels – in the negotiations space, the third one - intuitive fathom level. This expands a 
gallery of negotiation styles. Taking bipolar levels of intuitive and analytically 
organized behaviors, we can transform chart of styles presented in [1] to the cube 
presented in Figure 2. Of course, the cube as well as the chart can be split in more parts 
– the Figure 2 illustrates split into two polar positions for each axis. 
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Figure 2. The classical model expands with the third coordinate. This leads to four new styles 
of which three are visualized as vertices A, B, and C of cube. Here A stands for Jovial with 
intuitive interventions style, B represents Analytical-aggressive with intuitive interventions style 
and C - Flexible-aggressive with intuitive interventions style. 
Introduction of intuition enriches description of the process of negotiation, and 
consequently – introduces new possibilities to intervene positively in the process of 
negotiation. New styles are reflected again in attitudes revealed in this process, however 
the issue how to operate with unconscious thinking – raised earlier – requires deeper 
pondering. We discuss this issue to the next section.
3. Artificial intuition in negotiation support
Let us consider strategic thinking in analysis of negotiation problem and strategy. To 
clarify the argument, we consider two concepts. The first one is preference with respect 
to intuitive attitude in analysis versus procedural approach. The second one is intuitive 
potential – the capability to perform intuitive information processing analogously to 
general intelligence introduced by Charles Spearman, see [15]. It can be evaluated 
indirectly through comparison of insights revealed in testing problems demanding 
either intuitive or procedural action.
The problem of abovementioned preference was investigated by [16]. White collar 
employees (n=30) and entrepreneurs (n=30) were surveyed. Both groups operated over 
a year in Health Care, IT or Banking sector. The surveyed white-collar employees had 
no intention to set up their own business what allowed for a clear distinction between 
studied entrepreneurs and employees. There were used 27 statements from KSP 
Questionnaire [17] to measure the preference for intuitive over procedural approach in
decision-making. The survey proved that there is neither intuition nor procedures
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significantly preferred one from another. Moreover, among entrepreneurs who revealed 
the preference there is no correlation between this preference and success in business. 
This result is compatible with a view that intuition is not opposite of deliberation [10].
Thus, intuition and deliberation are two independent dimensions to be considered 
jointly and not excluding one each other [18].
Another interesting finding in this paper is identification of intuitive potential as 
determinant of business success. It appears that potential of entrepreneurs is higher than 
white collar employees. Results show that entrepreneurs provide more solutions in 
series of problems requiring insight (an explicit form of initial intuition). Thus, potential 
of intuition was measurable or at least comparable for different parties. 
Evaluation
Decision making
Advantages Disadvantages
intuitive utilizing unique experience 
and creativity
lack of support of decision 
making process
procedural ability to support decisions 
with data and knowledge on 
relations and connections 
among structure elements
Lack of creativity results 
in relaying only on 
information previously 
introduced by human 
Table 1. Characteristics of pure intuitive and procedural modes in decision-making. The most 
functional decision-making model should arise form mixed modes in the way to maximize their 
advantages and minimize their drawbacks.
We claim that intuitive and procedural decision making should be present 
simultaneously in negotiation. To recommend search for appropriate mix of these two 
modes let us characterize advantages and disadvantages of (intuitive) human and 
(procedural) machine decision-making. They are presented in the Table 1.
This analysis suggests finding strengths of mix of intuitive and procedural modes of 
decision making in creation of ideas and their verification. The process of creation of 
ideas includes problem descriptions, structures and strategy elements and is based on 
players experience and intuition. The process of verification of creative ideas requires 
analyses of all available data and consequences. The appropriate mix negotiation 
support in creation of ideas and their verification is deeply dependent on learning. 
All these postulates - capacity for logic, understanding, self-awareness, learning, 
emotional knowledge, planning, creativity and problem solving – are compatible with 
the definition of intelligence [19]. We aim at presenting a procedure to increase initial 
intelligence through organized process. The result of this process will be named 
artificial negotiating intuition to distinguish from natural skills. More precisely, 
artificial negotiation intuition is more generally described as the ability to perceive 
information, and to retain it as knowledge to be applied towards adaptive negotiation 
behaviors within an environment or context.
In negotiation support three modes of assistance of parties are considered, see e.g. [20].
The first one – arbitrage – assumes moving group decision problem to the external 
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party provided with collected knowledge on the problem under condition of 
confidentiality. Then parties subordinate to decision resulting from the arbitrage. The 
second one – advice – assumes individual expert advice for a party. The third one –
mediation – differs from arbitrage in treatment of mediator’s verdict as 
recommendation only. 
This classification can be supplied with so called artificial intuition. Here the adjective 
artificial emphasizes the fact that parties use in the process not only their own intuition 
but also intuition of a system which is raised from intuitions of all decision-makers.
Even though we propose a procedure for increase of intuition usage (named extended 
advice in the sequel), we keep the term intuition since propositions from a learned 
system result from unsupported intuitions of players. The system allows constant 
development as result of all decisions made by its users. Each recommendation or 
decision enriches the system. It remains intuition driven as the results from artificial 
intuition are not supported by any evidence.
The following procedure leads to creation of artificial intuition in negotiation with 
assistance of experts in the expanded advice mode.
Step 1. Build relevant knowledge repository - acquire available knowledge on the 
problem i.e. structure, details, goals, criteria, constraints etc.
Step 2. Identify experts.4
Step 3. Provide experts with relevant knowledge repository5 and analytical tools.
Step 4. Experts intuitively identify anchoring point for analyses.
Step 5. Experts take leap of faith which interpret the intuitive judgment and provide a 
general direction where to search for a solution.
Step 6. Experts form repository of solutions6.
Step 7. Experts go beyond leap of faith and gain insight with a solution which is 
supported with collected information7.
4 Usual criteria for expert identification include: reputation in the domain based on experience 
and achievements, number of years of experience. Expert supplies experience with record of 
excellent results and individual abilities that facilitated him/her to become expert (i.e. high 
intelligence, creativity, ambition, empathy, positive attitude, strength). On the contrary, novice 
is a person who is new for a given domain and didn’t have time to collect sufficient experience 
to rely on it in their decision-making. There could be novices with a potential to become experts 
and novices who will never become experts.
5 The most complicated decision-making occurs when we have not enough data to provide 
structured analysis. In such situations, experts use their experience e.g. to fill the missing data.
6 Each solved problem is accumulated by a system with information about the role of intuition.
7 To support such decision-making done by experts the system should allow experts to follow 
their analysis with accordance to their intuition and leap of faith but also to verify if the given 
intuition is not misleading.
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Step 8. Experts (or artificial intuition supporting system coordinator) interact with 
parties treating them as novices to communicate and to explain their findings 
(cumulated correct experts’ intuitions and proposals of possible solutions).
If a player - unexperienced novice at starting point - approaches a problem with missing 
data, then she can use cumulated by the system intuitions of experts. Their intuition 
indicates an anchoring point and leap of faith provides direction for further information 
collection and analysis so as to gain insight with a suitable solution. Within this 
approach not only intuition but also analysis is important. 
The introduction of intuition into negotiation analyses allows to consider enriched 
mode of advice. More precisely, we assume that intuition of expert may be used by 
novice players to increase artificial intuition in negotiation. 
4. Concluding remarks
Embedding intuition in the coopetition-proactiveness frame, leads to enrichment of 
variety of negotiating styles. New styles can allow to consider mixes of analytical and 
intuitive attitudes in preparation of negotiation strategies. The question rises whether 
new styles can be used in similar way as styles from the initial, classical set. In classical 
models, styles were treated in two ways. As far the other parties were considered, an
attempt to identify styles of these parties was undertaken to decrease the level of 
uncertainty in forecasting their behaviors. This helped in building negotiation strategy. 
However, own style can be treated as a controllable variable – one can intentionally 
switch e.g. from flexibly aggressive to jovial style. 
Identification and controllability of intuitive component of style was investigated in 
this perspective and remains challenging direction of future research. The first step in 
this direction was made in recalled study where a set of suitable tasks allows to 
distinguish and valuate between impact component of intuitive data processing. This 
approach could be recommended in real life problems to identify own party intuition 
profiles. The easiest way to control proportion of intuition in problem solving would be 
exchange of players in negotiation team. Under assumption that team profile is
identifiable exchange of players with different intuition components will result in 
change of team intuition profile and thus will facilitate change of switching negotiation 
strategy. This can be illustratively compared with situation when defensive tactics of 
football team is switched to attack oriented one in result of replacement of player in 
defense with another one in attack. Switch of negotiating style may increase likelihood 
of leap of faith. The switch should be considered in two different situations, either when 
an anchoring point is identified or when it cannot be identified for very long time. 
Experts who recommend direction of negotiation process (see Figure 1) using concept 
of styles may assist in definition of a toolbox of actions in negotiations in the same way 
as in a traditional approach [1].
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Abstract. The question whether and how initial trust of the negotiators 
develops during negotiations leading to spill-over effects eventually influencing 
negotiation outcomes is important for negotiation research and practice.
Therefore, we present initial results of a negotiation experiment involving 
students from 3 European universities showing effects of initial trust regarding 
ex post trust, outcome effectiveness, efficiency, and satisfaction of the 
negotiators. The trusting beliefs of the negotiator making the first offer exert a 
strong influence on the evolving negotiation.
Keywords: trust, negotiation, Negoisst, efficiency, effectiveness, satisfaction
1 Introduction
Trust is an important aspect in negotiations whatever the domain. When 
negotiators trust each other, they negotiate more cooperatively and information 
sharing is more apparent leading to more effective and efficient agreements [1].
However, business negotiation partners often change and are not always motivated to 
engage in expensive processes of relationship-building [2]. The question remains how 
to create and maintain a trustful relationship with the negotiation partner(s)
effectively.
Numerous approaches have modelled initial trust formation and investigated the 
effect of trust on negotiation outcomes [1, 3]. How trust exactly develops during the 
negotiation process, however, is largely unknown. The current paper analyses trust in 
negotiations following an ex ante and ex post perspective and expecting a spill-over 
effect during the negotiation process. Initial trust is formed before the negotiation and 
then reassessed in continuous trust-related interactions with the negotiation partner
eventually shaping the negotiation outcome. Based on this, our research question is: 
Can high initial trust be beneficial leading to a positive reassessment increasing trust 
of the negotiation partner? To this end, we present a negotiation experiment, 
manipulating initial trust formation of the participants and evaluating the 
aforementioned reassessment as trust spill-over between the negotiators.
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2 Theoretical Background
In the following, we will present a brief state-of-the art of research on initial trust 
formation and trust development. Furthermore, we will apply the concept of trust to 
negotiations and derive our hypotheses, which will be investigated in the remainder of 
this paper.
2.1 State-of-the-Art of Trust Research
Trust is defined as “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of 
another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action 
important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other 
party” [4]. We assess trust as an interpersonal construct emitted by the trustor to a 
trustee and vice versa. Following the model of initial trust formation (cf. Figure 1) by 
McKnight et al. [3, 5] a person’s general disposition to trust is influenced by 
personality traits such as trusting stance defining whether a person is to be treated as 
being trustworthy to maximise gains or to improve the relationship when no further 
information is available. Moreover, cognitive processes assessing the trustee such as 
categorisation processes (i.e. unit grouping, reputation, stereotyping) and illusion of 
control processes (i.e. confirmation of one’s beliefs about trustworthiness) influence 
trust formation. Institution-based trust plays an important role relying on promises, 
regularities, contracts, or guarantees, which create a belief of structural assurance.
Additionally, an assessment whether the current situation is normal and can thus be 
managed leads to institution-based trust. The described factors act as antecedents of 
trust being defined as a combination of trusting beliefs (i.e. beliefs about benevolence, 
competence and honesty of the trustee) and trusting intention, which eventually 
influence trust-related behaviour. 
Figure 1 Initial trust formation model adapted from [3, p.476; 5, p.341]
Investigating possible spill-over effects of trust within groups, it is furthermore 
necessary to model trust development. Trust influences behaviour, which in turn leads 
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to reactions of the trustee eventually providing a reassessment of trusting beliefs and 
intentions [6]. Negotiations enable researchers to analyse the process of trust 
development in a scenario where mutual gains as well as losses are possible coming 
to an agreement or rejection.
2.2 Hypotheses
Trust has been found to affect both decision making and communication in 
negotiations, leading to cooperative negotiation behaviour in cases of high trust or 
competitive negotiation behaviour in cases of low trust [1, 4, 7, 8]. Similarly 
communication behaviour is described to be more cooperative in cases of high 
trusting beliefs. In turn cooperative communication itself increases trusting beliefs.
While repeated interaction between trustor and trustee has been found to lead to the
development of trust on both sides [9, 10], we will focus on the differences of trust 
development between dyadic negotiations with both, only one, or none of the 
negotiators with high trust assessing possible spill-over effects. Trust development is 
measured analysing the difference between ex ante trusting beliefs towards the 
negotiation partner and ex post trusting beliefs towards the negotiation partner (called 
ex ante trust and ex post trust respectively for the remainder of the paper). Regarding 
spill-over, people with high trust are described as having a greater tendency to ignore 
low trust-related behaviour of their partner, whilst people with low trust adapt to high 
trust-related behaviour of their partners [5]. Therefore, we assume negotiations with 
two negotiators exhibiting high ex ante trust to maintain their high trust. In contrast,
negotiations involving negotiators exhibiting mixed ex ante trust show a spill-over 
resulting in a high trust development for the negotiator exhibiting low trust. This spill-
over is assumed to lead to trust levels comparable to those in negotiations where both 
negotiators exhibit high ex ante trust. Negotiation where both negotiators exhibit low 
ex ante trust are assumed to achieve low trust development since spill-over is 
impossible leading to significantly lower ex post trust.
Relating trust development to negotiation outcomes, we hypothesise a positive 
relationship between trust development and individual outcomes [11] as well as joint 
negotiation outcomes [6, 12]. Previous studies report a positive relationship between 
trusting beliefs and outcomes regarding effectiveness [13] and efficiency [14].
Effectiveness in negotiations is measured analysing agreement rates, while efficiency 
is measured using individual or joint utilities representing achievement of preferences.
As negotiation outcomes are positively related to negotiators’ satisfaction [15], we 
consequently hypothesise, that high ex post trust leads to increased satisfaction with 
the negotiation. To summarise:
H1: Negotiations involving one or two negotiators with high ex ante trust achieve 
higher ex post trust compared to negotiations involving two negotiators with low ex 
ante trust.
H2a: Negotiations involving one or two negotiators with high ex ante trust achieve 
higher individual utility compared to negotiations involving two negotiators with low 
ex ante trust.
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H2b: Negotiation dyads involving one or two negotiators with high ex ante trust
achieve higher agreement rates compared to negotiation dyads involving two
negotiators with low ex ante trust.
H2c: Negotiation dyads involving one or two negotiators with high ex ante trust
achieve higher joint utility compared to negotiation dyads involving two negotiators 
with low ex ante trust.
H3: Negotiations involving one or two negotiators with high ex ante trust achieve 
higher satisfaction compared to negotiations involving two negotiators with low ex 
ante trust.
Figure 2 summarises the described constructs and relationships. Initial trust is 
based on the model by McKnight et al. and is manipulated regarding institution-based 
trust and cognitive processes (dashed lines). Initial trust shapes trust development 
during negotiations as well as negotiation outcomes and satisfaction. Solid lines 
represent our proposed hypotheses.
Figure 2 Constructs and Hypotheses
3 Experimental Design
We conducted an international electronic bilateral multi-issue negotiation via the
negotiation support system Negoisst [16, 17].
The simulation case used is about student members of an international student 
association (ISA). The participants needed to negotiate five issues concerning the 
organisation of ISA’s 50th anniversary event. They were provided with a general case 
description, private information (which varied according to the trust manipulation), 
and private preference information. The case was designed to enable the participants 
to follow a cooperative strategy (i.e. to maximise joint utility and minimise contract 
imbalance) or a competitive strategy (i.e. to maximise individual utility). The best 
negotiator will be awarded a job offer at ISA.
The negotiation was conducted via Negoisst which follows a holistic support 
paradigm providing decision support, communication support, and document 
management. Decision support plays an important role in this simulation because it 
provides individual utilities for each offer and counteroffer. To get to know individual 
utilities of the counterpart ,joint utility, and contract imbalance, participants could
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either try to estimate the negotiation partner’s individual utility or ask for it in case of 
high trust.
The pre-questionnaire assessed the participants’ disposition to trust [5] performing
a confirmatory factor analysis. Using a median-split, participants were grouped into 
two treatments reflecting 92 participants with high disposition to trust (H), and 91
participants with low disposition to trust (L) (N = 183, Mdn. = 3.3675, SD = 0.62, 
Min. = 1.64, Max. = 4.52).
After the assignment to a treatment, trust disposition was amplified by 
manipulation providing second hand information about the reputation of the 
negotiation partner (e.g. H: The negotiation partner’s previous projects have been 
successful; negotiation partner is a team player and very cooperative; L: The 
negotiation partner is stubborn, has a competitive attitude and strong self-focus) and 
by focusing on unit-grouping (e.g. H: Both negotiators are ISA members; negotiator 
has positive experiences with ISA members; they are very reliable, competent, and 
professional; L: Negotiation partner is student at another university; negative 
experiences with ISA members at a different university; they behave like self-
exposers, try to achieve their optimal outcome, neglect the overall project goals, are 
idiots and fools). Moreover, we manipulated the structural assurance belief as part of 
the institution-based trust (H: e.g. Participant is pleased with the selection criteria; 
transparent, rigorous and performance-based application process; the application 
process is controlled by a neutral committee; L: Application process is non-
transparent; rumours about unqualified applicants entered the simulation; students 
might have intensively used their contacts to leading ISA members; participant 
worries that winner will not be picked based on the evaluation criteria). After the 
manipulation, participants were assigned to the treatment groups following a two-by-
two-design shown in table 1.
Table 1 Treatment groups
Treatments High Trust Low Trust
High Trust
Low Trust
HH dyads
LH dyads
HL dyads
LL dyads
The HL and LH dyads were further distinguished according to the person wiring 
the first message: (1) L in LL: low ex ante trust for both negotiators; (2) L in LH:
negotiator with low ex ante trust writes first message; (3) H in LH: negotiator with 
high ex ante trust writes the first message; (4) L in HL: negotiator with low trusting 
beliefs writes the first message; (5) H in HL: negotiator with high trusting beliefs 
writes the first message; and (6) H in HH: high trusting beliefs for both negotiators.
After the negotiations ended, substantial outcomes are investigated including 
individual utility and joint utility [18]. Also the post-questionnaire assesses ex post
trust [18] and satisfaction of the negotiators [19].
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4 Results
In the following we present descriptive results providing external validity to our 
dataset eventually evaluating the proposed hypotheses. All psychometric measures are 
assessed on a 7-point-Likert-scale using means to reflect constructs based on several 
items.
4.1 Descriptive Results
A total of 215 students – 125 of them graduate students - from three European 
universities in Austria, Germany, and the Netherlands studying Management, 
Information Systems, Communication and Information Sciences, and Engineering
participated in the study. Participants were matched into negotiation dyads including 
two negotiators from different universities leading to a dataset of 142 individuals (36
L in LL, 14 L in LH, 13 H in LH, 18 L in HL, 19 H in HL, 35 H in HH, 71 female, 
MAge = 24.29 years, SDAge = 3.12) respectively 54 negotiation dyads after data 
cleaning (14 LL, 10 LH, 16 HL, 14 HH).
45 out of 54 negotiations concluded with an agreement leading to an agreement 
rate of 83.3%. Further investigations on negotiation agreements show an average 
individual utility of 54.15% (SD = 7.06%, Min = 31%, Max. = 82.26%), an average 
joint utility of 107.67% (SD = 6.61%, Min. 90%, Max. 113%), and an average 
contract imbalance of 7.76% (SD = 8.12%) ranging from a completely fair 
negotiation agreement with 0% to 34%. Cronbach’s alpha of all constructs under 
investigation remains between 0.884 and 0.943 showing good construct validity [20].
The experimental manipulation worked as planned amplifying general trust 
disposition with regards to institution-based trust and cognitive processes. On average 
negotiators with low trust disposition had significantly lower institution-based trust
(M = 4.30, SD = 0.80) compared to negotiators with high trust disposition (M = 5.08, 
SD = 0.58, t(121.15) = -6.569, p < 0.001). The same effect is prevalent for negotiators 
with low trust disposition having significantly lower ex ante trust (M = 4.02, SD = 
0.13) compared to negotiators with high trust disposition (M = 4.65, SD = 0.88, t(137) 
= -3.37, p < 0.001).
4.2 Hypotheses
Regarding hypothesis 1, we expected a difference in ex post trust between 
negotiation dyads where high trusting negotiators are involved (HH, HL, and LH)
compared to dyads involving solely low trusting negotiators (LL).
ANOVA shows a significant effect of the treatment groups on ex post trust (F(5, 
129) = 3.212, p = 0.009, r = 0.111). To investigate hypothesis 1, planned contrasts 
were used comparing the treatment groups in detail revealing that negotiators with 
low ex ante trust differ neither in the LH group (M. = 3.95, t(129) = -1.940, p = 0.055, 
r = 0.168) nor in the HL group (M. = 5.01, t(129) = 1.390, p = 0.167 r = 0.122)
regarding ex post trust compared to negotiations with low ex ante trust only (LL, M = 
4.59). Therefore, hypothesis 1 cannot be supported. However, post-hoc analysis 
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reveals an effect of who makes the first offer showing a difference regarding ex post 
trust between L in LH and L in HL negotiators. If the high trusting negotiator writes 
the first message there is a significantly higher ex post trust (M = 5.01, SD= 1.04)
compared to if the low trusting negotiator writes the first message (M = 3.95, SD =
1.05, t(30) = -2.840, p = 0.008, r = 0.460).
Regarding hypothesis 2a, analyses performed using ANOVA show no significant 
effect of the treatment groups on individual utility (F(5, 106) = 1.978, p < 0.088, r =
0.085). Again planned contrasts were used to compare treatment groups with mixed
ex ante trust to treatment group with equally high ex ante trust revealing no 
significant difference (t(106) = 1.962, p = 0.052, r = 0.187). However, analysing each 
treatment separately, the treatment group HL including negotiators with high trust 
making the first offer to low trusting negotiators achieved significantly lower 
individual utilities compared to HH negotiations (H in HH: M. = 56.93%, H in HL:
M. = 52.05%, t(106) = 2.348, p = 0.021, r = 0.222 respectively L in HL M. = 52.72%, 
t(106) = 1.993, p = 0.049, r = 0.190). Comparing the LL treatment to all others 
showed no significant differences regarding individual utility (t(106) = 1.457, p =
0.148, r = 0.140). Only direct comparison of negotiations with two low trusting 
negotiators to negotiations with two high trusting negotiators revealed a significant 
difference in resulting individual outcomes (MLL. = 52%, MHH. = 56.93%, t(106) =
2.507, p = 0.014, r = 0.237). Therefore, hypothesis 2a cannot be confirmed. However, 
the data shows tendencies, that negotiators with low trusting beliefs achieve higher 
individual utility in mixed negotiations than negotiators with high trusting beliefs.
Regarding hypothesis 2b, there is a significant medium association between the 
treatment groups and reaching a negotiation agreement (Ȥ2(3) = 7.406, p = 0.050,
Cramer’s V = 0.370). LL negotiations exhibit the lowest agreement rate of 63.3%, 
followed by HH negotiations (78.6%). Mixed treatments achieved the highest 
agreement rates (LH: 90%, HL: 100%). Therefore, we can confirm hypothesis 2b
showing that negotiations involving two negotiators with low ex ante trust achieve 
less agreements than negotiations with one or two high trusting negotiators.
Regarding hypothesis 2c, a Kruskal-Wallis test is conducted showing a significant 
effect of our treatments on joint utility (H(3) = 9.180, p = 0.027). Visual inspection 
confirms our initial considerations showing that LL negotiations achieve worse results 
compared to negotiations involving negotiators with high ex ante trust (LH, HH),
while HL negotiators perceive even worse than LL negotiators. Follow-up Mann-
Whitney tests indicate, that HH negotiations achieved significantly higher joint utility 
compared to LL negotiations (MHH. = 111.73%, MLL. = 106.11%, U = 20.50, p = 
0.022, r = -0.511). However, HL negotiations violate our assumptions achieving the 
lowest joint utilities of all treatments showing a significant difference to HH 
negotiations (MHH. = 111.73%, MHL. = 104.44%, U = 35.50, p = 0.007, r = -0.510).
Therefore, hypothesis 2c cannot be confirmed.
Hypothesis 3 assumes a relationship between ex ante trust reflected in our 
treatments and satisfaction with the negotiation [15]. ANOVA reveals a significant 
effect of the treatments on negotiators’ satisfaction (F(5, 129) = 3.515, p = 0.005, r = 
0.120) representing our initial considerations that negotiations involving two low 
trusting negotiators (LL) achieve lowest satisfaction, while negotiations involving two
(HH) or at least one high trusting negotiator (LH and HL) exhibit increased 
satisfaction levels. Further comparisons displayed no significant differences between 
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HH, HL, and LH treatments. Instead the LL treatment was significantly different to 
the remaining groups (t(129) = 3.478, p = 0.01, r = 0.293). Therefore, we can confirm 
hypothesis 3.
5 Discussion and Outlook
The present study describes a negotiation experiment investigating the research 
question, whether highly trusting behaviour leads to a positive reassessment and spill-
over of trust during the negotiation process by comparing ex ante and ex post 
variables such outcome effectiveness and satisfaction of the negotiators. While 
negotiations involving two negotiators with high ex ante trust consistently perform 
better than negotiations involving two negotiators with low ex ante trust regarding all 
variables of interest, we cannot confirm spill-over effects in our mixed treatment 
groups. Trust spill-over can be observed increasing outcome effectiveness (H2b) as 
well as satisfaction (H3). Furthermore, tendencies show that the negotiator who
makes the first offer influences trust reassessment of the negotiation partner
increasing ex post trust (H1), albeit decreasing outcome efficiency (H2a, H2c). In 
contrast, low trusting negotiators are observed to achieve more efficient negotiation 
outcomes. One possible interpretation is that a negotiator with high ex ante trust 
making the first offer causes a spill-over and the negotiators focus on achieving an 
agreement. If a negotiator with low ex ante trust makes the first offer, no spill-over 
occurs leading to less effective but more efficient bargaining.
The present study also poses several challenges such as continuous interaction, which
has been found to increase trust [9, 10]. This effect was also observed in our data
(Mex_ante_trust = 4.41, SDex_ante_trust = 1.08, Mex_post_trust = 4.71, SDex_post_trust = 1.13). This 
might diminish the effects of the manipulation over the course of the negotiations.
These limitations directly lead us to the next steps of research. To further investigate 
the link between ex ante trust, trusting behaviour in negotiations, and ex post trust, the 
processual character of trust development needs to be brought into focus. Therefore, 
negotiation behaviour will be analysed w.r.t. concessions (using standardised 
interpolated path analysis [21]) as well as communication behaviour (performing 
qualitative content analysis). Through those additional consideration of procedural 
trust development in future research and taking into account the measured ex ante 
investigation presented above, the research circle can be closed so that a holistic
approach can be achieved. This will further disentangle the complex relationship 
surrounding trust spill-over investigating the behavioural link between trust and 
negotiation outcomes.
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Abstract. There are several MCDM methods attempting to elicit criteria weights 
ranging from direct rating and point allocation methods to more elaborated ones. 
To facilitate the weight elicitation, some of the approaches utilise elicitation 
methods whereby prospects are ranked using ordinal importance information
while others use cardinal information. In this paper, we explore simplified models
mixing cardinal and ordinal statements and demonstrate which of them are more 
efficient than established methods. It turns out that weights are much more 
insensitive to cardinality than values, which has implications for all ranking 
methods.
Keywords: Multi-criteria decision analysis; Surrogate criteria weights; The CAR 
method; Simplifying rank order.
1   Introduction
One of the problems with the additive model as well as other MCDA models is that 
numerically precise information is seldom available, and most decision-makers 
experience difficulties with entering realistic information when analysing decision 
problems. For instance, Barron and Barrett [1] argue that the elicitation of exact weights 
demands an exactness which does not exist. There are other problems, such as that ratio 
weight procedures are difficult to accurately employ due to response errors [2].
The utilisation of ordinal or imprecise importance information to determine criteria 
weights is a way of handling this problem, and some authors have suggested surrogate 
weights as representative numbers assumed to represent the most likely interpretation 
of the preferences expressed by a decision-maker or a group of decision-makers. One 
such type is derived from ordinal importance information [1,3,4], where decision-
makers supply ordinal information on importance and the information is then
subsequently converted into surrogate weights corresponding to the extracted ordinal 
information. Often used methods are rank sum weights (RS) [5], rank reciprocal 
weights (RR) [5], and centroid weights (ROC) [6]. For instance, [1] introduced a 
process utilising systematic simulations for validating the selection of criteria weights,
when generating surrogate weights as well as “true” reference weights. It also 
investigated how well the result of using surrogate numbers matches the result of using 
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the “true” numbers. This is however heavily dependent on the distribution used for 
generating the weight vectors.
Fig. 1. The group decision tool Decision Wizard 
We have earlier investigated various aspects of this in a couple of articles and 
compared state-of-the-art weight methods, both ordinal (ranking only) [7,8] and 
cardinal (with the possibilities to express strength) [9-11] in order to devise methods 
requiring as little cognitive load as possible. We also used these together with ranked 
values (utilities) and suggested a multi-stakeholder decision method that has been 
applied in, e.g., [10]. This method fulfils several desired robustness properties and is 
comparatively stable under reasonable assumptions. Figure 1 shows of a multi-criteria 
multi-stakeholder tool (POLA) developed for group decisions regarding infrastructure 
policy making in Swedish municipalities, using the CAR method of [11]. The values 
(utilities) of each alternative under each criterion is assessed by experts in the respective 
fields. Each stakeholder group will then order the criteria in terms of importance using 
cardinal ranking possibilities. The final evaluation then sees a combination of the 
stakeholders’ assessments, either directly or via a set of stakeholder weights for the 
purpose of sensitivity analyses. The underlying method in all stages is the CAR method. 
An observation during the use of POLA has been the inability of the stakeholder groups 
to express cardinality (similar to white cards in the Simos method), which spurred the 
investigation into even simpler means of expressing importance for stakeholders.
In this article, we take steps towards decreasing the cognitive load even further while 
still maintaining decision power and measure the effects of decreasing the load in 
different ways. Not least in multi-stakeholder decision situations, where different 
groups express different assessments (i.e. rank criteria and/or alternatives differently), 
there is a need to express these assessments with simple yet powerful expressions. In 
that sense, this is a follow-up study to [11] and other results presented at GDN 
conferences and we will for lack of space refer to those studies rather than repeating 
the methods and results in the earlier studies. 
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2 Surrogate Weight Methods
The crucial issue in all these methods is how to assign surrogate weights while losing 
as little information as possible. Providing ordinal rankings of criteria seems to avoid 
some of the difficulties associated with the elicitation of exact numbers. It puts fewer 
demands on decision-makers and is thus, in a sense, effort-saving. Furthermore, there 
are techniques for handling ordinal rankings with various success. A limitation of this 
is naturally that decision-makers usually have more knowledge of the decision situation 
than a pure criteria ordering, often in the sense that they have an idea regarding 
importance relation information containing strengths. In such cases, the surrogate 
weights may be an unnecessarily weak representation. Thus, we have also investigated 
whether the methods can be extended to accommodate information regarding relational 
strengths as well. This while still preserving the property of being less demanding and 
hence more practically useful than other types of methods. One well-known class of 
methods is the SMART family. The criteria are ranked and then 10 points are assigned 
to the weight of the least important criterion (wN). Then, the remaining weights (wN-1
through w1) are given points according to the decision-maker’s preferences. The overall 
value E(aj) of alternative aj is then a weighted average of the values vij associated with 
aj (Eq. 1):
ܧ൫ ௝ܽ൯ =
σ ௪೔௩೔ೕ
ಿ
೔సభ
σ ௪೔
ಿ
೔సభ
   (1) 
The most utilised processes for converting ordinal input to cardinal use automated 
procedures and yield exact numeric weights. For instance, [12] proposed the 
SMARTER method for eliciting ordinal information on importance before converting 
it to numbers, thus relaxing information input demands on the decision-maker. An 
initial analysis is carried out where the weights are ordered such as w1 > w2 > ... > wN
and then subsequently transformed to numerical weights using ROC weights and then
SMARTER continues in the same manner as the ordinary SMART method.
The probably most well-known ratio scoring method is the Analytic Hierarchy 
Process (AHP). The basic idea of the AHP-process requires the same pairwise 
comparisons regardless of scale type. For each criterion, the decision-maker should first 
find the ordering of the alternatives from the best to the worst. Next, he or she should 
find the strength of the ordering by considering pairwise ratios (pairwise relations) 
between the alternatives using the integers 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 to express their relative 
strengths, indicating that one alternative is equally good as another (strength = 1) or 
three, five, seven, or nine times as good. It is also allowed to use the even integers 
2, 4, 6, and 8 as intermediate values, but using only odd integers is more common. As 
an alternative, we have in [11] suggested the CAR method and shown that this is a more 
efficient method than methods from the SMART family and AHP.
2.1 Strength of Weights
In order to make an ordinal ranking of N criteria into a stronger ranking, we add 
information about how much more or less important the criteria are compared to each 
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other. Following [11], we use the following notation for the strength of the rankings 
between criteria as well as a suggestion for an intuitive verbal interpretation of these1:
>0 equally important
>1 slightly more important
>2 more important (clearly more important)
>3 much more important
While being more cognitively demanding than ordinal weights, these are still less 
demanding than, for example, AHP weight ratios or point scores like. In an analogous 
manner as for ordinal rankings, the decision-maker statements can be converted into 
weights.
2.2 Preference Strength Methods
Analogous to the ordinal weight functions above, counterparts using the concept of 
preference strength can straightforwardly be derived. 
1. Assign an ordinal number to each importance scale position, starting with the 
most important position as number 1. 
2. Let the total number of importance scale positions be Q. Each criterion i has 
the position p(i)  {1,…,Q} on this importance scale, such that for every two 
adjacent criteria ci and ci+1, whenever ܿ௜ >௦೔ ܿ௜ ାଵ, si = | p(i+1) – p(i) |. The 
position p(i) then denotes the importance as stated by the decision-maker.
Thus, Q is equal to Ȉsi + 1, where i = 1,…,Ní1 for N criteria.
Then the cardinal counterparts to the ordinal ranking methods above can be found by 
using the results from [10], where the ordinal SR weights were given by Eq. 2
ݓ௜
ୗୖ =
ଵ
௜ൗ ା
ಿశభష೔
ಿ
σ ௪ೕ
౏౎ಿ
ೕసభ
   (2) 
and using steps 1–3 above, the corresponding preference strength SR weights (CSR,
Eq. 3) are obtained as 
ݓ௜
ୌୖ =
ଵ
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ା
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   (3) 
Using the idea of importance steps, ordinal weight methods in general are easily 
generalised to their respective counterparts. In the same manner, values (or utilities) 
can be assessed, either ordinally (ranking only) or cardinally (additionally expressing 
strength). 
1 Of course, this is not intended to be totally normative. Any interpretation is possible and can be formally 
handled in the same way.
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Already in [11], we combined cardinal weights with cardinal values into the CAR 
method and assessed the method by simulations as well as a large number of user cases. 
The CAR method was found to outperform SMART and AHP in terms of performance 
and the ease of use (the cognitive load), but some of the users still wanted a method 
with even less cognitive load so we tried to satisfy this while still preserving reasonable 
requirements of correctness. 
The CAR method follows the three-step procedure presented below [from 11]. First, 
the values of the alternatives under each criterion are elicited in a way similar to the 
weights described above:
1A. For each criterion in turn, rank the alternatives from the worst to the best 
outcome. 
1B. Enter the strength of the ordering. The strength indicates how strong the 
separation is between two ordered alternatives. Similar to weights, the strength 
is expressed in the notation with ‘>i’ symbols. 
Second, the weights are elicited with a swing-like procedure in accordance with the 
discussion above. 
2A. For each criterion in turn, rank the importance of the criteria from the least to the 
most important. 
2B. Enter the strength of the ordering. The strength indicates how strong the 
separation is between two ordered criteria. The strength is expressed in the 
notation with ‘>i’ symbols. 
Third, the usual weighted overall value is calculated by multiplying the centroids of the 
weight simplex with the centroid of the alternative value simplex. 
The same description can be used to introduce the three candidate methods called 
C+O, O+C, and O+O depending on whether a cardinal or ordinal procedure is used for 
the representation of weights and values respectively. In the original CAR method all 
the steps 1A, 1B, 2A, 2B, and 3 were performed in that order. The steps in the three 
candidate methods that we suggest are performed as follows: In O+C, step 1B is 
omitted, resulting in the sequence 1A, 2A, 2B, and 3 in order. In C+O, step 2B is 
omitted instead, resulting in the sequence 1A, 1B, 2A, and 3 in order. Finally, in O+O, 
both steps 1B and 2B are omitted, resulting in the sequence 1A, 2A, and 3 in order.
We will, in the next section, compare these CAR derivatives in search for a method 
with less cognitive load but still performing better than SMART and AHP. This is, to 
our knowledge, the first time ordinal and cardinal ranking methods (and combinations 
thereof) have been compared systematically in this way.
3 Assessment of Models for Weights
We will utilize similar techniques as in the simulation studies [8-11] and others for 
determining the adequacy of the methods suggested above. The assumption in all these 
is that all elicitation is made relative to a weight distribution held by the decision-maker. 
The basic idea is that decision-makers’ mind-sets should be reflected by the random 
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generator for generating test vectors, but all such machinery is then depending on the 
underlying distribution of the random generator, which must be taken into account.
Thus, the evaluation of MCDM methods in this paper will follow the procedure 
described in [8-11] in order to find the most efficient method.
3.1 Comparing Six MCDA Methods
We will compare the three methods SMART, AHP, and CAR, which were compared 
in [11], together with three new candidate methods (O+C, C+O, and O+O), i.e., the
scaled-down versions of CAR as described above, in order to look for methods that are 
cognitively less demanding while still yielding powerful results. Remember that the
CAR method consists of cardinally ranking weights and also cardinally ranking values.2
The three candidate methods are composed as follows: O+C and O+O use ordinal SR 
weights while C+O and CAR use cardinal CSR weights. Further, CAR and O+C use 
cardinally ranked values while C+O and O+O use a pure ordinal ranking of the values 
(such as v12 > v14 > v11 > …). 
3.2 Simulations
The simulations were carried out with a varying number of criteria and alternatives. 
There were four numbers of criteria N = {3, 6, 9, 12} and four numbers of alternatives 
M = {3, 6, 9, 12} in the simulation study, creating a total of 16 simulation scenarios. 
Each scenario was run 10 times, each time with 10,000 trials, yielding a total of 
1,600,000 decision situations generated. An N-variate joint Dirichlet distribution was 
employed to generate the random weight vectors for the simulations as well as a
standard normalised random weight generator, see [11] for details. Unscaled value 
vectors were generated uniformly since no significant differences were observed with 
other value distributions. The value vectors were then used for multiplying with the 
obtained weights in order to form weighted values to be compared. 
The results of the simulations are shown in Tables 1 below, which shows a subset of 
the results with a selection of pairs (N,M). The measure of success is the hit ratio, i.e. 
the number of times the highest evaluated alternative using a particular method 
coincides with the true highest alternative. The tables thus show the hit frequency for 
the three MCDA methods SMART3, AHP4, and CAR together with the three 
candidates.
It is clear from Table 1 that among the established methods, the CAR method 
outperforms the other methods. While CAR averages 87%, the other two well-known 
methods perform at around 80-81%. For example, in Table 2, CAR displays better 
overall ranking compared to the other methods. We know from [11] that the other two
well-known methods fare about equal, with SMART being somewhat stronger when 
fewer alternatives are involved and AHP being somewhat stronger when more 
2 In the terminology in this paper, it could have been called C+C but we retain the name it is more widely 
known under.
3 SMART is represented by the improved SMARTER version by [12].
4 AHP weights were derived by forming quotients wi/wj and rounding to the nearest odd integer. Also 
allowing even integers in between yielded no significantly better results. 
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alternatives are involved. This is not surprising since a very large amount of information 
is requested for AHP’s pairwise comparisons when the number of criteria and 
alternatives increases. The gap up to CAR for both of the other methods is substantial 
considering the relatively high hit rate level that the methods operate at. In Table 1, 
using an N–1-generator, this can be seen while the candidate methods fare both better 
and worse than the established ones.
In Table 1, the established methods yield results as expected and in accordance with 
[11]. An interesting pattern emerges between the candidate methods. The method O+C 
that kept cardinality in the values perform rather well while the ones (C+O and O+O) 
that only use ordinal values perform worse than SMART and AHP regardless of using
cardinal weights or not.
Table 1. The winner frequency for the methods 
Combined SMART AHP CAR O+C C+O O+O 
3 | 3 87.8 84.0 91.9 88.4 84.3 81.8 
3 | 12 72.2 82.5 85.8 79.4 74.6 71.3 
6 | 6 81.4 79.6 88.0 83.6 75.7 73.6 
6 | 12 74.5 81.0 85.6 79.9 73.7 70.8 
9 | 9 78.9 80.2 85.1 81.6 73.5 71.9 
12 | 3 85.7 76.3 89.3 88.4 82.1 81.6 
12 | 12 77.6 81.0 82.7 80.6 72.1 71.3 
The CAR method performed the best overall as expected. But the interesting 
observations are made among the other candidates. One of the candidates, O+C, does 
perform better than all other methods except CAR. It puts a considerably less 
demanding cognitive load on the decision-maker by only requiring cardinality in the 
values, not the preference weights, making it a very attractive alternative. Its efficiency 
is due to the performance of the ordinal SR weights (Eq.3) originally developed in [8].
4 Concluding Remarks
Elicitation methods available today in MCDM are often too cognitively demanding for 
normal real-life decision-makers and there is a clear need for weighting methods that 
do not require formal decision analysis knowledge. We have investigated several
methods, including state-of-the-art approaches for asserting surrogate weights with the 
possibility to supply information regarding preference strength and for assigning values 
to consequences by ranking them. It is known from [11] that the CAR method 
outperforms both SMART and AHP, but all these are still considered to be difficult for 
some decision makers. In search for a method with even less cognitive demand than 
CAR, three candidates have been put forward. One stood the test, performing better 
than the benchmark methods SMART and AHP. This new method is similar to CAR in 
assessing values but use only ordinal ranking of the preference weights. The choice 
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between cardinal and ordinal ranking in the weights has an impact on efficiency, but 
much less than the values. The focus on cardinally ranking weights is misplaced, it 
should be on values instead. This, of course, has implication for other cardinal ranking 
methods such as Macbeth as well.
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Abstract. Dictator games model situations where one person decides
how to allocate payoﬀs between himself/herself and others. Such situa-
tions diﬀer with respect to whether a given person is either exclusively
on the dictating or receiving end, or whether he/she assumes both roles
at the same time. In the former (non-interactive) situation, the decision
of the dictator is determined by his distributional preferences alone, in-
dependently of others’ decisions. The optimal allocation is generically
intermediate, keeping some and giving some. In the latter (interactive)
situation, one person’s distribution choice depends on that of somebody
else, and decisions are interactive so that non-trivial Nash equilibria exist.
Generically, the resulting Nash equilibria are unique and characterized
by extremal payments, where at least one of the players allocates either
all or nothing to the other. This report on ongoing reasearch summa-
rizes our theoretical analyses of these two situations and highlights key
diﬀerences.
Keywords: Dictator games, CES utility functions, Distributional pref-
erences, Social preferences
JEL Classiﬁcation: A13, C72, D01, D64
1 Introduction
Dictator games, and their generalizations, are situations where one player de-
cides how to allocate money between himself and a recipient. Such games are
used to measure players’ distributional and social preferences with important
implications for human behavior in games in general, and, in particular, for
cooperating, donating, negotiating, helping, etc.
In the original formulation of a dictator game [11], the dictator decides how
to split a pie of ﬁxed size. In the generalized/modiﬁed dictator game, the prize
 This extended abstract reports on recent progress from ongoing work, which we
intend to make available soon, see [8]. We thank Kurt Ackermann, Raymond Fis-
man, Matthew Jackson, Tatyana Kovalenko, Ryan Murphy, Matthew Polisson, Henri
Ra¨stas and Stefan Wehrli for help and stimulating discussions. Nax acknowledges
support by the European Commission through the ERC Advanced Investigator
Grant ‘Momentum’ (Grant No. 324247).
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of redistribution p varies, that is, for every piece π of his pie that the dictator
does not allocate to himself the recipient gets p times π.
From a narrowly selﬁsh perspective, the dictator maximizes his payoﬀ by
allocating everything to himself and nothing to the recipient, independent of
p. Nevertheless, starting with [11], various controlled laboratory experiments
have shown that humans typically allocate positive amounts to the recipient,
because individuals value the distribution of payoﬀs more broadly than just with
respect to their own material beneﬁt. The seminal study by Andreoni and Miller
[3] and various extensions (e.g. [7, 6, 5]) have considered individual allocation
decisions in multiple games (with various p’s). Using the generalized axiom of
revealed preferences (GARP), these decisions are ﬁtted by utility functions of
the constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) family.3 As a result, a classiﬁcation
of individual preferences with respect to trade-oﬀs of self-interest vs. altruism as
well as equality vs. eﬃciency emerges.
2 Dictator Games as Proper Games
In this report on ongoing research, we point out an important aspect that con-
cerns the nature of the underlying interaction that needs to be taken into con-
sideration when performing such analyses. Namely, it is of crucial importance to
distinguish between the following two types of (generalized) dictator games:
Non-interactive dictator games. The dictator’s decision alone fully deter-
mines both his and the recipient’s monetary payoﬀ. Importantly, the dictator
is no one’s recipient, and the recipient is no one’s dictator. In game-theoretic
terms, this dictator game is not a proper game (i.e. it is degenerate), as
decisions do not depend on each other. Hence, the analysis of this class of
games reduces to decision-theoretic analysis.
Interactive dictator games. Each player assumes both roles, the role of a
dictator and the role of a recipient, at the same time. Hence, each player’s
total monetary payoﬀ is determined by (i.) the payment he receives from
‘his’ dictator and (ii.) the amount he keeps and does not give to ‘his’ recipi-
ent. Such games require a full game-theoretical analysis as they are proper,
simultaneous-action, ‘decomposed’ [13] games with non-trivial Nash equilib-
ria.
Figure 1 illustrates these diﬀerent settings. In this report, we focus on the 2-
player case, where both players are each other’s dictator and recipient at the
same time. However, note that the interactive dictator game may involve two or
more than two players: a speciﬁc player’s recipient may but need not be also his
dictator. In principle, a dictator game is interactive as long as each dictator is
3 GARP goes back to Samuelson [16], CES functions to Solow [17], and the method
of estimating preferences to Afriat [1, 2]; see also [4]. A recent overview of the cor-
responding literature can be found in [9]. Other, simpler approaches to interpret
decisions in dictator games include, for example, the ‘ring measure’ from social psy-
chology [12, 14, 15].
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also the recipient of someone (else), who is the recipient of someone (else), etc.
– as long as this ‘loop’ closes. Analysis of the more general, > 2-player case is
left for the full paper.
Fig. 1. (I) The dictator’s own material payoﬀ depends only on how much he keeps,
and the recipient’s material payoﬀ depends only on how much the dictator gives. (II)
Each player is both, the other player’s dictator and recipient. Hence, a player’s material
payoﬀ depends on how much he keeps (as he is a dictator) and on how much he receives
(as he is also a recipient).
In the real world, there are many examples for both kinds of situations. When
making a donation, for example, we can think of this decision as a non-interactive
one: while one’s own donation may depend on others’ donations (to the same
recipient), this decision does not depend on any decision taken by the recipient
himself. Exchanging gifts, by contrast, is more naturally described interactively,
as the gift one makes may depend on the gift one receives.
In the economic laboratory, dictator game experiments have been conducted
both in interactive and non-interactive settings. Importantly, existing analyses
of interactive implementations have not considered the kind of interactive in-
terpretation that we propose here. In principle, whether or not an interactive
dictator game is indeed viewed as such may depend on the circumstances: if an
individual assumes both the role of a dictator and that of a recipient but ignores
the latter –e.g. because he is framed accordingly– then he will play as if the
game was non-interactive. An empirical investigation of dictator game decisions
in interactive settings in order to test the new theoretic predictions reported
here is part of the ongoing research of the authors.
3 Results
In this report, we restrict ourselves to a semi-formal discussion of results regard-
ing optimal allocation decisions for both types –interactive and non-interactive–
of (generalized) dictator games. A mathematical treatment is given in the full
paper (including the general N -player case), where also we also present a re-
analysis of recent experiments that corroborate our ﬁndings.
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In our analysis, as is one of the standard assumptions [10], we assume utility
functions of the following CES (constant elasticity of substitution) type:
v(o, s) := [coρ + (1− c)sρ] 1ρ . (1)
Here, o and s represent the ﬁnal material payoﬀs for other and self. Moreover,
c ∈ [0, 1] represents a player’s altruism-vs.-selﬁshness preference, so that he is
purely selﬁsh if c = 0, impartial if c = 1/2 and purely altruistic if c = 1. The
parameter ρ ∈ (−∞, 1] represents a player’s eﬃciency-vs.-equality preference,
so that he/she is completely equality-oriented for ρ → −∞ (Rawlsian) and
completely eﬃciency-oriented for ρ = 1.
Our results summarize as follows. In the non-interactive case, for general
CES utility functions, the amount allocated by a dictator to the recipient is an
intermediate amount that increases monotonically (i.) in the eﬃciency concern of
the player if p > 1 (if p < 1 it decreases with the eﬃciency concern), and (ii.) in
the concern of the player for the other’s payoﬀs, see also [10]. In the interactive
case, things become more complex: generically, we tend to have unique Nash
equilibria and bang-bang outcomes – that is, at least one of the players gives
either nothing or everything. In particular, if both players have suﬃciently low
–yet not necessarily vanishing– concerns for each other’s payoﬀ, no payments are
made at all, as opposed to the non-interactive case.
Let us expand on this point with an example contrasting the two cases.
Consider the unit-pie dictator game when the price of redistribution is p = 1,
and suppose players are perfectly impartial (c = 1/2 in Eq. (1)) and not fully
eﬃciency-oriented (ρ < 1). In a non-interactive setting, such a dictator would
split 50:50. By contrast, in an interactive setting, any strategy combination where
both players make identical payments forms a Nash equilibrium as they imple-
ment a 50:50 outcome overall; in particular, so do zero payments. If, however,
both players are even just slightly less altruistic, the degeneracy vanishes and
zero giving becomes in fact the only equilibrium. Similarly, if both players are
even slightly more altruistic, giving everything becomes the unique Nash equi-
librium.
Our results have applications to experimental design. Many of the more re-
cent dictator game experiments follow an interactive implementation while ad-
hering to a non-interactive interpretation. Such implementations have prima
facie a clear advantage from a data collection point of view: there are no passive
subjects as every participant is required to take decisions that can be used for
the subsequent analysis. However, what our results suggest is that zero-giving
in an interactive experimental implementation of a dictator game need not stem
from extremely selﬁsh players, as is usually claimed. Instead, it may be the con-
sequence of equilibrium play, as participants take into account giving decisions
of others.
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4 Future Research
We will extend our investigation in two directions. One direction is to analyze
existing experimental data to identify behavioral diﬀerences between interactive
and non-interactive settings (indirectly), and to conduct new experiments in
order to test our predictions (directly). The other direction is to extend our the-
oretical investigation, as our present analysis does not cover interactive settings
with incomplete information, arbitrary preference distributions, semi-interactive
settings, or multi-player settings.
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Abstract. This work aims to present a multiple criteria group decision model to 
locate healthcare facilities, using additive model with Flexible and Interactive 
Tradeoff (FITradeoff) elicitation method for scale constants of the criteria.
Sitting complex facilities, such as hospitals, is a multidimensional decision 
problem due to the several issues to be taken into account and also regarding the 
different opinions of stakeholders that should be involved. The problem 
addressed here is the location of a new large healthcare facility in Lombardy 
Region, Italy. FITradeoff is an easy tool for decision makers, because it requires 
less effort from the DMs compared to other elicitation methods, and thus it is 
expected to have less inconsistency during the elicitation process.
Keywords: Healthcare facility location, Group Decision, Multicriteria 
Decision, Additive Model, FITradeoff.
1 Introduction
Weights assignment is a crucial step in the definition of the influence of criteria 
during the decision process. In detail, planning public services aimed to serve the 
community, it is important to understand how different parameters can be combined 
in order to achieve the final aim. The location of healthcare facilities could be a good 
example to consider in order to analyze this step, as it is a process that should 
consider many different stakeholders [1] with different expectations and competences.
Actors behave in order to achieve a certain goal that is influenced by specific 
interests and social factors [2]. Considering their preferences means involving the
stakeholders, asking them to rank a set of criteria and comparing the results obtained. 
The aim of the research is to understand and compare stakeholders’ preferences 
using Flexible Interactive Tradeoff (FITradeoff) method able to perform several 
analyses in order to investigate and solve group decision problems.
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2 Healthcare Facility Location Problem
The topic analyzed and investigated for the specific aim of the research is the location 
of healthcare facilities. The selection of the most suitable area for hospitals’ sitting, is 
a typical ill-structured decision problem, since “Site selection for sitting of urban 
activities/facilities is one of the crucial policy-related decisions taken by urban 
planners and policy makers.” [3]; “Site selection, as one of the key principles of 
building planning, plays an important role and has a huge impact on the design of a 
proposed building.” [4]
Starting from a deep literature review and studies of existing evaluation tools [5],
focused on the assessment of hospitals’ sustainability performance, a multicriteria 
evaluation framework, composed by a set of sixteen criteria, has been defined, 
consistent to the multidimensional nature of the decision problem under investigation.
In detail, criteria investigated could be divided in four dimensions -Functional; 
Locational; Environmental; Economic – according to the subject matter. The 
Functional dimension concerns intrinsic characteristics of the area to analyze and the 
neighborhood where it is located (1. Building density; 2. Health demand; 3. Reuse of 
Built-up areas; 4. Potential of the area to become an attractive point); the Location 
dimension is related to how and how much the area is served in terms of 
infrastructures, accessibility, etc. (5. Accessibility; 6. Existing hospitals; 7. Services; 
8. Sewerage system); Environmental dimension is focused on the pollution and the 
context (9. Green areas; 10. Presence of rivers and canals; 11. Air and Noise 
pollution; 12. Land contamination); Economic dimension in related to the value of the 
area and its suitability to host a hospital (13. Land size and shape; 14. Land 
ownership; 15. Land cost; 16. Land use). 
The case study analyzed concerns the location of “La Città della Salute” in the city 
of Milan (Italy), a project aimed to relocate two existing specialized hospitals in order 
to obtain a unique pole focused on research, teaching, science and training and able to 
meet new health demands of the population. During the last 15 years, six different 
areas located in the city of Milan and in the suburb have been proposed [6], but at the 
moment, the project is undergoing bureaucratic delay.
Given the multidisciplinary approach required to solve the decision problem and 
the multidisciplinary characteristic of the topic, several stakeholders have been 
actively involved in the process. In detail, taking into consideration the classification 
provided by [2], five categories, with specific interests, have been identified:
a. Political actors: Health and Urban Councilor;
b. Bureaucratic actors: Health and Urban General Manager;
c. Actors with special interest: Local Health Unit Director;
d. Actors with general interest: NGO; NPO; common people;
e. Experts: Architects; Urban Planners, Doctors; Urban Economist; etc.
After that, using the matrix of power and interest, the five categories have been 
further organized in four classes: Minimal effort, Keep informed, Keep satisfied and 
Key players (Table 1).
Many professionals have been selected for each corresponding class and 
questioned in order to understand and obtain their preferences for ranking the set of 
the proposed criteria. In detail, since it is a multidisciplinary problem related in 
Group Decision and Negotiation – GDN 2017 317
14-18 August 2017, Stuttgart-Hohenheim, Germany
 
 
particular to the urban planning and the healthcare field, experts involved belongs to 
these two categories, as listed in the previous description.
Table 1. Matrix of Power/Interest.
    INTEREST
    low high
PO
W
E
R
lo
w
Stakeholder: 
Minimal effort
Nonprofit Organizations;
Non-governmental Organizations
Stakeholder:
Keep informed
Common people
hi
gh
Stakeholder:
Keep Satisfied
Health and Urban General Manager, 
Local Health Unit Director, Experts
Stakeholder:
Key players
Health and Urban Councilor
3 FITradeoff Method
The multiple criteria group decision problem of healthcare facility location addressed 
in section 2 is going to be solved by applying FITradeoff method [7]. The flexible and 
interactive tradeoff is a new method for elicitation of scale constants in additive 
models, based on the traditional tradeoff elicitation procedure [8]. This new method is 
easier for the decision-makers, because they do not need to give the exact indifference
point which makes two consequences indifferent, which is a critical limitation of
traditional tradeoff procedure. The number of questions answered by each DM is 
expected to be lesser in FITradeoff, and the questions made are cognitively easier, 
compared to the traditional tradeoff procedure [7].
The DMs give information about preference relation between two consequences, 
and this information is converted into inequalities that act as constraints for evaluation 
of the performance of the alternatives through LPP models [7]. With these constraints, 
a weight space is obtained, which is updated with DM responses in order to reduce the 
subset of potentially optimal alternatives. Since less effort is required from the 
decision-makers, it is expected to have less inconsistency during the elicitation 
process [7].  
A discussion on the application process is considered based on the adaptation of
FITradeoff to Group Decision [9], in which multiple decision makers’ preferences can 
be considered and aggregated, in order to find a final compromise solution. The 
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elicitation is conducted with four different classes of stakeholders and then the results 
will be compared and discussed, in order to find the best location for the healthcare 
facility problem. FITradeoff DSS is available for download on request at 
www.fitradeoff.org.
4 Conclusions
The stakeholders preferences’ analysis is assuming a relevant and strategic role 
because it is possible to create an interaction among different actors, trying, moreover, 
to satisfy their expectations solving the decision problem. The complexity has been 
defined by [2] as the plurality of points of view that are present in a process, and in 
particular, the public policy process is characterized by this kind of complexity. The 
application of FITradeoff method with the stakeholders involved in the problem could 
facilitate the decision making process addressing validity and robustness to the 
methodology applied.
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Abstract. In the past it has been suggested by some authors that negotiators 
utility functions over the issues may not be linear. In this case, a phenomenon 
called “negotiation crossover” takes place, in which a negotiator may switch 
issues on which they choose to make concessions at some point in negotiations. 
This work sets to investigate the validity of such claims. To this end we 
introduce several concession-making models and use them for testing 
hypotheses. We have used a dataset from online negotiation experiments 
featuring a contract – signing case. The results suggest that concession 
crossover does occur.
Keywords: Concession crossover, Electronic negotiations, Experimental 
studies
1   Introduction
Concession making behavior exhibited by participants in the negotiation process 
has a significant effect on the outcomes of negotiations [1]. Understanding the manner 
in which human negotiators choose to concede on the issues involved can help build 
effective support tools. When multiple issues are included in the offer exchange, there 
is always a possibility that the parties will have heterogeneous preferences on the 
issues. In particular, the importance of different issues will typically vary for a given 
participant, and it may also differ from the perspective of the counterpart. In this case 
a mutually beneficial solution can be found when negotiators make appropriate 
moves.
Under the assumption that issues contain approximately equally spaced options 
(e.g. $100, $120, $140, $160 for a price) the linear model of negotiator’s preferences 
assumes that the utility values of those options are also equally spaced. In other 
words, going from one option to the next level results in the same utility difference 
regardless of the current option level. Northcraft, Brodt and Neale [2] showed that in 
such model a negotiator will always choose to concede on the same issue. They have 
proposed an alternative model where the utility functions are non-linear. They have 
shown that in such a model a phenomenon they called “concession crossover” may 
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occur. In other words, a negotiator may switch between the issues at some point when 
making concessions.
In this work we investigate the presence of the concession crossover using a large 
dataset obtained from the experiments involving electronic negotiations. We propose 
alternative models of concession-making behavior in order to test our expectations.
2 Background
When multiple issues are involved in negotiations, it is likely that the negotiators’ 
preferences over the issues will not match exactly. The difference in the importance 
of the issues of the opposing parties allows for the search of the mutually beneficial 
solutions. When preferences are kept private such a search can be facilitated by 
logrolling approach, i.e. making concessions on less important issues in order to 
obtain gains on more important ones [3, 4].
However, it is often assumed that utility functions of the issues involved are linear
[2]. Under this assumption, the rate of utility change remains constant regardless of 
the current position on a given issue. Northcraft, Brodt and Neale [2] hypothesised 
that in the majority of cases actual utility functions are non-linear. They have used the 
same rationale that is used in Economics, i.e. the law of diminishing marginal utility. 
Under linear model, a negotiator would always prefer to obtain gains on the most 
important issue. However, under non-linear model, there would be a point where 
marginal gains on a less important issue will equal (and thereafter exceed) those on 
more important ones. That point is where negotiation crossover occurs. The authors 
describe the phenomenon as a concession paradox, whereby gains in less important 
issues become preferable.
The above work analyzed concessions from the point of view of the receiver. This 
allows drawing parallels with the law of diminishing marginal utility. In this work we 
will adopt the view of a concession-maker to detect concession crossover. Simple 
concession-making models have been introduced in [5]. In particular, one model was 
based on the assumption that a negotiator will make concession on an issue which has 
more “concession potential”. We will adopt this model in order to detect concession 
crossover using a large dataset of online negotiations.
3 Models
We propose a series of tests to detect non-linearity of issue preferences as 
exhibited through concessions and concession crossover.  Even though one may ask 
negotiators to explicitly define their preferences, the true measure of preferences is 
expressed by the concessions made.  Even though a negotiator may make offers based 
on a strategy designed to send false signals, each offer can potentially be accepted by 
the counterpart, thus there is significant intrinsic incentive to make offers that closely
follow the negotiators true preferences.  
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For a specific negotiator in a negotiation session, there is a total number of issues 
( ) and a total number of offers ( ).  Each offer ( ) contains values ( )
for each issue ( ).  The values will range between the minimum and 
maximum limits for an issue ( ).  A concession 
( ) is made when the value of an issue for the current offer is 
lower than the value of the issue in the previous offer. 
For modeling purposes, issue ranges are inversed when required so that they follow 
the same direction as utility, meaning a larger number is better for the negotiator.  
Thus, we always model from the perspective of maximizing utility.  Buyers and 
sellers ranges are always inverse.
For a given issue, we can calculate the remaining concession potential as:
(1)
The baseline model used for the analysis here is the random model. Here the 
assumption is that a negotiator randomly picks an issue for concession-making at each 
step. A good predictive model must fit the data better than the random one.  The 
random model simply indicates that the negotiator has no preference difference 
between issues and chooses a random issue that has remaining potential to concede 
on.
A negotiator who adopts a random sequence will behave as follows: 
Let be a random issue in the set 
(2)
The most basic assumption in modeling concession-making is that of linear 
sequence of issues to concede.  Under this assumption, the negotiator will concede on 
the least preferred issue until there is nothing left to concede. Even if the counterpart 
has conceded on the negotiator’s least preferred issue, the negotiator will still be 
willing to concede beyond the counterparts offer since any other issue concession will 
result in larger utility loss.
Therefore, we define Naive model as follows: A negotiator who adopts a linear 
utility model will behave as follows:
(3)
The first and simplest model that can be used to test for concession crossover is the 
anti-naive model.  In this model the next issue to be conceded on will be any issue 
other than the issue that was last conceded on, for which there is remaining potential 
to concede on.
Anti-Naive model: Concessions will be made as follows:
(4)
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A more complex model for explaining concession crossover considers how much 
the concession-making potential remains in each issue.  The next issue for concession 
would be the one with the most remaining concession potential.  
Max-Potential model: Concessions will be made as follows:
(5)
4 Hypotheses
Our basic expectations are that 1) concession crossover occurs, and 2) Max-
potential model explains concession crossover better than other models. Thus we
propose the following hypotheses. 
H1: Random model will significantly outperform the Naive model in predicting 
the next concession issue.
Linear utility assumption implies that naïve model should do significantly better 
than the random one. Our expectation is that switching between the issues, even using 
random choice should do a better job at predicting the next issue, than the Naive 
model, which prohibits any switching, as long as there is a potential concession 
remaining on a given issue. 
The Anti-Naive model will be the first test effect for non-linear sequence that 
result in concession crossover.  
H2: Anti-Naive model (3) will significantly outperform the random model in 
predicting the next concession issue.
The second non-linear sequence model is the Max-Potential concession model, 
which specifies that the next concession will be on the issue with the most remaining 
potential. 
H3: Negotiators will make the next concession of the issue with the most 
remaining concession potential (4)
Since we may have two different concession crossover models that explain the 
data, we might need to compare the Max-Potential model to the Anti-Naive model.  If 
the more complex model is not shown to be a better explanation of the behaviour, it 
would be considered rejected.
H4: The Max-Potential explains the concession crossover better than the Anti-Naive 
model.
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5 Results
The dataset used in the study comes from online bilateral negotiation experiments 
conducted regularly in the last 10 years and contains records collected from over 2000 
subjects. The negotiation case is about signing a contract between a music company 
and a musician. The case has been described elsewhere, e.g. [6], hence here we will 
only briefly mention the issues involved. The negotiated issues included number of 
new songs (songs), royalties for CDs (royalties), contract signing bonus (bonus), and 
number of promotional concerts (concerts). No exact preference information was 
given to the subjects, but the relative issue importance and utility values were shown 
graphically in form of circles.
Because the negotiation issue had different numbers of predefined option levels, 
there are more concessions made on issues with more option levels.  For example, 
Concerts has 4 option levels, Songs has 5, Royalties has 4 and Bonus has 3.  
Therefore, there will be more concession occurrences on Songs simply because there 
are more levels.  We could simply predict that Songs would be the next issue to be 
conceded on and it would fit the data better than the Random model.  However, since 
none of our models are issue specific, it has no impact on the tests.  In addition, since 
the Random model is the baseline, and not simply a 25% (1 in 4 issues) prediction 
rate, any impact of an overall issue bias on the results is completely avoided.   
Since the models evaluate the next concession based on the previous concessions, 
at least two offers are required from a negotiator. The negotiators who sent only one 
offer have been excluded in the analysis. After the filtering, there were 9024 offers in 
the Music negotiation case that were used for hypothesis testing.  The results are 
presented below:
To test Hypothesis 1, we compared the Naive model versus the Random model. 
Since a negotiator may have conceded on more than one issue at the same time, only 
one of such concession issues was chosen randomly to provide a fair comparison.  
The Random model had an average fit of 18.01% and the Naive model had an average 
fit of 7.05%.  The difference between the two means is highly significant (p-value 
0.00000). Therefore H1 is supported.  
The Anti-Naive model can select any or multiple issues with remaining concession 
potential that did not have a concession in the last offer.  To make the comparison fair 
with the Random model and other models, a random issue will be selected from these 
issues.  The average fit of the Anti-Naive model is 21.55% versus 18.01% for the 
Random model. Thus the Anti-Naive model fits the negotiator’s concessions better 
than the Random model with the difference between the two means being highly 
significant.  Therefore, Hypothesis 2 is supported with a p-value of 0.00000.
The average fit of the Max-Potential model is 25.69%, which is higher than  
18.01% for the Random model. Thus, the Max-Potential model fits the negotiators 
selection of issue sequence to concede 42.65% better than the Random model with the 
difference between the two means being highly significant.  Therefore Hypothesis 3 is 
supported with a p-value of 0.00000.
Furthermore, the average fit of the Max-Potential model is 25.69%, which is higher 
than 21.55% for the Anti-Naive model. Thu, the Max-Potential model fits the 
negotiators preferences 19.18% better than the Anti-Naive model with the difference 
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between the two means being highly significant.   Therefore Hypothesis 4 is 
supported with a p-value of 0.00000. 
These results provide evidence demonstrating that the negotiators will select a non-
linear issue sequence to concede, when utilities are non-linear and that concession 
crossover does occur.
6   Conclusion
The purpose of this work is to demonstrate that the phenomenon of concession 
crossover will occur in negotiations involving multiple issues when negotiators’ 
utilities are non-linear. To this end we have used experimental data containing records 
of bilateral negotiations featuring a contract signing case. We have used four 
concession prediction models in order to test the crossover effect. The results 
demonstrate that concession crossover does occur in negotiations.
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Abstract. Human beings make decisions based on their values, beliefs and 
other aspects belonging to a set of particular individuals/group, known as 
culture. Negotiations processes also reveal cultural aspects of people. This 
work-in–progress considers negotiation contexts, and seeks to understand how
people perceive themselves in this context vis-à-vis their perceived expectations 
of their negotiation counterparts. The overarching goal is to study the effect of 
culture on this self-other perceptional difference, specifically with Brazilians 
and Indians.   We use Cultural Dimensions developed by Hofstede, and report 
very initial results with a small Brazilian sample.  Currently data from India are 
being collected.
Keywords: Negotiation process; Cultural aspects, Negotiators perceptions.
1   Introduction
Culture is one aspect that can define the attitudes taken by people in making 
decisions. The term can be used in different formats such as nations, regions within 
nations, or even between some groups (ethnic or tribal) in a region [1]. Cultural 
differences have an impact on how individuals interact during the process of 
negotiation or group decision [2].
Not only in cross-cultural negotiations are the differences perceived. Even in one 
country (continental countries) the way of population reacts and their points of view 
can change significantly. This can be explained, according to [1], because each 
nation/culture has a diversity of individuals.
According [3] on the business negotiations study three phases are essential: 
antecedent phase, concurrent phase and consequent phase. These phases correspond 
to the three stages of negotiations in the real world: pre-negotiation analysis, conduct 
of negotiation and post-settlement analysis. Table 1 summarizes the main features of 
each stage of negotiations by [4]. It is possible see that before initiating a negotiation,
in the earlier stage, is crucial to know better the opponent to best formulate the 
strategies to apply during the negotiation process.
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Table 1. Phases of the negotiation [4]
Business 
negotiation 
on literature
Negotiation 
in the real 
world
Characteristics
Antecedent 
phase
Pre-
negotiation 
analysis
Situation, problem and opponent analysis; formulation of 
preferences (characteristics of negotiators); strategy; 
restrictions
Concurrent 
phase
Conduct of 
negotiation
Messaging and offers; the offer includes all issues; the 
compromise is reached or one party terminates the process 
and informs; analysis of the strategy and behavior, changes in 
the negotiation problem and the perception of the negotiators, 
and the dynamics of the negotiations
Consequent 
phase
Post 
settlement 
analysis
Evaluation of the negotiation results (commitment and 
satisfaction); if negotiation enables analysis and improvement 
of compromise efficiency, this improvement should be 
continued, post-trade questionnaire
The work published by [5] explores how valid can be studies with student samples, 
making a wide exploration of works already performed. One justification to conduct 
research with student samples is the difficulty of professional negotiators have 
available time to participate in surveys. Although there are some controversies by 
researcher groups affirming that students have no experience or these kind of studies 
could be better with MBA students only, the research showed satisfactory results to 
conduct studies in negotiation among students.
Focused on the experience issue the paper concludes that negotiators, because they 
have more experience, do not outperform students without experience. The difference 
between a trade made by professionals and students, detected in an experiment done 
by [6] was about the speed at which traders more expertise achieve faster results than 
students.
The famous study of Hofstede [7,8] about a metric scale to measure the cultural 
values has been widely used over the years. He considers five dimensions to measure 
the culture values of a set of individuals: Power Distance, Individualism x 
Collectivism, Masculinity/Femininity, Uncertainty Avoidance, and Long-Term 
Orientation.
The Power Distance dimension measures perceptions of authority and power. High 
power distance means that organizations/individuals are characterized by the strong 
sense of hierarchy where subordinates have a distant relation with their superiors. 
Individualism dimension measures if the values of certain community prioritize the 
needs of an individual or a group. Masculinity dimension reveals some masculine 
norms (achievement, material orientation) or feminine norms (base on relationships, 
people orientation, and quality of life). High level of masculinity means that a 
group/society values are more competitive, materials, assertive. The Uncertainty 
Avoidance dimension reflects the degree to which a person prefers security and 
stability. Finally, the Long-Term Orientation dimension shows the values oriented 
towards the future, such as perseverance.
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Based on these five cultural dimensions proposed by Hofstede, the overall
objective of this work-in-progress is to analyze the behavior of Brazilians and Indians 
regarding how they view themselves (and act during a negotiation process) in relation 
to the perceptions/reactions of their counterparts. The study has been started with 
Brazilian sample as a pilot and the current status is the data collection among Indians. 
More data from Brazil has to be collected and then compare the results.
2 Questions
The broad questions arising in this research program:
1. How do people perceive themselves when they are in a negotiation context?
2. Are these perceptions different from what they expect from their negotiation 
counterpart?
3. How does culture influence these perceptions and also the gaps between 
these perceptions?
A set of experiments done by [9] reports the relationship between the self-
evaluation and the evaluation of others in social judgments. Three experiments were 
done in order to examine this relationship. It was found in one of the experiments that 
the self-evaluations were more favorable than the assessments of the other part, and 
the higher a person's self-esteem the more positive was their assessment of the other.
This comparison between self-evaluation and self-esteem generates self-esteem, and 
these perceptions about the differences found may or may not motivate one part to 
negotiate with another. This becomes even greater when it comes to different cultures.
The activities already done as part of the pitot study are as follows.
3 Methodology
Survey Instrument
The experiment seeks to capture the perceptions of the participants about how they act 
on a possible negotiation process and compare these answers with what they expect 
their counterparts act in a negotiation environment using a questionnaire containing 
some situations that can occur in a negotiation scenario. Thus, there are two sub-
sections in the questionnaire: one about how the participants act in a negotiation 
process and the other about the perspective of how they wish their counterparts act in 
the same scenario.
Since the fundamental purpose of our research is about the role of culture, our 
questionnaire is also about the five culture dimensions.  The questionnaire was based 
on instruments available in [10, 11, 12, 13], but the questions was formulated to a 
negotiation process environment.
The questionnaire has a total of 52 items in both sections. All the questions are 
measured using a five-point Likert scale. Table 2 show some questions for each of 
dimension from Hofstede’s work. The questions capture the aspects from the 
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respondents about themselves. These same questions are made after in relation to their 
perspectives about their opponent.
Table 2. Partial questionnaire about negotiation perceptions based on cultural dimensions.
Cultural Dimension Questions
Power Distance  I think I should address my superiors with more 
politeness than I address my subordinates during a 
negotiation
 I work hard during a negotiation.
Individualism versus Collectivism  I am very cooperative during a negotiation
 I prefer to work in groups or in pairs rather than 
working alone during a negotiation
Masculinity versus Femininity  I am an ambitious person during a negotiation
 I am a reluctant person during a negotiation
Uncertainty Avoidance  If my job is to negotiate, I prefer to work in the 
same place during a long period of time
 Usually, I get nervous or tense during a negotiation
Long versus Short-Term Orientation  I am a persistent person during negotiations
 In negotiations, I try not to do anything that will 
embarrass me
It is notable that the goal of this questionnaire is capture the point of view of the 
respondents in some situations that can occur in a real world of a negotiation process.
Participants
The first step of this research program was start the conduction of data collection
among Brazilians students, with participants having different levels of education. The 
survey was administered in one state of Brazil.  While this is a limitation (note: Brazil 
has been found to have sub-cultures within its population), there are people in the 
sample who belong to other states. Subjects are university students.  Although there 
have been issues raised with respect to the use of student subjects [5], one 
justification to conduct research with students is the difficulties that professional 
negotiators have in terms of time available to participate in surveys. Further, in one 
study with trades [6], it was found that the differences lie not as much in perception, 
but more in speed, as explained before.
Given this, we collected responses from 5 students from Brazil.  All respondents 
participated in the research voluntarily and the data collection was done in December
2016. Participants from three institutions have participated with a varied academic
background.  On average the sample is 26 years old, ranging from 19 to 52 years old. 
Some demographics data from the survey participants are shown in Fig.1. 
The next and current step is collecting data from Indians. In this stage, data 
collection is also being made among students from one state in India. At the present 
moment, a sample of 159 was collected. The sample is 24 years old, in average. The
descriptive data are presented also in the Fig. 1.
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Fig. 1. Demographic data from the survey participants from three institutions in Brazil and 
three institutions in India
The data is also being collected in three institutions in India. The data present more 
male participants and a large portion of the sample is composed by single 
respondents. Most of the data has as the last education level the undergraduation.
4 Initial Findings
The first step is to do a factor analysis with the goal to group the variables with 
minimal loss of information. The extraction was based on principal components with 
varimax rotation. It was four factors for the self-evaluation and five for the 
counterpart’s evaluation. We next analyze with the four factors given below with 
some descriptive statistcs..
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x Power Distance dimension: Brazilians view themselves as a person who 
has low PD while it is not to clear about what they expect from their 
counterparts (some prefers negotiate with a counterpart who prefers low 
and others with high PD); Indians, however, has a high PD level and also 
prefer to negotiate with someone who has a high PD level.
x Uncertainty Avoidance dimension: when the Brazilians respondents 
believe to be risk averse and when they have to negotiate with someone 
the answers are divided among be averse or risk prone; Indians are risk 
neutral and prefer also negotiate with a risk neutral counterpart.
x Individualism and Long-term Orientation dimensions: in these dimensions 
the respondents have the same behavior, in both cultures. They believe be 
collectivist and expect to negotiate with collectivist counterpart and also 
they are oriented to the future and prefers negotiate with a person having 
this same profile;
x Masculinity: in both samples the respondents present a high level of 
Masculinity while prefers to negotiate with a counterpart who presents a 
low level in this dimension.
After the demographic analyses, we did a correlation test. The Spearman correlation 
test was applied to both evaluations (self-evaluation and counterpart’s evaluation). 
This test gives us the information of the items how correlated the items are. The 
correlation of the items were evaluated to each factor and was observed that with p-
value of 0.05 the variables were few correlated, except the items belonging to the 
Individualism x Collectivism dimension in both cultures (0.71 for self-evaluation and 
0.76 in Brazil and 0.77 for self-evaluation and 0.61 for counterpart evaluation in 
India).
5 Expected Results from Future Work
The first step of this study was starting to collect some data from Brazilians. Data 
collection in India has begun in April 2017 and is still in the data collect stage and is 
expected to finish until July 2017.
The expected result from this research is to compare the cultural difference 
between Brazilians and Indians regarding their perceptions in negotiation processes. 
To get a significant and consistent result the factor analysis suggests that the number 
of respondents be five times the number of variables. So, this way, the number of the 
sample must be bigger to better compare individuals in Brazil and also in India.
The statistical analyses are being made with the sample from India. For future 
work the sample must be bigger and also collect more data from Brazil.
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6 Conclusions
The main remarks of the proposed work is that study trying to obtain the gap 
between the perceptions about the respondents and what they think that their 
counterpart could be. Analyzing this gap, besides to see how the participants from 
both culture react and in this way it is possible to know more about the counterpart, 
we can observe how fast could be a negotiation, since the sample can act in a way 
however desiring to negotiate with a counterpart acts in another way could take time 
on the negotiation process. With this outcome the negotiator is able do best develop 
his strategies based on the strengths and weaknesses from his/her counterpart.
The current stage of this research is the data collection, from both cultures to have 
a representative sample and then compare the results. The questionnaire must be 
validated and then statistical tests have to be made.
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From Desirable to Feasible. Fostering Inter-
Institutional Cooperation with Competence-based Multi 
Criteria Analysis
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Abstract. Many contemporary policy issues require cooperation between 
institutions. Yet, cooperation is often hampered by problems including political 
transaction costs and the non-internalisation of externalities. The article 
presents a novel evaluation and group decision-making method, Competence-
based Multi Criteria Analysis, which, in essence, is a framework for applying 
MCDA in a multi-actor, multi-level context. For each actor the desirability of 
different decision alternatives is derived from the actor’s individual criteria and 
priorities. Individual actor results are aggregated with those of other actors that 
have the same role or function in the decision’s implementation, yielding 
insight in the desirability of the decision alternatives for each of the groups 
whose support is needed for the decision’s implementation. The article shows 
how COMCA can be applied for overcoming typical hurdles in inter-
institutional cooperation by revealing policy options that are feasible 
considering the actors’ competence to make or break a decision, or revealing 
policy options that are desirable from local or global points of view.
Keywords: multi-actor multi-level decision making, multi criteria analysis, 
project appraisal, inter-institutional cooperation 
1   Introduction
In many situations decision makers are faced with problems that stretch beyond 
their institutional boundaries or fields of competence. Typical examples include 
global challenges that cannot be dealt with by single states, such as financial market 
regulation, climate policy, migration policy and others. Inter-institutional cooperation 
is also needed in smaller-scale issues, such as metropolitan transport infrastructure 
between cities and surrounding commuter municipalities.
This short paper presents a novel group decision-making tool that aims to foster 
inter-institutional cooperation: Competence-based Multi Criteria Analysis (COMCA). 
Its use is explained in how it can help facing two challenges associated with inter-
institutional cooperation: 1) political transaction costs, and 2) the non-internalisation 
of externalities.
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The paper first explains COMCA and its origins in Multi Criteria Decision 
Analysis (MCDA). Then, the challenges of political transaction costs and the non-
internalisation of externalities are discussed and the role COMCA can play to tackle 
these challenges. Next, ongoing research for the application of COMCA in the 
planning of metropolitan infrastructure is discussed.
2 What is COMCA?
In short, COMCA is a group evaluation and decision-making tool for problems 
with multiple actors with different tasks or levels of responsibility. It indicates which 
decision alternatives best meet the priorities of individual actors, but it also indicates 
the feasibility of decision alternatives by showing the support for each alternative 
among each of the actor groups that are accountable for each of the tasks needed for 
implementing the decision alternatives.
COMCA is a means for applying MCDA in a multi-actor, multi-level context. 
MCDA is a well-established branch of decision making methods. Its principle is to 
provide the decision maker with an indication of the desirability of several decision 
alternatives, usually in the form of a preference ranking, based on multiple, often 
conflicting, criteria.
Many real-world decision problems, however, do not concern just one but several 
decision makers. For this reason several methods have been developed for involving 
multiple stakeholders or actors in the process. Multi Actor Multi Criteria Analysis 
(MAMCA) (Macharis, 2005; Macharis, Turcksin, & Lebeau, 2012), for instance, 
juxtaposes the preference rankings of a common set of alternatives by multiple actors, 
each using an individual set of criteria.
In MAMCA, aggregation of individual preference rankings into a common 
preference ranking is usually omitted and focus is put on critical actors or critical 
criteria regarding a common decision. (Macharis et al., 2012) Indeed, aggregation of 
individual preference rankings only makes sense in cases where: 1) a single group 
judgement is required rather than an indication of obstructing factors, and 2) actors 
are interchangeable or are considered equivalent.
These conditions might be met in situations with a large number of actors, of 
whom no-one’s individual judgement is crucial (e.g. customers co-deciding on the 
launch of a new product), or in situations where MAMCA is adopted as a group 
decision-making method by actors that consider each other equivalent, i.e. when it is 
applied using a constructive approach (Roy, 1993), rather than a prescriptive or
descriptive approach (Bell, Raiffa, & Tverski, 1988).
Thus, simple aggregation of individual preferences is not appropriate in most real-
world policy-making situations. In certain decision problems, however, the number of 
actors is so high (e.g. citizens or customers) and the degree of influence so different 
(e.g. national vs. local government or citizens), that a mere juxtaposition of preference 
rankings would play down the preferences of crucial actors and leave too much 
complexity for decision makers to deal with. In such situations differentiation 
between actors is needed in order to structure their preferences.
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Several methods differentiate between actors by assigning weights to stakeholders. 
This typically implies actors assigning each other relative degrees of influence 
(Hosseini & Brenner, 1992; Ramanathan & Ganesh, 1994; Van Den Honert, 2001). 
While this might be a sensible in a constructive approach, with all actors adopting ‘the 
rules of the game’, again, it is less likely to accurately reflect real-world power 
relations. Moreover, when actors evaluate each other, there is risk of coalition 
formation (Bogetoft, 1992; Van Den Honert, 2001).
In COMCA, the actors’ degree of influence is not expressed with an absolute 
value. On the contrary, the actors’ influence depends on their role in the 
implementation of the decision in question, i.e. their competence. Accordingly, actors 
are classified in competence domains; the smallest subsets of actors of which support 
as a group is essential for the decision’s implementation. From this classification one 
can derive if actors constitute a competence domain on their own and are therefore to 
be considered as a veto players (such as permit-granting authorities), or as belonging 
to a group of whom only a substantial amount but no individual support is required 
(customers, citizens in participatory processes) and whose preferences are therefore 
eligible for aggregation.
Through preference ranking by competence domain one can derive the desirability 
of the different project alternatives for each of the actor groups accountable for 
implementing the decision. This also provides an indication for the feasibility of each 
decision alternative as a whole.
3 How does COMCA work?
In theory, within COMCA, any existing MCDA technique can be used, such as 
MAUT (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947), ELECTRE (Roy, 1968), AHP (Saaty, 
1980), PROMETHEE (Brans & Vincke, 1985) or Verbal Decision Analysis (Larichev 
& Moshkovich, 1997). The social context of COMCA, however, requires maximum 
transparency, rather than mathematical sophistication. For this reason, in many cases, 
Simple Additive Weighting might be the most appropriate technique (Mayer & 
Stirling, 2004; Stirling & Mayer, 1999).
In summary, COMCA consists of the following steps: 1) determination of the 
planning problem and project alternatives; 2) determination of required competences; 
3) identification of actors; 4) determination of criteria; 5) assessment of alternatives 
on criteria; 6) assignment of relative priorities to criteria; 7) determination of 
individual actor preferences; 8) determination of group preferences per competence 
domain; and 9) determination of overall group preferences. These steps do not have to 
follow each other in the stated order as more often than not, decision making is not a 
linear but rather a circular or chaotic process with multiple feedback loops.
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4 Alleviating political transaction costs
For institutions such as local or regional governments, cooperation can be 
advantageous in many different ways, especially when the social-economic 
functioning of their respective jurisdictions is spatially entangled. However, even 
when potentially beneficial for all actors involved, inter-institutional cooperation can 
be hampered by political transaction costs. North (1990) defines transaction costs as 
the costs of ‘measuring and enforcing agreements’. In inter-institutional cooperation 
the concept can be used to refer to the non-monetary costs of obtaining information 
on which issue to cooperate with which actors, but also the burden of negotiation on 
which decision to take might be perceived too high a cost for making cooperation 
attractive.
COMCA can help to alleviate political transaction costs. Any actor can initiate a 
process to explore the social-political feasibility of an inter-institutional project. 
COMCA provides information on which actors are likely to provide support for 
which project alternatives. Using this method helps actors to reveal previously 
unknown mutual interests. Negotiation costs are brought down as well, as actors 
stipulate the criteria that make decisions, in their perspective, acceptable or not.
5 Internalising externalities
Alleviating political transaction costs leads to win-win situations in projects that 
are beneficial to all actors. However, many inter-institutional projects do not generate 
equal benefits and costs for all. Infrastructure, for instance, is beneficial to those who
Fig. 1. Structuring multi-actor multi-level decision making with COMCA
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use it to reach their destination, but disadvantageous for those who experience
environmental nuisance. A waste incineration plant is indispensable, but undesirable 
for those living nearby. In other words, some actors have to bring sacrifices in favour 
of the common good.
This, however, is unlikely to happen in situations where each actor has a de facto 
veto right; a common sight in international politics (e.g. EU, UN) or within 
federalised states (e.g. Belgium). Rationally acting actors have no incentive to act in 
favour of the common good when it is not beneficial to their own situation. The 
problem is, indeed, that when the territories of jurisdictions do not correspond to the 
spatial functions they host, institutions do not experience the full impact of their 
decisions. As Hooghe & Marks (2003) put it: institutions do not internalise the 
negative or positive externalities of their decisions.
This situation leads to what Scharpf (1988) calls the joint decision trap; inter-
institutional decisions do not reflect the social optimum, but rather the lowest 
common denominator, i.e. the decision accepted by all. Solutions that are desirable 
from a group perspective are not feasible because they are not desirable for each 
individual. Likewise, feasible solutions are unlikely to be the most desirable for the 
group as a whole.
In multi-level governance contexts, such as occurring in federal or EU politics, a 
higher-level institution cannot overrule a lower-level institution’s veto. This implies 
that in prescriptive decision analysis methods (Bell et al., 1988), their respective 
preferences should be held in equal regard.
Figure 2 shows the juxtaposed preference rankings of a hypothetical project 
straddling the border between two regions. Even if alternative A, the social optimum, 
is preferred by most actors, it is not a feasible alternative because certain actors 
(municipality 2 and to a lesser extent, region2) are unlikely to accept.
Fig. 2. Desirable vs. feasible decision alternatives
COMCA, or any group decision-making method for that matter, cannot change the 
institutional set-up to remove an institution’s veto right. Yet, in a constructive 
approach (Roy, 1993) where actors are incited to act beyond maximising local utility, 
COMCA can be used to reveal area-optimal solutions. That is, in inter-institutional
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projects with an uneven distribution of effects (as in any infrastructure project), 
institutions of the same level can be considered competitors for the project’s 
amenities (and the avoidance of nuisance) and will favour different project 
alternatives. In a constructive COMCA approach, institutions of the same level can be 
considered equivalents, allowing for the aggregation of their preferences. The result 
reflects an area-optimal solution where local interests are compensated for by other 
local interests of the same level; externalities are internalised.
Figure 3 shows the aggregate preference rankings for each institutional level using 
the same project as for figure2. It shows that for the project area as a whole (which 
can either be divided into 2 regions or 4 municipalities) alternative A is the optimal 
solution. Yet, even if a constructive COMCA approach reveals group- or area-optimal 
solutions, the intermediary steps revealing critical actors and criteria remain useful for 
formulating compensation policies.
6 Current applications
COMCA is currently applied in the metropolitan area of Brussels, Belgium, for the 
planning of several transport projects, such as highway feeder roads, suburban (light) 
rail and bus lines. This metropolitan area has the peculiarity that the central city (itself 
consisting of 19 municipalities) and its commuter belt belong to three different 
regions, each with a high degree of transport policy autonomy, without any 
coordination from a higher policy level. This has resulted in political deadlock and a 
virtual standstill of most metropolitan transport projects.
Applying COMCA, the authors aim to contribute in overcoming the institutional 
deadlock with innovative forms of cooperation and decision making. Simultaneously, 
experience is gathered for fine-tuning the method in terms of data input, stakeholder 
consultation, and modes of processing and aggregating stakeholder input.
Fig. 3. Preferences aggregated by institutional level
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7 Conclusion
Many contemporary policy issues demand an inter-institutional approach. 
Cooperation between institutions, however, is hampered by problems such as political 
transactions costs and the non-internationalisation of externalities. This article shows 
how a novel group and decision-making method, COMCA, can be applied to tackle 
these problems. It is potentially helpful in identifying feasible inter-institutional 
policy options and actor coalitions. Also, it helps to reveal which policy options are 
desirable for each actor individually, which options are feasible considering each 
actor’s competence to make or break a decision, and which options are desirable from 
a global, rather than a local point of view. Potentially, COMCA can be applied in any 
decision problem with actors that have different roles in the decision’s 
implementation.
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Abstract. This paper studies the application of the Leoneti utility function for 
multi-criteria decision problems to dynamic games with two players. In order to 
support Pareto optimality of the choices, the Cobb-Douglas function is used to 
combine players’ utility function and the probability of playing altruistically.
The latter is defined by the balance of the payoffs in past negotiations proposed 
by Gimon. A numerical example showed that the Cobb-Douglas function, when 
used as a utility function in dynamic games, results in alternations of the games’ 
Nash equilibria. The payoff balance tends to converge to a single limit defined 
by the players’ preferences and their aspirational payoff balances.
Keywords: multi-criteria decision-making, Nash equilibrium, dynamic games, 
dynamic negotiations, Cobb-Douglas function.
1   Introduction
In economic sciences, the branch dealing with individual and group decisions is the 
microeconomic field that is based on the idea of utility functions. Utility functions are 
mathematical models whose goal is to translate material goods into an ordinal scale 
that satisfactorily represents an individual’s satisfaction with their choices [1]. Several 
of these functions have been proposed, many following the axioms proposed by von 
Neumann and Morgenstern [2], and form the basis of game theory. In general, the 
main characteristic of these functions is the measurement of utility in strategic 
interaction environments, where the choices of individuals in a group depend on each 
other choices.
At the individual level, a utility function with interesting mathematical properties is 
the Cobb-Douglas function [3]. This utility function, created by the mathematician 
Charles Cobb and the economist Paul Douglas, has similar characteristics to the 
convex monotonic indifference curves, also known as well-behaved indifference 
curves. This utility function allows one to describe the preferences of an individual 
with respect to two goods, x1 and x2, according to equation
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where x1 and x2 are, respectively, the amount of goods 1 and 2, and c and d are
positive numbers that describe the preferences of an individual over the two goods. 
In the context of group decision making, a recent example is the utility function 
proposed by Leoneti [4]. This utility function allows for the modeling of the strategic 
interaction that occurs between two or more decision makers who have different 
preferences for meeting the multiple criteria that are under evaluation and who need 
to make a joint decision. An example of this utility function for group decisions can 
be seen, for the case of two players, in equation 
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where uj is the utility for the player i = 1,2, IA is the maximum value that the player 
can obtain from x1 and x2 together and M is an estimate for the trade-offs according to 
equation
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where, 
2121
cos1 xxxx x TD  is the scalar projection of the vector x1 on the vector x2,
21
cos xxT is the angle between the two vectors, 222212 ... ccccx  is the norm 
of the respective vector with c criteria . The image of M (range of the function 
values) varies between 0 and 1 (due to the conditional G ), meaning the closer it is to 
1 the more similar are the alternatives. An example of modeling using this utility 
function in a group environment is the battle of the sexes game, where the husband 
and wife must decide where to go out together. These two players have different 
preferences and therefore different utilities. For example, let us consider that the 
husband and wife have different preferences over two criteria, “Adventure” and 
“Romance”. Consequently, they will have different utilities for going together either 
to “Cinema” or “Football”. Figure 1 shows how such a game would be modeled using 
the utility function of equation 2 and demonstrates the utility for each player 
depending on their choice and on the choice of the others.
Football (F) Cinema (C)
Football (F) ),(1 FFu ),(1 CFu
Cinema (C) ),(1 FCu ),(1 CCu
Football (F) Cinema (C)
Football (F) ),(2 FFu ),(2 CFu
Cinema (C) ),(2 FCu ),(2 CCu
Fig. 1. Framework for a game with two players (Husband left and Wife right) and two 
alternatives
In game theory, one way to solve the games is to use the concept of equilibrium.
The most famous is the equilibrium proposed by John Nash Jr. [5]. When adopting
the Nash equilibrium, the players involved have no incentive to change their 
preferences. This gives Nash’s solution an important property: stability. However, the 
Nash equilibrium has other important properties, one of them being that it may not be 
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an optimal choice under Pareto. In other words, an equilibrium can be reached that is 
not optimal for the players involved and in some cases, can be even worse, where the 
equilibrium is formed by the worst choices for all players (lose-lose situation). On the 
other hand, in negotiations, an important aspect to be considered is one’s own utility 
and the utility of the others involved in the process, which is known as a win-win 
situation [6].
In this sense, Gimon [7] states that it is beneficial for an agent to take into account 
how beneficial his concession is for the opponent as well as how many unforced 
concessions the opponent has made in the past for that agent. The author states that 
the negotiator’s rationale is dynamically changing in a series of negotiations with the 
same opponents, and this change could be represented through refined utility function. 
The author proposes a refined utility function where the original utility value for each 
alternative is adjusted by a component that represents how beneficial the alternative is 
for the opponent compared to the agent’s ideal alternative and taking into account the 
balance of concessions made in the past. Therefore, Gimon [7] refined utility function 
considers not only individual utility, but also the utility of their opponent. This quality
makes this function closer to a real-life negotiation. The refined utility function is 
presented in equation
)),,((),(),( ,2121,21,
cum
niinini BxxCfxxuxxu  (4)
where ui,n is the utility for the player i = 1,2 in the negotiation round n, Ci is the 
concession value given by the player in this round (difference between the alternative 
chosen and his ideal alternative), Bi,n is the accumulated value of all balances 
(difference between the two players' concessions). However, this refined utility 
function is limited to describe utility function dynamics in problems with a single 
criterion. To expand this limitation we propose to use Leoneti’s [4] utility function for 
multi-criteria negotiations, refining this utility functions within a negotiation series. 
In this sense, we propose modeling the refinement proposed by Gimon [7]
(equation 4) by using the utility function proposed by Leoneti [4] for group decision 
making (equations 2 and 3) in the form proposed by Cobb-Douglas [3] (equation 1),
where the preferences in a negotiation would be defined by the player’s preference 
between its own utility “me” and the utility of other players “us”1. A numerical 
example is presented to illustrate its application.
2 Materials and Methods
In order to make a more straightforward use of equation 1, we propose a 
monotonic transformation of this equation, as suggested by Varian [3]. Let us suppose 
that we are starting with the Cobb-Douglas function as proposed in equation 1. By
1 Although intuitively the idea of the modeling is suitable for situations with more than two 
players, in this paper it is presented in situations with only two players.
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raising utility to 
)(
1
dc  power, and defining )( dc
ca  we get equation 4, where
the property of the sum of the powers is equal to 1. 
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'HILQLWLRQ  3OD\HU SD\RII IXQFWLRQ ʌ Let ʌ: 2 o[0,1] be the payoff for a 
player i from the set of 2 players defined as equation 2, where ),( 21 xxjS is the 
utility value for the player when considering the basket composite by the alternatives 
x1 and x2 from the set of A alternatives. We have, therefore, the payoff function 
defined by equation 
),().,().,(),( 221121 IAxxxIAxxxi MMMS  (6)
where M is given by the pairwise comparison function M: c o[0,1], according to 
equation 3.
Definition 2 (The altruistic willing function Ȧ): Let Ȧ: 2 o[0,1] be the altruistic 
willing function for a player i from the set of 2 players defined as
߱௜ =
ଵି( ఉ೔ିఊ೔)
ଶ
,ݓ݄݁ݎ݁ ߚ௜ =
୺೔
୺೔ା୺ೕ
, ݅, ݆ א  {1, 2}, ݅ ് ݆ (7)
where ȝ௜ =  σ ߨ௜
௞௡
௞ୀ଴ , where ߨ௜
௞ is player’s i payoff on negotiation round k, and n
is number of negotiation rounds conducted; ߛ௜ is aspirational balance of the player i
negotiating with player j. The rationale behind the function Ȧ is the same as in the one 
proposed in Gimon [7]; that is, a player is more likely to play altruistically when the 
outcomes in the past negotiations were better for him.
Definition 3 (The player preference strategic decision ȥ): Let ȥ: c o[0,1] be 
the player preference strategic decision for a player j from the set of 2 players defined 
as equation 5, where ʌ is the utility value for the player, considering the basket 
composite by the alternatives x1 and x2 and Ȧ its probability of playing altruistically.
We have, therefore, the player preference strategic decision defined by equation 
)1(),( ai
a
iiii
 < ZSZS (8)
In this refined utility function (equation 8), we define the first component as the 
payoff for the player itself (“me” component) and the component as the probability of 
playing altruistically (“us” component). We calculated the results of thirty rounds of
negotiations between two players. In order to test the “me” versus “us” strategic 
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decision in a dynamic negotiation process, the parameters of a and ߛ௜ were modified 
in twelve different environments2 to test the players’ behaviors.
3 Results and Discussion
To verify the “me” versus “us” strategic decision in a dynamic negotiation process, 
we have calculated outcomes in the 2x2 battle of sexes game repeated 30 times for the 
same pairs of players with varying values of a and ߛ௜. The games were modeled from
the multi-criteria decision-making approach using equation 6, where two criteria were 
chosen (“Adventure” and “Romance”) in order to evaluate two alternatives “Cinema” 
and “Football”. The preference matrices and the weighing vectors used in the 
calculations are given in Table 1.
Table 1. Preference matrices
Adventure Romance
Football 10 0
Cinema 0 10
Weight 
vector
0.8 0.2
a) Husband
Adventure Romance
Football 10 0
Cinema 0 10
Weight 
vector
0.2 0.8
b) Wife
Table 2 reports the results of the calculations. All chosen Nash equilibria were 
Pareto optimal.
Table 2. Calculation results
a
(both)
No. of 
football
No. of 
cinema
% of 
football
% of 
cinema
ߚଵ ߚଶ
ߛଵ = 0.2, ߛଶ = 0.8
Envir. 1 0.3 5 25 17% 83% 0.21 0.79
Envir. 2 0.5 6 24 20% 80% 0.21 0.79
Envir. 3 0.7 6 24 20% 80% 0.2 0.8
ߛଵ = 0.5, ߛଶ = 0.5
Envir. 4 0.7 15 15 50% 50% 0.5 0.5
Envir. 5 0.5 15 15 50% 50% 0.5 0.5
Envir. 6 0.3 15 15 50% 50% 0.5 0.5
ߛଵ = 0.5, ߛଶ = 0.8
2 We define “environment” as the combination of parameters a and ߛ௜ which represents the 
percentage of concern regarding one’s own payoff (“me” component) and the aspirational 
balance that a player i is aiming for in each game (“us” component), respectively.
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Envir. 7 0.5 11 19 37% 63% 0.37 0.63
Envir. 8 0.7 11 19 37% 63% 0.37 0.63
Envir. 9 0.3 10 20 33% 67% 0.35 0.65
ߛଵ = 0.8, ߛଶ = 0.8
Envir. 10 0.7 15 15 50% 50% 0.5 0.5
Envir. 11 0.5 15 15 50% 50% 0.5 0.5
Envir. 12 0.3 15 15 50% 50% 0.5 0.5
By means of illustration, “Environment 1” simulates a scenario in which the 
Husband has an DVSLUDWLRQDOEDODQFHRIȖ1), whereas the Wife has an aspirational 
EDODQFHRIȖ2). From this profile, we can assume that Husband is more likely to 
play the game altruistically, while the Wife will not. Also, the parameter a (for both 
players) says that, apart from WKHLU VWDQGDUG EHKDYLRU JLYHQ E\ Ȗ1 DQG Ȗ2, they will 
adjust their behavior for playing with each other by giving less importance to their 
own utility (“me” component) than to the utility of others (“us” component), 
according to equation 8. It results that, despite the Wife’s strong trend to play 
unaltruistically, the amount of times that they decide go to football and cinema
closely matches the aspirational balance of each.
When two aspirational balances ߛଵ + ߛଶ = 1, the percentage of desired outcomes 
matches the balance allocation ߚ, thus proving the model. Note that our simulations 
include symmetric mirrored preferences only (in this case “0.8 and 0.2” to husband 
and “0.2 and 0.8” to wife for the criteria “Adventure” and “Romance”, respectively). 
When ߛଵ + ߛଶ > 1, it is impossible to satisfy both players’ aspirational balance and
the negotiation series would result in compromise balances, which are determined by 
the aspirational balances of both players and their preferences. In the case of 
symmetric preferences, the balance of the payoffs tends to converge to a limit equal to 
ߚ௜
ᇱ =
ఊ೔ା(ଵିఊೕ)
ଶ
.
Figure 2 shows the dynamics of balance allocation in a series of 30 negotiations. 
We present the cases when a=0.5 only. In the first round of negotiations where the
balance is 0 and an outcome would fully satisfy either one or the other player results 
in a model with alternations and the period depending on ߛଵ, ߛଶ. Figure 1 shows that 
the balance fluctuates around the aspirational balance or around a compromising 
balance value when achieving aspirational balance is not possible. The calculations 
confirm that the balance always tends to converge to a single limit. 
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a) Husband’s balance b) Wife’s balance
Fig. 2.  Dynamic balances in negotiation series (ܽ = 0.5). Environment 2 (ߛଵ = 0.5,ߛଶ = 0.5,
݈݋݊݃ ݐ݄݅ܿ݇ ݀ܽݏ݄݁ݏ), Environment 5 (ߛଵ = 0.2,ߛଶ = 0.8, ݏ݄݋ݎݐ ݀ܽݏ݄݁ݏ), Environment 8 
(ߛଵ = 0.5, ߛଶ = 0.8, ݀݋ݐݐ݁݀ ݈݅݊݁), and Environment 11 (ߛଵ = 0.8, ߛଶ = 0.8, ݏ݋݈݅݀ ݈݅݊݁) are 
shown on the chart.
4 Conclusions
This paper studies dynamic negotiations considered as a multi-criteria game with 
two or more players. We propose using the Cobb-Douglas function to describe a 
refined utility function as a weighted product of the user’s utility (“me” component) 
and the probability to play altruistically (“us” component). The function uses a utility 
function proposed by Leoneti [4] for multi-criteria decision problems with two or 
more players. We proposed to change this utility function after each negotiations
using the approach proposed by Gimon [7] to calculate the probability of playing 
altruistically based on the balance of past outcomes.
The numerical example shows that when the proposed function is used in dynamic 
games, the Nash equilibria (i.e. optimal strategies) of the game will alternate. These 
alternations tend to satisfy the players’ aspirational outcomes when they are 
achievable. Otherwise, they result in compromising outcomes. 
The outcomes of the modeled games were also Pareto optimal. However, further 
research should study Pareto optimality with preferences other than the mirrored 
preferences used. Also, we considered aspirational balances to be constant during the 
series of negotiations. However, research literature suggests that aspirations may 
change over time. Further research should be done to incorporate dynamic aspirations 
into the model.
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Abstract. Neuroscience approach has presented advances in connection with 
other areas of knowledge by providing understanding about brain function and 
promoting improvements in systems, in general. For instance, Decision Support 
Systems (DSS) may be challenging for providing proper preference modeling 
tools, which can be benefited from neuroscience experiments. This work deals 
with neuroscience experiments for preference modeling in decision making 
with FITradeoff method. The FITradeoff is a flexible and interactive method for 
coping with multicriteria additive model. It uses graphical visualization in some 
steps to support decision makers in the elicitation process and for decision 
analysis, if a few incomparable alternatives are found at the end of the process.
So, this work shows which kind of contribution neuroscience can provide for 
designing DSS and for improving the support of analysts in multicriteria 
decision making, particularly dealing with preferences in group decisions for 
MCDM.
Keywords: Decision Neuroscience, Neuroeconomics, Multicriteria Group 
Decision Making, FITradeoff method.
1 Introduction
Preference modeling in group decision making is not an easy task, since in most cases 
different and conflicting perceptions of the problem are involved in the analysis. 
Recent advances in cognitive neuroscience and neuroeconomics can help this process, 
since analysts can better understand how decision makers think and act when they are 
making decisions. This field of research related to neuroscience is uncovering the 
neural system of cognitive, emotional, social and rational process. These advances are 
offering new insights into the complex interplay between areas, promoting studies and 
improvements in marketing, information processing and systems, decision making,
game theory psychology and economy [1, 2, 3, 4, 5].
In this context, this approach provides an interdisciplinary research that aims to 
analyze the neural systems and its implication for human behavioral. In decision 
making, the study is relevant to support the analyst to understanding how decision 
makers use information from the environment to make decisions, and thus aid
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preference modeling and improve decision support systems (DSS) in group decision.
So this work intends to relate the importance of decision neuroscience in the design of 
a new elicitation method for aiding multicriteria decision making (MCDM) problems, 
FITradeoff method. In the presentation, the methodology will be clarified in more 
details with the experiment design and examples will be given in order to support the 
conclusions by numbers and graphics.
2 Preference Modeling with FITradeoff 
The FITradeoff method [6] is characterized as a flexible and interactive method for 
elicitation process in multicriteria decision making problems. This new method is 
based on the traditional tradeoff procedure [7], keeping its axiomatic structure.
In the traditional tradeoff elicitation process, the decision makers compare 
consequences trying to find indifferent relations between them, which are not an easy 
task, leading to inconsistencies in the process. The difficulty of elicitation questions in 
the tradeoff procedure leads to 67% of inconsistency in final results, according to 
behavioral studies [8].
Therefore, one of the main benefits of FITradeoff compared to the tradeoff is the 
absence of these difficult questions in the process. Instead, in FITradeoff method 
decision makers have to give only strict preference statements, which are much easier 
to provide.
Another benefit of FITradeoff is the flexibility in the process. This method uses 
partial information about the decision makers’ preferences, so the DMs do not need to 
complete all the steps to find the solution. In this method, after each question
answered, partial results can be observed and decision makers can decide whether to 
select one of the potentially optimal alternatives (POA) and stop the process, or to 
continue answering the elicitation questions. Besides that, graphical visualization with 
the potentially optimal alternatives can be used to support this process. Therefore, this 
method compiles a strong axiomatic structure with flexibility in the decision making 
process.
3 Decision Neuroscience Experiments 
As described in the introduction, neuroscience is an approach that involves interest of 
many areas of knowledge. Because of its importance, many tools were developed to 
measure brain process related to decision making. Some examples of tools applied to 
these studies are: the eye tracking, responsible to measure eye movements and pupil,
the electroencephalogram (EEG), responsible to measure the areas of brain.
Related with design preference modeling in FITradeoff method [6], represented 
basically by graphics in elicitation process and in partial results, the study about 
neuroscience is important to understand how decision makers understands the
elicitation questions using the design and how they select an alternative in a group of 
potentially optimal alternatives (POA).
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In this context, some measures can be analyzed to answer these questions above
and improve the design of FITradeoff method, being useful in evaluation of group 
decision preference modeling. Related with the design of FITradeoff, the combination 
of metrics offered by the eye tracking and EEG can be a great option.
The eye tracking is responsible for measure the eye movements, some important 
metric for this analyses is the pupil diameter. The changes in pupil diameter, called 
pupillometry, is a function of cognitive processing. In situations with difficult 
decision making, pupil dilatation can inform decision thresholds [9]. Besides that, the 
pupil diameter can be used as an implicit metric of uncertainty [10]. So with this 
metric the analyst can evaluate if the design used represent low or big cognitive effort 
for decision makers. The experiment was designed with several set of graphical 
visualizations, changing the number of criteria and alternatives (three to five) [11].
The EEG is responsible for capturing the electrical signal generated in transmission 
of information between the neurons. In this context, the use of EEG in the graphical 
visualization in FITradeoff is important to investigate the areas of the brain that are 
activated during the elicitation process [11]. Thus, based on this information, the 
analyst is able to evaluate which information within the design of DSS is generating 
highest conflict for decision makers.
4 Conclusion 
The potentially use of neuroscience for aiding preference modeling in group decision 
making problems, especially when multiple criteria are involved, is briefly described 
in this work within the specific case of FITradeoff method, with partial results of this 
researches in progress. The FITradeoff is a flexible and interactive method that uses
the graphical visualization in two steps, the elicitation process and the partial results.
So, to improve the design of this method and give more information to the analyst 
about all the elicitation process, the neuroscience with its tools can be used to bring 
insights for the decision making process, and thus contribute for preference modeling 
in group decision for MCDM.
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Abstract. Cities are regularly being recognized as a focal point for producing 
public service innovations and supporting economies at the local and national 
levels.  The increased focus on cities to deliver economic vitality, social 
development, and environmental sustainability (otherwise known as the triple 
bottom line) is resulting in new public administrative approaches that identify 
beneficial policy options.  This proposal advances an unconventional approach 
for the application of open data, to identify stakeholders, formulate innovative,
viable options and assist with preference ranking of states to develop policies that 
derive a positive triple bottom line.  A case study using this approach is then 
applied to leverage procurement processes to achieve beneficial policy outcomes 
in Toronto, Canada.
Keywords: decision-making, innovation, open data, policy, values
1 Introduction
It has been accepted that open data will become increasingly important for the 
stimulation of new, innovative public services [1].  This open data movement is a 
worldwide phenomenon, with governments around the globe making their data 
accessible to the public by publishing it on the web [2].  From an ideological 
perspective, the publication of such data aims to increase democratic accountability, 
enhance transparency, foster civic engagement, and stimulate economic growth [2].
However, as Chauhan et al. [3] identifies, merely publishing data does not necessarily 
result in achieving value.  While the publication of open data is becoming a more 
popular activity, the approaches to apply and integrate open data within the policy cycle 
remain poorly understood, with limited scholarly research available.
Currently, the majority of policy recommendations are primarily based on
alternative-based approaches; which only consider objectives or criteria to evaluate 
alternating solutions after potential solutions (or alternatives) are identified [4]. In 
contrast, a value-focused approach enables a decision-maker to focus on strategic 
activities essential to the problem, before any contemplation of a solution [4]. This type 
of approach enables more appealing solutions and identifies more appropriate policy 
issues to address [4]. By integrating open data analytics with a value-focused approach 
to policy formulation, a more strategic alignment of policy objectives and outcomes 
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can be synthesized. It is also important to identify that policy recommendations are not
formulated in a vacuum; they are a composite of multiple stakeholders’ preferences.
Despite open data being freely available, policy formulation models have yet to 
involve open data and promote a positive triple bottom line (positive economic vitality, 
social development, and environmental sustainability).  The generation of any value-
focused policies involving open data is far from straightforward and poorly understood
within the scholarly literature. The central question remains:  How can governments 
harness a value-focused, open data approach to driving a positive triple bottom line
while deriving benefits for an ecosystem of heterogeneous stakeholders, all with their 
own objectives? The aim of this study is to exemplify an open data analytical approach 
that enables government decision-makers to identify stakeholders, their options and 
associated preferential rankings when formulating innovative policy recommendations.  
This approach is then applied within a case study context involving the City of Toronto, 
Canada, to demonstrate its efficacy.
2 Innovation and the Smart Cities Movement
By its definition, innovation is simply any process that leads to a novel outcome [5].
From a government perspective, open data analytics enables the potential to access
information from data collected through various sources [6].  At present, these data 
sources primarily include smartphones, computers, sensors, cameras, global 
positioning systems, social networking sites, commercial transactions, and games [6].
At a foundational level, open data analytics has great potential to help drive innovation
and identify new opportunities within governments and their public services. In 
addition, open data analytics is proposed to enable smarter policy recommendations.
A 'smart city' is broadly defined as a city seeking to address public issues via 
information and communication technology-based solutions on the basis of a multi-
stakeholder, municipally based partnerships while ensuring that benefits are realized in 
a manner unique [7] and consistent with its core values of economic, social and 
environmental vitality [2]. Smart city initiatives encompass a diversified set of publicly
funded activities: from building public transportation systems to supporting creative 
innovation, or designing energy-saving policies [7]. Fundamental to a smart city's 
success is how it acts as local innovation platforms, bringing together all involved 
stakeholders [1]. As Keeney [4] has already identified, values, being the principles for 
evaluating the desirability of any possible alternative or consequence should be the 
driving force for decision-making.  To this end, a smart city must identify a positive
triple bottom line as a value, in addition to enabling innovation platforms and involving 
stakeholders, when formulating policies.
3 Value-focused, Open Data Driven Approach to Policy 
Formulation
Any value-focused, open data-driven approach is designed to focus the decision-
maker on essential activities [4], stakeholders and objectives before they formulate any
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policy recommendations. This type of approach assists in uncovering hidden policy 
objectives and can lead to more productive information collection [4]. Furthermore, it
has been shown to improve the communication among all parties involved in policy 
recommendations, facilitate the involvement of multiple stakeholders, and enhance the 
coordination of interconnected decisions [4]. From this perspective, policy value refers 
to the necessity of innovation that enables citizens and their local government to 
integrate, analyze and visualize different kinds of solutions [3]. Through the 
incorporation of open data analytics within a value-focused open data approach, a more 
thorough and integrated policy recommendations will result.
According to Tukiainen et al. [8], the first step for a city to become drivers of 
innovation using open data is to act as orchestrators that connect various parties to 
create and maintain sustainable ecosystems.  Within a policy development context, 
there are a substantial amount of stakeholders including elected officials, government 
administrators, suppliers, interest groups, residents, think-tanks, consultants, non-
governmental organizations, and policy entrepreneurs [9].  It has been suggested that 
stakeholders, within an open data context, can work as receivers or senders of 
information (or both) [9].
This study asserts that the formulation of any policy recommendation should involve
multiple stakeholders, and apply open data analytics to assist with the identification of 
policy options and stakeholder preferences.  Tukiainen et al. [8] asserted that cities 
should establish an active dialogue with their citizens, and private and public sector 
actors to co-create, develop, test and offer service innovations that utilize diverse sets 
of platforms.  This process requires an effective stakeholder management approach that 
utilizes a technological platform to interact with and gather information from 
stakeholders. To readily access the potential value of open data, this study will propose 
an open data analytical methodology to identify (1) stakeholders involved; (2) policy 
options; and (3) stakeholders’ preferences.
4 Case Study: City of Toronto, Canada
The City of Toronto is currently developing an Open Data Strategic Plan which will 
aim to improve the delivery of public services, make information more accessible and 
support initiatives that build public trust in government.  The public procurement 
process provides local governments the opportunity to leverage spending to achieve 
specific economic, social and environmental outcomes, which strategically align with
the principles of developing a smart city.
As part of this initiative, the City of Toronto is also proposing to make public 
procurement data readily available online. The recent addition of the Social 
Procurement Policy in the City of Toronto, provides an opportune framework to apply 
the proposed value-focused, open data approach and apply open data analytical 
methods to illustrate the effectiveness of the approach.  For this study, an online 
surveying platform will be applied to gather information from identified stakeholders
and utilize the open data made available by the City to determine policy options and 
stakeholder preferences.
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Abstract. This work presents a methodology to assist participatory decision-
making in integrated water management and planning. A group approach of 
Value-Focused Thinking is used to identify the decision-makers’ values. Based 
on these values, alternatives are created and attributes identified to evaluate 
these alternatives. The process stimulates interaction and communication and 
enables the problem to be modelled based on the perspectives of the group 
rather than on those of single individuals. A multiple-attribute value function 
aggregates the group’s preferences. A virtual case-study is used to illustrate the 
applicability of the methodology.
Keywords: water resources management; value-focused thinking; group 
decision; participatory decision-making.
1   Introduction
Many countries around the world, such as France, China, Brazil and India, have 
adopted an integrated approach to managing the use of water resources (Deng et al. 
2016). An Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) takes into consideration 
that fresh water is a finite resource, however essential to sustain economic 
development, life and the environment. An IWRM also bears in mind that the 
management of water must include the participation by the community, policy-makers 
and water users (Hassing et al. 2009; Urtiga and Morais 2016, Medeiros et al 2017).
In group decision-making two or more DMs must together choose an alternative 
from a set of two or more alternatives that will represent the group’s objectives. 
Usually, decision-making methods tackle a decision problem by considering that a set 
of alternatives is given, following which the objectives and criteria are considered. 
However, the DMs could consider the values of the group prior to identifying the 
alternatives, in order to choose the solution that bests represent the group’s objectives. 
Baring this in mind, a methodology is proposed to assist the DMs from the beginning 
of identifying the problem and structuring objectives for the group members. It also 
assists the DMs to identify common attributes so as to measure the objectives and to 
identify relevant alternatives for the group. Thus, the DMs are able to make decisions 
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considering the group’s perspective of the problem, but without losing sight of the 
individuality of each member of the group, since the evaluation is made by each DM 
individually and subsequently aggregated for the group evaluation. The methodology
promotes communication, interaction and structures the problem as part of the group 
decision process. A virtual case-study on a watershed conservation problem in Brazil 
is used to illustrate its applicability.
2 Results
The steps of the methodology are presented in Figure 1. A virtual case study is is 
presented which is based on a realistic decision problem of a Watershed Committee 
having to decide which option it should take to address a problem of pollution and 
degradation in the watershed they represent. Three DMs are considered: i) a 
representative of the local community; ii) a representative of the local authority; iii) a 
representative of industry.
Fig. 1. Structure of the group-decision framework
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The process starts by identifying and structuring the DMs’ objectives using Value-
focused Thinking (VFT) techniques. As means of illustration, the structuring of 
objectives for the DM “representative of the local community” is presented in Table 
2.
Table 2. Hierarchy of Objectives for the representative of the local community
To maximize the quality of life
1. To maximize income
1.1 To maximize the employment rate
1.1.1 To keep production and services in different economic sectors
1.1.1.1 To guarantee water for the community’s multiple economic uses
2. To ensure good health and well-being
2.1 To have good water for leisure and sports
2.2 To have water in an amount that meets people's basic needs
2.2.1 To improve sanitation
2.2.2 To guarantee clean water for people and animals
2.2.2.1 To maximize the quality of water
Having obtained the hierarchy of objectives for each DM individually, the 
facilitator can start the process of identifying clusters and the relationships that exist 
between the objectives if the DM is different. This is important because when similar 
objectives are identified this means that there is a common point between the DMs.
Thus it is possible to identify alternatives that will help the DMs achieve that common 
objective. However, all alternatives suggested by the DMs should be considered. If a 
DM finds that an alternative is not appropriate, he or she can evaluate it poorly 
according to his/her objectives. 
Based on the DM’s objectives, alternatives are identified and the attribute to 
evaluate the alternatives regarding that objective are also identified. The following 
attributes were identified for all DMs: i) the tax rate percentage, ii) the concentration 
of coliforms/100milliliters, iii) the number of new job vacancies, iv) the number of 
hectares of planted riparian vegetation and, v) the response time, which refers to how 
long an alternative implemented takes to show results. Six alternatives are identified 
based on the DMs’ values: i) implementation of a sewage system (A1), ii) new 
treatment station (A2), iii) construction of a landfill site (A3), iv) educational 
campaign to reduce pollution (A4), v) protection of the dam (A5), vi) improve 
collection of waste material (A6).
After identifying the attributes and alternatives, each group member evaluates the 
alternatives based on an individual additive value function. The individual values are 
aggregated in a group value function. For each DMi, there is a value-function to 
evaluate the alternatives, such as shown in Equation 1.
(1)
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where kj are the constant scales that reflect the trade-offs between the attributes, 
, and vj the value given to the performance of each alternative in each 
criterion j. 
The group function will be determined by Equation 2.
(2)
where wi is the weight of the evaluation of each DM for the group evaluation also 
considering his/her relative importance, and .
Having obtained the group’s evaluation of alternatives, the alternative chosen is A3
(construction of a landfill site), which is the best alternative for the government 
representative and second best for the Industry and community representatives. 
Alternatives A1, A6 and A3 are preferred to alternatives A2, A5 and A4 by all DMs.
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Abstract. The main features of the adaptation to a face-to-face cooperative 
group approach of an interactive decision support tool previously developed 
with the aim of supporting decisions concerning multicriteria location problems
are described. In the application implemented there is no inter-criterion 
aggregation, so there is no need to reduce the various evaluation dimensions 
into the same scale. It allows for the individual intervention of several elements 
of the group, includes some logical tools as well as the possibility of 
introducing constraints. Furthermore, it propitiates an extensive use of 
interactive graphics. A guided tour of the desktop application emphasizing its 
potentialities and limitations is presented. 
Keywords: Cooperative group decision, Multicriteria analysis, Interactive 
decision support tool
1 Motivation
In the past, the authors of this communication developed an interactive decision 
support tool named SABILOC. It is aimed at supporting decisions concerning 
multicriteria location problems [1]. The tool combines an interactive bicriteria 
mathematical programming module with a multi-attribute analysis module allowing 
the decision makers to proceed with a more detailed analysis of a subset of solutions 
selected from the first interactive phase. The application of this DSS to problems 
involving environmental issues involves complex and multi-disciplinary tasks dealing 
with psychological, sociological, cognitive and political issues. In these 
circumstances, we designed a multi-attribute module adequate to combine ill-
structured Human intervention with the computational decision support. The first 
version of the software is described in [2, 3] and it is based on an interactive 
implementation of the conjunctive method, enabling the consideration of up to three 
performance thresholds, having in mind to classify the objects under evaluation, and 
extensively using graphic tools in order to improve human-computer interaction. This 
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software is in essence very simple. There is no inter-criterion aggregation, so there is 
no need to reduce the various evaluation dimensions into the same scale, thereby 
avoiding all possible associated distortions, which are very common for instance 
when the aggregation is based on the use of weights. Reducing the multidimensional 
evaluation of objects to a scalar by recurring to aggregation procedures enables, the 
ranking of those objects, but it is our conviction that these procedures are reductive, in 
many situations, since, even in the cases where the used aggregation rules are 
technically acceptable, they involve a subjective character and often an ideological 
charge. So, the contents and the architecture of those indices are conditioned by the 
ideological/interest positions of the involved politic, economic and social actors. 
In [4] this approach was tested by assessing the Rio de Janeiro State’s Green 
Economy considering the most representative sectors of activity. It was a success 
namely because it avoids the use of a single index of green economy. Furthermore, 
[5] carried out a study regarding the quality of life and sustainability. Both studies 
show the usefulness of the approach in complex decision problems involving very 
subjective options of the decision makers. Furthermore, these problems usually 
involve multiple actors suggesting the necessity of adapting the software to this issue. 
It must be reminded that Group Decision is a complex process involving 
multidisciplinary topics from psychology, sociology, organizational and political 
sciences, etc. Effective Group Decision Support Systems involve not only new 
information and communication technologies (ICT) and Operations 
Research/Management Science (OR/MS) models, but also take into account
behavioral issues.
The main features required to a face-to-face cooperative group approach were 
suggested in [6], based on the above referred to case dealing with quality of life and 
sustainability. Recently this work was deepened and the software implemented. This 
communication consists in a guided tour of the desktop application emphasizing its 
potentialities and limitations.
The next section starts by a review of the original software. It continues by 
presenting the main features of the Group Decision module, namely:
a. Allowing the individual intervention of several elements of the group. The 
graphical representations put in evidence the actions of the different actors and,
when there is no consensus, the software allows identifying how far apart they 
are;
b. Some logical tools allowing a simple identification of the conclusions supported 
by all elements of the group or by any pre-specified subset of them; those 
supported by at least one element of the group; and those supported by at least a 
pre-specified number of elements of the group;
c. The software allows the introduction of hidden constraints on the feasible 
variations of the above referred to thresholds. It will be put in evidence that this 
issue is particularly useful in what concerns group decision settings.
The conference presentation is supported by a software demonstration.
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2 A summary of the desktop application’s guided tour
2.1 The single user software tool – a brief review
To illustrate the software, we will use the case study of a real-world problem applied 
to waste transfer station siting. This case study was used in [1], at the time 
considering just a personal appreciation of objects under evaluation by a single 
decision-maker. In short, the problem consisted in identifying a suitable site where the 
company responsible for the treatment, recovery and disposal of urban solid waste 
produced in some municipalities should build a waste transfer station. As it is known, 
site suitability depends on numerous technical, environmental, economic, social and 
political criteria. 
The software’s desktop interface (Fig. 1) presents on the left-hand side the 
performance matrix, in which each row describes an alternative (potential site to 
install a waste transfer station) and each column describes the performance 
(quantitatively or qualitatively) of the alternatives against each attribute (attributes 1, 
2 and 3 represent environmental issues; attribute 4 represents accessibility, attributes 
5 and 6 represent costs, attributes 7 and 8 represent equity measures of environmental 
effects, and attributes 9 and 10 represent equity measures of accessibility). On the 
right-hand side of the desktop interface the performances are represented through a 
radar chart, enabling the decision-makers to easily visualize the peculiar differences 
between alternatives when facing all the criteria. On this radar, each axis represents an 
attribute and the performances of alternatives are plotted along the axes. Each 
alternative is represented in the chart through a star, filled or not, in which the vertices 
lie on the axes (in example of Fig. 1 we can see the filled star relative to alternative 3 
in the foreground).
Some tools are available to start analyzing the performance matrix. The application 
allows the users to disregard redundant criteria, by inactivating those in which all the 
alternatives have exactly the same or similar (considering a small tolerance)
performance values. Moreover, it also allows the users to inactivate dominated, or 
even quasi-dominated1, alternatives (in example of Fig.1 alternatives 4, 6, 7 and 9 to
12 are inactivated, so they appear in red).
As already mentioned, the multi-attribute analysis module stands for an interactive
implementation of a version of the conjunctive method2. To put into practice the 
method, the software enables the consideration of up to three performance thresholds, 
having in mind to classify the alternatives under evaluation into four classes: 
“unacceptable”, “acceptable”, “good” and “excellent”. For details about the 
manipulation of the application, please see [1, 2, 3]. 
1 The concept of quasi-dominance extends the concept of dominance between alternatives 
considering a tolerance ߝ > 0.
2 In its elementary version consists in eliminating alternatives that do not reach specific 
performance levels for all the criteria here considered.
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Fig. 1 Software’s desktop interface.
2.2 Main features of the Group Decision module: outline and exemplification
2.2.1   Individual intervention of the elements of the group
The process of setting the thresholds for the various attributes (through the sliding 
controls – see left side of Fig. 2 - or through the adjustable pinpoints on the radar 
chart – see right side of Fig. 2) may be carried out by each one of the decision-
makers. The representation of the thresholds in the radar chart to delimitate classes is 
made through different colors, depending on the threshold and on the decision-maker.
Fig. 2 shows the windows where the elements of the group can set their thresholds,
in this case the first two decision-makers, and the matrix of the objects under 
evaluation with the corresponding performance on each attribute. To select a site to 
build a waste transfer station, a balance needs to be achieved among the multiple 
decision-makers that might have conflicting objectives. For example, a site centrally 
located in the area where waste is generated would be economically better but it 
would disturb the wellbeing of people living or working near the site, causing public 
concerns and opposition. Here we assume that the first decision-maker is more 
concerned with the costs, being more demanding with attributes 5 and 6, but also with
attributes of accessibility. On the other hand, as we can see in Fig. 2, the second 
decision-maker is more concerned with the environmental impact caused by waste 
transfer stations, i.e. attributes 1, 2, 3, 7 and 8.
When a user manipulates/changes the thresholds, the first column of the matrix 
automatically informs through colors which class the objects under study belong to, 
giving an immediate feedback about his/her choices. 
The representation in the radar chart of the three thresholds, corresponding to level 
0, level 1 and level 2, is made through unfilled polygons using colored solid, dashed 
and dotted lines. Depending on the user, the colors are different but in any case, the 
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dark color represents level 0, the intermediate color level 1 and the light color 
represents level 2. Since the implemented algorithm uses the conjunctive rule the 
alternatives will appear with the following colors: red if at least one of its attributes 
does not reach the reservation level (level 0 or “acceptable” threshold); orange if 
every attributes satisfy level 0 but at least one attribute does not reach the “good” 
threshold (level 1); yellow if every attributes satisfy the “good” threshold but at least 
one attribute does not reach the “excellent” threshold (level 2) and green if every 
attributes satisfy the “excellent” threshold.
Fig. 2 Setting of thresholds.
By moving the mouse over a cell relative to an alternative, the application gives 
some important information about it, namely:
x The performance thresholds, defined by the user, responsible for the current 
classification of the alternative;
x For each threshold identified in the previous point, and considering each 
dimension, how far (in absolute value and also in percentage) is the alternative’s 
performance from the corresponding value of the threshold;
x Also for each threshold identified, in the absence of consensus between decision-
makers, the comparison between the user requirements.
For the example shown in Fig. 2, the information associated with alternative 3, for 
decision-maker 2, is, in short: a) the classification in class “good” is due to the level 
2 thresholds not satisfied by attributes 2, 7 and 8; b) the alternative’s performance is 
17% worse than level 2 threshold of attribute 2, 4.8% worse than level 2 threshold of 
attribute 7 and 4.3% worse than level 2 threshold of attribute 8; c) for all attributes, 
the other decision-maker is less demanding. For the other user this alternative is 
classified in class “excellent”.
This way, the manipulation of the controls and the analysis of the information 
provided by the software allow users to gradually become aware of the problem under 
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study and give rise to a complete understanding of the behavior of the alternatives
when dealing with the levels required for the criteria.
2.2.2   Logical tools
In order to facilitate the perception of all the information, the software allows making
logical operations between the considerations of the users. At present, the operations 
implemented are disjunction and conjunction between 2 or 3 users. In case of the 
operator disjunction, an object is classified in the class corresponding to the highest
threshold if satisfies for at least one of the users involved in the operation. The 
operator conjunction assigns an object to the class corresponding to the highest 
threshold it satisfies for all the users involved in the operation. Fig. 3 shows the result
of disjunction and conjunction operators between decision-makers 1 and 2, in the
same window where the attribute’s thresholds of both users are presented. In this case, 
alternative 3 is yellow for the conjunction and green for the disjunction, confirming 
that it is good for one of the users and excellent for the other. In a situation with more 
users this can be useful. Once again, some new information can be attained by 
moving the mouse over a cell relative to an alternative in an operator column. Finally, 
it is also possible to identify the class that guarantees the satisfaction of at least any 
two decision-makers. Of course, if considering more than three users/decision makers 
it should be possible to make this analysis for any sub-set of users.
Fig. 3 Disjunction and conjunction operators.
2.2.3 Constraints on threshold variations
Another tool presented here, which can be very useful, especially in the case of 
several decision agents, is the possibility of including hidden constraints in the 
definition of each one of the thresholds, for each one of the decision-makers.
In many situations, there are dependencies among dimensions and so among the 
corresponding thresholds. The computational tool under development can be very 
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useful, because it allows the introduction, in the background, of linear constraints on 
the variations in the thresholds, limiting or imposing their joint variation / fixation.
The tool supports numerous forms of functional and logic processing semantics. Fig. 
4 shows an example in which two constraints, in level 2 threshold, were added for the 
first decision-maker. 
The first constraint
C6 := 2*C5 (1)
assigns the double of increase or decrease of the value of level 2 threshold in criterion 
5 to the same threshold variation (in %) in criterion 6. So, any change in the value of 
level 2 threshold of criterion 5 has implications on the level 2 threshold of criterion 6.
The second constraint
if (C9 > 0) C10 := C9 (2)
assigns the increase, and only the increase, of the level 2 threshold value in criterion 9 
to the same threshold variation (in %) in criterion 10.
Fig. 4 Level threshold constraints dialogue box.
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3 A case study: Software test in progress
Previously, it was concluded that the usefulness of the single user/decision maker 
version of this software is mostly due to its simplicity, both conceptually and from the 
operational point of view, as well as to the extensive interactive graphic 
representations and to its flexibility of use. In the previously mentioned case study 
referring to a real-world problem applied to waste transfer station siting, as in [4], we
realized that one of the limitations of the application was not being able to deal 
explicitly with a cooperative and diversified group of actors involved in this complex 
problem. Of course, this was one of the motivations for the development of the new 
module of the desktop application here presented.
The software demo in the conference presentation will be supported by the case 
study referring to waste transfer station siting, simulating the cooperation of two
decision makers privileging economic and environmental issues, respectively. This 
experience, now in progress, will be reported in a paper to be submitted after the 
conference.
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Abstract. The literature presents several supplier section models, which discuss 
what features might be present in this type of analysis. A given problem might 
be evaluated differently depending on the DM, due to his/her having different 
objectives for the same problem and, due to the diversity found in civil con-
struction projects, different activities have to be hired, and these have different 
effects on the project. In addition, the hiring process might end up with a nego-
tiation phase between the contractor and the top rated subcontractors. Thereby, 
in order to support DMs of contractors to follow a structured decision process to 
reach a better deal, this article proposes a framework to aid DMs in selecting 
subcontractors considering three models to deal with each phase of the hiring 
process. One for sorting of activities into classes, then the selection and aggre-
gation of DMs’ preferences and finally a negotiation step takes place.
Keywords: voting procedure; preference elicitation; Additive-veto model; sort-
ing problematic; negotiation.
1   Introduction
Outsourcing different services and searching for flexibility is a reality of current 
supply chain management [1]. Due to the need to outsource or subcontract services, 
several problems have been addressed in the literature, such as a single supplier and 
multiple firms forming a coalition for cooperative replenishment [2], for the purposes 
of jointly setting the control policies for production and subcontracting while taking 
environmental legislation into account [3], to evaluate the price of the product to be 
supplied [4], and to select outsourcers/subcontractors [5]. Outsourcing activities in the 
CC is part of the culture of this sector [6], about which several authors have expressed 
concern. The oversupply of specialist firms and the ease with which they can enter the 
marketplace are two of the main concerns [7]. This directly affects procedures for 
selecting such subcontractors, because it is necessary to verify if they are reliable. In 
addition, Keshavarz Ghorabaee et al. [8] classifies the selection process as a Mul-
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ticriteria problem, because DMs have to take into account qualitative and quantitative 
criteria. 
In order to reduce the problems created by contractors, Holt, Olomolaiye and Har-
ris [9] proposed using prequalification of subcontractors before the selection. Gonçalo 
and Alencar [10] proposed to sort activities and materials into classes according to 
their impact on the company´s strategic results by using PROMSORT [11] prior to the 
selection itself. The main idea was to focus on activities or products that had the 
greatest effect on the results of the business. This approach allows DMs to save time 
that would otherwise be spent on the selection process on an activity that does not 
cause a positive effect on the project. Palha, de Almeida & Alencar [12] proposed to 
sort alternatives into classes based on the risk and impact that the activities cause to a 
CC project for which they used ROR-UTADIS. 
In today’s businesses scenarios, decisions are no longer individual; they often re-
quire a group to participate in them [13]. The idea is to reduce the risks that might be 
caused by one single DM and to allow DMs to make decisions in a decentralized en-
vironment. De Almeida [14] states that the group decision aggregation is divided into 
those that aggregate DMs' initial preferences, such as in Chen [15], and those that 
aggregate DMs' individual choices, such as in Karsak and Dursun [16]. Some models 
do not aggregate at all, but instead present DMs with a general evaluation to help 
them reach a consensual decision as in Shemshadi et al. [17].
Because groups of DMs increasingly make managerial decisions [18], their prefer-
ences have to be aggregated in order to reach a social choice and to do that one of the 
aggregation procedures considered to be democratic is that of voting [19]. Because an 
analyst chooses the voting procedure, it may not be suitable for the decision process 
faced by the DMs. Therefore, de Almeida and Nurmi [18] proposed a framework to 
help DMs choose the voting procedure by considering their preferences with respect 
to the problem. The choice is made by considering the voting procedures as alterna-
tives and their properties as criteria. In addition, Nurmi [20] presented a set of proper-
ties to be evaluated as binary. Also, research interest in a voting procedure, which 
deals with partial information is growing [21,22]. Therefore, a criterion that considers 
this property should be included in the analysis.
In addition, the supplier selection problem also involves a negotiation process, be-
cause the suppliers present different performances in different criteria and these per-
formances might be negotiated to make the alternative competitive [23]. In business 
environments, the use of NSS may aid DMs to find a better solution faster. Several
NSSs have already been built with different propositions, and in none of them one 
party have information about the preference structure of his/her opponent. Vetschera 
[24] emphasized the importance of knowing about one’s own preferences and the 
opponent’s preferences to find a superior agreement. Usually DMs have difficulties in 
presenting their own preferences [25] and difficulties in inferring the opponents’ pref-
erences [24]. In addition, in negotiation process, agents are employed to work on 
behalf of one party. Yu and Wong [26] proposed a multi-agent model, where they use 
synergy to evaluate multi-products supplier selection and run a negotiation with top-
ranked suppliers evaluating the synergy among products. Dzeng and Lin [27] pro-
posed agents for supporting construction procurement negotiation using genetic algo-
rithms. Later on, the authors run an experiment to evaluate its efficiency of their 
agents and verified and improvement in negotiations from 1.1% to 9.8% when com-
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pared to the ones dealt by humans [28]. Vetschera [24] presented a model to aid the 
negotiator to infer the preferences of the opponent. Non-biased mediators were found 
in the literature to provide advice in the post-negotiation phase [29] or to elicit prefer-
ences from negotiators [25].
Usually, when the selection process is considered as a group decision, the proposed 
methods consider DMs have the same objectives regarding the problem. When they 
aggregate DMs’ individual choices, they do not consider that the DMs might have 
different objectives and different rationalities. In addition, there is no proposition to 
evaluate the activities and subcontractors differently, in line with their effect on a 
project. The literature does not take into consideration that after receiving a bid, a 
negotiation is required and the process might be impacted by the effect that the activi-
ty and/or the subcontractor has on the project. Therefore, it is important to propose a 
framework to aid DMs to conduct the process for hiring subcontractors in a more 
informed and structured way to include the nuances of the CC environment with a 
view to reducing the number of liabilities, delays and avoiding additional costs. This 
framework should take into account the whole hiring process, from the identification 
of activities to be hired to the negotiation of the contract between contractor and sub-
contractor to accomplish the activity.
2 Context of the Problem
In the heavy construction industry, contractors work with a decentralized structure. 
This configuration is due to geographical and communication constraints imposed by 
the type of projects to be engaged on, such as constructing a highway, railways, air-
ports, harbors, bridges and industrial buildings. These types of construction usually 
are far from urban centers, and thus require DMs to have autonomy to make deci-
sions. However, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the company has to guarantee 
that the Director of Construction (DC) in charge of the project will maintain the val-
ues of the contractor. Thus, usually the managers are treated as DMs and legally an-
swer for the project as well. The DC behaves as a Supra Decision-Maker (SDM), and 
he/she has to choose his/her team and win the contract and the client. The managers 
and the DC behave as the board of the company and a group of DMs makes all the 
decisions guided by the governance defined by the contractor. The DMs present dif-
ferent characteristics and backgrounds. Therefore, it is important to use a framework 
to guide this decision process in the CC context from which the DMs can benefit by 
being flexible and fitting their needs to the aims of the project in terms of structure 
and information.
In a construction project, the actors involved are the DMs, the analyst, the experts 
and the stakeholders. The DMs of a project normally include a Director of Construc-
tion (DC), a Finance Manager (FM), an Engineering Manager (EM) and an Opera-
tions Manager (OM). Depending on the size and type of project, a Maintenance Man-
ager (MM) and the Client may also take part in the procedure. The analyst is usually 
an individual who is head of his own team, and who organizes the processes of the 
subcontractors and deals with them, with regard to payments, documents, and manag-
ing the contractual relationship. The analyst should have some background on deci-
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sion theory to be able to structure the processes and guide DMs during their evalua-
tion. The expert usually is not involved in the selection processes of subcontractors 
itself but is knowledgeable about the activity to be selected or has specific knowledge 
about the project itself. The stakeholders are environmental agencies, the Ministry of 
Labor, the City Hall, the Government, the population affected, the Union and the 
Client, as the enterprise, which actually hired the whole project. The Client might be 
from either private or public sector and may play the role of DM in Alliance Contracts 
or Cost-Plus Contracts because it will be one of the hiring parties in all outsourced 
contracts.
Nowadays, the process for hiring subcontractors does not follow a structured mod-
el in contractors. Usually, three companies are invited to take part in the selection 
during which information such as the nature of the structural project, deadlines, local-
ization and documents required are presented. These companies visit the construction 
site to evaluate subjective issues, such as labor conditions, labor union of affiliation, 
interaction with other activities, the need for lodgings, and transportation conditions. 
During the selection, the companies present their proposal, including price, time 
needed to start the activity, time needed to undertake the service considering the price 
presented and their assumptions about the project. DMs evaluate rank the proposals
based on cost.
Once the subcontractors are ranked, a negotiation process starts. The subcontrac-
tors’ proposals usually are evaluated based only on cost, however, previous experi-
ences with the subcontractor can be taken into account and a tradeoff may occur intui-
tively. This negotiation is made with the top-ranked subcontractors, only with the 
companies the DM feels to be the most reliable. Sometimes a pre-qualification step is 
included to analyze legal documents and verify if the company fulfills the legal re-
quirements. The negotiation process ends when the DMs find a subcontractor who 
fulfils all legal requirements, by presenting documents to prove they do not have legal 
issues, and technical requirements, such as the lowest price, best working practices 
and are able to accomplish the activity in the schedule planned for the project. Criteria 
such as quality, maintenance service level, and experience are evaluated based on 
information inferred during the negotiation step.
The hiring process starts with a manager requiring a service to be outsourced and 
furnishing the analyst with all technical information a subcontractor would need to 
formalize a bid. During the selection and negotiation phases, all DMs get involved in 
the analysis and interactions with the subcontractors in every possible hiring process, 
which is a time demanding activity. The question is: do all DMs actually need to get 
involved in every hiring process all together or if they could split this effort and eval-
uate the hiring processes as a group only on those activities that could bring more 
issues to the project?
An objective of this research is to offer DMs and analysts a framework to enable 
the costs associated with the hiring procedures to be reduced by reducing the time and 
number of DMs devoted to make decisions and play a role in negotiation when hiring 
subcontractors in the CC industry. The idea is to allow the actors to focus on situa-
tions that are truly dangerous to the project and relax the constraints imposed on those 
that do not strongly affect it. Therefore a framework to aid contractors to hire subcon-
tractors in the CC industry is proposed.
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3 A framework to aid subcontractors’ hiring in the CC industry
A Framework to aid DMs in the Civil Construction (CC) Industry to hire subcon-
tractors is proposed and presented in figure 1. This Framework takes into account that 
different activities are hired during a project that represents different impact to the 
project, also, the DMs have different objectives regarding the problem. Therefore, it is 
necessary to apply a method to aggregate DMs’ individual choices, meaning that the 
aggregation will take place at the end of the process, over the individual ranking of 
the DMs. Moreover, the framework also includes a peculiarity of allowing the analyst 
to apply different methods so that the DM can rank alternatives, depending on the 
DM´s rationality. By the end, a negotiation between contractor and subcontractors 
takes place.
De Almeida et al. [14] proposed a twelve steps procedure considering that the 
modeling process includes analysis of several possibilities that are associated with 
different hypotheses. This analytical process works as a funnel in which the possibili-
ties are refined to obtain a model compatible with the DM´s preference structure and 
the information available. This funnel’s filtering layers are usually the actors in-
volved, the DMs’ rationality; the attributes used to describe the alternatives and; the 
alternatives themselves. Therefore, the selection of subcontracts should take into ac-
count not only the characteristics of the project but also the DMs’ rationality.
The framework presented in Figure 1 to aid DMs to hire subcontractors in a CC 
project follows the procedure proposed by de Almeida et al. [14] to model multicrite-
ria decision problems. This framework uses two models to support contractors in their 
hiring processes in the CC industry.
The analysis has to start by listing and describing the activities of the project, and 
which of them will be outsourced. It is important to describe them based on infor-
mation that later shall be used as criteria for the sorting model. Before sorting activi-
ties into classes, it is necessary to verify which DMs are to be involved in the process 
of sorting and of choosing. These will not necessarily be the same ones.
Once the preliminary phase is finished, the first proposed model is used, which 
consists of sorting activities into classes by applying the Additive-veto model for 
sorting problematic [30]. Hence, the selection process will not necessarily have to 
involve all DMs, requiring only the Supra Decision Maker (SDM) to get involved in 
this phase of the framework. 
Depending on the impact, a contract will assign to the project or the contractor, the 
hiring process and its management are handled differently. In addition, the negotiation 
process is modified depending on the effect such a contract has on the project, and 
will involve assigning more DMs to higher impact activities and fewer DMs to the 
lower ones. Hence, by applying a sorting model prior to the selection, one can im-
prove the decision process by decreasing the risks of liabilities and costs associated 
with the selection and negotiation of hiring a subcontractor. Moreover, lower impact 
activities have less strict requirements compared to higher ones. Therefore, by manag-
ing each activity in a proper manner, money can be saved. In this model, the contrac-
tor has the possibility of making more realistic and wiser decision, since he/she con-
centrates on reducing risk and liability at a higher level. 
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Fig. 1. Flow-chart of the framework proposed
Within the CC context, the managers usually present a compensatory rationality 
when evaluating the risks they might face by outsourcing an activity. Therefore, some 
trade-off [31] among criteria might be required. This characteristic eliminates out-
ranking sorting methods. Moreover, this step of analysis usually takes place right at 
the beginning of the project. Projects vary in size, budget, location and types of activi-
ties. Thus, it is very difficult for a DM to present preference information based on 
holistic assignment, since he/she does not have information a priori. In addition, by 
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using SAW (Simple Additive Weighting) [31], the alternatives are sorted based only 
on thresholds, ignoring some nuances of the sorting problematic.
After all activities were grouped according to their effect on the project, the selec-
tion model is used. This model is divided into two phases: the preference modeling 
and the aggregation of DMs’ preferences. In the first phase of this model occurs the 
assessment of each DMs’ preferences to allow all DMs to rank the subcontractors’, 
which took part of the selection process. At this moment, the analyst might decide to 
use a compensatory method or a non-compensatory method. This decision will de-
pend on the DM´s rationality, which might be evaluated following the questions pre-
sented by Roy and Slowinski [32] or by using the definition of non-compensatory 
rationality presented by Fishburn [33]. The second phase only occurs in higher impact 
classes, because in those the process will be that of a group decision. Therefore, an 
aggregation process is proposed. The output of this model will be a ranking of the 
subcontractors, either by being analyzed by a single DM or by the group. After the 
subcontractors were ranked in each activity, the last phase of the second model takes 
place. Differently from what is found in projects in the CC industry, in this frame-
work, only activities that were sorted in higher impact classes have their contracts 
negotiated by all DMs. The other activities are only negotiated by the manager who 
required to outsource the service or the DC. This phase consists of negotiating with 
the top three or four bidders to decide which one would best suit the project. In this 
step, the negotiators provide preference information by using the FITradeoff method 
[34] and a mediator agent be used to reduce the number of interactions before reach-
ing a compromise solution.
Thus, the proposed framework was built to aid analysts and DMs in contractors to 
structure the hiring processes of subcontractors from the very beginning. This way, 
the team is able to manage the subcontractors and activities in a way compatible with 
the danger they might bring to the contractor, the project and the client while saving 
money and time of the DMs involved in the project.
4 Numerical Application
In order to validate the framework it was applied over the problem presented by Palha 
et al. [12]. Here, we used the Additive-veto model for sorting problematic to sort 
alternatives into classes. We considered four decision makers would be involved in 
the selection itself and had to provide preference information to choose the best vot-
ing procedure to aggregate the ranking provided by each DM and a negotiation step
with the top-ranked subcontractors was taken into account. The DMs were a Director 
of Construction (DC), an Operations Manager (OM), an Engineering Manager (EM) 
and a Finance Manager (FM).
Table 1 presents the classification of each activity into each class. To illustrate the 
second model, were considered the selection process to hire a subcontractor to ac-
complish the CFA pile activity, which later would be negotiated with the top three 
subcontractors. This activity was sorted as class C2 in Section 4.2.2 and class C3 in 
Palha, de Almeida & Alencar [12]. As an activity sorted in class C2, all DMs took
part in the selection process. Even though the DMs could use different criteria to run 
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the selection, as a matter of simplification, all DMs used the same criteria which were 
cost (g1), Time needed before starting the service (g2), Time needed to conduct the 
service (g3), quality (g4) and Maintenance service level (g5). By using the procedure 
proposed by de Almeida and Nurmi [18], the voting procedure chosen was Kemeny’s 
Rule [35] and the solution found was S02 P S01 P S07 P S05 P S03 P S04 P S06.
Table 1. Classification of activities by using the Additive-veto model for sorting problematic.
Classes Activities
C3 Concrete; Concrete Paving
C2
CFA; Earthwork; Food Supply; Gypsum Liner; Heavy Equipment; Hydroseed-
ing; Molds, shoring and scaffolding; Precast Concrete; Property Security; 
Transport of personnel; Waterproofing
C1 Air Conditioning; Asphalt Paving; Containers; Vegetation Suppression
In the last phase, for activities sorted in class C2, the DM who required the service 
or the DC has to negotiate the activity with the top ranked subcontractors. In the case 
of the CFA pile activity, the OM required the service. Thus, he has to negotiate with 
top-ranked subcontractors. These are S02, S01, and S07. During this negotiation, the 
OM can learn about each of the negotiators and use his knowledge of previous expe-
riences in this process, as well as the mediator agent gives advices on the best alterna-
tives to concentrate on.
5 Final Remarks and Managerial Impacts
The framework allows the DMs to make quicker and less costly decisions by sav-
ing their time during the selection process. It is easy to use and is a novel methodolo-
gy in the sense that methods compatible with the DMs’ rationality will be used. Be-
sides, it permits the DMs to express their own objectives and evaluate the alternatives 
based on their perception of the criteria. The procedure presented by [18] brings to the 
methodology a characteristic that makes the process flexible yet robust, by allowing 
the DMs to use their preferences to choose a voting procedure compatible with the 
problem faced. The idea of presenting a set of methods for the selection process has 
been previously addressed in the literature, without evaluating in the same model the 
DMs’ rationality. In addition, the last phase of the framework is a negotiation step, 
which varies according to the class of assignment of the activity. 
The proposed framework presents a different way of dealing with selecting sub-
contractors, namely by allowing the DMs to manage hiring procedures in a manner 
compatible with their impact over the project. In addition, it allows the DMs to use a 
method which fits their rationality. Moreover, the DMs do not have to consider the 
same criteria, and thus, can take their own objectives towards the problem into ac-
count. Finally, they can feel more secure about the aggregation procedure, since it is 
chosen based on their preferences.
In sum, the framework offers a flexible form of analysis to the supplier selection 
process in the CC context and other environments, which select workers, projects, etc. 
It allows a detailed and structured analysis process that might help DMs to feel more 
comfortable about decisions during a project.
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Abstract. This paper reports on a project in which a Group Support System 
(GSS) was used to ‘acquire knowledge’ from seven European cities with 
respect to the interactions between risk events faced by the cities. The aim of 
the project was to develop a Risk Systemicity Questionnaire (RSQ) which is an 
interactive tool designed to support cities in improving their resilience. A series 
of GSS workshops was organized in which participants co-created the risk 
scenarios that formed the main content of the tool. This paper presents an 
approach to using a GSS to inform specific research questions rather than to 
develop new solutions which participants can take ownership of and implement 
immediately in their work. In turn, the use of GSS in such non-traditional 
context poses a number of important methodological considerations of which 
GSS facilitators should be aware.
Keywords: group support systems, knowledge acquisition, city resilience
1   Introduction
Group Support Systems (GSS) have been used extensively to support productive 
meetings as they provide advantages over traditional meetings such as improved 
procedural justice and the ability for all participants to add their contributions at the 
same time (Ackermann et al., 2016; Nunamaker et al., 1991; Valacich et al., 1991).
GSS have also been applied for various purposes, such as making strategy or project 
management, and in work with organizations of different sizes and sectors 
(Ackermann and Eden, 2005, 2011b). In a typical GSS-facilitated session, participants 
are asked to consider a specific set of problems that is relevant to their work, and by 
pooling their expertise they co-create new options to address those problems. Thus, 
the focal points of the session become the solutions which participants should ideally 
feel ownership of, and subsequently agree to act upon, in order to change their 
projects or organizations for the better (Bryson et al., 2014; Tavella and Franco, 
2015).
In this paper, we present a ‘non-traditional’ approach for using GSS in a group 
meeting where representatives of seven cities were asked to feed their knowledge into 
the requirements of a European-funded research project titled Smart Mature 
Resilience (SMR). The purpose of the SMR project is to develop five tools which will 
support cities in developing their resilience against different kinds of risks, and 
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thereby form a new European Management Guideline. In this paper, we report on the 
production of one of the five tools called the Risk Systemicity Questionnaire (RSQ)
which aims to support cities in thinking about non-obvious interactions between risks 
and their consequences. 
Thus, instead of designing strategies or solutions which participants would 
subsequently implement in their own organizations, the role of the participants was to 
respond to a number of risk scenarios and share their views with respect to 1) the 
possible complex negative ramifications of different risks happening in their cities, 
and 2) the ways in which their city could mitigate the negative ramifications. Due to 
this design of the workshops, even though participants were highly committed to
providing valuable contributions for the needs of the design of the RSQ tool, they had 
no obligation or sense of ownership with regards to immediately implementing the 
outcomes of the workshop. Instead, it was only the final tool which they would 
consider implementing.
Consequently, the contribution of this research is in demonstrating how GSS can 
be used for ‘acquiring knowledge’ from participants who take the role of active study 
participants rather than ‘clients’ who expect to immediately benefit from the 
workshop. We elaborate on the important considerations which need to be taken into 
account by the researchers and the workshop facilitators where the goal of the session 
is to contribute to specific research questions instead of trying to directly benefit the 
participants’ organizations. This way, we expect to enrich and broaden the possible 
uses of GSS beyond action research or working with a client. Moreover, we 
demonstrate how the acquired knowledge can be structured and organized so that it 
can offer valuable insights into the context of a research project. 
2 Organizing GSS-facilitated sessions to construct Risk
Systemicity Questionnaire
The Risk Systemicity Questionnaire (RSQ) builds on previous attempts in the 
literature to move away from thinking about risks as independent from each other, 
which is encouraged, for example, when using risk registers, towards considering 
risks and their consequences as being interconnected with one another (Ackermann et 
al., 2007; Ackermann et al., 2014; Williams et al., 1997). The RSQ also addresses the 
increasingly recognized need to support today’s cities in improving their resilience 
with regards to different kinds of risks (Boin and McConnell, 2007; Crichton et al., 
2009; Labaka et al., 2015; van der Vegt et al., 2015). Thus, Group Explorer1, a type 
of GSS, was used in this research due to its proven effectiveness in capturing causal 
relationships between concepts (in this case risks) which participants add onto a 
shared model (a causal map) during the course of a facilitated session. By capturing 
risk events and their interconnectedness this way, it was possible to develop networks 
of risks, or risk systemicity scenarios that would inform the RSQ. 
1 Copies of the software are available from the authors (contact colin.eden@strath.ac.uk) free of 
charge
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As part of the reported research, seven GSS-facilitated workshops were organized 
in different European cities which all actively participated in the project: San 
Sebastian, Spain; Rome, Italy; Riga, Latvia; Glasgow and Bristol, UK; Kristiansand, 
Norway, and Vejle, Denmark. During the sessions, three different risk themes were 
explored: critical infrastructure, climate change, and social issues. Three of the 
workshops were focused on the development of risk scenarios, three workshops were 
focused on embellishing the policies previously added by participants, and one 
workshop was focuses on testing the initial draft of the RSQ. 
At every session, each of the seven cities was typically represented by 1-3
participants. The invited participants were mainly city employees responsible for risk 
and resilience, and so most of them could be considered as possessing generalist 
knowledge with respect to the three covered themes rather than being specific topic 
experts. As a result, the facilitated discussions tended to operate at a fairly general 
level in terms of how the different types of risks interacted, instead of dwelling on 
technical details.
During the sessions there was a high level of involvement by all city participants 
who produced a high number of contributions in a relatively short amount of time. 
Thus, the three causal maps resulting from the workshops were large and messy. The 
first ‘critical infrastructure’ workshop ended with 183 statements and 339 causal 
links, the second ‘climate change’ workshop ended with 339 statements and 515 
links, and the third ‘social issues’ workshop ended with 427 statements and 764 links. 
The continuing increase in map complexity was the result of 2 factors: i) increasing 
experience of the participants in using the GSS (more than a half of participants were 
recurring between the workshops and so they helped other participants to familiarize 
themselves with using the GSS); and ii) the increasing complexity of the theme. 
When designing GSS workshops for knowledge acquisition it is critical to consider 
the order in which topics are considered in order to exploit fully the growing 
experience of using the GSS. The series of workshops needs to be planned in advance
as a whole rather than as separate sessions, and it is useful to recognize whether 
different topics for the workshops have distinct levels of difficulty and complexity. 
Thus, the workshops are likely to be more productive (e.g. with respect to the number 
of gathered concepts, quality of links) when the researchers ensure that those ‘less 
complex’ workshops take place first. In this research it was appreciated that ‘social 
dynamics’ was a more complex and demanding topic for participants than ‘critical 
infrastructure’ and ‘climate change’ due to its very high level of interconnectedness 
between the various sub-themes. However, in our case we had not considered how 
important this factor would be and so the good outcome was the result of serendipity 
rather than good planning.
The three causal maps were subsequently merged together by identifying the 
shared patterns and commonalities between the maps. Upon merging the maps, 16 
key themes were identified such as ‘social inequalities’, ‘flooding’, and ‘air pollution’ 
– these themes subsequently provided the structure and the content for the RSQ, with 
each topic comprising of a number of risk scenarios. 
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3 Methodological considerations of knowledge acquisition with the 
use of a GSS
The reported research can be considered as a valuable case study describing 
knowledge acquisition using a GSS because it included participants from different 
countries who did not know each other before who were asked to use their existing 
knowledge to address different kinds of generic risk events (for example ‘the city 
becomes overwhelmed by flooding’), and who had not participated in this type of 
GSS session previously As a result, it was important for the researchers to address a 
number of methodological questions which appeared to become more relevant as 
opposed to more ‘traditional’ GSS sessions when working with people from the same 
organization and who would be discussing their own problems. The considerations 
experienced in this research included: 
x How to engage participants around problems that may not directly affect their 
own cities or their work practices? (For example flooding imposes higher risk 
for Glasgow than for Riga). 
x How to structure the session so that participants find enough commonality to 
co-create a shared model during the workshop? (Considering that participants 
had very different experiences from their own work settings).
x How to plan the order of a sequence of knowledge acquisition workshops 
bearing in mind: i) growing experience of using the GSS, and ii) the 
relationships between topics.
x How to analyze the resulting model when the researchers cannot draw on a 
comprehensive understanding of the participants’ organizational contexts? 
(Considering the international character of the participant sample combined 
with the restrictions on time and resources enforced by the research project). 
As part of addressing the above problems, an extensive literature review was 
conducted targeting city resilience in the context of the three covered themes in the 
workshops. The review of literature helped to identify a number of resilience-related 
concepts that could help to appeal to all participants, for example ‘bouncing forward’ 
(using the risk events as an opportunity for the organization to learn and to transform 
itself) (Malalgoda et al., 2014; Manyena, 2006; Taleb, 2013), or the notion of 
unintended consequences of cities’ responses to risks events (Eusgeld et al., 2011; 
Rinaldi et al., 2001). In other words, the use of relevant technical concepts helped to 
establish a common language for the participants which they could all use as a shared 
point of reference. Furthermore, an additional review was conducted covering the 
characteristics of the participating cities, which revealed further commonalities 
between the cities that could be drawn upon (such as geographical or demographic 
characteristics). The results of the literature review were subsequently used to draft 
the script for the workshops, including the starting questions, in order to enable 
everyone’s active participation.
Whereas a rigorous preparation allowed the group to work together effectively 
during the workshops and contribute in a very productive manner, at the end of the 
sessions participants felt little ownership of the resulting model because the co-
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created content was fairly generic and not tailored to each city’s particular 
circumstances. Another reason for the lack of ownership was the result of no 
organizing of the data in the workshop, whereas, in contrast, in a strategy making or a 
problem structuring workshop the material is continuously being organized into 
meaningful chunks. As a result of the limited ownership of the map, there was a 
smaller chance for participants to be able to 1) recall and understand the content of the 
maps after the session, 2) appreciate that they have contributed to all of the key 
clusters that have been recognized by the group as being important, 3) ‘find their way’ 
through the structure of the maps in a familiar manner, and 4) immediately act upon 
the outcome of the workshop (Ackermann and Eden, 2011a; Bryson et al., 2014).
However, in the knowledge acquisition session it is more important to address the 
specified research question rather than achieve the four above points. Thus, one 
tension is acquiring more knowledge versus less knowledge but more understanding 
from participants – and considering the knowledge acquisition nature of this research 
we chose the former. 
In addition to this, a considerable amount of effort had to be dedicated to tidying 
the models after the sessions in order to remove duplicate statements, to link the 
isolated concepts with the rest of the model, and to correct the direction of arrows so 
that they made sense ‘in the spirit’ of the overall style of contributions. Also, the 
material had to be carefully validated through different means: 1) the three 
researchers’ cross-validation, 2) referring to relevant academic literature and 
governmental reports, 3) asking city participants to validate parts of the material after 
the sessions. It must be noted that the analysis of data and the preparation of risk 
scenarios based on the findings took more than a half of the 1.5 year duration of the 
research. 
4 Conclusion
Overall, the products of the workshop enabled the design of the RSQ, and the co-
created risk systemicity scenarios embedded in the RSQ were received 
enthusiastically by the cities as they found them highly insightful. Thus, although 
knowledge acquisition with the seven cities was considered successful, researchers 
intending to conduct projects of similar nature are advised to appreciate the demands 
which such projects can impose on them. Firstly, due to the various methodological 
considerations discussed above, the GSS sessions were particularly demanding on the 
part of facilitators (this was mitigated by the fact that the lead facilitator had 
substantial experience in the practice of GSS facilitation), and so the GSS sessions 
required careful preparation of the script in advance of the session. As part of the 
preparation, where there are a series of consecutive meetings, it is essential to plan the 
scripts of the sessions in a way that the topics allow for incremental increases in the 
complexity of discussions so that the participants can conveniently build on the 
material contributed in the preceding sessions. In other words, in knowledge 
acquisition the incremental complexity should be considered intentionally during 
planning the research design, whereas, for example, in strategy workshops the 
increasing complexity can emerge more organically. Secondly, when working with 
386 Group Decision and Negotiation – GDN 2017
14-18 August 2017, Stuttgart-Hohenheim, Germany
participants who share little commonalities or do not have a shared stake in the 
discussed problems, it is essential to find the structure for the session that can be 
attractive to all participants. In this research a rigorous exploration of the subject 
literature helped to overcome the difficulties associated with the researchers’ limited 
understanding of the participants’ particular work context and to establish the ground 
for common understanding between participants. And thirdly, due to the highly 
divergent and scattered nature of the resulting models, researchers had to be prepared 
to invest a large amount of time on the analysis of the gathered data which covered 
the majority of the allocated work hours on the project.  
Whereas knowledge acquisition using GSS can be seen as a challenging endeavor, 
especially when working with a diverse sample of participants, it can also lead to 
important insights and valuable results which may not be possible to be achieved 
through other means. Further refinement of the approach disused in this paper is 
therefore seen as a promising direction for future research. In the complex, changing 
world, the ability to integrate the knowledge of different experts can be considered 
particularly important, and an informed use of a GSS can be a good way of enabling 
such valuable group collaboration. 
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Abstract. This paper reports on research which explores a typology of roles 
which participants undertake during the course of strategy making workshops 
facilitated with the use of a Group Support System (GSS). The reported 
research draws on a series of data logs generated in a number of strategy 
workshops with senior management teams in both public and private 
organizations. The data logs enable detailed tracking of the participants’ 
contributions over time. This level of richness and detail of analysis, in turn, is 
used to build the foundations for the proposed typology.  The typology may 
contribute to a better understanding of how GSS can be used effectively to 
conduct productive strategy making meetings. The typology provides guidance 
to facilitators of GSS, and especially those who are new to the facilitation 
practice.
Keywords: group support systems, strategy making, microanalysis
1   Introduction
Group Support System (GSS) have been effective in helping make group meetings 
more productive by allowing benefits such as anonymity and ability to gather 
information from multiple participants at the same time (Nunamaker, Dennis, 
Valacich, Vogel, & George, 1991; Valacich, Dennis, & Nunamaker Jr, 1991). Whilst 
GSS have been used successfully in variety of settings and with organizations of 
different types and sizes (Ackermann & Eden, 2011b), one application of the GSS 
that has been elaborated in the literature and through practice is the facilitation of 
strategy making workshops (Ackermann & Eden, 2011a). In these strategy making 
sessions the GSS is used to structure and prioritize the key issues participants believe 
the organization faces when seeking strategic success. However, group facilitation, 
using a GSS, is demanding for the facilitator. During a meeting, the facilitator needs 
to attend both to the content and the process of the discussion, and be able to make 
‘on the hoof’ analysis judgments (Bryson, Ackermann, & Eden, 2014) and also 
understand the behavior patterns of participants. For this reason, it is important for 
facilitators to inform their interventions and guidance to the group with refined 
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concepts and theories based on ‘real-world’ practice (Clawson, Bostrom, & Anson, 
1993; Kaner, 2007; Schwarz, 2002).
This paper reports on a pilot research project that explores a typology of participant 
roles during a GSS strategy making workshop. Thus, this typology, which is, in some 
respects, an elaboration Belbin’s (1981, 2010) popular Team Roles at Work. The 
typology characterizes a range of behaviors which people demonstrate at different 
stages of strategy workshops. It must be stressed that, typologies, as with all 
categories, are likely to be imperfect (Taleb, 2008). The inherent inaccuracy of 
categories is due their radial structure (Weick, 2009), which means that each 
category consists of prototypical members at its stable core (that is members who 
appear to fit well into that category), but it also comprises of non-prototypical 
members who may not seem to fit into that category as well as the prototypical 
members (Tsoukas & Chia, 2002). For example, it is clear that an elephant is a 
mammal (a prototypical member of the category), but it can sometimes be surprising 
for one to find out that a dolphin is a mammal and not a fish, or that platypus is a 
mammal and not a bird. Thus, whereas categories are essential in providing a resource 
for people to make sense of the world, they always remain simplifications of the lived 
world which, from time to time, need to be refined and updated (Weick, 1995).
Whilst recognizing that categories do not offer ‘perfect’ representations of reality, at 
the practical level, a  typology can provide valuable insights for GSS facilitators in 
three ways. Firstly, the typology of roles in strategy GSS workshops can inform the 
facilitator about typical behaviors that the participants demonstrate, and so the 
facilitator may be able better to identify and manage the group. Secondly, a typology 
offers a language and a point of reference that can be used by facilitators to negotiate 
a good practice and thereby increasingly draw on mutual experiences. And thirdly, 
the typology can be linked with recommendations for the facilitators that have been 
informed by extensive practice of facilitating strategy making workshops using a 
GSS. In addition, a typology of strategy making roles, with different roles not being 
exclusive to the specific person, also contributes to a better understanding of the 
flexibility required from practitioners who need to adapt their skills and experiences 
to the needs of the situation in the strategy workshop rather than resort to ‘what has 
already worked before’ (Katzenbach, 1997).
2 Methodological approach - using the GSS log
The research, with its focus on the participants’ roles in strategy making sessions, 
is designed to make extensive use of the data generated from the previously 
conducted ‘real-world’ workshops. This entails taking a micro perspective on the 
participants’ activity, where each recorded action is investigated on a second-by-
second basis (see also Ackermann & Eden, 2011b; Ackermann, Eden, & Pyrko, 2016; 
Paroutis, Franco, & Papadopoulos, 2015; Tavella & Franco, 2015). The GSS applied 
in this research (Group Explorer1) allows the recording of every interaction with the 
system over time. Thus, the computer based activity of each participant, and of the 
1 Copies of the software are available from the authors free of charge (contact 
colin.eden@strath.ac.uk)
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facilitator, is known. The data sets used in this research come from a number of 
previously facilitated strategy workshops, conducted with a variety of organizations 
within different sectors. 
The GSS log is saved in Excel spreadsheet format, which means that it can be 
analyzed in detail. The data is presented as a series of individual contributions listed 
in order of their appearance on the strategy model (a causal map) that is co-created by 
participants during the session. These contributions are separated by a range of 
different activities initiated by the facilitator, for example this can be an activity 
during which participants are asked to focus on entering statements with respect to a 
given topic, or participants may be invited to evaluate a selection of previously added 
statements which appear to be of considerable significance in their view. This in turn 
provides a detailed record of the facilitated activities which may not be possible to
obtain through other means (e.g. by hand-written notes and observations). 
As a result, it is assumed that the richness of data enabled by the use of the data log 
is valuable in the construction of the roles typology because it allows for 
identification of key patterns of behavior (as also seen in Shaw, Ackermann, & Eden, 
2003). The method of analysis builds on the approach for analyzing GSS data logs 
presented during the GDN 2016 conference. However, in this reported research, the 
method of analysis is refined further. 
Of course, such a log misses non-verbal behaviors and discussion that is not 
recorded through the GSS.  However, participants are aware that agreements and 
records of the meeting are derived solely from the GSS and so most discussion does 
appear in the log. Thus, while the log is inevitably incomplete, it does provide an 
important perspective on roles.
3 Exploring strategy making roles
While the analysis used in this project is expected to capture emerging patterns in 
data, these patterns are not fully grounded in the data but rather are prompted by a 
preliminary conceptualization of the possible strategy making roles. These 
preliminary roles are based on both the established Belbin roles for teams, as well as 
the researchers’ hypotheses based on experience of conducting strategy workshops. 
Thus the reason for identifying possible different team roles before conducting data 
analysis was to inform and frame an initial understanding of what patterns to look for 
in the data, what coding to apply, and what kind of analysis can be feasible to conduct 
on the data logs. Moreover, to ensure a reasonable degree of inter-coder reliability, we 
tried to apply such coding which could be easy to use and explain. The initial roles 
included:
Roles based on facilitators’ hypothesis
Pathbreaker. Adds early contributions which help other team members as a 
point of reference.
x Coding: count the number of contributions by each user with respect 
to the different stages of the session.
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Active contributor. Adds a large number of contributions in relation to other 
members.
x Coding: count the total number of contributions by each user for the 
whole session.
Adds generic options. This category relates to high level, general statements 
such as: ‘have a strong governing body’, ‘become a first choice employer’.
x Coding: assess whether the given statement provides a general 
direction for making strategy, but at the same time it would require 
further elaboration in terms of the more specific actions in order to 
understand better how to actually achieve that more general option.  
Connecting different participants’ contributions vs connecting mainly own 
statements. Whether the participant uses causal links to connect other 
participants’ contributions on the shared causal map, or the participant 
concentrates on linking their own statements. 
x Coding: the percentage of causal links added by the participant in 
which the participant a) links only their own statements, b) links 
one of their statements with a statement added by another 
participant, and c) links two statements added by other participants. 
Synthesis of options. This category relates to a situation when through the 
wording of a statement it can be seen that a statement brings together, or 
draws upon, other statements. For example, ‘become an excellent social 
housing agency’ and ‘focus on regenerating deprived areas’ could be 
combined into ‘achieve excellence as a social housing agency known for 
regenerating activities  ’. This category may often overlap with the category 
‘develops existing options’.
x Coding: look for statements which wording demonstrates that it had 
been based on at least two previously added statements. 
Roles based on the Belbin team roles mode
Plant – generator of new ideas. Creates (explores) new options with regards 
to strategic change, rather than develops (exploits) existing options added 
already during the session. This role can be observed when a participants 
adds a new idea on the causal map which has not been covered yet in the 
session.
x The main concern in coding is the meaning and wording, as well as 
the possible position of the statement in the means-ends hierarchy in 
the shared causal map. For example, John adds a new option: 
‘create excellent customer service’ – and this is a new option in the 
session because no-one has added a similar option before. 
However, if at a later stage Kathy adds an option ‘develop our 
ability to provide great customer service’ – then this is not a new 
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option, but an elaboration of the existing option. On the other hand, 
if a participant offers a more detailed option how to ‘create 
excellent customer service’, such as ‘hire new staff who are good at 
customer service’, then this can be considered a new option. 
Moreover, explanations why it is important to develop customer 
service are also likely to lead to a new option. Note that this 
category can be overlapping, but it does not have to, with the 
generic role described above. 
Resource investigator - focused outside of the team, connects stakeholders.
Refers to options which require that a number of stakeholders are connected 
together. For example, ‘have a better understanding of customer value at all 
organizational levels’, ‘have a clear strategy for collaboration with 
suppliers’. This category can be applied to the same statement together with 
other coding categories described above.
x Coding: look for wording/meaning which represent the need for 
different agents to work together (e.g. collaborate, integrate, 
stakeholders, networks, inter-team, inter-organizational).
Specialist who develops few themes vs develops many themes. Whether 
participant adds contributions to many themes identified in the session, or 
whether they prefer to focus on a small number of themes. The ‘themes’ are 
agreed by participants and determined by the position of statements in the 
shared causal map, as for example busy statements with large numbers of 
links around them tend to be key theme ‘candidates’. 
x Coding: the distribution of participant’s contributions across the 
themes identified during the session. 
Monitor evaluator. Provides impartial, logical assessment of the options 
added by the team. For example, in response to a statement ‘create a new 
product line’, Kathy added a statement expressing a constraint ‘insufficient 
budget’ which she then linked to ‘create a new product line’ with a negative 
arrow. Subsequently, Kathy added a new statement ‘improve the current 
product line rather than create new product line’ as a new option. 
x Coding: look for critical evaluation of the previously added options, 
situation where a participant weight up the available options.
With respect to the described roles, from the perspective of facilitating strategy 
workshops, there can be observed important differences between the roles described 
above. For example, whilst some participants are effective in developing key themes 
during the session, it is important for the facilitator to ensure that other participants 
also contribute to those themes as otherwise they may have no sense of ownership of 
the developed strategy. Furthermore, some participants will be more ready to devise 
new options rather than necessarily stick to the existing options (perhaps an 
equivalence to Belbin’s “plant” role), and so the facilitator may be advised to 
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encourage the more defensive participants to give it a try to consider creating new 
strategies based on the pooled knowledge of all participants. Another example in 
which the typology might aid facilitators is in gaining an increased clarity with 
respect to the importance of participants’ formal leadership during the session (active 
contributor role) and to what extent formal leadership translates into leadership 
performance during the GSS supported session - since in a GSS session all 
contributions are anonymized, the influence of formal authority is significantly 
constrained, but it may find other ways to influence the sessions (such as better 
strategic knowledge). 
4 Preliminary results of the analysis
At this stage of the reported research, one data log resulting from a strategy 
workshop was coded following the coding described in the previous section. As part 
of the analysis we were looking for clear patterns in the coding which could validate 
the initially conceptualized roles, or perhaps lead to new roles. The results, with 
respect to the different roles identified, are shown below:
Pathbreaker. Two participants, who were in leadership positions, were 
adding many contributions early in the session. For example, after the first 6 
minutes each of them had contributed at least 8 statements, whilst other 
participants on average had around 4 statements or less each by that time.
Active contributor. The same two participants who were pathbreakers, also 
ended up adding the biggest number of statements in the whole session. One 
of these two participants added 25 statements and the other added 24 
statements, whereas other participants did not have more than 10 statements. 
Summarizer: Adds generic options. For one participant 50% of contributions 
could be seen as being generic, high level contributions, whereas an average 
for the whole team was 25%.
Consensus Builder: Connecting different participants’ contributions vs 
connecting mainly own statements. One participant concentrated on linking 
only their own statements in 91% of cases, whilst for most of other 
participants this percentage amounted to 56-57%.
Belbin Plant – generator of new ideas. For one participant 78% of 
contributions were ‘new options’, whilst the team average was 49%,
Belbin Specialist: who develops few themes vs develops many themes. One 
participant used 80% of their causal links to connect at least 3 themes at the 
same time (as some statements belong to more than one theme), whilst the 
team average was 68%.
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And some possible roles that did not show through the data analysis, but will still 
remain as possible during further analysis of other workshops.
Practitioner: Synthesis of options. This category has proved to be difficult to 
code in the data log. Firstly, the synthesis of options is a highly tacit act, and 
therefore it is not easy to make a judgment whether the given option 
synthesizes the previously added options, as this may not be clear through 
wording. 
Belbin Resource investigator - focused outside of the team, connects 
stakeholders. Based on one the analysis of one data log no clear patterns was 
identified. However, it can be expected that by analyzing a larger number of 
data logs, some patterns illustrating this role might be obtained. 
Belbin Monitor evaluator. No clear patterns was identified in the analysis of 
data. This category proved problematic because in strategy making 
workshops participants are typically advised by facilitators to focus their 
efforts on creating alternative options to the options which they do not like 
rather than criticize the options which they do not agree with. However, it is 
then not always possible to track based on the data log which options were 
added in response to which other options.
The preliminary results show that this research is likely to develop a typology of
roles which are expected to contribute to the research and practice of making strategy. 
Many of the emergent roles do map onto those identified by Belbin, as expected.  By 
describing different patterns of behaviors which participants may demonstrate during
a meeting or a workshop, this typology can be helpful in facilitating the process of 
making strategy. Moreover, this research also helps to understand better what kind of 
analysis is feasible when working with data logs, and what additional information can 
be extracted from them in addition to, for example, the analysis of causal maps or 
facilitators’ handwritten notes.
5 Conclusion and Where Next
In summary, the research offers a contribution to both the theory and practice of 
facilitating GSS-supported strategy workshops. The resulting typology is expected to 
improve the current understanding of the different roles and behaviors which can be 
anticipated during strategy making sessions, and thereby serve as a useful point of 
reference for facilitators. Furthermore, the available data is explored using a new 
method of analysis of GSS data logs, and therefore in addition to offering an original 
contribution to our understanding of the process of negotiation in strategy making, 
this research also develops further the methodological knowledge of applying data 
logs in research. 
This pilot project has supported the research aims by demonstrating that many of 
the hypothesized roles, both those suggested by facilitators experiences and from 
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Belbin, have not been repudiated.  The research has indicated that further analysis of 
other data logs of strategy workshops is likely to be worthwhile.  In addition, so far, 
the data analysis has focused on the submission of statements in the GSS and has not 
analyzed the behaviors in relation to importance ratings and changing preferences for 
options.
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Abstract. An integrative approach to theorizing behavioral, affective and 
cognitive processes in model-driven group decision support (GDS) 
interventions is needed to gain insight into the (micro-) processes by which 
outcomes are accomplished. This paper proposes that the theoretical lens of 
situated affectivity, grounded in recent extensions of scaffolded mind models, is 
suitable to understand the performativity of affective micro-processes in model-
driven GDS interventions.  An illustrative vignette of a humorous micro-
moment in a group decision workshop is presented to reveal the performativity 
of extended affective scaffolding processes for group decision development.  
The lens of situated affectivity constitutes a novel approach for the study of 
interventionist practice in the context of group decision making (and 
negotiation).  An outlook with opportunities for future research is offered to 
facilitate an integrated approach to the study of cognitive-affective and 
behavioral micro-processes in model-driven GDS interventions.
Keywords: Group support systems · Group decision support · Model-driven 
approaches · Emotions
1   Introduction
The theoretical lens of situated affectivity [1-3] may help to conceptualize the 
complex affective processes in model-driven group decision support (GDS) 
interventions in a novel way. Our aim is to consider the potential of this theoretical 
lens to understand the interplay in practice of the behavioral, cognitive and affective 
resources that may make GDS interventions meaningful and yet playful work. 
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2. Emotions in model-driven GDS
Whilst a significant prior amount of research exists on emotion and affect in the area 
of group decision support, and whilst emotions have been considered in and for 
models of behavior in negotiation settings, particularly regarding electronically 
supported negotiations, there appears to be limited prior explicit theorization of social 
emotional processes that find their expression in the form of positive affective 
behavior during model-driven GDS interventions. Yet, positive affect is likely to be 
particularly beneficial for improving performance in problem restructuring situations 
because it is assumed to support flexible and creative thinking that can lead to more 
effective resolutions than compromise can. For example, prior research on humor in 
negotiations suggests that it can be used to improve cohesion, signal cooperation, 
cope with a difficult situation, and release tension [4]. As such, humor can be viewed 
as interpersonal emotion management with the aim to manage the emotions of others 
as well as of the self [5]. However, further research is called for to advance the 
understanding of affect in group decision development contexts and particularly 
observational and ethnographic studies of “live” encounters are needed [6]. We 
therefore propose a theoretical lens for the study of extended affective scaffolding 
processes ‘in-the-wild’. 
3. Situated affectivity 
The situated affectivity lens proposes that human emotions are best understood as 
active engagements with the world and not, as ‘traditional’ philosophy of emotion 
proposes, as passively undergone experiences [7]. Scaffolds in the environment are 
not just part of a background, but rather have a central causal role in bringing about 
cognitive-affective capacities [7]. The term scaffolding can be used to refer to the 
potential of amplifying cognitive capacities through productive engagement with
material artefacts and people in a situational context [8, 9]. It has furthermore been 
suggested that emotions could be usefully conceptualized as resulting from the 
circular interaction between affective qualities or affordances in the environment and 
the subject’s bodily resonance [10]. As such, the practices of seeking to sustain and 
amplify our behavior-in-practice, i.e. including the expression and influence on our 
epistemic and affective processes, through engagement with resources in the 
environment can be characterized a process of niche construction [11]. In affective 
niches, by virtue of scaffolded affectivity, further cognitive capacities can be 
developed [7]. The emphasis on agentic engagement with the world makes the lens of 
situated affectivity particularly interesting for the study of creative model-driven GDS 
which aims to engage participants in the active construction of a shared future plan 
for action [12, 13]. Figure 1 illustrates possible relationships between the concepts.
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Figure 1: Situated affectivity as niche co-construction (informed by [10] and [14])
4. Play frames in we-spaces
To illustrate how the lens of situated affectivity lens deepens our understanding of 
environmental, and in particular, interpersonal fuels for shared planning, we use the 
concept of a ‘play frame’. This concept is informed by Bateson [15]’s work who 
considered different modes in communication and the specific social recognition 
afforded to humor. Our vignette is drawn from a model-driven GDS intervention that 
took place in an urban planning context (cf. [16]). The vignette illustrates the 
intertwining of materiality beyond the model (e.g. bodies), instruments beyond the 
tools provided (e.g. linguistic patterns) and interaction rituals beyond the model-
driven GDS script (making fun to move the conversation forward) [17]. However, 
rather than being random or the product of individual differences, the sequence and 
flow of these interactions appear patterned – in our example by a humorous play 
frame with a shared focus on conversational rhythm- illustrating how the collective 
regulation of action in-situ draws on collective cultural resources. Thus, the micro-
moment illustrates how situated affectivity can be constitutive of effective model-
driven GDS interventions, by connecting participants and creating common 
experiences that shape shared feelings and social cognition. To understand the 
performativity of model-driven GDS it seems important to consider not ‘just’ the 
physical and epistemic interactions with a model as a tool in knowledge generation 
processes, but also the interpersonal emotional commitment(s) in interaction with 
cultural artefacts, including models, which we use to scaffold group decision 
formation processes. An abstract characterization of such resources and processes is 
likely to tell only half the story, as resources appear to be constituted equally by the 
situated affective patterns in activities of manipulation or inference of the participants 
who deploy the resources.
Practical 
interaction Agent A Agent B
Socio-cultural 
background
cognitive
resonance
affective
Affordances 
in we-space
cognitive
resonance
affective
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5. Purposeful play 
Model-driven group decision support (GDS) interventions are thought to scaffold 
constructive active group reasoning processes.  However, despite practitioners’
confidence that model-driven GDS will deliver enhanced outcomes, we do not yet 
fully understand how changes in collective behavior are stimulated by the provided 
scaffolds as there is a historical shortfall of research into the actual behaviors of the 
actors involved [18].  To this date, the design and implementation of model-driven 
GDS are often treated as ‘black boxes’ - full of unidentified processes and practices 
with little clear interdependencies. Model-driven GDS practice thus needs to be more 
extensively studied in-depth to identify how the use of methods may be associated 
with changes in the participants’ ability to take effective collective action in 
problematic situations.
The perspective of situated affectivity, which has not yet been applied to the study of 
model-driven GDS, may offer a potentially very relevant approach to the study of 
practice. Applying this perspective to study what’s going on inside the black box of a 
model-driven GDS intervention, we have illustrated a micro-moment of human 
creativity in-situ which may be seen as indicative of our joint ability, drawing on 
reciprocal scaffolding processes, to overcome obstacles in the context of model-
driven GDS. The use of humor, as reported in the micro-moment, may appear trivial 
but its performative function is surprisingly easy to overlook. Through playful 
cognitive-affective scaffolding, participants move forward in messy problem 
situations. The decision support provided by low tech GD interventions may thus, at 
least partly, lie in giving space to purposeful (play)(work). 
The micro-level view (re)emphasizes the need for integrative perspectives for the 
study of behavioral, cognitive and affective processes in-situ that take into account the 
complex role of the environment in scaffolding affective collective performance. 
Situated affectivity in model-driven GDS interventions might be understood as the 
nuanced interweaving of individual and collective resources for effective 
performance, contributing the development of a social(ised) logic of OR practice. 
More research from a micro-process perspective on situated affectivity would thus be 
desirable to further explore behavior in model-driven GDS interventions as serious 
(play)(work), undertaken and enabled by a(n) (OR) community alive in play.
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Abstract. The primary intention of this formative experiment was to obtain
practical experience of running an experiment. I obtained survey responses, 
video data and task outputs from three small groups of students working first to 
generate options and then to select and develop an idea for a student run start-
up business. Using an autoethnographic approach to analyze this experience I
share how this small study has influenced the development of my design for an 
organizationally situated study. Based upon empirical data this account 
provides insight into the impact of practical experience upon the development 
of a novice researcher. 
Keywords: Student experiment, problem structuring, autoethnography, idea 
generation, group decision making, Business Model Canvas (BMC)
1   Introduction
The initial motivation for this student experiment was to gain practical experience of 
designing and running an experiment. With the support of faculty and the cooperation 
of three small groups of undergraduate students I achieved the collection of some 
experimental data. Through autoethnographic analysis of this experience I derived 
benefits similar to those identified by Tavella [1] in her use of autoethnography as a 
framework for addressing the problems of novices seeking to research and publish on 
Problem Structuring Methods (PSMs). Tavella [1] identifies autoethnography as 
enabling access to real-world interventions, enhancing confidence and aiding 
identification of research and publishing opportunities.
I identify the main benefit of my autoethnography as similar to Tavella’s [1] 
finding about research and publishing opportunities because the experience has had a 
significant impact on the design of my main PhD research activities. My research is 
an organizationally situated study of naturally occurring group problem structuring 
activity. That is, activity that can be identified as problem structuring, although the 
participants have no conscious design or intent to follow a method that operational 
researchers would recognize as problem structuring [2, 3, 4, 5]. This benefit is similar 
to Tavella’s in its alignment with postgraduate research. As a PhD student, an 
experience that helped me make choices about how to conduct my study of naturally 
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occurring group problem structuring is relevant to my progress towards longer term 
research and publication objectives.
I also identify a benefit of increased confidence as I developed my personal 
research capabilities and gained new insight into my personal research preferences. 
This is similar to Tavella’s findings concerning building confidence in facilitating 
PSMs.
Tilley-Lubbs [6] describes how, when we use our personal experience as 
autoethnographic data, we write stories. In relation to understanding PSMs in action, 
White [7] has discussed the need for us to do this, to draw on autoethnographic 
method to increase our understanding of what happens during problem structuring 
activity. In this paper I tell the story of increased confidence first, because it can be 
more easily combined with providing background information about the student 
experiment. Then I build upon that story to identify how the experience contributed to 
the design of my organizational study. These accounts are personally situated 
interpretations from which I have made discoveries about my own experience [8, 9].
2 Increasing researcher confidence
Within my overall program of study this opportunity to prepare and run an experiment 
took just a few weeks. Earlier in the year I had a similar opportunity to practice 
ethnographic observation and interviewing. Neither study was critical to the progress 
of my research project, so each represented a safe environment [1, 10] in which I 
could experience being a researcher. Both were opportunities for embodied learning 
[10], or “learning by doing”, which I reflect upon in relation to my experiences pre-
experiment, during experiment and post-experiment.
2.1   Pre-experiment activities
I began with no previous experience of running experiments and with the 
constraints that my experiment must be a group experiment, and must be run in 110 
minutes on a particular date with student volunteers from a particular module. My 
first reaction was that establishing an appropriate group task and design of groups was 
quite a challenge. My final design was for three groups each tasked with generating 
options and developing a plan for a student run start-up business based on the 
University of Warwick campus. One group was to have a non-student experienced 
facilitator and another was to be facilitated by a student volunteer from within the 
group. The third group would be my control, with no facilitator. Only two lecture 
classrooms were available. I decided to place the group with the non-student 
facilitator in the smaller room with the remaining two groups sharing the larger room. 
This was because I did not want the other two groups to notice the non-student 
facilitator and perhaps be tempted to watch and copy that group.
In both pre- and post-surveys I used Rammstedt and John’s BFI-11 items [11]. In 
the post survey I also included items to measure satisfaction [12, 13], group decision 
process [14] and group effectiveness [15]. As I searched for standard items that had 
been developed and validated by other researchers I made compromises. The items 
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available did not exactly match what I hoped to measure. I also found that many of 
these item sets would require that I ask my participants to answer several pages of 
questions.
A total of six video cameras were used, two for each group. These created a verbal 
and visual data record. I also made observational notes during the experiment, 
although of course I could not observe all three groups at once.
Although I did not specify how groups should generate options and select an idea 
to develop I did request that they should make some form of record. To develop their 
selected idea I asked each group to produce a Business Model Canvas [16, 17]. The
students had previous experience of using the Business Model Canvas during the 
module and I provided brief guidelines based upon the lecture materials as a 
reminder.
Overall then, I planned to gather three types of data: surveys, observations and task 
outputs. 
2.2   During the experiment
My experiment took place on the afternoon of the last Friday of term, just before 
Christmas. Each participant was offered a GB£15 food and drink voucher for use in 
campus outlets on completion of the experiment. Seventeen volunteers signed up 
earlier in the term and twice I arranged for a table of names to be included in lecture 
slides to remind students of their commitment. During the days and hours running up 
to the experiment I was concerned about how many students might drop out. In the 
week prior to the experiment three students withdrew and on the day one student 
failed to turn up. The remaining thirteen students were randomly divided into three 
groups, one of which was joined by an experienced facilitator who had been briefed 
on the task earlier in the week. The student participants did not know the task details 
in advance.
During the experiment it was a rush to get the video cameras set up in time, I felt 
rather disorganized, but my schedule was broadly adhered to, the time allocated for 
the group task was not reduced and the participants completed all planned activities.
So although I felt disorganized, perhaps this was not as visible to others as I felt it
must be. During the task I observed the groups. Noting that only the non-student 
experienced facilitator asked me to confirm the time allowed for the exercise I made 
the decision to let each group know when they were halfway through the total time 
allowed (50 minutes). I also observed that some group members sought eye contact 
with me instead of being fully focused on the task. I reflected on this and felt that 
perhaps it was more disruptive to move between three groups to observe than it would 
be to stay still and observe just one group. Another possibility could be that during the 
module I had been supporting group work activities, so these particular students were 
accustomed to me asking about their progress and assisting them as they worked 
together on group tasks.
Within my schedule I allowed time to ask participants for individual written 
reflections on the exercise. I gave each participant a sheet of A4 paper and I was 
surprised that only one student produced less than half a page of notes.
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Overall I noted that although running the experiment was a new and unusual 
experience for me it was not a role that I felt uncomfortable with. However, I did feel 
less comfortable in this role than I had been when undertaking ethnographic 
observations or conducting interviews. Reflecting upon this difference I noted that
running the experiment was a more formal and processual role. I needed to maintain 
more distance as an observer; to direct more of my attention toward managing time, 
maintaining the separation between the participant groups and controlling the flow of 
activities. Previous experience of running workshops has given me the transferrable 
skills to do this, and yet I was more comfortable with observer and interview roles 
that I’d never attempted before. So, my next step was to challenge myself to think 
about why this could be. In contrast to an experimental researcher, a participant 
observer does not control the environment and flow of events, and so does not have to 
give attention to this. In an interview, the researcher does have more control.
However, in each of my interviews this role was performed in response to a single 
interviewee. The implication of these differences was that I felt closer to the 
participants and their embodied experiences when I was in the observer and 
interviewer roles. For me, joining the group felt comparatively more comfortable than 
maintaining distance from the group. 
2.3 Post-experiment activities
I was aware that having only two rooms for three groups would create problems 
with my audio data. I placed the two groups in the same room as far away from each 
other as I could, but I still found that it was difficult to follow the recorded 
conversation. 
Later I discovered two types of problem with my survey data. One student had 
missed out a question and another had recorded two answers to the same question. 
Also, the student facilitated group failed to create a list of the ideas generated, 
although I was able to partially reconstruct this using the video data. These appear to 
me to have been genuine mistakes.
Whilst it feels exciting to have my own data, I am concerned that with only thirteen 
participants and three groups my statistical analysis is necessarily limited. I am aware 
that I feel most drawn to the written reflections and the video files. As I downloaded 
and typed up my data for secure storage, my most interesting finding was that the 
written reflections support the principle that a facilitator role is desirable for members 
of a working group because it allows participants to focus on content rather than 
process [18].
2.4 Reviewing how the experience increased my confidence
I had anticipated several of the problems that I actually experienced in running my 
experiment. Although it was somewhat frustrating to “learn” things that I had 
expected to occur, the fact that I had anticipated them was reassuring. For example, 
the availability of only two rooms for three groups was a constraint that I might not 
have tolerated if this experiment had been vital to the success of my research.
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Through the problems that I anticipated and the aspects of the experiment that went 
well I was able to appreciate the relevance of transferrable skills. In contrast to
Tavella’s account [1] I would make a distinction between general and specific 
facilitation. During my experience I felt that my previous general experience of 
facilitation was relevant and did give me some measure of comfort in the new role of 
an experimental researcher.
At a small scale I now have personal experience of ethnographic observation and 
interviews and of running an experiment. These embodied learning experiences have
given me a more nuanced appreciation of the challenges that these different types of 
research present [10]. I now feel more competent to read (and in some cases reread) 
relevant experimental papers with an improved understanding [19, 20, 21]. I also feel 
that I will be better able to determine when and where an experimental approach 
would be appropriate in my own research.
3 Developing research design
The journey of reflection I have taken through my early research experiences has 
given me a better understanding of those experiences [1, 6, 7, 8, 9], and I have applied 
my learning to reflect upon issues that are relevant to my PhD research project, an 
organizationally situated study of naturally occurring problem structuring. 
3.1   Practicalities and preferences
Many of the areas in which autoethnographic reflection upon my student 
experiment supported improvement in personal capability and confidence were
practical. For example, recognizing transferrable skills, using new equipment and 
noticing the ways in which paper based surveys may be incorrectly filled out. Whilst 
these experiences all give me confidence that my second attempt at an experimental 
study will be better, recognition of personal preferences is also a valuable learning 
outcome. Through comparing my student experiment experience with my earlier pilot 
study in observation and interviewing I was able to recognize my preference for the 
ethnographic type role over that of the experimental type role. However, two issues 
that I discovered during my small experiment led to deeper reflections and to
significant changes in how I thought about the design for my organizational study.
The first of these issues relates to standard item surveys. During my experiment all 
participants completed the surveys, although there were small errors. Initially my 
response was to consider making the surveys electronic so that such errors could be 
identified and corrected before each survey submission was accepted. However, as I 
reflected further and began to draft out plans for the groups of organizational 
employees whom I might soon be asking to fill out surveys the focus of my concern 
changed. My main concern now centered upon the number of the questions and the 
feasibility of asking busy employees at a variety of hierarchical levels to fill out such 
long surveys. This brought my earlier concerns about finding appropriate items to the 
fore again. I had managed to find a short BFI survey [11], but there were 40 items in 
the group decision process set that I used [14]. I also began reading more about 
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surveys and noted that depending upon the type of standard items that I used I might 
have trouble attributing any changes to specific group activities [22].
The second issue was that I became increasingly concerned about how many 
surveys I would need and whether my statistical analysis should be at the level of the 
individual or of the group. If the focus of my research was to be upon the 
experimental aspect and my statistical analysis concerned differences between groups 
I would need to study many more groups in order to increase my sample size.
Whereas statistical analysis for many groups rather than a few would increase my 
analysis time a little, video analysis of in increased number of groups would represent 
a relatively greater increase in analysis time needed.
From these first two issues a third emerged. I began to reflect more deeply upon 
the appropriate balance of quantitative and qualitative research content for my study.
As academics asked questions about my research project and I engaged in 
conversations about my student experiment I began to question whether I should be 
referring to my study as a field experimental [23]. Perhaps it should be positioned as a 
set of case studies [24, 25] in which I would use a quasi-experimental design [22].
This prompted me to reexamine why my research should be interesting to an 
academic audience and how it would build upon existing research. 
3.2   Refocusing research contributions
My belief that naturally occurring problem structuring should be of interest to the 
academic community is based upon previous experience as a novice PSM practitioner 
in the workplace. When work colleagues heard that I had received training that might 
enable me to help them with situations that academics might recognize as messes, 
swamps or wicked problems [26, 27, 28, 29] I received far more requests for help 
than I could possibly respond to. This experience was quite the opposite to that 
reported by Tavella [1] in the case of novice facilitators struggling to find
opportunities to conduct academic research in the area of problem structuring. These 
requests for help made me feel nervous because although I had begun to study PSMs
and successfully passed Masters level assessments I had very little practical 
experience of using PSMs in the workplace. It also made me curious about naturally 
occurring problem structuring; activity I described in my introduction as identifiable 
as problem structuring, although participants have no conscious design or intent to 
follow a recognized problem structuring method. I knew that these teams would 
respond to these situations with or without the assistance of a novice or expert 
problem structuring practitioner. So I became curious about how they would do this.
My experience of running a student experiment caused me to reflect upon the type of 
data I sought and led to the realization that in relation to my research topic a more 
naturalistic dataset would be more appropriate.
White [30, p823] uses the words “systematic”, “purposeful”, “agent”, “PSM” 
“change” and “improvement” in his definition of a problem structuring intervention.
Defining problem structuring as “purposeful action by agents to create change or 
improvements” would recognize that the agents might not be “systematic” and might 
not be using a “PSM”. It would include agents using a wider set of concepts and 
frameworks such as theory of constraints, game theory, negotiation support or multi-
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criteria decision analysis, and also the activity of agents who are not consciously 
using any type of decision support approach. Decoupling the “problem structuring”
and the “intervention” was deliberate as I considered the possibility that agents’ 
naturally occurring problem structuring need not be viewed as a time bounded
activity. Within the context of ongoing organizational flux and change a study of 
those managing ongoing situations [31] might be possible.
Having watched and participated in groups structuring problems (without PSMs)
for over a decade, I reflect upon these observations and realize that they have not led 
me toward the generation of hypotheses. Rather I have a conviction that naturally 
occurring problem structuring is prevalent in organizations and that its resemblance to 
the problem structuring that occurs within PSM interventions may lie in the 
interaction and behavior of agents rather than the tools and approaches used. For this 
reason I am drawn to naturalistic data in which I can analyze interactions in detail, 
analysis that might be described as behavioral operational research [32, 33]. 
Through autoethnography I have arrived at a personal belief that an
organizationally situated study of naturally occurring problem structuring will be of 
more interest and value than an attempt to study this phenomenon via an experimental 
approach.
3.3 Reviewing the design of my PhD research project
Perhaps the most tangible results of reviewing my student experiment through an 
autoethnographic frame are that I have identified the detailed analysis of video data as 
central to my research and the gathering of naturalistic data as appropriate to studying
naturally occurring problem structuring. In addition to general learning about 
ethnomethodology using video data, close reading of other operational research 
studies using video analysis [34, 35, 36] will now be necessary.
For me, this will represent the next stage of my journey, and my reflections will 
continue. For example, I still need to identify and justify selection of the theories that 
will drive my video data analysis. I must still also consider the ongoing role of 
standard item based survey data in my project, and how I might use findings from 
quantitative survey analysis to focus my qualitative analysis.
In addition, positioning my research as a set of case studies using a quasi-
experimental design does not close my consideration of how much data I will need.
Whilst researchers can now produce guides for PSMs practitioners based upon their 
personal experience of working on a wide range of interventions [37], the number of 
cases it is feasible to expect a student to work on within a PhD project will not be 
comparable. However, it will still be necessary for me to consider how much data I 
can feasibly collect and analyze, how many different groups this will represent, and 
how many repetitions of interaction patterns I may expect to see.
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4 Discussion
The achievement of expertise in problem structuring is positioned as critical to the 
academic community in relation to the development of researchers [38]. White [7]
identifies the value autoethnography may bring to understanding what happens during 
PSM interventions and Tavella’s study [1] provides an example of doing so from the 
perspective of a novice facilitator. I have shared my autoethnographic story of how a 
pilot experiment has contributed to the development of my PhD project and aligned
the benefits I derived through the use of an autoethnographic frame with two similar 
benefits identified by Tavella [1]. A point of difference in my findings is that I was 
not seeking access to a real-world intervention and therefore could not experience this 
benefit. However, as I join the academic community from an industry background, I
have found that gathering my first small datasets gives me more to talk about as I 
begin to participate in academic conversations.
Within the literature on studying for a PhD, the journey of a student is often 
portrayed as lonely, or as a time when you might feel vulnerable to feelings of 
inadequacy. My personal experience has been that the opportunity to trial methods 
early in my studies has helped me understand my own strengths and weaknesses and 
enhanced my understanding of how different types of research may feel for the 
researcher. This understanding then delivered value for me as it guided decisions 
about my research design.
Bochner [39] identifies the purpose of self-narratives as being to extract meaning.
He quotes Geertz’s [40] view that alternative ethnography frees us to shape our work 
according to necessity rather than given rules. And my experience has been that 
reflecting upon my early efforts at gathering data was necessary to the progression of 
my studies. Through reflection I arrived at a coherence that as Bochner says “was not 
available at the original moment of experience” [39, p270]. The greatest personal
impact of this work was arrived at following several cycles of reflection and relates to 
the relative value and role of standard item surveys and video data in my research
project.
In sharing my autoethnographic findings I have attempted to deliver the five key 
features of analytic autoethnography identified by Anderson [8]. Analyzing my own 
role as a researcher, my introspection was intended to better understand my own 
attitude to research and how to position my research amongst existing and future 
contributions to advance our knowledge of problem structuring. Although I cannot 
generalize from the “N of one”, I did place myself at the center of my narrative, using 
empirical data to gain an insight into the practical process of research. I hope that my 
account is of interest both to those concerned with problem structuring and those 
concerned with the development of novice researchers.
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Abstract. Task complexity has been an important part of analyses of the Group 
Support System literature and relates to both task performance’s process and 
outcomes. The entanglement between the human agency (e.g., users) and the 
material agency (e.g., technology) should not be underestimated when 
considering decision-making enacted through technology usage. A relational 
concept of technology, affordances and constraints facilitates the organizational 
understanding of the potential of a technology as well as its sometimes 
unintended use. In order to assess the interaction between human and material 
agencies, we draw from the “imbrication” metaphor on sociomateriality. In this 
article, we combine the perspective of affordances with the McGrath task 
typology/circumplex) to study the material and human agency in the context of 
decision making in police work. Our approach is illustrated with field data 
collected during decision-making of police officers in practice. The approach 
proves useful to determine the outcomes of technology on High Reliability 
Organizations. It outlines differences between intended technology use and 
technology affordance as it is enacted in practice.
Keywords: Group Support Systems, Affordances, Constraints, Imbrication, 
Collaborative Technology, High Reliability Organizations
Introductions
Since decades, Decision Support System (DSS) have been designed to aid decision-
making processes [1]. Decision-making activities relate to problem-solving and is task 
related [2]. Both freight in difficulties when groups are involved. Group-thinking is a 
well-known example of defective decision-making style characterized by excessive 
concurrence seeking by homogeneous group members under stressful condition [3].
The field of Group Decision Support System (GDSS) has tackled defective decision-
making, such as group thinking, in providing sets of methods and technologies to 
encompass such challenges. Technologies have been designed as a group support of 
specific tasks through tight processes. The tasks ranged from the gathering of 
statements or information, ranking or categorizing statements, rating or evaluating and 
also monitoring, through combined use of human agency (i.e., participants, chauffeur 
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or facilitator) and material agency (i.e., Decision Explorer, Group Explorer, Group 
Support System, Strategic Options Development and Analysis, thinkLet). Different 
ontological approaches underpinned the development of major GDSSs [4, 5]. GDSS 
scholars have been pioneers in addressing to both the human and material agencies at 
the operational and strategic decision-making level of groups in organization. The aim 
of this study is to understand and explore material and human agency in decision 
making in HROs. Specifically, we look at the impact of material and human agency on 
the decision-making processes of police officers. 
Task complexity has been an important part of analyses of the Group Support 
System literature and relates to both process and outcomes of task performance.
Complexity plays a key role in differentiating task environments [6]. Task complexity 
depends at least on four elements: outcome multiplicity (i.e., more than one desired 
outcome), solution scheme multiplicity, conflicting interdependence (i.e., adopting one
scheme conflicts with adopting another possible solution scheme), and solution 
scheme/outcome uncertainty [7, 8]. Solution scheme/outcome complexity is the extent 
to which there is uncertainty about whether a given solution scheme will lead to a 
desired outcome. For example, earlier research has demonstrated the importance of the 
fit between the task and the technology for effective GSS use [8]. Other scholars in the 
field have directly mapped the level of collaborative capabilities to be influenced by a 
form of “intellectual bandwidth” fitting to the organizational tasks [9]. However, in 
1998, Zigurs and Buckland [8] regretted “that no generally accepted theory of 
task/technology fit had emerged yet” (p. 313). Also, scholars in the GDSS field 
recommended “being cautious of being driven by the opportunities that technological 
developments provide” [4]. In other words, we converge and state that one should not 
underestimate the entanglement between the human agency (e.g., users) and the 
material agency (e.g., technology) when considering decision-making enacted through 
technology usage. Congruently, past research has also demonstrated that enacting 
reciprocal interdependence (i.e., intersubjectivity) in dyads using cognitive mapping 
technology lead to better ethical decision-making [10].
Technology Affordances and Constraints Theory (TACT) [11] has emerged
answering partly to Zigurs and Buckland’s [8] wishes for a theory to understand the fit 
between tasks and technology. TACT’s essential premise is that one must consider the 
dynamic interactions between people and organizations and the technologies they use 
to understand its consequences [11]. The ontological status of technology led to a 
controversy in the TACT literature. However, TACT scholars agree that having a 
relational concept of technology affordances and constraints distinct from features and 
purpose, facilitate the organizational understanding of the potential of a technology as 
well as it sometimes unintended use (for more details see [11]). They propose focusing 
on the interactions between material agency (i.e., technology) and human agency (i.e., 
people) rather than on technological features or human attributes separately to afford 
or hinder (i.e., enact) for example collaboration. According to Majchrzak and Markus 
[11] affordances and constraints emerge when users engage with technology,
affordance refers to an “action potential”, that is, what a user can do with a technology 
for a particular purpose . Constraints address the way technology may limit the users 
or an organization. Affordances by definition are sociomaterial as they emerge from 
the entanglement between social and material in practice [12, 13]. Orlikowski [14]
defined sociomateriality as “the recursive intertwining of humans and technology in 
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practice” (p. 1437). The later may not enact, for instance, knowledge sharing and 
therefore biased part of the decision-making process. A differentiation amongst
individual, collective and shared affordances was introduced when considering the use 
of technology at the group level [15]. Shared affordances emerge in cases of reciprocal
interdependence [15]. In the context of GDSS, shared affordances are crucial for 
success, since successful collaborations can only take place when there are shared 
affordances. 
Collaborative technology takes on an important role in today’s organizations. 
Organizations may achieve significant business improvement streamlining their 
collaborative work practice [16]. De Vreede et al. [17] state that especially “The 
widespread availability of smart phones has given whole societies opportunities to 
participate in large-scale sensemaking, problem solving, and efforts to organize 
collaborative action” (p. 1). In the context of High Reliability Organizations (HRO), 
for instance emergency response or firefighting brigades, smartphone applications 
embedding collaborative features have been successful in supplying role-specific 
information independent of time and place, and afforded collaboration [18].
Police work & Sociomateriality
We studied human and material agency and affordance in the context of a HRO, the 
Dutch Police We focus on the operational work of police officers, and address the
mobile-technologies currently used by the Dutch Police. The day-to-day-activities of 
the ‘blue’ officers cover responding to emergency calls, enforcement of the law, and 
maintaining public order. Mobile police technologies are defined as the technologies 
that can be used irrespective of time and place. We limit our research to the technologies
that are carried-by the officers on their person, excluding the (mobile) information 
technology in police vehicles and information technology at police stations.
Research conducted in the context of police work demonstrated that the highly 
entangled relationship between technology and the organizational life is one of the 
driving factors behind the implementation of mobile technology [19, 20]. On one hand, 
mindful workarounds around technological constraints benefited the organization. On 
the other hand, the lack of enactment of certain affordances by the officers imposed 
potential risks for the organization [21]. Leonardi [22] states “that people’s work is not 
determined by the technologies they employ” (p. 148). In other words, users are free 
deciding how they use a certain technology [22].
Uncertainty is associated in the literature with a lack of information [e.g., 23].
Therefore, the logic would be to increase the amount of information in order to decrease 
uncertainty. However, in the context of HROs and IT usage, more information may add 
uncertainty. In other words, more information may paradoxically increase equivocality 
as the amount of solution scheme/outcome uncertainty may expend. In this article we 
defined equivocality as “the existence of multiple and conflicting interpretations about 
an organizational situation” [24, p. 357]. Research has demonstrated that reducing 
equivocality relying on technologies may be challenging [24]. Technology usage may 
simply add complexity to the tasks. We defined task complexity as the amount of 
processing or attention required by a task, or the amount of structure or clarity provided 
by a task [25]. Nowadays, many decisions are being taken even faster and with more 
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connectivity then before. Instead of functioning as a tool in the hands of the worker, 
technology is developing agency of its own [22, 26]. While technologies are often 
developed to reduce task complexity, if human agency is not considered properly,
technologies can be a burden to otherwise routine tasks increasing equivocality, 
especially in group decision-making. The distinction between individualized, collective 
and shared affordances is essential in the study of collaborative technology as the level 
of affordance is reflected in the level of decision-making. Individual decision-making
may require only individualized affordance. Yet, when multiple group members are 
involved in decision making, depending on the interdependence, collective or shared 
affordance may be appropriate. This relationship between the level of affordance and 
the level of decision-making is two-fold. First, there may be a direct relationship 
between decision-making and the level of affordance, i.e. individual decision making 
implies an individualized affordance of retrieving information to reduce uncertainty. In
group decision-making, collective affordance emerges, where the ability for the group 
to achieve a goal is a sum of the individual affordances. Second, collaborative 
communication technologies’ affordance affect the level of decision-making. A shared 
affordance enables shared decision-making, in cases where synchronous 
communication is required for decision-making. In addition, collective affordances 
may enable shared decision-making, in the case of pooled interdependence in the 
decision-making task. For example, each of the group members may supply different 
pieces of information required for the group to make the decision. 
The data collection and method previously applied in healthcare setting [27] is 
outlined below, followed by an overview of the technologies currently available to the 
police, categorized based on the McGrath circumplex [28].
Data Collection & Method
In the Netherlands, the police has been given the task of law enforcement and providing
assistance to anyone who is in need of help. Throughout 2016, 80 hours of police work 
was observed at three police stations in the Netherlands. Data was collected using a 
smartphone with a note-taking application. Video recording equipment was not used in 
order to avoid legal implications for police, victims, suspects and others parties 
involved Observations were written down on any kind of impressions that were 
witnessed, this rather than deciding before data collection which elements were relevant
[29]. Within 24 hours, additional information was added to those field notes and they 
were structured. Full disclosure regarding the research purpose was given to the police 
officers. This made it possible to engage and listen to their rich experiences with 
technology in practice. In addition to the field observations, weekly meetings of the 
Business Support of the organizational program charged with development and 
implementation of the smartphone at the Dutch police were attended. Lastly, to 
determine the intended use of technology as seen from the perspective within the 
organization, internal documents were collected and studied. These documents 
contained the business case for the implementation of the smartphone, as well as the 
implementation plan.
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Table 1, Overview of technology functionalities categorized based on McGrath [28]
Technology/functionality McGrath segment Interdependence
Radiotelephone
Voice communication 
through radio
Planning (1), Reciprocal interdependence
Status messages through 
radio
Planning (1) Reciprocal interdependence
Emergency button Psychomotor-
performance (8)
Reciprocal interdependence
MEOS Smartphone
Mobile ID Intellective tasks (3) No interdependence
Information Retrieval Decision-making (4) Pooled interdependence
Fine Performance/psycho-
motor (8)
No interdependence
Secure E-mail Intellective tasks (13), Reciprocal interdependence
Camera Psychomotor-
performance (8)
No interdependence
In the affordance tradition, we focus on how humans enact the technologies to operate 
in teams. Particularly, we categorized the affordances as individualized, collective or 
shared, depending on the interdependence of the task in combination with the 
affordances as it was classified in the McGrath [28] circumplex. As demonstrated in 
Leonardi’s study [15], we witness a range of individual, collective and shared 
affordances in context [15]. Individualized affordances revolve around officers solving 
intellective tasks, i.e. making sure someone is who he says he is. Yet, in some cases, 
we see a similar affordance being used as part of a collective affordance. For example, 
when one officer looks up information about an address and shares this with his 
colleagues in his vicinity as input for a discussion on what went down in that situation. 
The situations where shared affordance can be witnessed involve planning tasks where 
officers communicate through their radiotelephone. There is a high level of reciprocal 
interdependence, and all the officers enact the affordance of the radiotelephone in a 
similar fashion.
Conclusion & Limitations
In this paper, we assess the interaction between the social and material in practice 
through the lens of affordances. From the illustration in the context of mobile 
technology use in the police context, a number of insights emerge. By design, the 
majority of functionalities are intended to be used as individualized affordances.
However, in practice, those individualized affordances are enacted as collective 
affordances, due to the pooled interdependence within the group. 
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In the part of the circumplex that involves solving problems with correct answers a 
number of individualized affordances can be identified. Collective affordances were 
witnessed in decision-making with no right answers. Usually, due to the more complex 
nature of the decision-making tasks, multiple officers are involved. In these situations, 
collective affordances emerge, where the officers work together to achieve a group goal
through different affordances. During planning tasks, which require coordination, 
shared affordances were used as they were intended. 
In this exploratory research, we aim at a better understanding of the imbrication
between the human agency and the agency performed by technology – material agency 
in the context of police work. Concluding, our approach has shown the value of 
studying affordances in a non-functional way, by assessing their means to reach a 
social, emotional [30] or in this case: collaborative end. In fact, in studying the impact 
of technology on organizations, this approach lines up with the sociomaterial 
perspective in studying human agency which is similarly defined as the ability of an 
agent to reach their goal [31].
This study has shown that only in practice [32], the enacted can be studied, as those 
affordances may differ from those intended by the organizational decision-makers. 
Clearly, it is from those actualized affordances that the effects on the organization will 
emerge [33]. These findings may prove useful to practitioners, as it gives an insight in 
the limited predictability of the use of technology functionalities. From a theoretical 
perspective, the task technology fit approach is surely useful, but it is difficult 
nowadays to develop the proper method to study teamwork, when not considering 
imbrication or entanglement. 
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Abstract. Risks to cyber infrastructure are rising and becoming ever more 
complex. In that respect, situational awareness, knowledge and understanding 
are key factors when dealing with cyber threats. Information Technology 
managers and practitioners are faced with enormous computer-processed data 
coming in at ever increasing speed. IT-related overload impacts the associated 
ability to process this information safely and efficiently. Altogether, it is a big 
challenge for IT managers to conduct a dedicated cyber defense agenda. In most 
cases the overload occurs because of limitations in time or human processing 
capacity, or defective team communication. This is exacerbated in a small-scale 
economy where resources are often very limited. While financial consequences 
may not seem substantial to the world, for an island it may be economically 
devastating. This research in progress focuses on collaboration between private 
and public sectors to implement a resilient national cyber defense agenda.
Keywords: Cyber Security, Information Overload, High Reliability 
Organizations, Collaborative Action.
1   Introduction
The Caribbean islands, with their geographic proximity to South America, together 
with their historic ties to Europe, have a strategic advantage regarding their triangular 
geographical location with South America and historical roots in Europe. Tourism is 
the main pillar of the national GDP income in many Caribbean islands. In Aruba, it is 
expected to rise to 94.0% in 2025 [9]. Relative to their size and number of inhabitants, 
the islands form a self-sustaining “microcosm”, rich of various infrastructures (e.g., 
airports, banks, ISP’s, hotels). Expanding the position of the Caribbean as a logistical 
hub for trade is therefore cardinal to diversifying and thereby fortifying its local 
economies. In the example of Aruba, well-functioning infrastructures, services, as 
well as promotion of entrepreneurship are critical success factors for developing
towards such a diversified economy. In that context, a sound reputation for safety and 
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security is crucial. Keeping up with technological trends, especially those related to
Information Technology (IT), is a key factor both for ensuring sustainability of 
Aruba’s main economic pillar and for its development towards being a commercial 
gateway between South America and Europe. By extension, cyber-resiliency will 
increasingly underpin Aruba’s economic development. However, in the last few years, 
conform the worldwide trend, concerns for cyber security in the public and private 
sector have been growing in Aruba. For example, cyber-attacks may pose significant 
threats to financial services relied upon by tourists and entrepreneurs on the islands. 
Locally, collaborative efforts to mitigate these risks are in motion, but sill struggle to 
formalize.
Currently, the island of Aruba is not on the attack radar like large countries. The 
Caribbean islands have not been under heavy cyber-attack as is the case with countries 
such as USA, China and Russia. No major incidents have been recorded in Aruba. The 
main reason for not being so high on the target list may be due to an actual low 
political interest or the relatively limited capital of potential target companies. At best 
the Caribbean basin may be utilized as a sandbox to test out hacks, viruses and 
malware. On the other hand, most islands in the Caribbean have increased their 
bandwidth in a rapid pace. This fact, combined with relatively low cyber security 
awareness poses a new set of possible threats for misuse by cyber criminals. For 
example, insufficiently protected devices could serve as potent botnets for cyber-
attacks. A targeted attack on an island such as Aruba or any other Dutch, French or 
British Caribbean island would potentially have highly detrimental effects on the local 
economies and possibly even have a significant impact on their relationship with the
motherland. Politically motivated cyber-criminals may therefore consider the 
Caribbean islands to be low hanging fruit for such attacks. This is especially true in 
the case of Aruba, where bandwidth has increased dramatically, yet digital literacy is 
still trailing.
As cyber defense risks are rising, collaboration on a national scale, both micro and 
macro, becomes increasingly important. At the micro level, difficult posing data, 
situational awareness and understanding associated to cyber defense are lacking, 
increasing these risks. Particularly, IT managers and practitioners are bombarded with 
computer-processed data linked to cyber-threats. This situation of IT-related overload
(i.e., excessive number of inputs delivered through IT) impact the associated ability in 
processing efficiently these amounts of information [5, 6]. The cyber security budget 
is in most cases part of the overall IT budget. The cyber security budget is under 
pressure as business initiatives often do not explicitly include the necessary controls to 
adhere to the cyber risk appetite of the organization. In the struggle for resources,
between choosing the best set of defenses based on the information assets that need 
protecting and building a scalable network, commercial interests usually have the 
upper hand. Additionally, implementing end-user awareness programs and monitoring
comes at the costs of slowed down and less flexible business operations. Security 
measures only briefly fall into perspective after a security breach is exposed, either 
internally or in worldwide examples such as the recent WannaCry ransomware 
infections. It is usually only during the aftermath of such a security breach, that risk 
owners are engaged and motivated to take measures to ensure the security of their 
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operations. In this case, the development of remediation plans and collaboration with 
security partners to aid vulnerability resolution and meet expected trust levels of its 
clients are among the temporary activities. The strength, however, of the IT security 
practitioner is to combine external intelligence with internal sources to lower cyber 
risk exposure in the long term. In fact, cyber security recommendations advocate that 
one of the important mandates of the IT security practitioner should be to ascertain 
that cyber security has a permanent and prominent place on the organizational risk 
management agenda. In organizations driven by profit, the cyber security agenda will 
usually be perceived to be in a trade-off with the organization’s commercial interests
or even with the execution of its strategy. Therefore, cyber security is likely to become 
subject to negotiations in such organizations. It is crucial for the IT security 
practitioner to be properly equipped to handle these situations and to be able to 
convince decision makers of the likeliness and impact of the relevant cyber-related 
risks. Collaboration between IT security practitioners across the industry and the 
government can help them obtain the necessary baggage to perform their mandate 
individually, which should ultimately yield collective gains across the industry and 
nation.
Cyber has become an adjective that is accolated to nouns such as security, space, 
crime or even bullying. It is an abbreviation of cybernetics that is according to the 
Oxford dictionary the science of communication and automatic control systems in 
both machines and living things. Cybernetic is born in the 1980’s with the appearance
of the first computer as a results of the cognitive revolution [2]. The aim of the first 
computers was to mimic and later assist higher cognitive processes such as decision-
making. While facing information overload one may hope Quantum computing and 
Quantum Information Processing (QIP) will solve the big data issue, helping in 
managing processes. However, it is clear that the challenge will remain human and 
collaborative in nature. These QIP technologies are expected to improve computing 
communication and cryptographic systems [2]. QIP will surely help chunking data and 
may lead to automatization of some decisions. This futuristic view of “cyber” will be 
an emerging area of research, with implication in searching in large databases, cloud 
storage or intelligence repositories. The advantages of QIP will be key to the cyber
security. Cyber will not be limited to the ability of a new generation of super-
computing in solving the big data problem. At the strategic level, QIP will give 
superiority. However, as is well-known in the cyber security domain, such technical 
superiority never lasts due to what is known as the challenge and response 
mechanism. Data is not information. Information is contextual and to that respect 
human decision making will remain key to making informed and strategic decisions.
Decisions are emotional not logical [1]. Groundbreaking discovery in neuroscience 
revealed that when one cannot feel emotion, one cannot decide properly. Hot and cold 
cognition form a dichotomy within executive functioning in charge with the decision-
making process. There has been support for separation into "hot" affective aspects and 
"cold" cognitive aspects.
At the macro level, social regulation as well as business competition make sharing 
relevant cyber intelligence difficult. Indeed, most companies that would benefit from 
sharing information related to cyber security are often each other’s competitors. 
However, we assume collaboration is possible and desirable to cope with cyber 
426 Group Decision and Negotiation – GDN 2017
14-18 August 2017, Stuttgart-Hohenheim, Germany
threats. Indeed, data and information carry different values for different industries.
This information could be categorized and shared when relevant for mitigating cyber-
attacks. In order to foster collaboration between industry sectors, it would be 
beneficial to support a sharing platform where incidents and relevant information 
regarding cyber security would be shared. An independent platform and associated 
policy to report and or share breaches would be beneficial. Also, it would provide a 
better picture at the intelligence level in order for governments to be able to take 
proper actions in the event of an attack. Such platforms for collaboration would foster 
awareness and understanding of cyber security both at the national level and 
organizational level. Relevant information could be shared amongst private and public 
entities, while being properly categorized.
The banking and telecom sector are front runners in cyber intelligence sharing on 
the island of Aruba. They function as High Reliability Organizations (HROs). Vogus 
and Sutcliffe (2007) [8] defined HROs as “organizations that operate hazardous 
technologies in a nearly error-free manner under trying conditions rife with 
complexity, interdependence, and time pressure” (p. 2). The introduction of new 
technologies is not trivial as it also impacts organizational routines and decision-
making [3, 7]. Threats also increased in the banking sectors as more IT leads to more 
potential security breaches. While financial consequences of cyber-attacks may seem 
small for the world, for a small and highly inter-dependent island, it can have 
enormous economic impact. In the last years, as globally, concerns for cyber security 
in the public and private sectors has raised in Aruba. Both sectors are highly
dependent on information technologies, conform to worldwide standards. A cyber 
resilient Aruba is an important prerequisite for economic growth. Cyber threats may 
affect financial services for tourists and entrepreneurs on the islands.
The authors postulate that the Caribbean basin is an exceptionally and interesting 
environment to implement such a cyber resiliency agenda at both the micro and macro 
levels. This research in progress focuses on the collaboration between private and 
public sectors to create a resilient national cyber defense. Ultimately, the goal is to 
implement an innovative agenda for cyber defense based on the premises previously 
underlined in the text.
Our vision encompasses an analysis at three core levels. The first one regards
information management (e.g., data and information processing), the second level 
addresses to the sharing of knowledge and creation of shared understanding (e.g., 
individual and team learning) and the third to decision-making encompassing shared 
understanding and wisdom. In order to build such an agenda, a survey is being run on 
the island of Aruba to capture the current state of situational awareness, knowledge 
and understanding regarding cyber security as well as the consequences of 
information overload on main cyber security stakeholders.
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Abstract. The paper proposes the use of the Strategic Choice Approach as a 
way of structuring the architectural design process, partly individually and 
partly supported by meetings and interviews with DMs, experts, and 
stakeholders. SCA is employed as a designing tool to provide alternative 
transformation scenarios. We reflect on the possible use of SCA to determine 
prescriptive conditions on physical form at a scale that is still intermediate 
between the building and the urban tissue. In this sense, planning and 
architectural design talk to each other via SCA. It represents a way of 
approaching the challenge of planning in an uncertain world, but moreover it 
produces an architectural transformation. SCA can work in a physical sense, not 
only eliciting guidelines and strategies. This proposal shows an application to a 
real-world problem, currently under debate by the City of Turin (Italy), the re-
use of abandoned barracks located in a prestigious residential area.
Keywords: Strategic Choice Approach – Architecture – Planning – Design tool 
1 Introduction
Strategic Choice Approach [9] belongs to Soft Operational Research fundamental 
methods, developed in order to manage practical problem situations [14]. In 
particular, Soft OR and Problem Structuring Methods (PSMs) deal with “wicked 
problems”[15], or ill-structured problems [13], with difficult resolution, marked out 
by multiple actors, many conflicting values and points of view, a large number of 
possible solutions and high uncertainty [12]. The traditional use of SCA is here 
enlarged with an experimental use as a designing tool. 
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We observe that SCA is traditionally used, in urban and regional development, in 
order to manage uncertainty and to deal with such planning difficulties in a strategic 
way [8]. There is an extensive literature that offers account on the SCA use in a 
tradition that comes from planning, in particular urban planning [8, 10, 13]. In fact, 
there are many public planning situations characterised by different levels of 
uncertainty, in which SCA applications provide what different possible actions might 
be undertaken [8] and which functions should be located. On the opposite, as far as 
we know, there is a gap in the literature of SCA application in the architecture realm. 
By shifting the analytic focus from urban planning to architecture, our research shows 
the SCA cooperating with the design process. 
Therefore, this paper is a first attempt to explore the feasible interface between two 
disciplines: PSMs and architecture. We study the possible use of SCA in buildings 
transformation at a district level, to determine prescriptive conditions on physical 
form at a scale that is still intermediate between the single building and the urban 
tissue. In this sense, planning and architectural design talk to each other via SCA. It
still represents a way of approaching the challenge of planning in an uncertain world 
[5], but moreover it produces an architectural project or transformation: it works in a 
physical sense, not only eliciting guidelines and strategies. We argue that, when SCA 
is used to design physical form and spaces - as geometric ones and not only as a 
functional target - then we use the method as a tool to realize or transform an 
architectural outcome, as buildings.
2 SCA, Urban Planning and Architecture
The approach to planning known as the Strategic Choice Approach originated in the 
late 1960’s, during a research project in the English city of Coventry: the aim was to 
understand the processes of strategic decision making in city government [8] and the 
project was conducted by a mixed team of operational research scientists and social 
scientists. Through several meetings, they found solutions about some issues, as the 
redesign of the city’s road network, the development of housing land, the renewal of 
inner areas [8], and others. After that, SCA method has been applied to different kinds 
of planning situations, in fields like local community development [8, 10, 13], or 
environmental policy [7], or in decisions about transports [8]. So, the Strategic Choice 
Approach is often used in public planning, in order to solve political and technical 
challenges about urban design. The aim is the construction of a shared view of the 
nature of the decisions [8], in which planning is a continuous process of strategic 
choice [9] and people play interlocking roles. SCA is usually experimented in public 
participation, to respond to uncertainties and take good decisions, in which analysis, 
planning and design are interwoven: in this sense it is a rational basis for comparison 
of competing solutions. In general, in urban processes, SCA is used as a tool that 
supports decision makers in shaping problems [7], a sort of preliminary “platform” for 
designers, builders, developers and urban planning authorities involved in the process 
itself. PSMs help planners in early design stages, characterized by a high level of 
complexity and not clear definition [8]. Therefore, SCA can be a framework, a 
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starting point for future activities. From the point of view of the architectural design, 
the challenge is to consider SCA methods as an integrated device and not as a mere 
complement or external support to the design action. We have considered the process 
of design production as an open phase (Fig. 1), which is intertwined with decision-
making [17]. Architectural design is a practice based on the production and exchange 
of documents [6] or “registered acts”, where decisions are embedded into the 
drawings. Thus, it is fundamentally a “strategic” practice, which can be combined 
with a large set of tools.
Fig. 1. The project can be seen as a contract between different parts. Source: adapted from
Armando and Durbiano [3].
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3 The Case Study: the La Marmora Barracks (Turin, Italy)
SCA is tested as a tool to support the creation of alternative design scenarios for 
abandoned barracks: the method, in its setting in phases, in the definition of options 
and with the comparison of alternative courses of action, has allowed to include in the 
process different points of view, which contributed to the definition of alternative 
reuse strategies of the property. The context is a highly topical theme in Italy, that is 
the reuse and enhancement of properties originally belonging to the Ministry of 
Defense, then property of the State Property Agency. As a matter of fact, over the last 
two decades, a process of divestment has occurred, offering interesting opportunities
to private developers and to the Public Administration as a chance to enhance urban 
renewal operations. The former barracks, often situated in central urban areas, can be
an important opportunity for development and rebalancing of local realities. The La 
Marmora barracks in Turin are a late nineteenth century property of the Ministry of 
Defense that are no longer used; they have become a void to be reinvented. The aim 
of the research is to consider the several aspects of the decision problem related to the 
barracks in its complexity. The attempt was focused on combining the architectural 
aspects of the project along with the testing of the SCA decisional method. At an 
institutional level, the situation is defined: the bureaucratic process has been 
completed with the approval of the urban variation and the sale to Cassa Depositi e 
Prestiti, a significant Italian financial institution, acting within the Italian economic 
system essentially as a State bank. The property, however, was occupied from April 
to November 2015 by some members of the association of social promotion ‘Terra 
del Fuoco’, who were protesting against the current abandonment and asking for a use 
respectful of the memory and the value of to the barracks, which during the Second 
World War were used as a prison. The establishment was vacated in mid-November 
2015, following a further occupation carried out by an anarchist collective and some 
nomads. Currently the barracks is part of a feasibility study, developed by an
important architecture firm in Turin. The situation is a reflection of a reality far from 
being clarified, especially concerning the requests coming from "the bottom”. The 
research takes place in parallel with the process itself, changing and adapting to 
current events and the on-going discussions. In this context, the SCA is perceived to 
be an ideal test method, due to its focus on uncertainty management in conflict or 
unclear situations, with the aim of defining the problem and solve it by identifying 
and comparing alternatives. In order to involve the main actors, the organization of a 
participatory workshop was put forward. But the on-going events (the two squattings 
of the site) have caused the refusal by institutional actors to participate. The use of 
SCA method partially in individual form was then pioneered, supported by meetings 
and interviews with individual DMs, experts, stakeholders (a councillor of the City of 
Turin, an executive of the Urban sector of the City of Turin, the director of the 
association which squatted the barracks, the district representative, a design expert). 
In fact, the asset transformation involves some key players, whose interests and 
powers has been analysed with a stakeholders analysis [4], elaborated since several 
meetings, at the barracks (with the occupants), but also after institutional gatherings 
(with municipality and district officials). 
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3.1 Method Application: SCA and Architecture
The SCA application takes place after a series of “unstructured” meetings with the 
mentioned key players involved, in order to explore more deeply their different 
positions. In some cases these meetings give birth to conflictual situations (i.e. the 
collaboration with the executive of the Urban sector of the City has been initially 
difficult, due to the fact that we also have met and discussed with the occupants). 
Consequently, as mentioned before, the first two phases of the method are 
experienced without a participatory workshop. In the shaping mode (Fig. 2), some 
feasible interventions were first brought out, identified as decision areas: the 
demolition of the building used as a warehouse (demolition); the realization of an 
underground parking (underground parking); the reconstruction of the demolished 
quantities (reconstruction); the study of permeability, routes and accessibility 
(ground); the buildings, in terms of space and possible uses (buildings). The way of
structuring in morphological and tangible way every step of the reasoning, it was a 
way to test an interaction between the method and the logical thread of the design. In 
fact, the definition of these decision areas is equivalent, in the architectural project, to 
discover the “space” of transformation. According to the method, there is a definition 
of the connections between the decision areas and of the most important and urgent 
ones (i.e. the demolition is an urgent decision).
Fig. 2. The decision areas in the shaping mode (on the left); the decision options in the 
designing mode (on the right).
Next, the decision options for each decision area are defined in the designing mode 
(Fig. 2). The alternative solutions for the underground parking are to create a new 
entry with a two-lane ramp from Cardinal Maurizio street (Cardinale), or to maintain 
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the current entries from Asti street (Asti) and to create two different ramps. About the  
reconstruction, it is possible to imagine a new building on the previous demolition 
area itself (New), or a volume distribution on the barracks roofs (Distribution). Then, 
the different possibilities for the ground are to design a new building as a door that 
open a portion of the barracks wall, connecting the existing walkway on the first floor 
in a complete ring of public use (Door), or to imagine a ramp in the same place, 
without the possibility of a ring at the first floor (Ramp). Through a combination in 
the option graph, the probable incompatibilities between the options are then defined. 
Therefore, it is possible to combine in sequence the options in an option tree, 
excluding their incompatibilities, and to obtain two decision schemes and different 
transformation scenarios. The other two phases are the occasion to support the process 
by meetings and interviews with some of the main stakeholders involved. Turning to 
the comparing mode, it is possible to compare the two scenarios, according to a series 
of criteria. The interviews are conducted firstly in order to modify the comparison 
criteria – firstly considered autonomously – and to validate them, in their final form. 
These meetings are structured in different steps. First of all, the previous two phases 
of the method are shown and the schemes and drawings are explained to the 
interlocutor. Second, the focus turns into the comparing mode itself and the 
interviewed gives his/her opinion about the comparison areas chose, by answering 
some questions. In some cases the disagreement is about the label given to a specific 
criterion (i.e. “usability” changes in “inclusiveness”); in other cases the criterion itself 
is discussed and transformed. 
Fig. 3. The advantage comparison in the comparing mode (on the left); the uncertainty areas in 
the choosing mode (on the right).
After that, using these criteria, the key-actors play an important role in defining the 
relative assessment and the advantage comparison between schemes A and B: the 
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scheme A seems to be the most suitable. The choosing mode (Fig. 3) is also tested 
thanks to the interviews. The key-actors help to define the uncertainty areas of the 
transformation. So, it is declared any doubt or concern about the scenario. This SCA 
application, by the output of a decision scheme (scheme A) and a list of uncertainty 
areas, becomes a framework, a starting point for future projects: starting from SCA, it 
is finally thinkable to define different levels for the transformation. 
4 Discussion
The refusal by institutional actors to participate to a collective workshop stimulates a 
switching in the SCA application. In fact, this originally participatory kind of 
intervention is here experimented first individually, then in a series, through one-on-
one interviews. This case study, as a real-life problem solving situation, is a subject to 
behavioural issues and effects [11], referring in particular to the interviewees in 
relation to the context and the models of the application. In other words, the 
comments here mentioned concern both the process and the content [2] of these 
relationships between the social, behavioural and the material entities involved in the 
interventions. In these, behaviours and human factors are crucially important to 
address [16]. In fact, in these interventions the aim is to represent a model of 
viewpoints and beliefs to enhance people involved to understand the conflictual 
situation, in order to let them able to solve it [16]. In this particular case study, the 
concern is with individuals and the representation or models are instrumental (relating 
to the framework for behavioural OR in [16]). The qualitative method of SCA can be 
analysed with a focus on understanding these micro-processes that affect the 
interviewees. First of all, as mentioned before, we have met the different key players 
in several occasions without any a priori ideas or specific aim. This fact allows a 
comparison (even if only qualitative) about their changes in way of thinking, opinions 
and behaviour afterwards, during the SCA application. We argue that, in some 
meetings, this simplified model of a real-world problem has helped in clarifying the 
different implications of various choices and the role itself of the researchers (i.e. the 
executive of the Urban sector of the city definitely distinguished our role from the 
occupants’ role), by removing the previous prejudice. Moreover, during the first step 
of the interviews (the explanation of shaping and designing modes), we notice that a 
growing interest has gradually emerged, probably due to the increasing understanding 
of the case study. It is also interesting to underline that, in some cases, the comparing 
mode just has started from the first question set up and then the themes investigated in 
the following questions has naturally come to light from the person interviewed. We 
suppose that it happens thanks to the fact that this method is similar to the way of 
thinking of who usually meditates on this kind of “wicked” spatial problems. In this 
sense, it also sounds quite interesting the merging between the method and the 
architectural process, given the wicked nature of how design sits within the planning 
process. The main similarity between these two processes is related to the 
experimental context in which they take place. In PSMs interventions, as well as in 
some kind of architectural design actions, the research is a continuous “in progress”, 
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due to the fact that it occurs simultaneously with the process itself. It is therefore 
logical to bring these processes together, as similar “running labs” about real-life 
problematic situations. The interesting difference – and possible field of study –
between PSMs an architectural research is the fact that the project, moving from 
policies, tackling conflicts and negotiations, and taking shape into documents, 
produces some clear material effects [4], that is what we can see in the physical places 
considered. These, as the real points of arrival of institutional actions, are practical 
and concrete outcomes of the interaction between several entities, including people, 
documents and space as social objects [6]. Thinking about micro-processes, in 
architectural design process it becomes very clear that every step of negotiation about 
an issue is a micro-project led by the drawings and schemes proposed, as “documental 
traces” [6] registered and capable to produce material effects [4]. In this sense, we 
argue that this link between PSMs and architecture leads to considering the micro-
processes on the basis of the “traces” they leave [6].
5 Conclusions and Future Studies
In this paper, we identify the possible use of SCA as a design tool. The architectural 
project is intended here as a process and a decision problem, for which there are 
multiple answers and alternative solutions. Therefore, the SCA, in its setting in 
phases, is a useful scheme through which the architect (individually and as facilitator) 
can reason, defining alternatives with sketches and drawings. We believe that, dealing 
with “wicked problems”, a more structured approach in the process of choosing 
alternative transformations could have an impact on the quality and the results of the 
project. Despite its potential, improvements are needed to consider SCA as a support 
for architectural design. Two main areas of future research are proposed. First, it 
would be of interest to test the method on other architectural issues, at a different 
geographical scale (the case here illustrate can be considerate at an intermediate level 
between “urban” and “building”) and concerning different architectural problems (i.e. 
infrastructural issues or new expansions of the town). Second, there is a problem 
connected to the possibility of “measuring” the effectiveness of the architectural 
project counting on the method. Our research about the effects of OR processes on 
knowledge, behaviour and action has some limitations, due first of all to the fact that 
we focus on a single case study; second, we only analyse the notes and schemes 
produced during the interviews, without a video or audio recording. However, it is 
important to say that the majority of these studies “are based on little more than 
authors’ reflections on single case studies” [16]. It has to be mentioned that this is a 
general limitation of the architectural projects, where the functionality, the aesthetic, 
the cost, the sustainability, etc. can be considered fundamental parameters to be 
evaluated in themselves and in their synergies. Research designs that include testing 
the SCA in different urban contexts, potentially including also a MCDA, would help 
to implement this proposed agenda.
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Abstract. A negotiation protocol defines a set of rules, which governs the 
communication and decision-making processes of the parties and may e.g. 
specify the number of participants, their roles, possible actions and the 
sequence of these actions. Electronic Negotiation Systems (ENSs) often 
implement only one negotiation protocol or a subset of negotiation protocols. 
Consequently, these ENSs restrict the range of supported negotiation problems. 
This paper presents a novel approach to increase the flexibility of electronic 
negotiation protocols by integrating a BPMN 2.0 Workflow Management 
System in an existing ENS. The results show, that freely configurable protocols 
can be executed during the runtime of the ENS. Furthermore, the utilisation of 
BPMN 2.0 may increase the understandability of negotiation protocols for the 
negotiators.
Keywords: flexibility, negotiation protocol, electronic negotiation system, 
workflow management system, BPMN 2.0
1   Introduction
A negotiation is “[…] an iterative communication and decision making process 
between two or more agents (parties or their representatives) who 1) cannot achieve 
their objectives through unilateral actions; 2) exchange information comprising offers, 
counter-offers and arguments; 3) Deal with interdependent tasks; and 4) Search for a 
consensus which is a compromise decision” [1, p. 316]. The negotiation process is 
structured by a negotiation protocol, i.e. the protocol defines a set of rules which 
govern the communication and decision making processes of the parties [2].
In face-to-face negotiations, the parties are relatively free in defining a protocol or 
may not even define an explicit protocol at all [2, 3]. In contrast, negotiations 
conducted in an ENS require precise protocols defining the activities undertaken by a 
human negotiator or the system [3].
Negotiations differ in many aspects: e.g. the negotiation type (bilateral, 
multilateral, auction) or the involvement of a neutral third party (arbitration, 
mediation) [4]. There are also mixed negotiation types, e.g. it is quite common in 
procurement scenarios to start with an auction focussing on the price only, followed 
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by a negotiation determining the other attributes of the transaction [5]. Furthermore, 
there is a large number of existing and emerging agreement scenarios in business 
negotiations [6]. Current ENSs implement only one negotiation protocol or at most a 
small subset of protocols [7].
However, for an adequate electronic negotiation support, a fit between the real 
negotiation problem and the electronic negotiation protocol is essential. 
Consequently, ENSs are required that support various negotiation scenarios and allow 
to define new protocols that fit the negotiation problem during the runtime of the ENS 
[2, 6–9].
In this work, the need for more flexibility in ENS is addressed by focussing on the 
following research question:
How can the flexibility of electronic negotiation systems, i.e. the support of various 
negotiation protocols, be increased by the integration of a Workflow Management 
System?
Several previous approaches using a Workflow Management System responsible 
for executing the negotiation protocols have been developed [8–11]. This paper
presents a novel approach by using the Business Process Model and Notation 
(BPMN) 2.0 to model and execute the negotiation protocols [12].
2 Methodology
The presented research question requires a methodology that supports the creation and 
evaluation of a software artefact. Therefore, a Design Science Research (DSR) 
approach is applied [13].
As a first step, an integrative literature review is conducted focusing on 
foundations of electronic negotiations, electronic negotiation protocols, and existing 
approaches for the design of ENS. Approaches based on workflow technologies are of 
particular interest. Using the explanatory design theory [14] for DSR demands the 
definition of general requirements and components of the software artefact. The 
literature review provides these requirements for the artefact and explains the derived 
general components for the artefact to design.
The design and development of the artefact includes the integration of the 
Workflow Management System (WfMS) in the electronic negotiation system
Negoisst [15, 16] and the implementation of the general components. Negoisst 
provides a holistic view on electronic negotiations by integrating communication, 
decision, and document support [16] and is thus appropriate to study the potentials of 
a WfMS executing negotiation protocols.
Following the design of the artefact, the evaluation is a crucial activity in DSR 
[13]. The focus of this paper is the technical feasibility of an approach integrating a 
WfMS. Thus, as a first step of evaluating this artefact, this paper follows a purely 
technical evaluation strategy, which does not involve organisations and human users 
[17]. The evaluation presented in this paper includes the analytical evaluation of the 
artefact [13]. As a last step, the presented approach is critically discussed and 
compared with existing solutions for flexible ENSs [18]. The goal is the creation of an 
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artefact, which represents an improvement to current approaches aiming at increasing 
the flexibility [18].
3 Theoretical Background
In the following a brief theoretical background on electronic negotiation protocols and 
workflows will be presented. Furthermore, the state-of-the-art on ENSs using 
workflows for negotiation protocols will be investigated.
3.1   Electronic Negotiation Protocols
An electronic negotiation is not only mediated by information and communication 
technology, but “[…] it is restricted by at least one rule that affects the decision-
making or communication process, if this rule is enforced by the electronic medium 
supporting the negotiation, and if this support covers the execution of at least one 
decision-making or communication task” [19, p. 147].
The negotiation is structured by a negotiation protocol, which defines a set of rules 
governing the communication and decision making processes of the parties [2]. The 
protocol “[…] may specify possible actions and their sequence, allowable offers and 
messages, timing of offers and messages” and may also “[…] specify the syntax and 
semantics of the messages, and mechanisms in which alternatives are determined and 
assessed, offers are constructed, and concessions are made” [1, p. 316]. The protocol 
restricts the range of available activities and the permissible inputs for each activity.
The ENS passes information about the successful or unsuccessful completion of an 
activity to the embedded protocol, which selects and returns the next activity [3].
One or multiple activities form a negotiation state [3]. An activity may be assigned 
to multiple states. States in turn belong to a certain negotiation phase [20]. This 
means, that electronic negotiation protocols may also differ in the support of various 
negotiation phases [21].
3.2  Workflows
Processes or workflows in organisations are nowadays often controlled and executed 
by a WfMS. The Workflow Management Coalition describes a workflow as being 
“[…] concerned with the automation of procedures where documents, information or 
tasks are passed between participants according to a defined set of rules to achieve, or 
contribute to, an overall business goal” [22, p. 6]. Transferring the description and 
idea of a workflow to an electronic negotiation, the overall business goal of the 
involved parties is reaching an agreement and the negotiation process and information 
exchange follows the negotiation protocol.
The workflow is executed by a Workflow Management System, which assigns the 
tasks of a workflow to human or IT resources. A WfMS is defined as follows:
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“A system that completely defines, manages and executes ‘workflows’ through the 
execution of software whose order of execution is driven by a computer 
representation of the workflow logic” [22, p. 6].
A WfMS needs to execute workflows defined in a computer interpretable 
language. Different workflow languages have been developed in the last years, e.g. 
the Business Process Execution Language (BPEL) and the BPMN. The following 
chapter focusses on flexible ENS approaches utilising workflows.
3.3   Workflows in flexible Electronic Negotiation Systems
Rolli and Eberhart [10] published an auction reference model and created a generic 
Java runtime environment (RTE) covering the basic functionality of various auction 
types. In their opinion, protocol designers only need to define a restricted set of 
directives using a graphical BPEL designer. Their RTE already covers recurring 
auction processes. Finally, a script converted the BPEL model to Java-code and the 
protocol was executed in the runtime environment.
A web-service enabled marketplace architecture was proposed by Kim and Segev 
[8]. In their architecture, the negotiation web-service enforces the rules of the selected 
negotiation protocol, while leaving intelligence for decision making to the services 
and systems of the parties connected with their marketplace. The protocols were 
modelled in BPEL and could be deployed on the BPEL WfMS integrated in their 
marketplace. One of their limitations was the expressiveness of BPEL: arbitrary 
cycles of activities were not allowed and some important Workflow Patterns [23]
were not supported.
Another approach also designed a web-service enabled e-marketplace using the 
Statechart formalism to model negotiation protocols [11, 24]. The created Statechart 
models were automatically mapped to BPEL process models, which could then be 
executed within the marketplace. The authors argue for the Statechart formalism, as it 
is intuitive and easy to learn and the created protocols are compact and clear, helping 
the negotiators to understand the protocols. However, there were some issues 
regarding the mapping of Statechart models to BPEL models.
Koumoutsos & Thramboulidis [9] developed a framework for complex, pro-active
and service-oriented ENSs. They also address the need for adaptable negotiation 
protocols by utilising a layered protocol architecture. The bottom layer forms the 
basis of every negotiation protocol and includes functionality required in each 
negotiation. On a higher layer, new negotiation protocols can be created with a WfMS 
using the XML Process Definition Language. Their workflow language selection was 
mainly driven by the criteria to provide a user-friendly visualisation of the protocol.
4   Explanatory Design Theory for Electronic Negotiation Protocols
In order to develop the artefact, the general requirements and the derived general 
components have to be defined [14]. They are summarised in Table 1 and are 
discussed in the following.
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The first requirement relates to this paper’s research question and demands to 
support the definition and execution of various protocols. A possibility to define and 
execute new protocols during the runtime of the ENS is required. Consequently, new 
protocols can be added without the need to implement new code and deploy the ENS 
again. The component realising this requirement is the integration of a WfMS in the 
ENS. Similar solutions have already been applied by [8, 9].
The second requirement is a graphical protocol representation. A user-friendly 
protocol visualisation enables the negotiators to understand the protocol models [9, 
11] and communicate his/her protocol requirements. In this approach, the requirement 
was realised by using the BPMN 2.0. The BPMN has a standardised graphical 
protocol representation and was especially developed for non-IT experts, such as the 
negotiators, to understand and communicate their process models [25, 26]. In 
addition, the BPMN includes an executable meta-model, which allows the execution 
in a workflow engine. Thus, a mapping algorithm between the graphical 
representation and the executable workflow language [11] is not required.
Third, the artefact needs to handle the states and activities of a protocol. The ENS 
passes information about the successful or unsuccessful completion of an activity to
the embedded protocol, that selects and returns the next activity [3]. Activities are 
executed either by the users or automated by the system. There might be states, in 
which the user can select from a number of next activities [3] all of which need to be 
presented to the user. For this purpose, an interface between the WfMS and the ENS 
is required to retrieve the current state of a negotiation and the feasible next activities 
of the negotiators. The ENS passes required information to the WfMS, e.g. the user 
completing the task and additional variables needed for further processing.
Last, the artefact needs to authorise users and manage their roles in different 
negotiations. In a negotiation, multiple negotiators may represent a party [4].
Furthermore, different parties may have the same potential activities in a protocol. 
They can be categorised as a group, e.g. as a group of bidders in an auction protocol 
[24, 27]. For protocol activities assigned to a group of several users, the component
should grant access to complete the activity to all users assigned to this group, i.e. the 
members of one group in a negotiation do all have the same authorities.
Table 1. General requirements and components.
No. General Requirement General Component
1 Support Definition and 
Execution of Various Protocols
Integration of a WfMS
2 Graphical Protocol 
Representation
Workflow Language with standardized 
graphical representation and an 
executable meta-model (BPMN 2.0)
3 Management of States and 
Activities
Interface between the WfMS 
(managing protocol states and 
orchestrating activities) and the ENS 
(executing activities, managing user 
activities and requests)
4 Authentication, Group and 
Role Management
Authentication and role component 
managing access to negotiation 
activities with a defined role
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5 Implementation and Protocol Example
The general components described in the previous chapter were integrated in the 
negotiation support system (NSS) Negoisst [15]. NSSs are a subtype of ENSs [4].
Negoisst, currently developed in its fourth version, is a web-application based on the 
Spring Framework. The BPMN WfMS chosen for the integration in Negoisst is 
Activiti since (1) it supports the BPMN corresponding to the second general 
requirement; (2) the license of the WfMS corresponds the open-source requirement of 
the NSS Negoisst; (3) its engine can be easily integrated in a Spring application [28].
Activiti provides seven core interfaces to interact with the WfMS [28]. Using an 
integrated architecture for a web application based on the Spring Framework and the 
Activiti engine [29], both the web application and the Activiti engine share the same 
Spring container. This shared container allows the NSS to interact with the WfMS, as 
well as the WfMS to call service-methods in the NSS.
Figure 1 exemplary shows an extract from an English auction protocol in BPMN. 
Once the participants enter the bid process, the User Task for bidders to write and 
submit new bids is triggered. When a bidder submits a new bid, the system compares 
it with the current highest bid. This function checks whether the utility of the new bid 
is higher than the utility of the highest bid. Additionally, in this example a minimal 
increment D [30] of value one is used. Thus, a new bid’s utility has to be at least 
greater than the current highest bid by one. If the new bid’s utility is lower than in the 
protocol defined, the system refuses the bid and the protocol returns to the write 
message task. If the new bid fulfils the condition, the bid process ends and is 
momentarily left to update the highest bid (not displayed in this extract) and returns to 
the bid process. An English auction may close when no new bids have been submitted 
within a certain period of time [30, 31]. Thus, the bid process has a boundary timer 
attached to it. If this process was not left in the last 24 hours, i.e. there were no new 
higher bids, the event is fired and the auction ends (also outside of this extract).
Fig. 1. Extract from the BPMN English Auction Protocol
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6   Evaluation
Following a purely technical evaluation strategy [17], as a first step the artefact is 
evaluated analytically [13]. Kersten and Lai defined six properties desirable for 
negotiation protocols [3], which will be discussed with regard to this work:
Input consistency refers to the use of all available information for protocol 
processing and the validation of inputs. Validity is ensured by the Negoisst system on
the user interface, whereas the use of information for protocol processing depend on 
the protocol and only required information (e.g. the user completing a task or 
decisions by the user) are passed to the WfMS. Transparency requires an 
understandable protocol. By using the BPMN developed for non-IT experts, users can 
understand the activities in the protocol visually. Furthermore, the direct execution of 
the BPMN model in the WfMS allows retrieving the current state of a negotiation in a 
graphical representation, highlighting all current activities. Explicability demands 
justification of a specific activity selection, whereas tractability is more general and 
demands justification of all potential protocol activities. First, Negoisst provides 
document support, i.e. all messages are persisted and visible to the negotiators [15].
Second, the activities can be justified by the graphical syntax of the BPMN modelling 
elements [12]. Third, the WfMS documents all completed tasks in an audit trail [28].
Satisfiability describes the possibility to reach a concluding state in a negotiation. 
Completeness demands for all activities a path to a concluding state. The graphical 
modeller of Activiti assures, that there is a path between the start and end event of a 
process, thus fulfilling the satisfiability property. The completeness however, needs to 
be assured by the protocol designers. 
Furthermore, the utility of the artefact is shown by two negotiation case studies
from the literature. For reasons of limited space this evaluation cannot be discussed in 
detail. For more details on all evaluations performed please cf. the corresponding 
master thesis [32] (if you would like to access the master thesis, please contact the 
author of this paper).
7   Discussion and Future Research
In the first part of this section, the design decisions of the approach are critically 
reviewed, before the approach is compared with the systems presented in 3.3.
As described in chapter 5 we selected the BPMN WfMS Activiti. Unfortunately, 
during the modelling process some workarounds were necessary, since Activiti’s 
BPMN implementation did not always conform to the BPMN specification [12].
These findings correspond with the evaluation of open source engines regarding their 
BPMN conformance by Geiger et al. [33]. They evaluated three open-source engines, 
including the Activiti engine. As a result, they found that these engines support only a 
subset of the BPMN specification and implement BPMN features differently. 
Similarly, different and non-standard conformant BPMN Service Task
implementations in the open source engines were found [25].
Some of the problems are considered to be rooted in the BPMN standard itself 
[34]. Several BPMN constructs are underspecified or ambiguous, thus making it 
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difficult for BPMN engine vendors to follow the standard. As a result, the BPMN 
engines only support a subset of the standard, vary in their implementation and are not 
compatible with each other. Therefore, the BPMN cannot be used for web service 
orchestration [25], such as presented by [8, 11]. Thus, the BPMN would only be 
suitable for standalone negotiation systems, as presented in this approach.
In comparison with the systems presented in chapter 3.3, the designed artefact 
provides one new feature: The graphical definition and the execution of the protocol 
in BPMN allows to retrieve the current state of a negotiation in a graphical 
representation, highlighting all current activities. Thus, the graphical BPMN 
representation is not only useful for the definition of a protocol, but also during the 
negotiation to trace the activities and increase the transparency of the protocol [3].
Kim & Segev’s approach provides a pattern-based approach to design new 
protocols [8]. Choosing from several a-priori defined parameters a new protocol can 
quickly be developed and executed. Compared with the presented approach, their 
marketplace allows for a quicker development of protocols. However, the flexibility
of the protocols is restricted to the given patterns, whereas this work provides more 
flexibility with the disadvantage of a longer protocol development phase.
The Invite platform integrates several negotiation systems on one platform [7].
Similar to [8], the systems allow specifying some parameters for the protocols with 
the same advantages and disadvantages listed above. 
The marketplace by Benyoucef and Rinderle utilised the Statechart formalism for 
modelling protocols [11]. While the Statechart formalism is more reductionist than
the BPMN models, the mapping to another workflow language can cause mapping 
problems for certain constructs [24]. Thus, using a workflow language, that can be 
graphically represented and executed in a WfMS, is superior to mapping approaches.
This work and the approach by Koumoutsos & Thramboulidis [9] have several 
aspects in common: Both provide a user-friendly visualisation of the protocol in an 
executable workflow language; the protocols are freely configurable and they provide 
basic functionality used in any protocol. However, their approach additionally uses 
rules to define strategies for agents on top of these protocols.
Summarising all findings, the flexibility of the presented artefact is only restricted 
by the expressiveness of BPMN, which already provides manifold constructs [12],
and the BPMN support of the selected WfMS.
The results of this paper call for future research in several areas: First, since the 
creation time for a new protocol can be time-consuming, it would be useful to 
determine recurring negotiation workflow patterns, which are offered in the graphical 
modelling tool and may ease the process of protocol creation. Second, as the protocol 
is dependent on the problem and the negotiation context [3], a guide suggesting 
appropriate protocols should be developed. At last, the offered transparency by 
retrieving the current state of the negotiation requires further investigation regarding 
its usefulness and impact on the negotiation process and performance. 
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Abstract. Teaching negotiation skills poses a twofold challenge to lecturers: 
Firstly, negotiation is inherently practical and thus requires teaching other than 
solely traditional lectures. Secondly, the way we negotiate is individual and 
thus teaching it to students should be done in a way that supports their 
individual learning and negotiation styles. In this paper, we discuss a novel and 
interactive course concept teaching negotiation skills at the University of 
Hohenheim from a students’ perspective. Based on an assessment of our own 
learning styles, we evaluate how the course’s unique structure and methodology 
caters to the students’ individual predispositions and helps them to achieve their
learning goals effectively and efficiently. 
Keywords: Negotiation Management, Learning Style, Negotiation Teaching
1   Introduction
Every one of us faces at one time or other the distinct feeling of opposition, the 
challenge of another person’s differing opinion on a matter we deeply care for, and 
the pressing urge to achieve a particular goal despite such obstacles. We may then 
choose to flee, to fight – or to negotiate, i.e. to find a constructive way to come to an 
agreement where other means might prove futile or in the worst case even destructive. 
Thinking about our social interactions, we may find that negotiations are not an 
abstract concept from the realm of theoretical sciences – they are rather an inherently 
practical aspect of our everyday life.
So why take a course in negotiation management? Why not simply read a book or 
learn it on the job? Because a good negotiator combines two sets of skills: The 
knowledge about the basic concepts and dynamics involved in successful negotiation, 
as well as the self-awareness, social skills and practical training to put them into 
action. A combination of both enables to judge conflicts correctly and act confidently. 
For this reason, the Chair for Information Systems I at the University of Hohenheim 
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has developed a novel, interactive teaching approach which enables their students not 
only to study, but also to experience the benefits and challenges of negotiation [4].
The course in Advanced Negotiation Management (ANM) features a mix of 
interactive teaching methods selected to equally address students with different 
learning styles. This is achieved by a combination of solitary and group work tasks 
during phases of preparation, application and reflection. In short: by knowing, doing 
and understanding.
The aim of our paper is to assess the innovative form of teaching from the 
viewpoint of students, answering the question whether this type of teaching achieves 
its main goal, namely teaching the students how to negotiate in an effective manner. 
The authors thus assess their learning journey w.r.t. the above question by writing this 
paper in an essay style. In the following section we will assess our own learning styles 
based on Honey and Mumford’s Learning Styles Questionnaire (LSQ) [2]. This will 
serve as the background against which we evaluate our experience with and the 
perceived usefulness and benefits of the course concept as well as of selected teaching 
methods in section 3. Finally, we conclude the paper in section 4.
2 Learning Styles
We start by giving a short introduction to the idea behind the concept of learning 
styles in general and the LSQ in particular. Based on the LSQ, the authors’ individual 
learning style is described in more detail.
2.1 The idea of different learning styles
Learning is crucial to our success at university and in the workplace. In fact, 
learning is the most important capability we have, since it is the gateway to every 
other desired capability [3]. Interestingly, teachers as well as researchers find that the 
speed, manner and confidence of picking up, processing and using new information 
and ideas vary greatly between individuals. For this reason, research during the past 
decades has put much effort into the investigation of learning styles and has 
developed several approaches to describe individual learning behaviour [1]. One of 
these approaches is the Honey and Mumford’s Learning Styles Questionnaire (LSQ)
[2], which was applied by the lecturers in the beginning of the ANM course to 
determine the students’ individual learning styles.
2.2 Honey and Mumford’s Learning Styles Questionnaire
The LSQ offers practical help to understand one’s dominant learning style(s), to 
enhance one’s strengths, and to improve on still weakly developed learning styles.
Referring to the four stages in Kolb’s learning cycle, Honey und Mumford [2]
differentiate between an Activist, Reflector, Theorist, and Pragmatist style. 
Activists are flexible and open minded, thus happy and optimistic when they are 
exposed to new situations. They learn best from new experiences and challenges, 
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competitive teamwork, leading discussions or giving presentations. On the other hand, 
they find it hard to learn by performing solitary, passive or overly repetitive tasks like 
reading, writing and simply observing.
In contrast, Reflectors are thoughtful, thorough and methodical. They are good 
listeners and observers, and they assimilate information quickly, which is why they 
rarely jump to conclusions. Therefore, Reflectors learn best if they are allowed to do 
detailed research and take their time to think things through before acting or 
commenting.
Theorists are logical thinkers and have a very low tolerance for uncertainty, 
ambiguity, or even contradiction. They long for clear structures and purpose, which 
explains their particular fondness of formal models and theories. Theorists are experts 
in spotting and exploring the underlying concepts and interrelationships behind a 
subject.
In contrast to Theorists, Pragmatists think in a practical and realistic way and tend 
to judge any piece of knowledge by its perceived applicability and usefulness.
Pragmatists learn best if they can test their knowledge in practice. They appreciate
coaching and feedback from experts, but they struggle if guidelines are unclear or if 
they cannot observe the benefit of what they are learning [2].
2.3 Our own learning style
The authors themselves determined their learning styles in the beginning of the 
course. Since we found our individual dominant styles to be mostly identical, we will 
treat them as the authors’ learnings style prototype in this paper. It can be best 
described as a strong mixture of the Theorist and Reflector with few Pragmatist 
elements. Interestingly, we spend more time theorising and reflecting in the beginning 
of the semester, whereas we experience a stronger tendency towards pragmatic 
learning once the exams move closer. Like typical Theorists, we start the learning 
process by making ourselves acquainted with the general concepts and the structure of
the learning content. We tend to construct a mental logical framework of the concepts 
involved and link them to others we have learned before. This approach allows us to 
draw conclusions concerning similar problems. Moreover, the use of such a
generalised framework can facilitate the process of memorising the material, since its
logical corner marks can serve as cognitive cues with which deeper, more detailed 
layers of knowledge can be simply associated. In this stage of the learning process, 
we experience that our performance can be best enhanced by teaching techniques 
which offer a clear representation of the logics behind a concept and the 
interrelationship between its parts.
We then try to apply the gained knowledge by doing exercises. This serves as a 
checkpoint at which we can assess whether we really understood all of the material 
and can reproduce and apply its key aspects. In general, the further the course 
progresses, the more pragmatically we proceed. We observe a shift of focus from very 
time-consuming, purely intellectual investigations towards a more pragmatic 
approach, dedicated to the material’s applicability in real life and, not to forget, in the 
upcoming examination.
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We feel that the concept and methodology of a lecture play an essential role in our 
learning process: The better a teaching concept is tailored to meet the requirements of 
our learning styles, the easier and more sustainable our learning process becomes. 
Chapter 3 discusses our personal experience with some selected concepts and 
methods explicitly chosen by the lecturers to enhance our learning experience based 
on our individual predispositions.
3. An Interactive Concept of Teaching Negotiation Management
– Fit between course structure and our learning styles
The ANM course is offered for around 130 Master students of Management, and 
Information Systems and has been completely revised from a traditional lecture 
course with a case study to a flipped classroom [4]. The course consists of three 
alternating phases, namely a preparation phase, a presence phase (the actual lecture) 
and a reflection phase. Every stage features different teaching methods and activities 
for the students to participate in. This section discusses some of the most prominent 
methods and their perception from the viewpoint of students as those learning to 
negotiate. The preparation phase is supported by an e-learning tool, whereas the 
presence phase offers a mixture of the traditional lecture and several group tasks such
as discussions, role plays, or the fishbowl. The reflection phase consists of a learning
journal written by the students.
E-learning. To facilitate e-Learning, the University of Hohenheim uses the Learning 
Management System ILIAS. Besides getting access to the lecture slides, we used
ILIAS to perform the mandatory preparation tasks and to create our learning journal 
during the ANM course. Each preparation unit consisted of different tasks such as
reading summaries of the upcoming lecture’s topics or answering research questions 
after reading scientific papers or watching videos. At the beginning of the course, it 
was recommended to perform the E-learning tasks as group activities. However, all 
three of us did not join a group.
When it comes to acquisition of knowledge, group learning activities and relying on 
others may seem difficult for Theorists due to their low tolerance for uncertainty [2]. 
We find it hard to trust other group members whose personality traits and way of 
learning and thinking we do not know. We also have difficulties appraising the other 
person’s motivation and diligence. This makes it impossible to assess the 
completeness and correctness of the knowledge gathered and conveyed to us by other 
group members. In previous courses we experienced that we remember information 
better if we gather it on our own, since we know best how we prefer the learning 
material to be served. Online exercises and quizzes helped us to test and reflect on our 
newly acquired knowledge. From our perspective as Theorists and Reflectors, e-
learning was a helpful tool because it allowed us to do thorough research and 
accumulate knowledge in our own pace and without time pressure. This had 
facilitated the formation of a coherent initial framework of each topic, against which 
the Theorist then evaluated further knowledge acquired in the subsequent phases.
Since the learning tasks could also be performed in groups, not only Theorists and 
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Reflectors but also Activists benefited from this form of learning. E-learning offered 
us the flexibility to learn theoretical issues where and when we wanted to. However, 
this freedom required a certain degree of discipline which not all students had. In 
every lecture we observed students who were not prepared. As a result they struggled 
in following the lecture because theoretical knowledge was a prerequisite. 
Thus, forced to constant preparation, we soon realised its positive effects and even
continued the habit of preparing (e.g. repetition of presented learning contents) in 
other lectures. 
Group tasks. Whereas in the preparation group activities were voluntary, they played 
a more important role in the presence phase. Since the presence phase focused more 
on the actual application of the knowledge, the lectures included group tasks, i.e. 
discussions, role plays and the fishbowl. For performing role plays, the students 
usually were supposed to form groups of two to four people and each person chose a 
role. Then the lecturer revealed the task and gave us a few minutes to prepare 
ourselves before we started the role play. Whereas in the role play every student 
participated actively, for the fishbowl the lecturer picked some students to perform a 
task in front of the course. Afterwards, the students in the audience were asked to tell 
their opinion and to discuss what they had observed. For example, one of the tasks 
consisted of negotiating a case with secretly predefined negotiation styles. After every 
negotiation the audience had to guess the respective negotiation style and had to 
explain their decision.
In discussions we tended to be reflectors and so we felt most comfortable being 
quiet observers at the beginning, listening to all the opinions of the other participants. 
This perspective allowed us to collect information and thereby we contextualized the 
different perspectives and got a broad picture of the subject. Furthermore, this 
perspective supported us to evaluate whether our knowledge seemed to fit into the 
context or whether we might have to adjust our knowledge. In addition, this raised our 
awareness for aspects otherwise overlooked. By evaluating we had weighted and 
tested the arguments against our own state of knowledge and jumped in with critical 
questions or statements once we had found a discrepancy between our own 
knowledge framework and the point of the argument or lecture. Hence showing that
we rather contributed to a discussion in a reflective way by carefully listening and 
revealing discrepancies. When we felt that we had collected enough information and 
considered sufficient perspectives, we started adding our own ideas. When it came to 
conclusions we were careful and preferred working towards an appropriate solution 
without time pressure.
In fact, negotiations are inherently practical processes and therefore should be 
experienced to understand their underlying concepts and dynamics. Through 
participating actively in the role plays we were able to deploy theoretically learnt 
concepts in practice and try out different strategies and tactics within a protected 
environment and without fearing any consequences. Some role plays not only focused 
on the actual negotiation process but targeted also other intercorrelations, e.g. the 
impact of cultural differences. So the active participation allowed us also to identify 
issues which we hadn’t thought of before and take those into further considerations 
when thinking about negotiating. Moreover, we identified weaknesses and strengths 
of ourselves. In contrast to the pure role play, the fishbowl allowed every student to 
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observe the same situation and therefore have a common experience. As people might 
perceive situations differently and focus on different issues, talking about this 
common experience allowed the students to get an insight into other viewpoints. 
Comparing other viewpoints and opinions with one’s own thoughts and knowledge 
contributed to reveal discrepancies and incorporate different perspectives to get a 
more holistic view of the whole subject. The activists and pragmatists were able to 
observe how the learnt concepts can actually be applied in practical examples or even 
try it out on their own. The reflectors, however were able to get an insight into 
different viewpoints and evaluate those insights against the own knowledge and 
understandings.
Summing up, in the presence phase we deepened our knowledge and transformed it
from a factual knowledge to a real understanding achieved by doing. The fact that we 
could link the learnt knowledge to an experience helped to better remember this 
knowledge. This was quite motivational and stimulated the interest for the subject 
matter also among those who hadn’t paid attention before. Since we had prepared the 
subject matter earlier in the preparation phase, this phase did not only meet the 
learning styles of the pragmatists and activists, but also our learning styles. Although 
group tasks typically suit Activists better, in this stage of the learning process we had 
no difficulty collaborating actively with other students to fulfil the tasks because we 
had already extracted the main aspects of the material and established a coherent 
mental framework to build on. This highlights that theorists and reflectors do not 
hesitate group work principally but rather benefit from them if they have the chance 
to prepare themselves before. 
In the past group activities were our least preference due to the above mentioned 
aspects. This course sharpened our awareness of surrounding circumstances (e.g. time 
for preparation) that also matter. The positive experiences within the course have 
made us more open for other learning approaches. Regarding our negotiation skills, 
we have recognized that the learning contents, with which we dealt during the role 
plays, are still (several months after passing the course) embedded in our minds and 
we remember them unconsciously in the right situations. For example, we have a 
higher cultural awareness when communicating with other people. We also observed 
that we prepare more properly for any kind of negotiation and negotiate more 
confident because of the practice gained through the role plays. Therefore we perceive 
the role play as the most effective form because of its sustainable impact. 
Nevertheless all forms helped us to achieve our learning goals. 
Learning Journals. The predominant activity which was supposed to support the 
reflection was the writing of journal entries which were mandatory and graded by the 
lectures who reviewed our journals. We were given tasks which we should answer 
with a predefined amount of words which had to be met at least. The task concerned 
the issues learnt in the lecture and in the preparation phase. So, for example, we had 
to evaluate whether our identified predominant learning style fitted our actual learning 
behaviour and had to link our learning style to our conflict style. 
Being able to write a coherent text requires an understanding of the interrelations 
between the different topics treated in the text. The fact that the minimum number of 
words was rather high which ensured that it wasn’t enough to just address the topic 
Group Decision and Negotiation – GDN 2017 457
14-18 August 2017, Stuttgart-Hohenheim, Germany
superficially, but one had to deal with the topic intensively. Thus, we were forced to 
make an honest, substantial reflection of the learnt topics instead of just a simple 
repetition. This helped us to make sure that we had understood the different topics 
treated in the lecture and in the preparation phase thoroughly and that we could bring 
them into a meaningful context. In case there were misunderstandings or 
discrepancies the lecturers commented on those, which further contributed to the 
disclosure of misunderstandings and the clarification of such. The fact that the sum of 
the journal grades made up 50 percent of our final grade ensured that every student 
(who wanted to pass the course) participated in the journal writing. This supported the 
review of the learning content in a timely manner. Thus, also learning types which 
usually don’t follow up the lecture in a timely manner were animated to do so.
Writing the journal entries was rather time-consuming but at the same time 
supported us to not only repeat the course content in a quick recapitulation but in a 
substantial reflection. This paid out when learning for the exam. Through 
continuously examining the course content the effort for learning for the exam at the 
end of the semester was reduced. 
Negotiation Simulation. An activity which combined the application and the 
reflection of the subject matter was the negotiation simulation. Before the actual 
simulation phase started every student had to attend a mandatory briefing, in which 
we got acquainted with the Negotiation Support System Negoisst [5] that was used to 
conduct the simulation. The simulation consisted of three phases, namely the 
preparation, the actual simulation and the postprocessing. First, every student received 
an e-mail containing the case study for the Negotiation Simulation. It gave 
information about the case itself, the counterpart and the own role including 
preferences and interests. The students were required not to pass any of this
information of the case study.  Furthermore, the case study revealed who had to start 
the negotiation and determined the deadline until the negotiation had to be concluded, 
either by an acceptance or a rejection. We got three days to prepare for the role and 
the negotiation. It followed the simulation itself, in which we negotiated with our 
counterpart via asynchronous messages. Finally, we used the postprocessing phase to 
write a journal entry about the negotiation simulation and the preparation.
The simulation was the broadest activity as it required both theoretical knowledge 
as well as the application of such. The preparation enabled us to go through the 
theoretical background again and apply first concepts regarding the negotiation 
preparation. This offered us the opportunity to experiment with different strategies 
and tactics. In addition, the simulation allowed us to perceive the mutual correlations 
of the participants’ attitudes, emotions and interests and thus learning by doing. The 
fact that the messages were exchanged in an asynchronous way allowed us to act 
reflected and evaluate different possibilities before actually acting. The writing of the 
journal entry facilitated a careful reflection of one’s own behaviour, recognition of 
one’s own weaknesses and strengths and areas of improvability. Moreover, it helped 
us to interlink the theoretical concepts learnt in the lecture with practical experiences 
and therefore contributed to the coherency of our “inner” framework. The reflection 
of the process was supported by the possibility of reviewing the exchanged messages 
saved on Negoisst at any time.
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4. Conclusion
Both students by the end of the semester and the authors by the end of this paper
must answer for themselves the same question: Does this type of teaching achieve its 
main goal, namely teaching the students how to negotiate in an effective manner? In 
comparison to any conventional lecture it should be clarified at this point, however 
not surprising, that the course demands a much higher amount of time and effort by 
the students. This serves as an additional hurdle which the benefits of the course must 
stand up to. We have experienced these benefits of the course’s interactive design in a 
twofold way: Firstly, we are strongly convinced that we have learned to negotiate in a 
more effective, specifically in a more comprehensive manner than we might have in a 
traditional front lecture. The phase structure, leading us from a theoretical 
preparation, over to phases of discussion and reflection, and finally towards our first 
own endeavours into practical application catered to the needs of all the learning 
styles and pushed us far beyond learning the facts by heart. It allowed us to fully 
fathom, probe and evaluate for ourselves all aspects of negotiation. From a students’ 
perspective, we appreciate this as an important and long overdue step in the German 
university system towards a more hands-on style of education in certain fields of 
study. The way we see it, negotiation undoubtedly qualifies for such an approach. 
Secondly, we feel that we have learned a lot about ourselves as well as about our 
beliefs and behaviours in similar situations. Beginning with an evaluation and 
understanding of our own learning and conflict styles, every opportunity of 
interaction during the course, each discussion, role play, or reflection has posed on us 
an opportunity to challenge our own positions, opinions and behaviours.
To come to a conclusion, we must acknowledge that not all of the students may 
have appreciated the results before the background of the high amount of time and 
effort necessary to achieve them. This is especially the case for those with only 
limited interest in the subject, but for whom the course was a mandatory part of their 
programme. For all the others, i.e. those seeking the challenge and eager to learn and 
develop themselves actively, the course offers an ideal platform to explore 
negotiations from all perspectives as well as various opportunities for personal and 
professional growth.
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Abstract. The international conference of GDN covers various highly 
interesting research streams. Within the framework of this paper, a research 
map is prepared which provides a first overview of the topics submitted at the 
conferences 2012 to 2015. The research map shows the density of the topics 
and the respective thematic links between them. To be able to determine the 
topics from the submitted articles, a GDN-specific categorisation scheme was 
iteratively developed. Furthermore, a subsequent coding process of 250 articles 
was conducted which enabled the quantifiability of textual data.
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1   Introduction
The international conference on Group Decision and Negotiation (GDN) is one of the 
most important and largest international conferences within the research areas of 
decision-making and negotiation. So far, 16 conferences have taken place including 
countries such as United States, Poland, France and Sweden. The GDN conference 
provides an important melting pot for the acquisition and exchange of knowledge for 
future scientists and doctoral students from the fields of business administration, 
psychology, management of information systems, computer science, mathematics and 
many other areas. As incoming PhD students and science-oriented information 
systems students course the University of Hohenheim, we have recognized that
considerable effort is necessary to gain an overview of the existing research areas 
within the GDN. Furthermore, there is no conference introduction for young 
researchers, which allows a thematic research overview.
Leaving the egocentric perspective and to facilitate the entry for all GDN-
interested young researchers, we decided to conduct literature review of the GDN 
proceedings. Literature reviews are implemented to create the essential basis of a 
research project. They intend to reflect the current state, to provide a guide for future 
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research, to facilitate the theory development for the researchers and to close the areas 
where a research gap exists (Webster & Watson 2002).
The main goal of this research project is to design a research map. In particular, we 
tried to examine which topics predominate the GDN conferences (RQ1), how these 
topics are connected (RQ2), and how the temporal distribution of research areas is 
designed (RQ3). These links can be used by researchers of a specific area to identify 
relationships between own and adjoining research areas. 
In summary, the readers from the GDN research map will be able to see which 
areas dominate the GDN, which topics are addressed less, and how the topic-specific 
linking of these topics is interrelated. As a database, 250 GDN articles from 2012 to 
2015 were used for the evaluation of literature. Thus, this research is an initial outlook 
for the GDN research spectrum and not a final result. This research is still in progress 
and hence it intends to deliver preliminary results and collect feedback which can be 
incorporated in this early stage.
2   Methodology
There is no standardised way to conduct a literature review as there is for empirical 
work. Consequently, modern literature provides various indications how a literature 
review can be conducted (Toracco 2005). Vom Brocke et. al (2009) introduced a 
renowned framework for conducting an IS literature review (cf. figure 1).
We defined our review scope specifically for current GDN participants as well as 
for future ones. The second phase, conceptualisation of topic, can be disregarded as 
there is no need for providing working definitions or the like (Zorn & Campbell 
2006). In a next step, literature search was realised. As mentioned in the introduction, 
our literature consists of GDN conferences between 2012 and 2015.
Figure 1: Framework for IS literature review (Vom Brocke et al. 2009, p.8)
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After defining the review scope and considering the relevant articles through the 
literature research, a literature analysis was conducted with the application of certain
methods (cf. figure 1). In order to be able to analyse the qualitative data from the 
articles quantitatively through the use of descriptive statistics, the data had to be 
systematically processed according to a certain scheme (Kelle & Kluge 2010).
Within the framework of this research work two main steps are defined with regard to 
the methodology: (1) The consideration of an existing categorisation scheme or the 
development of a new categorising scheme by applying the open coding process and 
(2) the implementation of the active coding process, which takes place within the 
framework of the hypothetical conclusion.
When integrating an already completed categorisation scheme, we have the 
advantage of avoiding the data overload. The risk in data overload is that imprecise 
coding classes will be overloaded, while other classes are rarely used (Miles & 
Huberman 1984). In the research area of GDN such literature search has not yet been 
carried out so that there is no pre-formulated categorization scheme. Therefore, the 
second approach of open coding was chosen, in which a pre-formulated categorisation 
scheme is kept off. In open coding (Glaser & Strauss 1967), a thematic categorisation 
scheme is developed adaptively over several iteration steps. This ensures that 
unsuitable concepts are avoided and that a schema matching of respective research 
area is obtained.
For the creation of the categorisation scheme, two young researchers were taken 
into account in order to minimize the subjectivity of the development of the 
categorisation scheme. In order to be able to cover the subject areas for the beginning 
in a rough frame, both coders have passed through the four GDN proceedings with 
samples and have defined first classes via joint discussions. Subsequently, both coders 
have coded a test-proceeding data set over the years 2012 to 2015 and have assigned 
the articles to the appropriate classes according to Reichertz (1991). The test data set 
formed 20% of the total data. In a next step the coding results of the test data set were 
compared and discussed. In the case of deviations, the affected classes were refined 
and merged. Furthermore, new classes were added through qualitative induction if the 
article could not be assigned to any of the classes (Peirce 1991). After the adaptation 
of the scheme, new test data were generated and the adapted classification scheme 
was tested again. Within the framework of our work, three iterations were required for 
the creation of the GDN categorisation scheme until the finalised state was reached. 
In total, 37 categories have been formed in the finalised state. For instance, 
categories such as environmental management, software agents, game theory, 
multicriteria decision making, and negotiation support systems were determined.
A class is a research stream, which is gradually assigned to the articles in the 
following coding process of step (2). The assignment takes place with taking into 
account of certain criteria, which will be explained in the following sections.
The second implementation step of the higher-level methodology is the active 
coding process that takes place within the framework of the hypothetical conclusion. 
The hypothetical conclusion represents a conclusion or an assignment of classes based 
on known rules for the respective case (Reichertz 2003). Each of the GDN articles is 
assigned to at least one or more classes of categories created in step (1). The reason 
for multiple assignments is the fact that the most scientific work cannot be assigned to 
any research flow unambiguously. Many of them, just in the GDN, cover several 
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research areas and serve as bridges of interdisciplinary subject areas. The criteria for 
the coding assignment are the title, the abstract and the related keywords of the 
respective article. On the basis of these three decision-making criteria, an assignment 
is implemented.
The entire coding process works as follows: Initially, both coders take the finalised 
categorisation scheme from step (1) into account. Subsequently, the coding is 
performed parallel and independently of one another. This time the coding is done 
over all articles of the four proceedings (in total 250 articles). After completing the 
coding process, the two coding files are compared and unified in the following step. 
Here, the assigned classes of the both coding files are matched by means of a 
comparison function. 
For articles with no match the two coders have to discuss the differences, so that in 
the end one of the two versions is agreed. This finalised version is used as qualitative 
database to generate analytical insights of the GDN research environment.
3   Results
In this chapter, we present our results based on the IS literature framework described 
in chapter 2. At first we will look at the predominating topics of the GDN conferences 
between 2012 and 2015, followed by the temporal distribution of the research areas. 
In the end, strongly connected research areas will be pointed out.  
3.1   Predominating topics (RQ1)
In total, 250 different papers of the GDN conferences were taken into account, coded 
and analysed. Figure 2 illustrates the 20 out of 37 most used topics of the submitted 
papers during the GDN conferences 2012-2015:
The bigger circles are shaped, the more frequently respective topics were discussed in 
the proceedings. The thicker connected, the more respective topics were associated to 
the same article. So, lines connecting two topics demonstrates the quantity of papers 
that were assigned to both topics and the description of the respective lines indicate to 
the quantity of topics assigned to the same papers.
Figure 1 does not contain every connection due to a better readableness. 
Group decision making (41), conflict resolution (36), multicriteria decision making 
(35), preferences (34), followed by graph models (27) are the top 5 fields of research 
identified by the coders. Lowest 5 identified research domains are social media (5), 
negotiation models (4), group discussions (4), mediation (3), and communication 
support system (2).
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Figure 2: Network of the top 20 most used topics
3.2   Strongly connected research areas (RQ2) 
Figure 2 includes every connection with (n > 4) and some less in order to show as 
many connections as possible while keeping it neatly arranged. The network shows a 
strong threesome connection between conflict resolution and graph models (n=21), 
graph models and preferences (n=9), and preferences with conflict resolution (n=8). 
Furthermore, environmental management is heavily linked with conflict resolution
(n=8) and with graph models (n=8). Another noticeable relation is between 
multicriteria decision making and group decision making (n=12).
3.3   Temporal distribution of research areas (RQ3)
Figure 3 outlines the temporal distribution of noticeable topics within our defined 
scope. X-axis illustrates chosen categories related to 2012 - 2015 while y-axis 
represents the relative value of publications in respect of the categories. Collaboration 
falls continuously while conflict resolution peaks in 2014. Hereafter, it levels off. The 
most coded category, group decision making, reaches in 2014 its minimum point with 
4 papers focusing respective research area. Multicriteria decision making starts with a 
high value in 2012 but then it becomes gradually inessential for the GDN 
conferences.
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Figure 3: Temporal distribution of research areas
4   Discussion
In our literature review, we focused on the most addressed research topics in the 
context of GDN conferences between 2012 and 2015. For this, we used a mixed-
method approach which includes a qualitative-quantitative literature review. By 
analysing the collected data, we tried to examine which topics predominate the GDN 
conferences (RQ1), how these topics are connected (RQ2), and how the temporal 
distribution of research area is designed (RQ3). Hence, in this section we will discuss 
each research question in a structured way, followed by limitations on our finding.
With respect to RQ1, group decision making, conflict resolution, multicriteria 
decision making are the most predominating research areas. These accords with the 
“group decision” part of the conference title. On the other hand, the submission of 
research concerning group decision making and negotiation via social media (n=5) is 
surprisingly low. This might be rooted in the fact that there are conferences with a 
stronger focus on social media. Accordingly, authors submit their research to these 
conferences.
Regarding RQ2, figure 2 shows research areas which have only one or two 
connections to another one, e.g. GDSS and methods. One reason is due to the fact to 
keep the network neatly arranged, we mainly illustrated connections with n > 4. 
Another reason could be the scope of applications as, for example, new research 
methods can be used in many different research areas and, therefore, the distribution 
is at a very high level leaving only links with n < 4.
In RQ3, we focused on the temporal distribution of research areas. Altogether, figure 
3 shows a decrease of respective research areas except for conflict resolution. By 
considering the volume of each conference taken into account, 2014 has the 
lowermost number of articles between 2012 and 2015. All the more it is interesting to 
see that conflict resolution peaks in 2014 whereas other research areas decrease. An 
explanation is yet to be found. 
There are specific conditions which limit the generalisability of our results. Firstly, 
our coding process required the title, abstract and keywords, not the content itself. 
Consequently, the coders did not have a full insight of the article when coding. 
Secondly, no GDN conference organiser demanded to choose keywords out of a 
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standardised keyword-list which would have improved the comparability of all 
proceeding articles. Additionally, the proceedings also included articles without any 
keywords. As a result, one of the coding criteria could not be applied. Lastly, you 
need to consider all proceedings to make valid as well as sound arguments but like we 
said above, it is a research in progress.
5   Conclusion
This literature review reports on the predominating research areas of the GDN 
conferences, how they are linked as well as their temporal distribution. Although, 
being a research in progress, we can already conclude that group decision making, 
conflict resolution as well as multicriteria decision making play a bigger role than 
mediations and communication support systems. Furthermore, we can say that there is 
a multiple dependency between conflict resolution, graph models, preferences and 
environmental management.
In its completed form, our research can give all conference participants detailed 
insight of GDN history. For example, we could outline which nations contribute most 
articles and their focus of research. We also could reveal fields which have been 
researched a lot and at the same time showing fields of research which have been 
neglected identifying research gaps. 
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